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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
By using a longitudinal dataset of over 200 privatised industrial companies, covering the 
period 1995-1998, data analysis was carried out to explore two main issues: which factors 
determine export activity; and which firm characteristics determine the presence of a foreign 
partner in a host firm?
The determinants of export intensity and propensity were examined by a wide variety of 
techniques. The key results are interesting for policy makers and export promotion agencies 
alike. It was found that large firms undergoing industrial decline are more likely to be 
exporters and have higher export intensities, reflecting a “push effect” into foreign markets, 
as a result of the decline in domestic sales. In addition to general firm characteristics, a 
number of hypotheses were tested concerning the relationship between ownership, board 
structure and exporting activity. Results showed that foreign ownership, institutional 
ownership, outsider control and presence of a group of dominant owners positively influence 
export activity. As for board structure, it was found that this has a weak effect on export 
activity.
This provides four conclusions: foreign owners are foreign market sourcing i.e. seeking new 
markets to act as an export platform (Caves, 1996); institutional investors are active or 
“pressure resistant” investors and act in a manner to further firm performance, as 
hypothesised by Kochar and Parthiban.(1996), this also confirms the efficient monitoring 
hypothesis of Pound (1988); a group of dominant owners may solve agency problems within 
an environment with a weak legal environment, as suggested by La Porta et al. (1999), and 
attempt to boost firm performance via exporting activity; finally outsiders need control in 
terms of both voting shares and seats on boards to influence export activity.
Secondly, the extent of actual partner presence was explored by using non parametric tests. 
Following this, logistic regression was employed to estimate the likelihood of a firm having a 
foreign partner or not. This analysis assumes a novel approach by treating the perceptions of 
the host and entering firm as a determinant of firm foreign partner presence, and includes 
firm characteristics such as ownership structure, firm size and investment.
The principal findings show that the likelihood of having a foreign partner increases in firms 
requiring investment, which export and are not large, but decreases when managers are 
focused upon domestic strategies and foreign partners are seeking alliances in order to gain 
access to local technology.
Lastly, it was found that financial performance and indicators of industrial restructuring 
determine whether a firm retains a foreign partner.
The general contribution of my thesis to extant research is to explore two of the main 
elements of the internationalisation process in a unique institutional environment. Results have 
shown that most relevant theories in the Western literature apply to the transition 
environment, for example, foreign ownership positively affects exporting. Furthermore, 
existing internationalisation research has not explored the link between organisational culture, 
ownership and strategic goals. Lastly, when examining the determinants of foreign partner 
presence the view of the local partner is included, whilst previous research has 
concentrated upon the developing country’s partner.
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9Ch a p t e r  o n e: in st itu t io n a l  b a c k g r o u n d - t h e  t r a n sit io n  p r o c e ss  in  t h e  
fo r m e r  S o viet  Un io n
1.1 In t r o d u c t io n
The principal aim of this dissertation is to investigate the determinants of internationalisation 
in privatised firms in three countries of the former Soviet Union (fSU), Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus.
This chapter will seek to provide an account of economic developments in these three 
countries during the 1990’s and discuss some of the major elements of transition to a market 
economy1. In addition, a rationale shall be provided for studying this topic along with a brief 
research outline of the dissertation.
E c o n o m ic  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  b a c k g r o u n d :  t h e  m a c r o e c o n o m ic  e n v ir o n m e n t  
DURING THE EARLY 19 9 0 ’S
“The economic system of Russia has undergone such rapid changes that it is impossible to 
obtain a precise and accurate account of it... Almost everything one can say about the 
country is true and false at the same time.”
J. M Keynes (1925)
Although written over 75 years ago this comment still rings true for a country that has 
endured only one constant in the last 10 years: change. The years 1991-2 witnessed the 
sudden disintegration of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) which was accompanied by a 
drastic fall in output that was larger than that which occurred during the Great Depression.2
1 The focus here shall be on the period up to 1997, as the dependent variables are measured before this 
time.
2 J. Rostowski, “Comparing two Great Depressions: 1929-33 to 1989-93”, in Lessons from the Economic 
Transition in CEE in the 1990’s, ed. S. Zecchini. Dordrecht, Nlds: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.
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During the period of 1991-3 the decline in GDP in Russia was 29.9%, greater than that 
experienced by Canada and the US in 1929-33.
This dissolution of the Soviet Union during 1989-1991 provided Russia with the impetus to 
implement radical reform3. The end of 1991 witnessed the Gaidar government planning to 
introduce reforms and a stabilisation programme, in essence a “big bang” was to be applied 
to the Russian economy. In general, the aim of the programme was to restore internal and 
external stability, but the effect was to create a recession which would atrophy in 1-2 years, 
setting the scene for structural reform.
The components of the initial reform package can be classified as price liberalisation, the 
securing of a balanced government budget, enforcing tight monetary policy and liberalising 
foreign trade.
The issue of the sequencing of these reforms and the shock therapy versus gradualism 
polemic has been the subject of many debates4. The general consensus is that there can be 
no optimal formula to export to other transition economies, with regards to the sequencing of 
reforms, yet it is recognised that structural reforms need a more gradualist approach, to 
allow for market institutions to be created (Lavigne, 1999).
The price liberalisation of 1992 did create a big bang: by the end of January 1992, following 
the first month of price reform, consumer price levels had increased by 280% (see Koen & 
Phillips, 1993). De Melo and Gelb (1997) termed price liberalisation an “engine of growth”, 
creating opportunities for previously restrained activities, and constraining those that had 
been previously too prolific in the economy. The IMF had estimated a 50% price jump to 
eliminate monetary overhang (a situation where the government injects more money in tot he 
economy than households can spend given the available supply of goods and fixed prices), 
yet this figure was grossly underestimated. Reasons for this underestimation lie with the fact 
that the extent of monetary overhang accumulating since the 1960’s had been undervalued, 
as well as failure to thoroughly analyse the Polish case of 1990. In Poland, by 1989 
monetary overhang had been partly eliminated, thus the price jump could afford to be much 
less extreme.
3 See Gros and Steinherr (1995), Lavigne (1999) and Vasiliev (1999) for an overview of stabilisation and 
economic liberalisation.
4 See Sachs and Lipton (1991) and McKinnon (1991) (particularly for trade liberalisation).
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Repercussions of this violent price increase were threefold. Firstly, the adverse impact on 
society manifested itself as a decline in real wages and continuous shortages, which led the 
government to delay further reform for fear of a decline in popular support. Secondly the 
supply response to the price increase was slow, causing persistent shortages, so that the 
government had to re-impose price controls on staple commodities. Lastly the government 
failed to increase energy prices to that of the world market level, dampening the effects of 
foreign trade liberalisation.
In the long run price liberalisation had a tremendous impact, but alone it was insufficient to 
create a fully fledged market economy. The negative consequences of price liberalisation 
have been blamed for delaying subsequent reform, yet it could be argued that in 1992-3 the 
economy still lacked the required market institutions and legal instruments to advance further 
on the transition path.
As for external liberalisation, imports were almost entirely liberalised by January 1992 with 
quantitative restrictions being removed and a single tariff of 5% being applied. Although 
trade barriers had been dissembled a worrying distortion remained: ministries and other 
organisations were still allocated hard currency for imports and still not held accountable for 
their inefficient usage. In addition budgetary subsidies to state trading organisations for 
imports were not phased out until 1993, which Sachs (1994b)5 estimates at a cost of 10% 
of GDP.
Export restrictions on energy and raw materials have posed a larger problem, representing a 
huge loss of potential revenue for the state, as the government feared that large industrial 
enterprises would revolt or face bankruptcy if they had to pay world prices for such inputs. 
Table one shows the extent of the price differential for selected raw materials.
Table 1: Domestic prices as a percentage of world prices, 1993.
12/92 5/93 9/93
Crude oil 28 21 28
Heating oil 36 23 50
Diesel 34 28 55
Petrol 40 26 58
Aluminium 45 47 65
Russian Economic Trends, 1993, Table 22.
5J. Sachs, Russia’s struggle with stabilisation: conceptual issues and evidence, Papers for Annual bank 
Conference on Development Economics, Washington DC, 1994.3
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Additionally, the difference between the domestic and world price provided an opportunity 
for workers in the energy sector and corrupt civil servants to transport vast quantities of oil 
and other raw materials to other republics and re-export for a huge profit.
Although a serious attempt was made to divert trade away from Socialist economies 
towards market based trade with the Western world, this trend had already began in 1986. 
During this period the share of CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) trade fell 
by a half to 20%, yet that of the market economies had doubled, thus trade reorientation 
had started previous to the events of 1991.
A greater deal of success was enjoyed in the sphere of convertibility. In July 1992 full 
current account convertibility was permitted, exchange rates were unified and foreign 
exchange auctions were inaugurated for those wanting to make an import order. 
Unfortunately the dramatic consumer price increase in 1992 was not a once and for all 
ascent, only in 1994 did monthly average inflation begin to fall below 20%.
1.2. W h a t  w e r e  t h e  c a uses  o f  R u s s ia ’s  d e s t a b il is a t io n ?
It appears that a large fiscal deficit was not at the root of Russia’s destabilisation, as the 
official estimate for fiscal deficit was relatively low compared to other transition economies 
at 4.8% of GDP in 1992, the reason being the government’s concern with inflation. The 
table below shows the official Russian Budget.
Table 2: The extent of the Russian fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP
As % of GDP 1992 1993
Revenue 37.8 31.5
Expenditure 42.5 36.5
Balance -4.7 -4.0
Ministry of the Economy, Republic of Russia
In short, it appears that a fiscal deficit was not a major contributor to macroeconomic 
destabilisation. However, The Ministry of the Economy’s decision to implement credit 
expansion in order to clear mounting inter enterprise debt and a loose monetary policy 
eventually did lead to inflation. In addition, this expansion of monetary credit continued the 
soft budget constraint of state owned enterprises, acting as a buffer against eventual 
bankruptcy.
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However, credit expansion was not limited to the state enterprise sector, and by 1993 its 
share of credit was starting to decline, to only 0.1 % of GDP, which eventually led to 
quantity constraints on credit growth.
Table 3: Net credit of Central Bank of Russia
Received by: 1992 as % of GDP 1993 as a % of GDP
Ministry of Finance 13.4 5.9
Commercial Banks 13.8 3.9
CIS 8.7 1.6
Enterprises 0.2 0.1
TOTAL 36.1 11.5
Gros and Steinherr (1995)
The result of such destabilisation created a huge inequality of income between the those in 
state industry, who were treated favourably by the financial sector and were able to obtain 
access to cheap credits, and those who were not recipients of credit from other sources. 
This has been at the expense of the de novo private sector. According to Pripisnov (see 
Dyker,1999) the number of small/medium enterprises reporting a decline in gross income 
has been rising since 1992. One of the reasons cited for this maybe that large state owned 
enterprises have been choking off available credit
By 1994 it had been understood that the Central Bank of Russia could no longer issue large 
credits without causing inflation and its source was basically monetary, according to 
Nikolic (2000). It appears that Russia’s stabilisation programme, in essence, was based on 
shock therapy to appeal to the IMF and its’ creditors, but eventually had to be adapted to 
placate the former nomenklatura and regional and industrial lobbyists. Consequently 
reforms could only be introduced loosely.
As for Ukraine, Filatotchev et al. (1999) state “Ukraine occupies an intermediate position” 
between the two polar cases of Russia and Belarus with regard to market reforms.
Despite Belarus adopting various market orientated programmes in 1992 macroeconomic 
stabilisation and the implementation of privatisation have been slow to follow .^ Some 
progress has been made in the realm of price liberalisation: margin limits on wholesale and 
retail were eliminated by 1994, and prices on agricultural and food products were also 
liberalised following an agreement with the IMF by 1995. Unfortunately, the currency crisis
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of March 1998, and the ensuing inflation saw the government banning any price increases 
above 2% in the private and public sectors, a great setback for the previous liberalisation 
stance.
As for external liberalisation, in May 1994 Belarus unified its export and import duty system, 
allowing tariffs of around 15-20%, and by 1995 export tariffs had been dismantled. 
However, convertibility during the early 1990’s, was somewhat erratic: despite the 
Belarussian rouble becoming sole legal tender in 1994, restrictions on convertibility still 
remain. In fact the future of the Belarussian rouble is unclear, in 2001 it was pegged to the 
Russian rouble, and now plans are being initiated to adopt a common currency by 2008. 
However, Belarus has seen a slight increase in its ranking on trade and foreign liberalisation 
by the EBRD from 1994-2000, it has moved from a 1 to a 2- (Estrin, 2001)m see table 7 
for a definition.
Unfortunately monetary policy has been ineffectual in preventing large amounts of credit 
flowing to state owned enterprises and the agrarian sector, worsening inflation and 
dampening the growth of the already small private enterprise sector, as the figures show 
below.
Table 4: Inflation. Credit Budgetary subsidies and the private sector in GDP in Belarus
1992 1993 1994 1995
Consumer
prices*
969 1188 2200 709
Budgetary
subsidies**
- - 6.3 3.4
Credit to 
enterprises**
- - 16.5 5.5
Private sector 
share in GDP
- - 15 15
♦annual average, percentage change, **as percentage of GDP, EBRD Transition Report, 1997.
In Belarus fiscal reform has enjoyed some success, however credit to enterprises was still 
substantial in 1994, reaching 16.5% of GDP (EBRD, Transition Report, 1998), representing
6 The Transition Report 2001 documents that the “state will continue to play a dominant role in the 
economy, " (pi 19), while Estrin (2001) notes that Belarus still has private sector activity below 25% of 
GDP, and that the state has kept a share of more than 15% of privatised firms (pi 4).
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a significant drain on the government budget However by 2001, the social safety net is still a 
matter of importance for the Belarussian government and the World Bank.
Ukraine was the setting in the 1990’s for various incompatible reform programmes. Ukraine 
only began to make progress in stabilising its economy as late as 1994.
Price controls were not lifted until October 1994, relatively late, even compared to Belarus, 
but further price adjustments were made in 1995, so that only socially sensitive products 
such as bread, utilities, transport and fuel were subjected to price control. Some 
differentiation was made for residential and industrial users of energy, with prices remaining 
below cost recovery for residential agents, and above cost for industry.
Trade liberalisation lagged behind until the end of 1994, when the export sector was freed 
from quotas and restrictive licensing. Despite re-introducing restrictions on the export of 
grain in 1995, retaining import tariffs at an elevated level of 10-20% and not introducing full 
current account convertibility until 1997, Ukraine’s progress has been recognised, with an 
Interim Agreement on trade being signed with the EU. In addition, Ukraine has made 
progress in its negotiations for accession to the WTO.
As is the case in Russia, difficulties remain in Belarus with the reform of financial institutions. 
The EBRD Transition Report 1998 documents that the banking sector is largely dominated 
by the state owned banks7. The table below reports on particular aspects of the financial 
system. Clearly, foreign banks are not being encouraged and the problem of bad loans is 
troubling. In addition, the NBB’s attempt in 1998 to enforce minimum capital requirements 
has been repeatedly postponed to avoid bank closures.
Table 5: Growing problems in the Belarussian financial sector.
1994 1995 1996 1997
No. of banks 
(foreign owned)
48(na) 42(1) 38(1) 38(2)
Bad loans (as % 
of total)
8.4 11.8 14.2 12.7
EBRD Transition Report, 1998.
As for fiscal reform, there are still some advances to be made with tax collection and 
reducing credits to enterprises’, in fact tax revenue as a percentage of GDP declined during 
1994-7, with budgetary expenditure showing the reverse position, as shown below. Budget
7 The Belarussian banking sector is also highly concentrated with three state owned banks accounting 
for nearly 75% of total loans in the entire banking system.
16
constraints have not been tightened for enterprise restructuring, thus changes in the tax 
structure and expenditure cuts must be made to reduce the deficit to its target, set by the 
IMF in September 1998 (according to the EBRD).
Table 6: Falling tax revenues in Belarus, 1994-7
1994 1995 1996 1997
Tax revenues* 41.6 34.4 32.0 34.7
*as a percentage of GDP, EBRD Transition Report, 1998
Finally, it must be noted that the political disruption and the currency crisis of March 1998 
both play an adverse role in reducing and mediating the impact of reforms, and in the case 
of Belarus may have even be responsible for the reinforcement of state planning tendencies 
(Filatotchev et al, 1999). However we cannot expect the financial crisis8 to affect the 
analysis of data in this study as dependent variables are measured for 1994,1996 and 
1997.
1.2.b E c o n o m ic  t r a n sit io n  in  R u s s ia , U k r a in e  a n d  B el a r u s  t o  d a t e  
Before the literature review is presented in chapter two, it would be illuminating to give an 
overview of the transition progress of the countries to be studied, particularly in the sphere 
of structural transformation as opposed to the macroeconomic stabilisation process 
described above. The aims of structural transformation are to build a market environment, 
build a modem financial sector, conceive a developed tax policy and develop a social 
security sector to cushion the effects of stabilisation. The cornerstone of structural 
transformation is privatisation, creating infrastructure for de novo private firms and privatising 
state owned enterprises. This issue shall be pursued in the transfer of ownership section in 
chapter two. Also of paramount importance is the reform of the banking and financial 
sector, to mobilise domestic savings for enterprise restructuring, and facilitate the bankruptcy 
procedure.
The EBRD Transition Report 1996 puts both Russia and Ukraine in the “intermediate stages 
of transition” category, while it notes that these countries have all made progress in price and 
trade liberalisation as well as cutting some enterprise subsidies, it claims that they are less 
advanced in structural reform., compared to the Central and Eastern European and Baltic 
countries.
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As for Belarus the conclusion is less promising, being classified on a similar standard as 
China or Vietnam: “Since 1994 it has become increasingly apparent that Belarus is not, 
politically or economically a post communist transition country- not any more than 
China or Vietnam, ” (Nuti, 1999)
Before we look at developments in banking and financial sector reform, tax policy and the 
social security system, the EBRD transition indicators shall be presented for a selection of 
transition economies.
Table 7: Progress in transition in Eastern Europe, the Baltics and the CIS Enterprises(T998)
Countries
Private sector 
share of GDP%
Large scale 
privatisation
Small scale 
privatisation
Governance
&Enterprise
restructuring
Belarus 20 1 2 1
Bulgaria 60 3 3+ 2+
Czech
Republic
80 4 4+ 3
Hungary 80 4 4+ 3+
Latvia 65 3 4 3-
Poland 65 3+ 4+ 3
Russian
Federation
70 3+ 4 2-
Tajikstan 30 2+ 3 2-
Ukraine 55 2+ 3+ 2
Markets and Trade Financial Institutions
Countries Price
liberalisation
Trade & For.
Exchange
system
Bank reform & 
interest rate 
liberalisation
Securities mkt. 
& non bank 
financial instns.
Belarus 3 4 2 2-
Bulgaria 3 3+ 2+ 2
Czech republic 3 4+ 3+ 3
Hungary 3+ 4+ 4 3+
Latvia 3 4+ 3 2+
Poland 3+ 4+ 3+ 3+
Russian
Federation.
3- 2+ 2- 2-
Tajikstan 3 3- 1 1
Ukraine 2+ 3+ 2 2
Adapted from EBRD, Transition Report, 1998.
8 See Nikolic (2002) for a good description of the financial crisis.
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These indicators summarise progress of economic reforms since 1994. Classification 
indicators: most advanced industrial economies would achieve 4*, while 1 being the weakest 
score. (See p27 of the Transition Report for notes on the classification system)
The EBRD indicators confirm that no real progress has been made in the sphere of banking 
and the financial sector reform. Estrin and Wright (1999) also document pessimistic findings 
for Belarus, having found that banking sector reforms have even deteriorated. Credit 
allocations still favour state enterprises and agricultural units, with the state still being heavily 
involved in the banking system. These directed credits have helped contribute to inflation, 
which rose above the 1996 target of 2% a month. However, monetary policy in Belarus is 
governed by an independent central bank, the NBB, which has been classed the ninth most 
independent bank in the whole world, according to the 1994 law9. Yet, this level of 
independence can be questioned as the President has the power to replace the NBB 
president, and revoke any of his decisions.
Banking reform aimed to change the socialist monobank into a two tier system of an 
independent central bank, with many commercial banks operating underneath this. It was 
hoped that their role would support the stabilisation programme, provide finance to the 
economy and facilitate privatisation and enterprise control. This has not transpired It would 
appear that these transition economies would have been wise to adopt the UK/ US banking 
model, with banks performing savings and lending activities, staying uninvolved in corporate 
activities and having arms length relationship, which would not have allowed the continuation 
of Soviet era networks. On the other hand, the Japanese/German blueprint, whereby 
companies raise external finance from banks with which they have a close long term 
relations. In reality, it seems that the banks in the CIS have attempted to mix the two 
systems, leading to many of the private banks in Russia becoming fraudulent fronts for 
money laundering (Gaddy and Ickes, 1998). In Russia some of the biggest banks, 
particularly Sberbank (the national savings bank) and Vneshtorgbank (foreign trade bank) 
are entangled in financial industrial groups and enjoy political and personal relationships with
9 See Nuti (1999). See the work of Ilieva (2000), at Manchester Metropolitan University which details the 
indices used to measure central bank independence.
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industrial enterprises. This makes it very hard for banks to enforce limits on emergency 
credit, and initiate bankruptcy proceedings, as they have no incentive to monitor the 
behaviour of management This occurs as banks may be under pressure from the 
government to prevent the decline of certain sectors.
However banks are granted privileges for these services in the form of direct wealth transfer, 
opportunities to operate without transparency, which maybe detrimental to 
minority shareholders, through share dilution and transfer pricing. Furthermore, prevailing 
central bank supervision is still weak, with some banks still not meeting capital requirements 
and capital adequacy ratios.
In the Ukraine the banking sector is still small and undercapitalised (see table 8.) Yet since 
the poor liquidity position of 1998, caused by the rescheduling of government debt the NBU 
(Ukraine’s central bank) has taken some measures to improve the situation. International 
accounting standards were introduced in early 1998 and the limit on foreign ownership has 
been abolished, in order to create more competition and capital.
In brief it appears that it would have been sensible for the three countries to adopt the 
UK/US style of banking system., which would have helped prevent fraudulent relationships 
between banks and firms.
Table 8: Scale of deposit taking and lending in selected transition economies (Ratio of broad 
money to GDP in %).
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Belarus - 39 15 15 18
Czech
Republic
70 73 81 75 71
Hungary 50 46 43 42 42
Poland 36 37 36 38 40
Russia 24 21 17 16 17
Ukraine 32 27 13 12 14
IMF, International Financial Statistics and EBRD.
Inefficient tax policy has helped contribute towards the negative government balances, (see 
table below) making tax reform an urgent item on the agenda. At the root of the problem lies 
the failure to collect tax revenue; in turn this means that growing social problems in Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus cannot be tackled. The problem appears less acute in Belarus, as
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compared to Russia or Ukraine achieving tax ratios of 32% of GDP, one of the highest
ratios of the CIS (EBRD, 1998), this reflects compliance to tax regulation and careful
supervision. However, the system in Ukraine and Russia has required some attention.
Although the Ukrainian system of tax administration is still in need of development, efforts
have been made to encourage small businesses to enter the formal sector, by simplifying tax
registration regulations. Similar pains have been made in Russia to streamline the tax system
following expansive tax avoidance, by introducing a new Tax Code in 1998 (EBRD, 1998).
Table 9: Tax Revenues as % of GDP and government balances in Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus, 1995 and 1997.
TAX REVENUE GOVERNEMENT
BALANCE10
Russia
1995 35.9 -5.7
1997 32.2 -7.4(est)
Ukraine
1995 32.6 -7.1
1997 34.3 -5.6(est)
Belarus
1995 34.4 -1.9
1997 34.7 -2.1(est)
EBRD Transition Report 1998.
It is highly likely that experts underestimated the necessity for a strong social security system
to cushion the impact of stabilisation. Institutions must be constructed to take responsibility 
for the social protection that was provided, and to some extent still is, by enterprises 
(EBRD Transition Report, 1998). Policy towards unemployment, health care and the 
pension system all demand adaptation given the startling degree of poverty associated with 
the CIS. The EBRD Transition Report (1998) highlights this, stating that Russia and Ukraine 
endure a situation where “inequality is among the highest in the transition economies”. The 
extent of inequality of earnings is shown below, measured by the Gini coeffcient11.
10 In % of GDP.
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Table 10:Gini Coefficient of earnings
1989 1996
Belarus 0.26 0.41
Russia 0.23 0.48
Ukraine 0.25 0.41
Poland 0.21 0.29
Slovenia 0.22 0.30
Adapted from Transmonee database, Unicef, 1997.
The policy response in Belarus to this problem has been slow, but this is not surprising since 
the current situation is not as desperate, with “only” 23% of the population in poverty, yet 
eventually measures will have to be taken to create an efficient system for the provision of 
unemployment benefit when a higher degree of enterprise restructuring is achieved.
As for, Russia there is still much progress to make in creating an efficient social safety net 
Most enterprises still supply most social services, such as child care and health provisions. 
The table below reports the state intervention index, revealing that Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus are experiencing higher levels of intervention, compared to other transition 
economies.
Table 11: State intervention index
State Intervention index
Belarus 42.5
Czech Republic 20.0
Poland 15.0
Russia 18.2
Ukraine 29.1
Transition Report, 1998. Business Environment and Enterprise Performance survey.
State Intervention index: calculated as the average across all dimensions of firms reporting a degree of 
intervention.
Without an efficient social safety net large scale restructuring will be impossible in much of 
the CIS, so developing public institutions to deal with these issues should be at the forefront 
of policy making. The reform of the social welfare system will be complementary to the 
hardening of budget constraints; this will remove any economic distortions that may be 
linked with production subsidies or protectionist policies. The social safety net will need to 
be more general and cash based, moving away from the system of enterprise based benefits.
11 A value of 0 represents a situation where income is distributed equally among society, and a value of 
1 represents a situation where one person holds the entire earnings of society (other measures can also 
be used: 10th percentile of earnings distribution as % of the median, Robin Hood index etc.).
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However enforcing hardened budget constraints on enterprises can have wide social 
consequences which can be particularly problematic in enterprise towns where the whole 
population of a region or district may be affected
Additionally, unemployment benefits are very low (about 10% of the median wage, EBRD, 
1998 and Unicef, 1997) preventing enterprises from creating open unemployment. This is 
obviously an area of reform that must receive attention if the tendencies towards poverty are 
to be reversed.
1.3 F o r e ig n  ec o n o m ic  r ela tio n s  a f t e r  th e  d isinteg r a tio n  o f  th e  Fo r m e r  
S o v iet  U n io n
Prior to the transition period foreign economic relations had already been reformed 
under Gorbachev, who had recognised the failure of the Soviet Union to export 
manufactured goods for hard currency from 1973-84. Some lay the blame for this 
phenomenon on the over development of the energy and military sector at the expense of 
other industrial sectors, ‘'which in turn had contributed to the poor quality and low 
level o f  manufactured exports.” ( Smith, 1993). Imports were also a source of contention 
at this time, with Soviet imports mainly consisting of grain and machinery, particularly for 
pipeline construction. What was needed was an alteration in the structure of these imports 
and exports. The principal problems facing the Soviet Union can be summarised below 
succinctly, as suggested by Smith (1993)
• the isolation of domestic producers from foreign competition
• Soviet managers lack of knowledge of foreign markets
• an absence of FDI
• currency convertibility
• the differential between world and domestic prices.
Thus Gorbachev and Ryzhkov announced in March 1986 their trade strategy, claiming that 
it was necessary to stimulate the competitiveness of exports of manufactured goods and 
introduce an import policy that would favour industrial modernisation. Yet at this time the 
central state monopoly of foreign trade was still in existence which would prove to be unable 
to cope with a diverse structure of imports and exports.
23
Gorbachev's reforms to the foreign trade system
The aim of these reforms was to adjust the administrative side to the operation of the foreign 
trade system, by decentralising the Ministry of Foreign Trade (MOFT) into 21 industry 
ministries. It was anticipated that more efficient methods of economic management of the 
trade system would develop as a result of this. However the MOFT still kept control over 
trade in fuel, raw materials and foodstuffs.
Secondly, the exchange rate system needed to be revised and eventually made convertible. 
The arbitrary differences between Soviet relative prices and world prices meant that a single 
exchange rate could not be used, to address this problem DVKs or differentiated valuation 
coefficients were implemented to convert the prices of imports or exports of decentralised 
trade into roubles. The complexities of computing these coefficients, along with other 
problems led to the introduction of a single exchange rate in 1991.
Lastly, attempts to attract foreign investment and encourage joint ventures were taken. For 
example, the Soviet partner was no longer required to hold the majority share of the joint 
venture, and in addition the chairman of the board no longer had to be a Soviet citizen. In 
addition, tax breaks were offered to foreign partners in order to attract more joint venture 
activity.
The table below shows that these reforms were not successful in modifying the dependency 
of energy exports to manufactured goods, using oil and machinery exports as indicators. 
Some manufacturing exporting sectors did manage to increase the volume of exports, but in 
relatively unsophisticated areas such as textiles.
Table 12: Soviet exports to non Socialist Countries. 1984-9. (million roubles)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Total 32,277 28,196 22,686 23,942 24231 26515
Machinery 2561 2622 2444 2650 2468 2449
Oil 13,567 10,623 5522 7103 6282 6686
Vneshtorg.
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Following the dissolution of the former Soviet union in late 1991 and the subsequent 
collapse of the “bloc autarky12” under COMECON it was anticipated that these countries 
would abandon their past behaviour and re-orientate trade towards the West, abandoning 
some of their links with other former republics.
At this time, in Russia foreign trade was to be liberalised as “external aspects o f  
reform... (bring) access to know how accumulated by the market economies (which) 
promise huge gains in productivity,13 ” In order to enjoy these benefits the following 
actions were to be taken:
• the state monopoly on foreign trade was abolished
• the exchange rate was to be unified
• availability of unrestricted foreign exchange for current account transactions
• the elimination of quantitative restrictions on foreign trade.
However McKinnon (1991) argued that there should be some “interim protection” to 
sustain some long term viable industries, as the goal of exchange rate unification is to 
eradicate export taxes (usually on energy) and import subsidies. Consequently, the domestic 
currency prices of these items would rise to world levels, increasing the cost of inputs for 
producers.
Referring to the study of Spain, Greece and Portugal’s experience of export led growth (see 
Gros and Steinherr, 1995) this looked to be a promising policy option for the transition 
economies. However Gros and Steinherr later dubbed Russian trade policy a “disaster 
area” due to the persistence of huge import subsidies and export restrictions contributing to 
the decay of Russian foreign trade in comparison with countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe.
The table below highlights Russia’s backwardness in exporting to developed countries, as 
compared to Central and Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, Russia’s ranking by the EBRD on 
trade and foreign exchange liberalisation has actually fallen from 3 to 2+ over the period 
1994-2000 (Estrin, 2001).
12 Lavigne (1999).
13 Gros and Steinherr (1995)
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Table 13: Russian Patterns of Foreign trade: shares in total trade 1990,1993 and 1997 in 
transition countries.
1990 1993 1997
Eastern Europe
Exports to transition 
economies: FSU
22.3 9.2 10.3
Developed market 
economies
49.5 58.0 66.5
Former Soviet Union
Exports to transition 
economies
25.9 26.3 26.8
Developed market 
economies
49.5 59.7 58.1
ECE/UN, 1994a, 1996a, 1998.
Table 14: Total exports in millions of US dollars 1987-1996 (current)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Russia 49682 52293 85342 105202 115254
Belarus 1061 758 2509 4156 -
Ukraine 3744 3222 10305 13317 14441
UN Statistical Yearbook, 1997.
In all three countries exports have increased, as table 14 shows, yet this disguises the fact 
that in some sectors exports have been falling, as shown below.
Table 15: Russian Exports of machinery and transport equipment and manufactures 1990-8 
(billions US dollars for manufactures, million US dollars for machinery and transport) 
(current).
1995 1996 1997 1998
Machinery and 
transport
4943 7999 8219 6243
Manufacturing 21.68 30.05 27.40 23.41
WTO Annual Report, 1999.
The Direction o f  trade
The EBRD Transition Report (1999) compares actual trade with the EU and predicted 
trade with the EU, using the gravity model of trade14. This study shows that CIS countries
14 See Brenton, P and Gros, D, (1999)
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are still largely dependent on trade with other transition economies; in short they have 
‘"under-performed” and failed to develop intra-regional trade links.
Table 16: Actual and predicted direction of export trade, 1997 (% of total).
Actual trade 
withEU
Predicted trade 
withEU
Actual trade 
with Transition 
Economies
Predicted trade 
with TE
Belarus 0.07 0.59 0.90 0.11
Czech Republic 0.61 0.72 0.32 0.07
Hungary 0.70 0.65 0.19 0.10
Poland 0.71 0.73 0.22 0.09
Russia 0.38 0.50 0.38 0.06
Ukraine 0.16 0.57 0.65 0.10
Adapted from IMF Direction of trade statistics and EBRD calculations.
Table 17: Percentage of exports to non transition economies, 1997.
Percentage of exports to non Transition 
economies
Belarus 9.9%
Poland 77.5%
Russia 61.9%
Ukraine 34.8%
The Transition Report, EBRD, 1999.
The relatively poor export figures of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in table 17 are surprising 
given the level of the exchange rate and several devaluations. Details of exchange rate paths 
in these three countries from 1992-97 are shown below.
Table 18: The end of year exchange rate, 1992-97: Belarussian rouble, rouble and hryvnia 
to the US$.15
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Belarus 134 51 698 10,600 11500 15500 30,740
Russia 0.134 0.511 1.247 3.55 4.640 5.974 20.650
Ukraine na 0.01 0.13 1.04 1.79 1.89 1.90
EBRD, 1999
15 It should be noted that in 1992 Ukraine introduced an interim currency the karbovanets, in 1992 the 
Belarussian rouble was introduced and in 1993 the new Russian rouble was introduced.
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In Russia the real exchange rate began to increase in 1996, increasing the price of Russian 
goods, relative to other countries’ goods (shown below), which may have adversely affected 
the level of exports the following year.
Table 19: The Russian exchange rate (annual average), data in new denominated roubles per
US dollar. One new rouble =1,000 old roubles.
Roubles per US dollar
1994 3.55
1995 4.64
1996 5.57
1997 5.97
Transition Report, 1998.
1.4 R a t io n a l e  f o r  st u d y
Despite the problems mentioned above, it is obvious that a significant number of enterprises 
in some countries of the former Soviet Union are involved in export activity. The table below 
shows the percentage of firms exporting to the non near abroad or CIS countries in the 
sample used in my research. As many firms had trade links with the former CIS countries 
pre 19911 decided it would be more useful to examine the determinants of exporting to 
“non near abroad” countries.
Table 20: The percentage of firms exporting to non near abroad countries in Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarus in 1995 and 1997.
1994 1996
Belarus 34.3% 43.3%
Ukraine 19.4% 22.2%
Russia 16.8% 17%
Source: University of Nottingham database
Table 21: Export intensity in Russia. Ukraine and Belarus in 1994-1997
1994 1996 1997
Russia 2.1 3.4 3.9
Belarus 8.8 10.8 7.4
Ukraine 3.2 6.6 6.2
Source: University of Nottingham database
Studying the export behaviour of privatised former SOE’s in the mid 1990’s in Russia,
Ukraine and Belarus presents an ideal opportunity to investigate factors which are affecting 
the decision to export in this new environment It will be illuminating to see if the issues
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concerning export behaviour discussed in Western literature have the same relevance in 
transition economies.
Other studies have focused on the impact of the macroeconomic level to destabilisation and 
industrial decline (see Gomulka, 1995, Hendley et al. 1998, among others). Here an 
attempt to examine one particular response to the “Great Transition Depression” of the 
enterprise sector in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus is made- have firms reacted to the change 
in incentives and undertook export activities?
These three countries represented 86.5 % of the industrial output (UN, 1992) prior to the 
disintegration of the FSU in 1991, providing a natural rationale for their inclusion in this 
study. This investigation will make use of two large surveys carried out in 1997 and 1998, 
along with the 1997 study, for the case of Russia, encompassing retrospective questions, 
creating a longitudinal panel for analysis.
1.4b M a in  r esea r c h  q u estio n s
This study proposes to investigate a particular element of strategic restructuring (EBRD, 
1995) namely the internationalisation process (IP) in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The 
factors that propel the decision of the firm to internationalise and seek a foreign partner will 
also be determined.
The extant literature documents the benefits of exporting at the macro level. For example, 
Otani and Villanueva (1990) remark on the contribution of export performance on the 
growth of per capita real income for 55 developing countries in the late 1980’s. They 
estimate a regression equation using the growth of per capita real GNP as the dependent 
variable, as explained by the savings rate, export performance, expenditure on human capital 
development, the real interest rate on external debt and population growth. Their main 
findings are that export expansion has powerful positive effects on growth; an increase in the 
export/GNP ratio by 2% points would cause a rise in steady state per capita output growth 
by 4-5% a year(p778)16. However, they suggest that export promotion policies should be 
country specific as the coefficient on growth of exports changes for different levels of 
income, as shown below.
16 The coefficient on the growth of exports is 0.4 for low income countries, and 0.43 for high income 
countries.
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Table 22: Cross country regression results: Income groups with growth of p.c real GNP as 
dependent variable, 1970-85.
Growth of exports (%)
Low income countries 0.4 (3.28)
Middle income countries17 0.1 (0.8)
High income countries 0.43 (3.37)
Otani (1990) p 776. Figures in parentheses represent t ratios.
Brezinski and Kalthoff (1998) argue that the development of foreign trade in the form of its 
structure and orientation, will accelerate economic restructuring.
Moreover the World Bank in 1993 declared that it considers export orientated growth to be 
the hallmark of a successful development strategy for Less Developed Countries, so it could 
also apply to middle income transition economies.
Yet, this research will look at the determinants of export activity at the micro or firm level, 
thus we have the following:
Xj = f(E, DF)
Where DF is a set of decision factors which affect a firms decision process as to whether to 
seek export markets or not (Xj). These may be experiential learning effects, growth 
strategy, firm size or ownership structure. E represent exogenous factors such as sectoral, 
regional and industrial decline “push” factors. Thus the impact of external and internal 
factors on the firms decision to export shall be examined, adopting some of the independent 
variables from the management and economics literature.
The effects of ownership structure on exporting activity will be a major part of the analysis. 
For example, which ownership structures favour greater degrees of internationalisation? It 
will be assumed that exporting will be a strategy for performance improvements (see chapter 
five for details).
Furthermore, the choice of degree o f  internationalisation available to the firm will be 
explored What is the rationale for a firm selecting a particular entry mode, in particular 
acquiring and retaining a foreign partner? An attempt will be made to determine which 
factors affect the firm’s decision to acquire a foreign partner, giving
17 It should be noted that Otani’s study does not include Socialist countries.
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FP= f(I+AP)
where FP represents if a firm has a foreign partner, I is internal factors such as ownership 
structure, firm size and investment levels, and AP represents attitudes and perceptions 
towards foreign partners and market strategy. This will allow us to determine which kinds of 
firms are more likely to possess and retain a foreign partners.
1.5 T h e  o u t l in e  o f  t h e  d is s e r t a t io n  a n d  h y p o t h e s e s
The second chapter shall present a literature review of the internationalisation process and 
privatisation, mainly in developed economies.
Chapter three examines the methodology adopted and describes statistical methods in detail, 
also information on survey techniques, and the quantitative approach shall be presented. 
Lastly, a comparison of other research methodologies in existing literature on exports and 
foreign partner selection is made. Following this, in chapter four, descriptive statistics and 
exploratory data analysis shall be presented.
Chapter five will explore the impact of ownership on export activity. By employing linear 
regression, repeated measures and weighted least squares techniques we are able to test the 
following hypotheses and finally conclude which ownership structures are more conducive to 
exporting.
Controls
Cl: the official reported level of industrial decline (measured as the corresponding 
industry’s reported decline in real output over 1993-1996, as a percentage of the 
1993 level) shall be positively associated with exporting intensity and propensity, 
reflecting that a fall in domestic sales acts as a “push factor” for exporting.
C2a: firm size in year Yt.i will be positively associated with exporting intensity and 
propensity in year Y.
C3: annual investment in year Y shall be negatively linked to exporting intensity 
and propensity in year Y.
HI: inside owners may have reason to block exporting strategy and thus lagged 
insider ownership shall be negatively associated with exporting levels.
H2: lagged outside ownership shall be positively associated with exporting.
H3: lagged foreign ownership shall be positively associated with exports
31
H4: a decline is state ownership in year Yt.i will lead to an increase in exporting 
activity in year Y.
H5: lagged board representation of insiders can negatively affect exports, 
representing the entrenchment hypothesis.
H6: lagged board representation of outsiders can positively affect exports, 
representing resource dependence roles.
H7: lagged board representation of foreign owners can positively affect exports. 
H8: the lagged interaction of outside share holding and percentage of board seats 
can be expected to have a positive affect upon exports.
H9: a change in directorate can be expected to positively affect exporting.
H10: the presence of a dominant owner in year Yt.i shall positively affect exports in 
year Y.
H ll: the presence of an outside dominant owner in year Yt.i shall positively affect 
exports in year Y, as we can expect these kind of dominant owners to have more 
power and incentive to become involved in restructuring.
H12: institutional share-holding in year Yt.i shall be negatively associated with 
exporting in year Y, in order to test if institutional investors are “pressure 
sensitive” and
H12b: institutional share-holding in year Yt.i shall be positively associated with 
exporting in year Y in order to test if institutional investors are “pressure 
resistant”.
Chapter six examines the foreign partner selection process of firms by adopting logistic 
regression techniques. This chapter shall test the following hypotheses:
HI: exporting activity increases the likelihood of a firm having a foreign partner. 
H2: firm size decreases the likelihood of a firm having a foreign partner.
H3: required investment levels increases the likelihood of a firm having a foreign 
partner.
H4: perceptions that foreign partners are seeking access to local markets via local 
production are positively associated with the likelihood of a firm having a foreign 
partner.
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H5: perceptions that foreign partners are seeking access to local technology are 
negatively associated with the likelihood of a firm having a foreign partner.
H6: attitudes of firms in the former Soviet Union concerning access to technology 
from foreign partners is negatively associated with a firm having a foreign partner. 
H7: attitudes of firms in the former Soviet Union concerning access to markets 
from foreign partners is positively associated with a firm having a foreign partner. 
H8: managerial strategy geared towards domestic strategy is negatively associated 
with the likelihood of a firm having a foreign partner.
H9: managerial turnover is positively associated with the likelihood of a firm having 
a foreign partner.
H10: greater than average employee share holding is negatively associated with a 
firm having a foreign partner.
H ll: greater than average foreign share holding is positively associated with a firm 
having a foreign partner.
Lastly, the determinants of retaining a foreign partner shall be tested with the following 
hypotheses:
Control 1: firm size is negatively associated with the probability of a firm retaining 
a foreign partner.
HI: capacity lost due to depreciation of machinery/equipment and permanent 
removal of workshops/plants is positively associated with the probability of a firm 
retaining a foreign partner.
H2: labour productivity18 is positively associated with the probability of a firm 
retaining a foreign partner.
H3: annual investment levels are positively associated with the probability of a firm 
retaining a foreign partner.
H4: gross job gains in existing and new production units is positively associated 
with the probability of a firm retaining a foreign partner.
H5: export intensity is positively associated with the probability of a firm retaining 
a foreign partner.
18 Approximated by total sales/no. of employees.
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H6: profit is positively associated with the probability of a firm retaining a foreign 
partner.
H7: total liabilities (to banks, suppliers, utilities, government and wage arrears is 
negatively associated with the probability of a firm retaining a foreign partner
Chapter seven summarises the main findings, details several contributions and implications 
and suggests items for further research.
1.6 MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONALISATION RESEARCH
Below several of the contributions to the internationalisation research are outlined below,
and are explored further in chapter seven.
• Dosoglu-Guner (2001) notes that despite the effects of organisational culture and 
ownership type on a firm’s strategic goals being well established, “the framework in the 
context o f  export decisions has not been developed despite a possible link," (p72). 
Chapter five attempts to fill this void in the literature.
• Thus far in the literature there has been little research on the impact of privatisation on 
exporting in the former Soviet Union, so chapter five intends to fill this gap.
• Previous research has not used such a wide selection of ownership variables. For 
example Roberts and Tybout (1997) include only one dummy variable to represent 
ownership structure. While, Dosoglu- Guner (2001) only uses a description of 
organisational structure, such as adhocracy. My main contribution shall be to include a 
much wider view of the impact of ownership structure upon exporting in chapter 5. For 
instance I include continuous variables in order to represent the level of insider, outsider, 
foreign ownership, the extent of dominant group ownership, along with board structure.
• Having highlighted the importance of foreign ownership in chapter five and in the 
literature, chapter six shall examine which factors determine whether a firm has acquired 
a foreign partner, thus treating ownership as an endogenous factor, contrasting from the 
previous chapter. This follows the research of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and 
Bishop et al. (2001).
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• Moreover, existing research on alliances has focused upon the characteristics of the 
developed country partner. My approach is to examine the presence or non presence of 
a foreign partner from the point of view of the local partner.
• Furthermore this study takes advantage of a unique dataset, which includes data from 
three countries of the former Soviet Union and captures firm level material over a period 
from 1994-1997.
• Lastly this study employs a wide variety of quantitative techniques such as WLS, logistic 
regression and repeated measures analysis.
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C h a p t e r  t w o : t h e  in t e r n a t io n a l is a t io n  p r o c e s s  a n d  T h e  O w n e r s h ip  d e b a t e : 
A  L it e r a t u r e  R e v iew
2.1 I n t e r n a t io n a l is a t io n
The process of internationalisation is also a central theme to this dissertation, therefore this 
section shall seek to present some of the main studies described in the literature.
In the 18th century Adam Smith had emphasised the importance of trade as a vent for 
surplus and as a means to improve the division of labour and productivity. Smith (1776) in 
fact claimed that,
“( Foreign trade) carries out the surplus part o f  the produce o f their land and labour 
fo r which there is no demand among them... ”
Smith hints at a lack of domestic demand inducing an export drive among firms. This study 
will use a similar argument: industrial domestic decline will ‘^ push” domestic firms to look for 
foreign markets, as a reactive force, which gives us the following hypothesis, tested in 
chapter five (Cl): industrial decline in year Yt_i will be positively associated with exports in 
year Y.
Later, David Ricardo (1772-1823), the official founder of the comparative cost and 
classical free trade doctrine, used this theory to describe and account for world trade. In his 
model, international differences in relative production costs determine the pattern of 
international trade. This model relies on the law of comparative advantage, which states the 
following, “countries specialise in producing and exporting the goods that they produce 
at a lower relative cost than other countries, ”. Begg et al. (1992) note that there 
several reasons why relative costs may differ in different countries, namely technology or 
productivity.
Their model assumes that there are two countries, the UK and the US producing two 
goods, videos and shirts. Also labour is assumed to be the only factor of production and 
there are constant returns to scale. Perfect competition is also assumed, so the price of each 
good is equal to its marginal cost. If we assume that American labour is relatively more 
productive in videos and shirts then these relatively productivity differences are the basis for 
international trade (see Begg et al. (1992) p 588, for a more detailed treatment of the 
model).
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In the nineteenth century there appeared to be a move towards a dialogue concerning the 
role of international trade in producing growth. In fact Alfred Marshall (1890) remarked 
that, “the causes which determine the economic progress o f nations belong to the study 
o f international trade f .  Moreover, scholars, such as Lewis (1980) almost a hundred 
years later, find a stable relationship between export growth and economic growth. The 
wide liberalisation of world trade under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 
1947, stimulated a deluge of literature attempting to explain patterns of international trade 
and production. Some of the classic papers shall be described below.
Vernon (1966) emphasised the importance of the product cycle in determining patterns of 
international trade. At the first stage, an advanced country (he assumed America) develops 
an innovative (unstandardised) product and exports it to other advanced economies. 
Eventually rivals will arise in foreign markets (Europe) and also begin to export as the 
product becomes more standardised. Now the original producer will have to decide- should 
it invest in Europe to commence international production? To decide he will have to examine 
locational advantages of foreign markets, production costs, the external environment and the 
price elasticity of demand Investing in international production abroad will lengthen the 
product’s life cycle. Vernon developed this theory to explain the behaviour of US 
multinationals in the post war period
Both Hymer (1960) and Dunning (1973) explore further the circumstances under which a 
firm may chose to start production in another country.
Hymer highlights several factors that affect the behaviour of firms considering international 
production or direct foreign investment Firstly, he argued that multinational firms exist due to 
market imperfections arising from economies of scale, credit advantages, market structure, 
and networks of distribution. If transaction costs are too high for intermediate inputs, owing 
to imperfect market then firms will be forced to replace market transactions with internal 
transactions. Thus, internalisation will arise when it is difficult to enforce contractual 
arrangements (usually on leasing technology or knowledge) so that knowledge or a 
technology can be kept within the firm’s boundaries.
Hymer also uses industrial organisation theory to show that if firms posses a certain 
advantage it may cause them to pursue international operations. These advantages in the 
home country, relative to a foreign market could manifest themselves as low cost factors of
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production, a differentiated product, efficient distribution facilities, top managerial skills and
access to cheap finance. A firms’ advantages may be more
prolific in a foreign market, than at home for instance, if the foreign country has less
entrepreneurial skill, competition and access to capital markets, inducing international
production.
Lastly, Hymer develops diversification as a minor motivation for international operations: if 
profits in one line of activity are negatively correlated with profits in a different line of activity, 
there is reason to diversify. Firms that engage in both activities, one of which may be 
abroad, will reduce risk of investment
Hymer concluded that international operations may occur for many reasons, yet it is 
impossible to predict their form.
Dunning (1973) attempted to integrate these three approaches of industrial organisation 
theory, internalisation and location theory, and is now more well known as the "eclectic 
approach or OLI paradigm According to Dunning, three conditions determine the 
presence of international operations abroad.
Firstly, ownership factors, or advantages specific to the firm, which outweigh the costs of 
moving production to foreign markets, and are superior to characteristics of firms in the host 
country. These advantages could be patents, strong brand names and technological 
superiority.
The second determining factor, perhaps the most important for Dunning, is locational 
advantages of the host. These may be an unsaturated market, low factor costs and a stable 
political and economic environment
Lastly, benefits from internalisation must accrue to international production, as opposed to 
licensing, which will reduce transaction costs in imperfect markets.
Many other attempts have been made to explain international production: Mundell (1957) 
proposed that trade and capital movements are actually substitutes for each other, and 
Kojima (1978) although criticised, in some ways confirmed this by finding that Japanese 
FDI had been trade- creating, while US FDI had been trade destroying. Other theories have 
centred round differential rates o f  return, which states that FDI will occur in countries 
with high rates of return, as opposed to countries with low rates of return. Thus international 
capital movements can be explained by differences in interest rates between countries. While
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this cannot explain why countries with high rates of return undertake outward foreign direct 
investment, it could explain why FDI has so far been low in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. 
International capital movements can also be explained by different tax rates amongst 
competing countries for FDI. For example, Lankes and Venables (in Zecchini, 1997) find 
that tax incentives are an important motivation for potential investors in the region of Central 
Europe and the former Soviet Union.
By the late 1970’s a new theory of international trade had been borne, that of Heckscher 
Ohlin19, which stated that international trade is driven laigely by differences in countries’ 
resources.
Krugman and Obstfeld (1994) note that the model shows that comparative advantage is 
influenced by the interaction between nations’ resources (the relative abundance of factors 
of production) and the technology of production (which influences the relative intensity with 
which different factors of production are used) (p64). Again the model is based on several 
important assumptions: each economy is able to produce two goods (cloth and food), and 
each requires the use of two factors of production which are in limited supply-land and 
labour. Also, each factor of production can be used in both sectors. Furthermore, the 
technology of production is one of fixed coefficients, i.e. there is only one method to 
produce each good. However the production of food and cloth is not expected to require 
land and labour in the same proportions, thus cloth can assumed to be labour intensive, and 
food to be land intensive.
Their model (illustrated on pp66-7 of Krugman and Obstfeld,1994) finds that an economy 
with a high ratio of land to labour will be relatively better at producing food than an economy 
with a low ratio of land to labour. Or, “more generally, an economy will tend to be 
relatively effective at producing goods that are intensive in the factors with which the 
country is relatively well endowed, ” (p67).
Although the Heckscher-Ohlin model is one of the most influential theories in the study of 
international economics, empirical testing has revealed that countries do not export the 
goods that the theory predicts.
19 This is one of the most influential trade theories, and in 1977 Bertil Ohlin, a Swedish economist won 
the Nobel Prize in Economics.
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It is well known that the US has a high capital-labour ratio, thus one would expect the US to 
export capital goods and import labour intensive goods. However Leontiel20 (1953) found 
the opposite result: US exports were less capital intensive than US imports, illustrating the 
famous Leontief paradox.
The number of assumptions and the fact that world trade patterns do not always exhibit the 
patterns explained in the theories discussed above has led many economists to develop new 
trade models.
Krugman (1983) states that most of the world’s trade in manufactures is trade between 
industrial countries with similar relative factor endowments. Also most manufacturing 
industries experience increasing returns and are in some cases imperfectly competitive, 
characteristics which standard trade theory do not allow for. Thus he suggests two other 
models.
Firstly is the theory of intra industry trade which includes scale economies along with 
comparative advantage as a cause for trade. In this theory two types of trade are 
mentioned- inter industry trade based on comparative advantage and intra industry trade 
based on economies of scale. The industrial structure of a country’s production will be 
determined by its factor endowments, however because of scale economies each country 
will only produce only a limited subset of the products in each industry, exhibiting a pattern 
of intra industrial specialisation. As a result each country is a net exporter in industries in 
which it has a comparative advantage, but now due to inter industry specialisation each 
country will also import some of the products in industries in which it is a net exporter. 
Therefore there will be intra and inter industry trade.
As Krugman concludes, the theory of intra industry trade provides “a neat explanation o f  
the empirical puzzles posed by manufactures trade among the industrial countries, ” 
(p344). Furthermore it provides an explanation for the puzzle of why similar countries trade 
so much and why a large proportion of this trade is a two way exchange of similar products. 
Second is the theory of technological competition which has emerged from the literature 
concerning the trade of manufactures where Research and Development (R&D) plays an 
important role. As a consequence of R&D, countries may engage in protectionist or 
interventionist policies.
20 Bowen et al. (1987) found a similar result for a multi country data-set.
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With this model it is assumed there are only two firms in the industry: one foreign and the 
other domestic. It is supposed that these firms compete on the grounds of technology either 
investing in R&D to decrease costs or develop new products, or both. Expenditure on 
R&D will determine their position in future competition and markets. The end result of the 
model shows that a protected home market can give a high technology firm an advantage in 
export markets or “in other words import protection will turn out to be a form o f 
export promotion
Introducing technological competition into trade theory is particularly useful as it allows us 
to see the reason and justification for industrial policies that have been adopted in countries 
such as Japan.
This thesis does not cover the disadvantages of trade. For a recent survey of this literature 
see Hillman (2003).
The primary focus of this study is to attempt to examine the determinants behind the firm’s 
decision to internationalise (export and select a foreign partner). The section below will 
present factors of internationalisation in other studies.
Which factors induce firms to internationalise?
According to Hitt et a/. (1999) when a firm sells products outside the firm’s domestic 
market, it is pursuing an international strategy- but what are the motivations for doing this? 
Hitt et al. note four deciding factors.
Increased market size
By producing goods for international markets they can enlarge the size of their potential 
market This may be an option for firms operating in markets with saturated demand, for 
example the US soft drinks market.
This could explain firms’ decision to internationalise when the level of domestic demand is 
low, due to transformational recession. This idea is tested in chapter five.
Return on investment
Firms that operate in R&D intensive industries have a tendency to produce for international 
markets as larger markets may be a critical factor in achieving a return on investments. Also
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as the market for new technology is getting bigger investments need to be recouped on a 
much faster scale, and larger markets provide an opportunity for this.
Location advantages
Lower costs of production are an obvious deciding factor, e.g. other countries may have 
cheaper labour, energy or raw materials. Again, for the countries in this study, this argument 
may not hold. As shown in the table below, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus all have relatively 
low US dollar wages, yet inward FDI remains low. However, Western markets may offer 
other locational advantages such a stable legal framework.
Table 1: US $ actual wages for selected transition economies (monthly)
US$ actual wage 1995 1996 1997
Russia 107 165 175
Ukraine 60 82 82
Belarus 101 83 79
Czech Republic 296 341 332
Romania 102 105 87
EBRD Transition Report, 1998, p66.
Economies o f  scale and learning
With the expansion of production into international products companies may be able to reap 
economies of scale and learning. Hitt also shows that firms may be able to exploit core 
competencies21 and encourage knowledge sharing between production units across 
countries, creating synergy across firms.
An earlier study by Czinkota and Ronkainen (1988) claims that activities on international 
markets may allow the firm to increase its output and “climb more rapidly on the learning 
curve.”
They also divide major motivations for internationalisation between proactive and_reactive as 
shown below.
Major motivations for internationalisation
* Proactive
* profit advantage
* unique products
* technological advantage
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* exclusive information
* managerial urge
* tax benefit
* economies of scale
♦ Reactive
♦ competitive pressures
♦ overproduction
♦ decline in domestic demand
♦ excess capacity
♦ proximity to customers or transport.
Proactive motivations stem from strategic change.
The promise of a profit advantage is often a strong stimulus to seek international markets: 
managers may perceive international sales a source of profit. This will obviously depend on 
managerial characteristics such as their perception of risk or inclination to internationalise. 
Terpstra and Sarathy (1997) document a case study concerning an Italian firm, Marzotto, 
which adopts an international strategy, with a main motivation being profit By diversifying its 
manufacturing base to Germany, it has achieved improved financial performance, and has 
seen net profit increase from 10.2 to 20.4% of sales. This will be the basis for one of the 
assumptions of my study: firms undertake exporting to improve performance.
Interestingly, Bonaccorsi (1992) gives us reason to believe that exporting may be the easiest 
path for company growth:
• domestic market expansion in specific sectors may demand investment in advertising and 
promotions which may be beyond the financial resources of smaller firms.
•  terms of payment are sometimes superior to that of the domestic country: this could apply 
in some transition economies.
•  there may be credit discounts, subsidies or exemptions for exporting firms.
The possession of a technological advantage or unique products may induce firms to seek 
foreign markets. If a product is unique or uses a specialised production technique then it is 
likely it will have a competitive edge abroad. In the long run other firms will innovate,
21 See Hitt (1999) Chapter 3 for a description.
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removing the original innovator’s competitive advantage. There are parallels with this and the 
product life cycle theory of Vernon.
In the medium run, exclusive market information may act as stimulus. If a firm has 
knowledge about foreign customers, market places, distribution, special contacts etc. that 
other domestic firms do not have, it may be a good to exploit this before competitors catch 
up.
Managerial urges are often a good explanation for internationalisation: they may desire to 
pursue international markets for prestige and more autonomy, or they may simply be more 
“cosmopolitan” in their outlook.
Government attitudes to international activities may also play a motivating role: if the state 
offers tax benefits or credits to assist exporters then it more likely for a firm to consider 
international markets. For example in late 1980’s the US government through the 
Department of Commerce established export trading companies and foreign sales 
corporations to encourage small and medium firms to increase their export intensity. 
However, Czinkota and Ronkainen claim that proactive firms are more likely to be 
successful in exporting activities, compared to reactive counterparts: this will have interesting 
ramifications for the success of firms in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.
Safety valve activities in times of a domestic business cycle decline can serve as a major 
motivation. Export sales may be stimulated by a fall in domestic price level, and then 
terminated when market demand reappears. This “hit and run” attitude into foreign markets 
can be met by some acrimony by foreign governments. Russian exporters cannot be 
accused of this behaviour before transition due to the “preisausleich” or price equalisation 
system. This meant that the price exporters received for their products (purchased by the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade) remained relatively stable- or at least were not subjected to 
fluctuations by market demand22.
A saturated domestic market may also induce the same results to prolong the product’s life 
cycle.
Excess capacity may also encourage internationalisation: if labour and equipment is not fully 
utilised then expansion into international markets could be seen as an attempt to distribute 
fixed costs on a larger base. If fixed costs have already been sunk in domestic production
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then the international pricing scheme can be based on variable costs, yet this could have 
serious implications for charges of dumping exports.
A proximity to customers is also likely to play a role in export activities, this is the concept of 
“psychic distance23.” It has been shown that in some cases geographical distance is not 
nearly as important as cultural distance. For example, some US firms feel closer to the UK 
than Mexico despite the huge geographical distance, due to common language and customs. 
Managerial attitudes towards exchange rate risk and the tools they have to protect 
themselves against currency related risk will also effect their decision to internationalise.
Firms carrying out transactions in foreign currencies will be exposed to transaction exposure 
from outstanding contracts in payables or receivables. In western economies three tools are 
implemented to protect against exchange rate risk: firstly, risk modifying by increasing prices, 
secondly, self insuring by manipulating lags in contracts in anticipation of currency 
revaluations, and lastly shifting risk by purchasing futures or options. Mangers in transition 
economies often lack these tools (particularly futures or options markets) so this may be a 
major factor preventing firms from undertaking foreign operations.
Bilkey and Tesear (1977) also propose another reactive reason for a firms decision to begin 
exporting: the unsolicited order, which acts as a “pull factor” into internationalisation. There 
are parallels with this idea and that of serendipity mentioned in the work of Meyer and Skak 
(2002), who find that chance or luck sometimes leads Danish or Austrian firms to enter 
Russian markets.
Other external factors also can determine the internationalisation process of the firm, in 
particular the type of foreign trade regime in which it operates in and subsequent policies, or 
more importantly for the transition economies, the government’s attitude to trade 
liberalisation.
Brenton and Gros (1997) emphasise the effect of institutional factors on trade reorientation 
from former CMEA to EU markets. Those transition economies (namely the former 
republics of the former Soviet Union) which concentrated their trade flows to the CMEA24, 
suffered a greater decline in trade volumes. Enterprises in these countries were “effectively 
isolated from the west” and can be expected to face serious constraints when attempting to
22 See A. Smith (1993)
23 Johanson and Vahle (1977).
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reorient trade. Brenton and Gros propose that improvement in the quality and product 
design is a prerequisite for export expansion to western markets, yet their empirical evidence 
refutes this and shows that the failure of some FSU countries to export lies with 
governments’ attitudes to liberalisation.
Lai and Rajapatirana (1987) also examine the impact of foreign trade regimes in developing 
countries. They report that a NBER study (Bhagwati, 1978) quantifies the effects of 
alternative trade regimes on dynamic factors that affect a country’s growth rate. He shows 
that none of these factors benefit from import substituting regimes25 suggesting the 
alternative, export promotion strategy. Aw and Hang (1995) document similar findings, in 
that those developing countries which pursue export orientated trade policies generally 
outperform those choosing to adapt import substitution policies. More recently, Ihirhvall 
(1999) also shows that those economies which are more “outwardly orientated” are 
associated with higher levels of economic performance26.
Thus for the transition economies the trade regime selected by the government is likely to 
affect the decision of firms to export or not. If the government adopts “strongly outward 
orientated policies” with very few foreign exchange controls and supportive industrial 
policies for export promotion the propensity of firms to begin exporting will increase.
Characteristics o f  exporting firms
This section intends to review the extant literature on general characteristics of firms at the 
beginning of their internationalisation process i.e. when they commence export activities. 
Leonidou and Katsikeas (1996) present a comprehensive review of the “microscopic 
approach” to export behaviour, as opposed to the effects of the macroeconomy. They 
present the core findings of 12 researchers27, one of the most common strands being the 
opinion that export operations are “an evolutionary and sequential process,” which can be 
viewed as a series of incremental decisions.
24 The FSU intra union trade was typically over 80% of total trade ( Kaminski et al, 1996).
25 For a description of import substitution and export promotion see Thirlwell (1999).
26 The Lai and Rajapatirana paper documents the problems of finding correlations between export 
growth and economic growth, and recommends the use of a Granger-Sims causality test.
27 Predominant studies being Cavusgil, (1986), Moon and Lee (1990), Barrett and Wilkinson, (1995), 
Crick (1995) and Johanson and Vahlne (1977).
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For example, Johanson and Vahlne (1977) base their model on the incremental 
internationalisation process (IP) of Swedish firms and their establishment chain of 
international operations. They emphasise that internationalisation is the product of a series of 
incremental decisions which involves the gradual acquisition, integration and the use of 
knowledge in foreign markets. Their findings show that the development of the firm is in 
accordance with this incremental view:
no regular exports independent representative —> sales subsidiary —> production.
This gradual order of development of international operations in individual countries is not 
limited to Sweden, according to Gmber, Mehta and Vemon (1967), who have documented 
a separate step process of internationalisation in the US. Johanson and Vahlne attempt to 
account for this “incrementalism” and find that the principle causes are a lack of market 
information, lack of knowledge of foreign culture or language, uncertainty and perception of 
risk: in brief, there is a direct relation between market knowledge and market commitment 
Eriksson et al (1997) find that a lack of experiential knowledge will increase the perceived 
cost of the internationalisation process, and thus affect the mode of entry.
To enlarge this model it would be beneficial to examine the firm’s internationalisation process 
into numerous foreign markets, and appreciate that firms may be capable of using multiple 
entry modes to foreign markets. Also, the models ignores firms who may “skip” the 
elementary modes of entry for direct foreign investment, and fails to recognise that 
internationalisation is not stepwise, as some firms may refocus operations.
Previously, Bilkey (1976) had noted that as these firms move to different stages of the 
internationalisation process the factors that affect the decision to export change, this, he 
recommends has implications for government policy which must differentiate between the 
various stages.
Czinkota (1993) also adopts an incremental approach to internationalisation, yet the scope 
used is much narrower and only focuses upon the stages of exporting activities, not the entire 
internationalisation process. He identifies several “change agents” which lead firms increase 
their commitment to export activities, some of these can be applied to movements along the 
establishment chain advocated by Johanson and Vahlne above. Internal change agents can
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be classified in to one of the following: managerial enlightenment, new management, over 
production/decline in the domestic market size and the acquisition of new information. 
External forces may be an increase in foreign demand, persuasion by distributors or other 
agents who enjoy relational transactions with the firm or pro- export programmes initiated 
by government bodies.
Leonidou and Katsikeas (1996) also highlight several factors facilitating or inhibiting the 
decision to export: managerial characteristics and style, organisational structure, production 
capacity, tariffs and the access to information.
Management style can be expected to influence the exporting behaviour of the firm, if export 
management systems and planning procedures are implemented this will accommodate 
internationalisation. In addition, younger managers with foreign language abilities have been 
associated with internationalisation (Langston and Teas, 1976 and Pinney, 1970, Bilkey, 
1973) Managerial commitment to resource allocation for exporting is also an important 
determinant of export behaviour. Firms with a high percentage of exports in sales can be 
characterised by a management team that commit large portions of organisational resources, 
such as financial capital, equipment and employees to internationalisation.
Boeker (1997) examines strategic change as a function of performance and managerial 
characteristics. The main variables that were examined were the tenure of the top 
management teams and the CEO. Boeker found that organisations with long tenured top 
management would exhibit less strategic change. This applies to the firms of the FSU, where 
organisations with long management tenure are more likely to harbour “Red Directors.” As 
already suggested above, in hypothesis 11 in chapter five, managerial turnover could be 
associated with export activity (as suggested by Filatotchev et a l , 1999).
Other research has examined the extent of management quality and exporting, Wisersheim- 
Paul, Welch and Olson (1975) report that exporting firms tend to have superior, more 
aggressive management teams.
Shama and Merrell (1997) have investigated the behaviour of Russian managers and claim 
that, “increasingly Russia’s emerging managers have professional education, favour 
change, ..., and (are) market and consumer orientated, and entrepreneurial risk 
takers. ” As for managers from formerly state owned enterprises their main priority has 
been firm survival, but some are now actively seeking growth opportunities.
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Puffer (1994) also documents similar findings suggesting that a growing number of managers 
are becoming more “market orientated”, one connected study showed that Russian
entrepreneurs exhibit the same amount of achievement motivation as their American
28counterparts .
The innovation status of the firm has also been classified as a characteristic of an exporting 
firm, or its probability of being an exporter. From Wakelins’s (1998) analysis it is clear that 
for a sample of UK manufacturing firms, innovating and non innovating firms behave 
differently in terms of export behaviour. The Wakelin study uses a number of innovations, 
as opposed to the level of R&D expenditure, as a measure of innovation status. The main 
results from this study are that non innovative firms are more likely to export than innovators, 
however the number of past innovations is positively correlated with the probability of a non 
innovating firm exporting. This coincides with the product life cycle in the work of Vernon 
(1966): firms innovate and develop an unstandardised good and eventually export it.
The influence of firm size on export behaviour has featured heavily in the literature.
The predominant hypotheses that have been tested are:
H I: the probability of being an exporter increases with firm size and 
H2: export intensity is positively correlated with firm size.
Aaby and Slater (1989) review 55 studies on size and they find that there is no agreement 
regarding the impact of organisation size on export propensity. Samiee and Walters (1990) 
claim that this conflicting empirical evidence is due to differences in contextual factors, such 
as industry, firm and market environments. In addition, there is not a general consensus on 
which variable should represent size: the number of employees, level of sales, volume of firm 
assets. Reid (1982)29 suggests other size indicators such as the number of technical 
employees and the number of product lines should be used, in this study the number of 
employees is the chosen measure.
Bonaccorsi’s (1992) study based on a survey on the Italian manufacturing industry ‘ falsifies 
the proposition and challenges some widely held assumptions in export marketing 
literature, ” he finds direct evidence to refute H I: in Italy small firms are largely involved in
28 Chirikova (1994) finds in contrast that leaders in formerly state owned firms are “functionalist and 
inflexible, ..., they can only focus on routine problems, ” (taken from an excerpt in Puffer (1994).
29 Reid, S, ‘The impact of size on export behaviour in small firms,” in Export Management, Czinkota and 
Tesar, eds. (1982).
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foreign trade. Additionally, he presents some compelling arguments to suggest that H2 
should also be rejected. Firms that operate in very high- tech industries or those that have a 
very high minimum efficient scale will be more likely to export, in order to recoup innovative 
expenditure and an attempt to enjoy economies of scale, regardless of firm size.
Bonaccorsi also notes that exports provide an opportunity for firm growth, yet he ignores 
the effects of firm size (employees or total sales) on foreign market entry behaviour this 
would be a useful extension, for example firm size could affect the probability of a firm 
acquiring a foreign partner. This will be examined later in chapter six. Bonaccorsi also 
suggests that internationalisation is a “collective process” among Italian firms, with a “high 
degree o f  co-operation within industrial districts ...there is a high level o f  
communication and o f interpersonal relationships among entrepreneurs... ” Thus the 
decision to export can be based on the experiences of neighbouring firms.
Alfred Marshall was one of the first economists to deal with the issue of localisation. He 
noted that the concentration of many firms offers a pooled market for workers with industry 
specific skills, providing a lower probability of unemployment and labour shortage. Also 
localised industries can support production of non tradeable specialised inputs and 
furthermore informational spillovers can give clustered firms an improved production 
function.
More recently, Krugman (1991) examined in detail the reasons for concentration and 
agglomeration of firms. He develops a model which explains why manufacturing forms 
become concentrated in a few regions, whilst others remain relatively undeveloped.
Yet, Krugman’s focus differs from Marshall’s, as it focuses upon generalised external 
economies, rather than a particular industry.
Krugman develops a model based on the monopolistic competition framework stemming 
from the research by Dixit and Stiglitz in the late 1970’s. In the model there are two regions 
and two types of production: agriculture which experiences constant returns to scale and is 
tied to the land region, and manufacturing, an increasing returns to scale sector which can be 
located in either region. The model also makes the strong assumption that transport costs of 
agriculture are zero, ensuring equal prices and wages in agrarian sectors, in both of the 
regions.
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As for the behaviour of firms, due to free entry into the manufacturing sector, profits do not 
exist, leading to equal output per firm, in each region, regardless of the wage rate and 
relative demand However, the number of manufacturing goods produced in each region is 
proportional to the number of workers.
Although the model does not include any dynamics Krugman does set out a brief concept of 
short and long run equilibrium. By examining the distribution of labour between the two 
regions he finds a trade off between proximity to the larger market and a lack of competition 
for the local market.
The model also seeks to explore whether worker concentration can be an equilibrium. It 
assumes that that all workers are located in region one, now being a larger market in that of 
region 2. Krugman asks if it possible for a firm to produce profitably in region two. If not, 
then concentration in region one becomes the equilibrium.
The main result from the algebraic manipulation (shown on p494-7) shows a simple story. In 
an economy with high transport costs and weak economies of scale the distribution of 
manufacturing will be determined by the distribution of “primary stratum o f peasants ” ( 
p497). Conversely, with lower transport costs and strong economies of scale or a higher 
proportion of manufacturing, circular causation and concentration will occur in which ever 
region gets a “head start ” (p497.)
Krugman’s study is useful as it shows how a country can become differentiated into an 
industrial core and an agricultural periphery by using transport costs and economies of scale. 
However, Neary (2001) criticises the new economic geography models on a variety of 
issues. For example, he notes that use and treatment of returns to scale maybe faulty, also 
the model does not allow the strategic interaction between firms, and lastly he claims that the 
model fails to account for the localisation of individual firms.
In Russia, co-operation may not be possible due to the sheer scale of the country, 
competing criminal networks and industrial concentration. Through the application of 
oligopolistic reaction or a bandwagon effect, managers may react to another rival firm, or 
indeed, any “neaf’ firm’s decision to export and follow suit
Aitken’s (1997) results differ from Bonaccorsi’s: in Mexico the decision to export is not 
correlated with local concentration of overall export activity. This could hold true for Russia
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too, regions are possibly too huge to allow for oligopolistic reaction. However, on an 
industry level, oligopolistic reaction may have some power, if a firm which is an industrial 
rival begins to export, this may positively affect the decision to export.
In this research, variables are not available for export planning, firm age,30 managerial 
characteristics such as age and lingual aptitude, as they were not captured by the 
questionnaire. Instead, managerial tenure, investment levels, firm size, industry membership 
and one factor which has not been used widely in the literature: ownership structure. In 
chapter six, concerning foreign partner selection, managerial attitudes will also be 
considered, a variable which is rare in most studies of internationalisation.
It can be anticipated that ownership structure will have a much bigger role in determining if 
a firm undertakes export activity in transition economies. For example, a firm with a 
remaining majority state ownership may be less likely to export to non former CMEA 
countries, than a firm with widespread outside ownership. This factor has been ignored in a 
wide number of studies (see Dosoglu and Guner, 2001, for an exception), and shall be 
examined thoroughly in chapter five.
Entry modes
Entry modes are a “frontier issue” in international marketing according to Anderson and 
Gatignon (1986) as the choice of entry mode brings a variety of advantages or drawbacks. 
However, the trade off between control and the amount of resources committed is not easy 
to evaluate, as we shall see below, when transaction cost analysis is employed.
This section will aim to illustrate the main motivations for each entry mode, present a 
framework for examining market entry and section 2.5b shall present some of the critical 
issues presented in experiences of international joint ventures in Russia.
Reich and Mankin (1986) cite that technology transfer is often a sensitive issue when 
considering a joint venture because the partners’ interests may conflict and tension may arise 
when one partner has the incentive to access technology and the other has the motive to 
protect technology. This may breed potential antagonism.
30 Ursic and Czinkota (1984) claim that younger firms are more disposed towards exporting activity, in 
transition economies it could be argued that younger firms are more likely to be unscathed by the 
former political system, and thus more prone to restructuring, this will be complex to quantify and thus 
shall not be followed up as an independent variable.
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This has been illustrated by McCarthy and Puffer who show that some multinational 
enterprises (MNE’s) are reluctant to invest beyond a limited amount required to establish a 
toehold, these organisations’ conservative attitudes to the risk and uncertainty in the Russian 
milieu employ a much different strategy to that of MNEs with aggressive investment policy. 
While it is clear that not all MNEs behave in the manner hypothesised above, such as the 
fast-food chain, Me Donald’s and Coca Cola who have both followed a voluntary heavy 
investment strategy, there is definite evidence of large companies, namely IBM, which used 
a reverse incremental strategy of reversing their course and re-deploying assets. In 1996 
IBM reduced its production presence in Russia, and reverted to exporting personal 
computers to Russia.
This may lead Russian firms to retreat to less “riskier” modes of entry such a licensing or non 
equity strategic alliances, if they fear that foreign partners will not fulfil their part of the 
agreement, this maybe one of the reasons why we see a decline in the number of firms with a 
foreign partner in chapter six. However, a trade off will occur risk versus opportunities for 
R&D and technological transfer.
Motivations
Eramilli (1991) finds in his study that firms with low levels of knowledge desire higher 
degrees of control when entering foreign markets to reduce risk and perceived cost, yet 
higher control is likely to involve higher amounts of investment
Terpstra (1997) recognises that the selection of method of entry to foreign markets depends 
on industry and firm specific factors particular to each firm which may be classed under the 
following:
• company goals: geographic coverage, time span.
• company size
• nature of product line
• competition abroad
• the degree of control and local feedback the firm requires
• investment requirements and the ability to raise finance
• length of profit horizon- does investment need to be recouped in the short or long run? 
The next section shall deal with the main motivations for various entry modes:
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1) Licensing agreements
This is a quick and easy method of entering a foreign market, which is suitable for firms who 
have limited funds for capital investment. Generally host governments favour this method 
over direct foreign investment, thus the need for meeting administrative and legislative 
demands are reduced. Additionally savings in trade barriers and transport costs will be 
acquired.
These benefits must be weighed up against the limited returns, lack of quality control and the 
fear of the licensee developing a competing product. However, despite these downfalls 
licensing agreements may provide a useful introduction to foreign markets for firms in 
transition.
2) International joint ventures (IJVs)
Harrigan (1988) describes how as business risks soar and competition grows more 
aggressive firms will embrace JV’s with increased fervour. International joint ventures can 
assist a domestic firm to enter the global environment or find a new method of competing, in 
fact the creation of a JV is one method of gaining a competitive advantage.
Each partner of the operating JV must make a contribution in the form of capital, 
technology, marketing, personnel or physical assets and at least one must have access to 
distributive infrastructure. The resources that each party possesses will form the basis of its 
bargaining power when entering the JV. This could have serious implications for the balance 
of power in JV’s in transition economies.
IJVs offer firms the opportunity to achieve greater returns from equity as opposed to 
loyalties from licensing agreements. Firms initiating UVs will also be motivated by greater 
degrees of control over production and marketing, as well as more feedback from local 
markets. Also there is more potential to exchange technology, managerial know how, 
equipment and local market knowledge between parties, this pooling of resources will help 
the progeny to develop new core competencies and synergy, which would not be achieved 
if the two firms operated alone. Thus each partner will be able to concentrate resources in 
those areas in which it has relative competencies while diversifying into other areas.
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UVs also provide a platform to overcome market imperfections yet they cause conflict 
between the two partners if their expectations are not met. They require high degrees of trust 
and co-operation and as Buckley and Casson (1992) point out “the success o f  this 
mechanism will depend on how each firm is to ideas emanating from an alien 
culture, ” this may be particularly profound for the transition economies.
In short, Buckley and Casson (1996) summarise the conditions conducive to UVs as the 
possession of complementary assets, opportunities for collusion and barriers to full 
integration.
3) FDI
It is well known that FDI by multinational corporations is considered to be a major channel 
for access to advanced technology by the developing world, it could be argued that outward 
FDI by transition economies will also benefit from this “contagion effect” from more 
advanced technology and management practices used by firms abroad. Bulatov (1998) 
studies the motivations for Russian outward FDI and found that one of the motivations is to 
rely on local partners for international experience, greater financial power, and highly 
qualified personnel
Borensztein (1995) claims that technological progress will occur through a process of capital 
deepening in the form of new varieties of capital goods and practices, however for transition 
economies undertaking outward FDI, or developing countries accepting inward FDI, before 
advanced technologies can be applied, the presence of a sufficient level of human capital is 
required. Thus for FDI to be productive a minimum threshold stock of human capital must 
be achieved. By, examining levels of education (e.g. primary, secondary and tertiary) as a 
proxy for human capital it would be fair to say that Russia, Ukraine and Belarus have 
reached this minimum threshold, due to the high level of education inherited from the socialist 
era (see for example the World Development Indicators, 1997). Barro and Lee (1993) use 
a similar variable of human capital stock namely the average years of secondary schooling.
If a firm has the ability to raise large amounts of capital finance, has successfully built up local 
knowledge, possesses contacts in the foreign market then it may be more suitable for an
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internationalising firm to consider acquisition of an existing firm overseas. It has already been 
mentioned above, that a firm in a transition economy may hope to acquire some of these 
characteristics from the local firm.
However, if it fears resentment and upheaval form the local population it may be prudent to 
purchase a “green field site” which could provide spillovers to the local economy in the form 
of job creation and possible increased demand for intermediate goods and distribution 
channels. For example, a study by Borensztein et al (1995) shows that FDI favours the 
expansion of domestic firms complementary in production or by increasing their productivity 
by spillover effects from advanced technology. In addition FDI actually has a “crowding in “ 
effect: a net inflow of FDI is associated with an increase in total investment in the host 
economy. In return, the investing firm will acquire a wider market access for growth and 
may increase its scope for efficiency seeking by finding cheaper raw materials.
Bulatov (1998) examines the motives of outward FDI, specifically for Russia. From his 
survey of 22 Russian companies in 1995 he found that the negative aspects of the domestic 
investment climate, excessive taxation and political instability, the desire to have a “spare 
business abroad”, to be close to foreign markets and the need to gain a competitive edge 
with a unique product, all motivate the decision to undertake FDI. These motivations may be 
common to other countries of the former Soviet Union.
Having discussed the main motivations behind various entry modes we can conclude that 
there is not an optimal method to enter a foreign market To quote Terpstra (1997) “the 
way best fo r  the firm  depends not only on its size, capabilities, and needs, but also on 
the opportunities and conditions in the target markets, ” It is imperative for the firm to 
examine its own situation to see how the characteristics above apply to itself.
A framework fo r  analysing entry modes
A more rigorous approach to examining entry modes is the transaction cost approach. 
Assuming that the aim is to maximise the return on investment of an entry mode, a theory of 
vertical integration can be used to generate hypotheses about the desirability of various entry 
modes.
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Anderson and Gatignon (1986) show that the efficiency of an entry mode depends on four 
constructs which assist the determination of the optimal degree of control.
1. Transaction specific assets : investments that are specialised to one or few users or uses.
2. External uncertainty: the unpredictability of the entrant’s external environment.
3. Internal uncertainty : the entrant’s inability to determine its agents’ performance by 
observing output.
4. Free riding potential: an agents’ ability to receive benefits without bearing the associated 
costs.
These variables will be positively related to the entrants’ degree of control.
The transaction costs analysis framework highlights the entry mode problem, the 
significance of uncertainty, balancing risks and the scale of operations. What it actively does 
is to offer a number of propositions for different governance structures, product lines and 
sociological distances to assist the managerial decision of how to select the appropriate 
entry mode.
Buckley and Casson (1998) extend the internalisation approach to foreign market entry, 
their model strives to improve on Dunning’s eclectic paradigm by -
• encompassing all entry modes
• distinguishing between production and distribution
• accounting for strategic intentions between the entrant and the host
However, their main contribution is to introduce market structure and competitive strategy 
into the modelling of the entry mode decision.
The model encircles location costs, internalisation factors, cultural factors, market structure 
and competitive strategy. It derives a “profit norm” which represents the situation of 
acquisition with guaranteed local market knowledge, and then compares the costs of 
alternative strategies to this norm. By a process of elimination from their workings, only two 
strategies remain: greenfield production combined with acquired distribution, greenfield 
production combined with franchised distribution and licensing. Finally, a method to derive 
the propensity to adopt a given strategy is used, focusing on the rate of interest, set up costs 
and the cost of building up trust, post acquisition.
While this model appears robust, as well as flexible, that can be easily extended posses a 
dynamic dimension or be refined to analysing duopolistic rivals, it has been
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shown that firms are not used to carrying out this particular kind of cost benefit 
analysis of each entry mode (see Robinson, 1978).
Few of the studies presented appear to integrate other modes of entry into the model, by 
recognising that exporting is the first stage of the internationalisation process31, this study 
hopes to improve on this. Firstly the determinants of exporting shall be examined Secondly 
the factors which determine the entry of foreign firms into Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, and 
how domestic firms select a foreign partner, shall be investigated. This, I would hope, give a 
broader outline of the growth and alternative strategies available to firms, within the scope 
of serving foreign markets.
2.1b E v id e n c e  a n d  is s u e s  c o n c e r n in g  e n t r y  m o d e s  in  t h e  f o r m e r  s o v ie t  u n io n
AND OTHER EMERGING ECONOMIES.
This section will present some findings of studies based on experiences of I JV’s and FDI. 
First, it would be enlightening to know how many firms used in this sample, from the 
University of Nottingham, have advanced from the first stage of internationalisation, and 
have initiated joint ventures, have gained inward FDI and undertook their own outward 
FDI.
The percentage of firms with a foreign investor could also be considered an advancement 
on the internationalisation path and thus shall be presented here.
Table 2: The levels of licensing, ivs and FDI in 1996 in Russia. Ukraine and Belarus
The percentage of firms who possess:
Licensing agreement with a foreign investor 4.9
Joint venture agreement with a minority stake 5.1
Joint venture agreement with a majority 
stake
4.8
a minority stake in a firm abroad 0.7
a majority stake in a firm abroad 1.1
a foreign investor 34
seek a foreign investor 63
University of Nottingham database.
31 Those that do actively recognise this are Buckley, P, “The Foreign investment decision,” 
Management and Bibliographies and review, 1979, and Johanson, J and Wiedersheim- Paul, F, “The 
internationalisation of the firm: four Swedish cases,” Journal of Management Studies, 1977.
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While it is obvious that the numbers of joint ventures and outward FDI have been low it 
seems that there is some potential for growth in this area: with almost two thirds of firms 
seeking a foreign investor.
An important issue described in the literature is that of the entry mode of multinational 
companies into transition economies. Bridgewater (1999) uses three strands of literature to 
understand entry behaviour of MNC’s into Ukraine: economic based theories (oligopolistic 
reaction), incremental theory and network theory. She argues that network theory will make 
the largest contribution to the advancement of knowledge on entry behaviour. Furthermore, 
Bridgewater claims that economic based theories treat the firm as a “black box”, that’s to 
say that firm behaviour is dictated by market conditions and cannot explain divergent entry 
modes by firms in the same sector. Conversely, network theory views the firm as 
embedded in a complex web of interdependent relationships, which may impact on entry 
decisions.
Bridgewater uses Lee’s (1993) distinction between external and internal interactions in 
international market entry as a framework. This means that all actors in the environment are 
considered, despite different traits, thus the environment becomes “fu ll faced?  (p i02). 
However, in reality, the changing structure of Ukraine’s networks may make identifying 
potential partners difficult An example of external interactions which may influence market 
entry is inter-organisational relationships, at home, in the host or other markets, these 
relations may be with other firms, suppliers or customers, or regulatory bodies. 
Alternatively, at the inter organisational level, relations between different agents within the 
firm may shape entry mode decisions.
Using a Eisenhardt’s structured case study approach, to ensure robustness of results, she 
finds that neither incrementalism, internalisation or oligopoly theory can frilly explain entry 
behaviour (pi 13). In contrast, network theory us useful as new Ukrainian networks are 
emerging and can determine entry mode choices. From her case studies Bridgewater finds 
the following experiences:
“it seems impossible to carry out ...business functions without enlisting in the help i f  
useful Ukrainian contacts, ” and that some firms have “long standing relationships with 
counterparts in customer or regulatory bodies, ” (pi 14).
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Manea and Pearce (1992) take a different approach and examine the strategic positioning 
of trans-national corporations in Romania. They adopt Dunning’s (1993) categorisation of 
INC activity: market seeking, efficiency seeking and knowledge seeking. A survey of 
TNC’s operating in Romania allowed their classification into the three genres, whilst it 
proved difficult to allocate a TNC into a particular group, it emerged that one of the most 
sxong reasons for investing in Romania was market seeking. Furthermore, their survey 
indicated that this strategic position allows them “to help our TNC group to effectively 
extend the supply o f its established products into Romanian and other CEE 
markets, ” (pi3), whilst using imported standardised technologies (p22). Manea and 
Pearce (1992) conclude that this is a worrying finding as these TNC’s are not generating 
localised creative competencies. For industrial transformation to take place dynamism and 
upgrading of resources are necessary, if standardised technologies are used they are “likely 
to stiffle rather than support change, ” (p23). This could breed antagonism and conflict, 
as Romanian firms may come to believe they are being used solely as an export platform, 
without the possibility of any benefits, such as technology transfer.
Indeed a major issue identified in the literature is that of joint venture success and conflict 
Buckley and Casson (1990) discuss several solutions to joint venture conflict and mistrust 
Firstly, they believe that the two parties should collaborate on two ventures instead of one. 
The function of the second venture is to counteract the mistrust by giving the least vulnerable 
party in the first venture, the greatest vulnerability in the second venture (p420).
Next they note that the role of co-operation is very important in solving conflict (p420), 
which may be a more efficient solution to creating another joint venture. It is the 
responsibility of the leadership of the firm to develop and corporate culture where a co­
operative spirit is paramount. Also leadership must ensure that their employees behave co­
operatively towards their counterparts in the other party.
Conversely, Newman (1992) examines determinants of success, rather than solutions to 
conflict and mistrust. Using evidence from UV experience in China, Newman identifies 
several key factors contributing to their success. The main one being the focused IJV  
strategy which has five elements: 1) prescribed operations, 2) a narrow product line, 3) a 
sustained commitment of partners to the initial simple focus of the UV, 4) motivated
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employees who accept the character of the IJV and 5) strict performance standards for 
local suppliers. These guidelines emphasise the importance of maximising current 
performance and achieving good performance in the short run. While Russian managers 
may agree on the importance of the five rules, they may consolidate their fears that MNEs 
may deviate from their initial commitment and use UVs as a transitional mode to eventually 
establish a wholly owned subsidiary. To reduce the probability of a conflict of interests the 
foreign partner must be explicit in its intentions and its time horizon to the Russian partner. 
Another method of ensuring success of UVs is by assigning parent country managers to 
key positions in the UV, suggest Geringer and Herbert (1989). In the case of Russia it will 
be relatively easy to find local managerial talents with local knowledge, connections and 
strong leadership skills. For instance, McDonald’s in Moscow replaced all of its foreign 
managers by local ones and adopted its own training mechanism. Nevertheless, Russian 
managerial philosophy could pose problems in the case of Russian -US UVs: Russian 
managers often put emphasis on task completion as opposed to product quality, this bad 
habit will have to avoided to serve customers that now seek high quality goods. For the US 
partner these cultural factors ingrained in Russian managerial thinking represent an extra 
training expense or risk.
Banai et al. (1999) in their study of Russian - US joint ventures claim that in order to avoid 
conflict a mutual understanding of the other partner’s position is crucial for a successful 
international joint venture. In short, “the success o f an international joint 
venture... depends on each partner’s compatible objectives as well as their willingness 
to contribute complementary resources, ” (p i8).
The Banai et al. (1999) study adopts a relatively new strategy, and investigates 
expectations of Russian managers on prospective UV’s. This is a similar approach to that 
taken in chapter six, where the perceptions of managers in host countries are examined. In 
their survey o f226 Russian mangers they examine why UV’s are attractive to Russian 
managers, potential problems envisaged, the possibility of a focused UV strategy, preferred 
equity structure and managerial philosophy. Their main results were positive, illustrating that 
motives are complementary, and perceived problems of each partner can be solved by the 
competencies of the other partner. Surprisingly, Russian managers agree to having 50-50 
management composition of Russian and US managers, and recognise that their US
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counterparts can facilitate the learning process (p32). However, there may be some conflict 
surrounding managerial philosophy, Russian managers tend to be autocratic and task 
orientated, while US managers are more people orientated and concerned with quality, 
both parties will have to adapt to these differing managerial styles and allow the qualities of 
each partner to be bought to the forefront. To conclude, the ideal IJV should draw 
resources and competencies from both partners, and make disclosure paramount, in 
particular concerning technology transfer, to avoid false expectations of host managers.
Fey and Beamish (2000) claim that meta analysis of 12 studies on UV failure showed that 
half identified conflict as the main culprit Tilman (1990) finds similar findings for Japanese 
and Thai UVs with the amount of conflict inversely affecting UV performance. Fey and 
Beamish’s work attempts to seek the determinants of such conflict The conflict literature 
identifies several causes of conflict, the most common ones being: competition for scarce 
resources, desire for autonomy, goal divergence, and perceptual incongruities. It is the 
latter, perceptual incongruities in the form of differing organisational climate which Fey and 
Beamish emphasise. These organisational differences may manifest themselves as different 
modes of communication, differing levels of team work and formal control and attitudes to 
risk. Other researchers have found that inter-firm diversity restricts the firms’ abilities to co­
operate successfully, see Adler and Greene (1989).
In contrast, firms with similar organisational climate have a greater chance of avoiding 
conflict, as parents of UVs will have aligned needs and assume lower agency costs.
Through a series of interviews with top managers of Russian UVs and a quantitative 
questionnaire, support for the following hypothesis was found- the greater the organisational 
similarity between the foreign parent and the JV organisation, lessens the propensity for 
conflict
This supports the work of Harrigan (1988) who finds that corporate culture homogeneity 
among partners is more important than national culture homogeneity. Similarly Buckley and 
Casson (1990) find that cultural differences are a source of conflict, and will determine the 
degree of co-operation between parties. They postulate that it is more important to know 
the religion or cultural background of senior management, opposed to their nationality 
(p425).
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Bridgewater (1999) in her case studies of Ukrainian IJVs find that networks and inter - 
intra organisational relationships must be forged to improve their chances of good 
performance, in order to compensate for disintegrated institutional relations and the 
“confusion and disorder*2” that has ensued over the last decade.
2.1C A SPECIAL CASE FOREIGN PARTNER SELECTION
As we have seen above, conflict endangers UV success. In the case of Russia the failure 
rate of UVs has been high, notes Banai et a l (1999), in fact of the 4000 registered in 
1993, only 20% were fully operational (p i8).
A determinant of UV success may well be the procedure undertaken to select a foreign 
partner. As Koot (1988) mentions foreign partner selection is difficult but critical to success 
of the international joint venture. The perceptions of what a potential foreign partner can 
bring in terms of technology, distribution networks and marketing etc. will obviously affect 
UV performance. If one partner overestimates the potential positive qualities of a partner, 
this may lead to conflict
Therefore, this is one of the reasons for examining foreign partner selection in the former 
Soviet Union in chapter six, where perceptions of local managers in relation to potential 
foreign partners, and their beliefs on how they are perceived by foreign partners are 
analysed.
By focusing on foreign partner selection from the local partner’s point of view this 
represents one of the first studies of this kind in the transition economics field, as Brouthers 
and Bamoussy (1997) note “research that examines joint venture activities involving 
CEE state owned enterprises is still an underdeveloped area o f inquiry, ” (p215).
Hitt et al (2001) had examined partner selection in three emerging economies (Mexico, 
Poland and Romania) and three developed economies (Canada, US and France). They 
hypothesised that there will be differences in partner selection criterion in the two types of 
market, owing to the resource based theory of the firm and organisational learning. Thus 
current resource endowments and needs motivate partner selection. For example, firms in 
emerging markets may seek a foreign partner “to develop their capability to compete in
32 Manninen and Snelbecker, (1993).
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domestic and global markets, ” whereas firms from developed economies may search for 
a partner “with specific resources...to complement their own resource base, ” (p451). 
They then test a number of hypotheses on how much emphasis is put on various criterion of 
partner selection (access to finance, technological/managerial capabilities etc.) by managers 
from each type of market By using hierarchial linear modelling their results show that 
partners are selected for access to resources and organisational learning opportunities and 
that context in partner selection is important (p461).
Firms in emerging markets value partners with access to finance, technical capabilities, 
intangible assets and a willingness to share expertise, more than firms from developed 
markets. While firms from developed markets value partners with access to unique 
competencies, access to markets and knowledge, more than firms from emerging markets. 
However, organisational learning is important for both groups of firms: both deem 
willingness to share expertise an important criterion in foreign partner selection.
Lastly, Hitt et al. comment on points for further research, they note that foreign partner 
selection is a dynamic process and that motives for selecting a partner may change over 
time. We allow for dynamism and test hypotheses for presence of a foreign partner over a 
two year period.
Brouthers and Bamoussy (1997) take an alternative approach to examining partner 
selection: they look at the role of key stakeholders (the government) in international joint 
venture negotiations in Central and eastern Europe (CEE). They hypothesise that a key 
stakeholder can shift the balance of bargaining power during joint venture negotiations, and 
therefore are capable of changing the outcome of the process.
They claim that the government maybe a key stakeholder in CEE as it controls two major 
resources: ownership and “suasion”33 and that it can influence the UV formation in many 
ways. Firstly, it may affect the pre negotiation stage by signalling to potential investors which 
SOE’s are acceptable for potential UVs. More importantly the key stakeholder may affect 
the industry structure to alter the bargaining power of the firm, i.e. by combining multiple 
segments into one firm (p289).
33 Suasion is the ability to withhold a resource, which would end the negotiation process or lead to IJV 
failure. This could involve withholding access to a trading license, a market or a supplier. (p287).
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In the negotiation stage the government may intervene at each step of the negotiation or wait 
until the post negotiation stage to act In the final stage the stakeholder may “demand 
changes in resource commitment, equity and control, ” (p290).
From eight case studies in Hungary and Romania they find that governments can have a 
direct and indirect influence on UV formation, pre and post negotiation stages, yet their 
extent and type of influence is contingent on the context For example, intervention is more 
frequent in strategic industries (telecommunications, oil and gas) than in consumer industries 
(food).
Some of their main findings indicate that in almost 40% of cases the government signalled all 
of its objectives prior to contact with a potential investor, furthermore, in some cases (gas 
and telecommunications sector) the government used its resources to influence the balance 
of power in the negotiations.
However, a more significant finding was that sometimes governments influence the UV 
formation process to the detriment of their own SOE, which could become a source of 
potential conflict in later UV success. Unfortunately, our data does not capture the role of 
the government in the foreign partner selection process, but this could be a possible route 
for further research.
2.2  P r iv a t isa t io n  a n d  O w n e r sh ip
The roots of the debate concerning privatisation and property rights date back at least to 
the seventeenth century teachings of the English philosopher John Locke, who proposed that 
rights to personal property should arise whenever man “mixed his labour”, because “’tis 
labour indeed that puts the difference of value on everything.” Locke34 envisaged the right to 
property as a right to material benefits and also as personal rights included in, “lives, 
liberties and estates,” Over time this view has been employed as the foundations of political 
philosophy surrounding the ownership conundrum.
The fundamental concept that lies behind privatisation is the transfer o f  ownership rights 
from the state to the private individuals, with its aim as to diminish the state’s direct role in 
the day- to day running of the firm and essentially to “depoliticise” enterprise decisions and
34 J. Locke (1632-1704) “Two treatises of government”, London, 1690.
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create a new class of capitalists. Lavigne (1999) adds that in LDC’s privatisation should 
also include the creation of an entirely new enterprise sector.
A Brief history ofprivatisation in the Twentieth century
Megginson and Netter (2001) provide an excellent survey of the literature on privatisation, 
and it is from their study that the next sections shall draw from.
They note that in the twentieth century the balance of private and state ownership varied in 
Western Europe and its colonies. Following world war two European governments became 
more active in the ownership of production, and those in developing countries increased 
their ownership due to their belief that state ownership boosted economic growth.
However, a privatisation programme was launched in the Federal Republic of Germany in 
1961 by the Adenauer government, beginning with selling a majority stake in Volkswagen. 
More recently, in the UK, during the 1980’s privatisation was established as a basic 
economic policy, as part of the Tory campaign, and by the end of the 1990’s the role of 
state owned enterprises was reduced to virtually nothing. Other European governments also 
launched privatisation programmes during the same period, for example Chirac’s 
government in 1986 privatised over 20 corporations.
Privatisation had also spread further afield to the People’s Republic of China, which initiated 
several small privatisations in the 1970’s, however the impact of privatisation was much 
wider and more successful in Latin America, for example, Mexico. As for Saharan Africa 
privatisation has not been widespread, although Nigeria has allowed public share offerings. 
The final region to implement privatisation programmes was the former Soviet bloc. In this 
area privatisation was part of many other economic reforms, as part of the transition to a 
market economy. As the population lacked savings, this shaped the method of privatisation, 
therefore mass privatisation programmes were common, which distributed vouchers to the 
population (see later sections in this chapter for details of privatisation programmes in 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus another privatisation programme had been launched in the 
Federal Republic of Germany in 1961 by the Adenauer government, beginning with selling 
a majority stake in Volkswagen..
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The goals of all these governments were broadly similar: to increase revenue for the state, 
promote economic efficiency, decrease government interference, promote wider share 
ownership introduce competition and subject state owned enterprises to market discipline.
Since the ownership structure of a firm has a large impact on its behaviour and performance 
we can expect a change in property rights to alter the underlying incentive structure and thus 
the behaviour of management simultaneously .
This can be succinctly illustrated by the principal and agent relationship and the subsequent 
problems that arise (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, is the seminal paper) Agency problems are 
likely to occur whenever:
“The directors o f such (joint stock) companies, however, being the managers rather 
o f others people ’s money than o f their own, it cannot well be expected, that they 
should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in 
private copartnery frequently watch over their own.... Negligence and profusion 
therefore must always prevail...in the management o f the affairs o f  such a company ”
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 1776.
Or, in brief, a “separation of ownership and control35 ” in large corporations and other 
organisations, namely financial mutuals, non profit organisations and partnerships give rise to 
these agency problems.
Simultaneously it must not be forgotten that the creation of the publicly held corporation did 
bring serious advantages, that have been responsible for the economic growth of much of 
the West (see Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986.) From 1895-1945 a revolution was 
experienced in economic organisation with the discovery of advantages of investment in 
corporations with easily marketable shares. Through the growth of commercial law and the 
abolition of the necessary royal charter the modem business corporation or the joint stock 
company was bom. By 1834 joint stock companies became legally recognised bodies and 
1856 saw registered companies gaining limited liability, thus by the end of the nineteenth 
century limited liability was a normal practice. Limited liability ensured that a member’s
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liability was restricted to their investment. The main advantages of this enterprise form is that 
investors are able to spread the risk of investment by small and marketable shares and are 
also able to express dissatisfaction with management by selling shares and reinvesting.
Tlie incorporated company did not end the organisational experiment, in fact this was only 
the beginning, to follow came the evolution of the multidivisional structure, take-overs, 
franchising and decentralisation.
The organisational revolution that occurred in the Soviet Union involved the transfer of 
ownership to the state, not investors. At the moment these countries are undergoing another 
“revolution” of trying to reverse this process.
Privatisation with the aim of transferring ownership from public to private hands
led to differences in the relationship between management (the agent) and their principal
(formerly the government, and now the entrepreneur) which implies a change in the
relationship between those responsible for firms decisions and the beneficiaries of its profit
flows. These differences are enhanced by the pre privatisation characteristics of Soviet
enterprises:
• principals did not seek to profit maximise.
• absence of market of corporate control
• non existent bankruptcy constraint on financial performance.
It could be argued that the principal -agent problem in Soviet enterprises in some ways was 
similar to that of the Western world with Soviet managers seeking perquisites and following 
self interested paths of behaviour inducing a residual loss (there will be a divergence 
between the agent’s decisions and the decisions that would maximise welfare of the 
principal, in this case the government.)
McFaul (1995) documents that agency dilemmas were acute in the Soviet era between the 
Party State (principal) and the enterprise directors (agent.) Despite being a command 
economy the interactions between the State and its agents were based upon a contractual 
relationship. Yet as the number of transactions increased the State found it harder to monitor 
the agents and developments, throughout the Brezhnev era allowed directors to assume 
more control of enterprises, and a rise in “grey” behaviour, such as production skimming and
35 See E. Fama and M. Jensen (1983.).
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shirking, leading to uncertainty and goal conflict, which are some of the main characteristics 
of the agency relationship.
One problem which was bound to occur after the collapse of the Former Soviet Union was 
the emergence of mangers behaving according to saticficing models, as first suggested by 
Williamson, whereby managers tend not to focus on maximising profits, but maximising his 
utility function consisting of a factors such as salary, size of workforce and perks.
An agency relationship can be defined as a contract under which one or more persons, the 
principal, hires another person, the agent, to perform some of the decision making activities 
in the firm, which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships. The only difference in the 
former Soviet Union is that the principal does not hire the agent - the director is already in 
place in most firms, remaining from before the privatisation process. If we assume that both 
parties are aiming to maximise utility then it can be anticipated that the agent will not always 
act in the best interests of the principal. The only way the principal can limit the residual loss, 
or the divergences from his interests is by creating an incentive structure for the agent and 
by incurring monitoring costs, as suggested by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) to reduce the 
self interested motives of the agent (in Alchian and Demsetz the emphasis is on the 
monitoring workers in team production.) In addition, it may be in the principals’ best 
interests to pay a bonding cost to the agent to guarantee that he will not take actions that are 
detrimental to the firm. Regardless of the principals’ efforts it will be impossible for him to 
ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions to guarantee the maximisation of the 
principal’s welfare. Thus we can summarise agency costs as the sum of monitoring costs, 
bonding expenditure and the possible residual loss.
It can be expected that agency costs will become particularly tense in Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus when insider dominated firms begin to sell shares to outsider owners, in the 
anticipation of assistance with restructuring, at the cost of control. Thus a trade off exists for 
the principal, between finance from equity markets and a loss of control. Agency costs will 
then be derived from the divergence between the insider owners and the outside 
shareholders’ interests, since the principal will reduce the proportion of costs of any non 
pecuniary benefits.
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As Jensen and Meckling note, as the owners- manager’s fraction of equity declines his 
residual claims on the financial outcome declines, in turn he will increase his self interested 
activities and award himself more perquisites. Outsiders may realise that they will have to 
bear monitoring costs to prevent this, which will be reflected in the share price. The effects 
of managerial ownership on market valuation of the firm have appeared in the literature in 
two articles, by Berle and Means (1932) and Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988). Berle 
and Means claim that if management hold too little equity and shareholders are sufficiently 
dispersed then inadequate monitoring of firm value maximisation will ensue. Morck et a l use 
piece-wise regression wise to find that the relationship between managerial ownership and 
market valuation, using Tobin’s Q as a proxy, is non linear, with medium levels of 
managerial ownership being associated with a fall in Tobin’s Q and high levels of managerial 
entrenchment Possible reasons for this he with the fact that at medium levels of managerial 
ownership (5-25%) managers do not have the incentive to pursue firm value maximising 
objectives or they may be colluding with board members. In contrast, at low levels of 
managerial ownership(0- 5%) managers may have the incentive to maximise Tobin’s Q in 
hope of promotion or the right to purchase more shares.
The agency relationship model of Jensen and Meckling (1976) illustrates the reduction of the 
market value of the firm caused by the owner-manager’ s consumption of perquisites or self 
interested behaviour.
In their model, X = {xl, x2,.. .,xn} is defined as a vector of quantities of all factors and 
activities within the firm, from which the manager derives non-pecuniary benefits. C(x) is the 
total cost of providing any given amount of these items and P(x) is the total dollar value to 
the firm of the productive benefits of X. Lastly, B(x) represents the net dollar value to the 
firm, ignoring any effects of X on the equilibrium wage of the manager. Thus, the optimum 
levels of factors and activities X are define by X* so that:
dB(X*) dP(X*) dC(X*) 
dX* ~ dX* ~ dX*
We can then define F as the dollar cost to the firm of providing the X-X* factors and
activities which bring utility to the manager, so in essence F is the current market value of
the stream of manager’s expenditures on non- pecuniary benefits.
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V denotes the value or wealth of the firm, and as the paper is concerned with the 
consequences of the owner -manager selling some of the equity, equity is defined by a 36. 
The Jensen and Meckling model then assumes that equity markets and buyer behaviour are 
rational, so that buyers will anticipate the increase in non pecuniary benefits of the manager. 
As a result, the new owner will not pay (1- a  )V* for 1- a  of the equity.
Thus the Jensen and Meckling theorem gives:
For a claim on the firm  o f (1-c l)  the outsider will pay only (l-cc) times the value he 
expects the firm  to have given the induced change in the behaviour o f the owner- 
manager37.
This means that the decrease in the value of the firm is imposed on the owner- manager, 
representing the residual loss or the agency costs accrued form the sale of equity to 
outsiders. Blasi et a l (1997) document the resistance of insider owners to outsiders with 
general directors making it clear that they are opposed the sale of stock to unknown 
outsiders. One interviewee claimed, “I f  a foreign investor agreed to give us all the 
capital we needfor control o f  the f ir m , I'm  not sure I ’d  take the offer j”38. One of the 
reasons for this opposition to outsiders may be caused by the very fact that insider- owners 
must bear the cost of agency. Upon selling a fraction of the firm’s equity to an outsider, (1- 
a  ) we can anticipate that that the owner- manager’s consumption of non pecuniary benefits 
will increase to F°, causing the value of the firm to fall to V°. Thus the buyer will not buy (1- 
a  )V* for his fraction of the equity, but (1 - a  ) V°. This will represent a loss of pecuniary 
income for the owner manager of (1 - a  )V* - (1- a  )V°.
In the above analysis we have made an important assumption, that outside owners will not 
monitor management behaviour, this assumption is then relaxed by Jensen and Meckling.
The owner- manager’s activities can be monitored by expending resources upon auditing, 
formal control systems, budget restrictions and the creation of an incentive system that brings 
the interests of the owner- manager and outside owners more closely in line.
However, it is of no importance who actually makes the monitoring expenditure, the owner- 
manager could expend resources to guarantee to outsiders that he would limit his 
expenditure on F- these are termed bonding costs. The results will be the same in the case
36 Please refer to the paper for a full mathematical and diagrammatic treatment of the model.
37 For details of the proof see, M. Jensen and W. Meckling,” (1976.)
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of outsiders undertaking the monitoring, with non pecuniary benefits falling to F” . The 
manager will be willing to carry out these costs if the net increment in his wealth from the 
increase in the firm value is greater than the loss in welfare from foregoing perquisites. The 
optimum position will occur where bonding expenditures and monitoring create the same 
outcome. In the transition environment bonding costs maybe related to the cost of entering 
the stock exchange or financial auditing and disclosure.
The above analysis has shown that whenever ownership and control are separated agency 
problems occur due to the self interested behaviour of managers.
However, Fama and Jensen39 (1983) show that in, “complex organisations the benefits 
o f diffuse residual claims and the benefits o f  separation o f decision functions from  
residual risk bearing are generally greater than the agency costs they generate,...” 
The reason for this lies with the fact that the separation of decision making and control 
contribute to firm’s survival as better decisions will be achieved by delegating decision 
functions to agents who have specialised knowledge and access to financial capital, 
compared to many residual claimants.
The theme of the transfer of ownership to outsiders is a key element in this study and shall 
be returned to in later chapters.
2.2b The transfer of ownership: state control to private ownership
The objective function of the principal and agent will also be modified by the transfer of 
ownership from state to private hands. A characteristic of state control is that principals will 
seek to maximise economic welfare, not financial return. The conventional approach is to 
measure economic welfare in terms of per capita income, but in a transition context it may 
be wiser to think in terms of per capita consumption (see Lecomber, 1978). The principal’s 
objective will be defined by some form of the social welfare function where W=
(Ui(x),.. .Un(x) which is an aggregation of consumers’ utilities. Alternatively, the government 
may account for producers’ utility and so attach different weights to consumer and producer 
welfare. In this case the government will know how the producer or consumer rates different
38 Quotations from interviews come the Russian National Surveys, 1995-6.
39 E. Fama and Jensen, (1983).
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bundles i.e. if he ranks the outcome of decision A over B: or in the language of utility:
U(A)> U(B).
The behaviour of agents ultimately cannot expected to differ under state or private 
ownership: in both cases they will pursue some self interested activities. However, the 
welfare of the agent under state ownership can be defined as: U = f(F3) where F is the 
consumption of non pecuniary benefit and B is the bribes paid to the principal for allowing 
these self interested activities. As the agent sets a “price” for his self interested activities 
some internal efficiency will be achieved under state ownership, at the price of high 
transaction costs.
In comparison under private ownership the agent’s welfare is: U= f(F, a , M) so, his 
welfare is not only dependent on non pecuniary benefits but the market value of the firm, as 
well as monitoring efforts. Without regulation40 the objective function of the agent in private 
ownership will seek to maximise profit at the expense of social welfare ( in the case of 
external effects).
One of the frequently cited market failure arguments in favour of state ownership is that 
there will be no adverse effects associated with dispersed share-holdings on monitoring and 
that governments can enforce appropriate incentive structures to intervene in decision 
making of managers41. In the case of dispersed share-holding shareholders will free ride and 
be unwilling to take costly actions, because they believe someone else will undertake this. 
Thus, for privatisation to improve performance it must provide a superior incentive system. 
Vickers and Yarrow (1988) acknowledge that privatisation improves internal efficiency at 
the expense of allocative efficiency unless some efforts are made to curb profit seeking 
behaviour by regulatory constraints. However their study may only be relevant to Western 
economies, and the utilities sector in particular. As Estrin (1994) notes, while the objectives 
of privatisation maybe the same in the East and West, issues such as a lack of domestic 
savings in Central and eastern Europe, the complexities of privatising land, and the sensitive 
issue of privatising large firms which in the past had provided social benefits, make the 
matter more complex, and thus the Vickers and Yarrow study may appear narrow in scope.
40 See Vickers and Yarrow (1988). In fact the effects of ownership on enterprise performance cannot be 
isolated from the interaction of potential competition and the regulatory framework.
41 Nevertheless Shleifer and Vishny (1994) note that in the case of the former Soviet Union, state owned 
enterprises did not always cure market failures, and often were the cause of pollution.
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Shleifer and Vishny (1994) look at the relationship between privatisation, corporatisation, 
restructuring and efficiency. They develop a model in which politicians and enterprise 
managers bargain over the decisions of the firm. Politicians are anticipated to derive political 
benefits from excess employment, for example the employees maybe union members and 
the government may wish to gain the support of the union. Their analysis suggests that a 
regulated private firm may have a higher excess employment level than a public firm. Thus 
for the privatisation of cash flow rights to lead to restructuring the politician must surrender 
all his control to managers and private shareholders. Furthermore, in an environment with no 
bribes (this maybe questionable whether this is the case in Russia) excess employment is 
lower under management control than under politician control. This reflects the critical role 
of coporatisation i.e. the procedure which transfers the control from politicians to managers, 
in order to stimulate restructuring.
Shlefier and Vishny also make an interesting conclusion concerning the study of the transition 
economies. They believe that in Russia and Central Europe policies which decrease excess 
employment are beneficial, even if they increase social transfers, as the inefficiency of former 
state owned enterprises is the greater social cost to be bome.
Megginson and Netter (2001) examine the economic theory and theoretical arguments for 
privatisation, and therefore their paper is referred to in this chapter.
The efficiency implications of the move from government ownership to private ownership is 
one of the key issues, and the theoretical arguments for advantages of private ownership of 
the means of production are based on the theorem of economic welfare. Under the following 
assumptions a competitive equilibrium is pareto optimal: absence of externalises in 
production or consumption, the product is not a public good, non monopolistic market and 
information costs are low.
Theoretical arguments fo r  privatisation
1) Privatisation has the greatest positive impact in cases where the role for government in 
lessening market failure is the weakest Yet the argument for privatisation is less 
compelling in markets for public goods and natural monopolies, or in markets where the 
role of competition is less.
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2) Government ownership can lead to problems in defining the goal of firms, and may lead 
to other objectives than profit or shareholder wealth maximisation. Instead they may aim 
to maximise social welfare, which can be hard to measure. Furthermore governments 
often lack the ability to write complete contracts with their managers and develop 
incentives.
3) State owned firms lack the discipline that exists in private firms inflicted by markets and 
threat of financial distress.
4) Privatisation can possibly reduce a fiscal deficit, as governments can raise a huge amount 
of money by selling state owned enterprises.
5) Lastly, privatisation can help develop product and security market institutions, all of 
which are particular relevant for the success of privatisation in transition economies.
However, it should be remembered that government intervention in ownership can also be 
theoretically argued for, this maybe necessary for regulation of monopolies, externalises and 
help provide public goods, or more generally correct for market failure.
Empirical evidence on the public versus private ownership debate
The table below presents a brief summary of some of the research on this polemic in
transition and non transition economies, included in the study by Megginson and Netter
(2001).
Table 3: Research summary
Researcher Key findings
1. Non Transition economies 
Ehrlich et al. (1994)
State ownership can lower long run annual rate of 
productivity growth by 1.7% -1.9%.
Vining and Boardman (1992) Private firms are significantly more profitable that 
mixed and state owned enterprises.
Dewenter andMalatesta (2001) Private firms significantly are more profitable and 
have less debt than SOE’s
Ramamurti (1996) Privatisation attractive for telecoms industry, less 
scope for improvements in airline and roads.
2. Transition economies
Djankov (1999) (includes Russia and Ukraine) Foreign ownership is positively related to 
enterprise restructuring at high ownership levels, 
managerial ownership is negatively related at 
intermediate levels.
Frydman et al (1999) Privatisation is successful only when firm is 
controlled by outsider owners.
Claessens and Djankov (1999) Concentrated ownership is associated with higher 
profitability and productivity.
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Harper (2000) Second wave of privatisation yielded 
improvements in efficiency and profits.
Tian (2000) Corporate value declines with state ownership, 
then increases as state share reaches 45%.
Djankov and Murrell (2002) also review some of the privatisation literature in order to see 
whether privatised firms perform better than SOE’s. In particular they mention the study of 
Frydman et a l  (1999) who find that privatisation improves revenue growth by 
approximately 7% a year, whilst Carlin et al. (2001) find a positive relationship between 
privatisation and new product restructuring, in their study of 25 transition economies. 
Methods o f  Privatisation
A key decision of the government when launching a privatisation programme is the method 
which to transform state owned assets to private ownership. As Havrylyshyn and 
McGettigan (1999) note, the method of privatisation is crucial for how agency problems are 
dealt with, as the empirical literature reveals that that start up firms are the best performers in 
terms of efficiency, whilst insider dominated firms appear to be the least efficient among the 
newly privatised (p3). For example, in the case of Russia, where workers or managers 
commonly received 51% of voting shares in their enterprise (under Option 2 of the 
privatisation programme), this led to the legalisation of a pre-existing structure of control, 
which is more closed to outside investors, than reformers would have originally liked 
(Shleifer and Treisman, 2000).
Generally, selecting the correct method can be a tricky procedure and involves several 
political considerations: the history of asset ownership, financial position of state owned 
enterprise, ideologies concerning markets and regulation, concerns of interest groups, ability 
to protect investors’ property rights42, existing institutions and corporate governance 
systems, sophistication of potential investors, which parties should be allowed to purchase 
state assets.
Several popular methods of privatisation shall be outlined below (see Megginson and 
Netter, 2000) for more details43.
42 Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (1999) comment that the protection of property rights is essential for 
privatisation process to be successful, they state that, “owners must be assured o f  the right to use 
assets, to decide on their use by others and to profit firm  their use and sale,” (p6).
43 Estrin (1994 (chapter 2)) also mention 6 other methods.
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1) Privatisation through restitution. This method has been the most widely used within the 
Czech Republic and is rarely employed out of eastern Europe. It is suitable for when land 
or property can be easily retraced to its original owners.
2) Privatisation via the sale of state property. Here the government trades its ownership 
claim for a cash payment, it can be done by direct sales where a state asset is sold to an 
individual, a corporation or group of investors. Alternatively share issue privatisation 
(SIP) can be used, where a government stake is sold through a public share ownership.
3) Mass or voucher privatisation. With this method eligible citizens can use vouchers that 
are distributed freely in order to bid for stakes in state owned enterprises or assets. This 
has been commonly used in Central and eastern Europe, where it has brought about 
fundamental changes in ownership structure.
4) Privatisation from below. This is carried out via the start up of new businesses, and 
can act as an important source of growth transition economies. In their review of 
privatisation Havrylyshyn and McGettigan (1999) state that start up firms maybe an 
alternative path for increasing private sector activity.
Djankov and Murrell (2002) in their detailed survey of enterprise restructuring in transition 
economies focus upon the speed of privatisation and performance of the economy. They 
find that there is no clear relationship between the speed of privatisation and performance: 
Poland was a relatively slow privatiser but a good performer, Russia was a fast privatiser, 
yet a poorer performer, whilst Estonia is an example of a fast privatiser performing well 
(p l4 ) .
Despite some studies showing mixed results for the impact of privatisation, it must be 
remembered that for Transition Economies privatisation is essential for enterprise 
restructuring.
It is this issue, privatisation in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus that we turn to now.
2.3  P r iv a t isa t io n  in  R u s s ia .
Privatisation under the rubric of structural transformation has been regarded as a 
complement to stabilisation and liberalisation programmes. Already at the beginning of the
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transition process it was understood that both liberalisation and privatisation would induce 
enterprise restructuring. Furthermore it was anticipated that privatisation would eventually 
improve enterprise performance, arising from a new incentive structure and a more 
advanced corporate governance system. As it stands the relationship between privatisation 
and restructuring is much more complex than first believed: although many industrial firms 
have been privatised (in Russia by the end of 1995,17,937 medium-large sized enterprises 
had been privatised and by 1997 the private sector’s share in GDP was 70%.)44 effective 
new owners and an adequate system of corporate governance had not been created45. Ihis 
phenomenon is not limited to Russia, the restructuring process has not been as far reached 
as hoped in other transition economies, as restructuring has mainly been reactive, focusing 
on downsizing and developing new products. Deep restructuring has been hindered by poor 
progress in institutional reform, failure to enforce a credible payments system and a lack of 
sound legal and financial institutions.
Evidence from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey46 
shows that the relationship between ownership and restructuring is complex. In Eastern 
Europe there are signs that privatised firms have restructured more extensively than state 
owned firms. Conversely, in the CIS state owned firms have surprisingly, in some cases, 
adopted new technology and expanded production more than privatised firms.
Additionally, in some cases post privatisation results have been unexpected, particularly in 
Russia. The Russian privatisation programme (see Blasi, e/ al. 1997 and Boycko et al, 1995 
for a review of the design and results of the Russian privatisation process) at the first stage 
ensured that “managers and employees did not have to compete with anyone to buy this 
initial package of shares,47” Thus, managers and employees managed to secure initial 
control. Western experts as well as the Prime Minister Yavlinsky both feared the domination 
of insider ownership, believing that workers would only be interested in guaranteeing their 
employment and securing high wages, while managers would seek to pursue self interested
44 See Blasi et al, (1997) and EBRD Transition Report (1998).
45 However, various measures were taken in the winter of 2002 in order to improve corporate governance 
in Russia. The Federal Securities and Markets Commission developed a voluntary code of corporate 
conduct, which details corporate governance norms, and aims to protect shareholders and investors.
Yet Guriev et al (2002) in the Transition Newsletter, Vol. 12, No.6. points out that firms may need 
incentives to adopt these practices, as few managers have heard of the Code (p39).
46 For details see EBRD Transition Report (1999), Annex 2.1, chapter 2.
47 Blasi, etal. (1997).
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activities and prolong relations with the nomenklatura, as opposed to undertaking 
restructuring activities.
A study by Buck et al. (1999) find interestingly that managerial and employee ownership is 
not always associated with retrenchment activities. Two of their key findings show that,
“non-managerial employee ownership does not afford employees a significant degree
o f decision control in the face o f acute business crisis... ”
and,
“No significant impact o f  managerial ownership on retrenchment in relation to 
capital assets is detected... ”
It appears that the fears expressed by some privatisation experts concerning insider 
ownership were in some cases unfounded, at least in the case of Russia. However, the 
remaining problem is if insiders are unwilling to sell shares to outsiders in order to enhance 
deep restructuring and allow a more dispersed structure of ownership?
23b The Russian privatisation programme.
As we have seen above privatisation is only a part of larger economic reform, but in Russia 
it was a rapid and ambitious programme so that by the beginning of 1996 77.2% of medium 
and large enterprises had been privatised. Under President Gorbachev in 1988 the Russian 
Supreme Soviet had adopted the preliminary laws for privatisation, manifesting itself as the 
Law on State Enterprises. This law intended to give autonomy to enterprise directors and 
allowed workers to elect management. The results were disappointing as no performance 
improvements were made, with no cost cutting efforts or any attempts to meet consumer 
demand were planned.
The Russian Law on Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity in 1990 had marginally more 
success allowing sole proprietorship, partnerships and closed and open joint stock 
corporations.
However, the end of 1991 marked the commencement of the Programme of Privatisation of 
State and Municipal Enterprise in the Russian federation, issued by a Presidential decree. 
The degree covered land reform, mandating the transfer of property of collective and state 
farms, as well as liberalising trade.
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Prior to the inauguration of the 1992 Voucher programme for medium and large enterprises 
a policy of “spontaneous privatisation” was applied to remove the power of the Soviet 
Cabinet Ministries from enterprises to award general directors more freedom in the day to 
day running of the enterprise.
Characteristics and principles o f  the programme
The seminal text in this area that shall be referred to is Boycko et a l (1995). The 
fundamental ideas behind the programme were the following:
• speed- to proceed quickly before the political window of opportunity closed.
• each interest group of society would be offered enough incentives for potential ownership 
which would in turn persuade the Supreme Soviet to pass privatisation law. In short, the 
aim was not to alienate any particular member of society (perhaps except the industrial 
ministries) to secure public support for the programme.
• simplicity- it was hoped that the design of the programme would effortlessly give 
incentives to all participants.
It has been remarked that the Russian mass privatisation programme ignored all economic 
principles ( Pejovich, 1994) and failed to chose a method that would demand enterprises 
being sold to the highest bidder. This was implausible for political reasons and a cash sales 
method would be too time consuming and costly in terms of inefficiency.
This issue was at the crux of the debate of the privatisation programme in 1992: should a 
system of mass privatisation be used whereby insiders and the public are freely distributed 
property rights or a system of cash sales be used?
The idea of cash sales was appealing on three accounts: “in cash sales, companies are 
either sold as a whole to the highest bidder, or else shares are placed in the market 
through a public offering,48” This method has been associated with profits, productivity 
and even employment increases.
In efficiency stakes privatisation by sales guarantees depoliticization and transfers companies 
to the most efficient owners, which are not always the existing management, liberating 
enterprises from “Red directors.” Assuming that outside investors will participate they will be
48 Boycko, (1995) p70.
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willing and able to combat agency problems, assuring that the divergence of interests 
between management and shareholders is tackled
Finally privatisation by cash sales provides much needed revenues for a transition economy 
attempting to balance revenues in a time of transformational recession.
Despite the attraction of the cash sales method it was dismissed in the Russian programme49 
on grounds that this method would not be politically feasible as the general public would not 
be catered for, with much of state property falling into the hands of foreigners, former party 
officials and nefarious business men. Additionally the cash sales method requires much 
preparation as auctions must be organised and much more importantly enterprises must be 
valued, which both requiring large amounts of resources and time.
Thus in 1992, led by Chubais a programme of mass privatisation, via vouchers distribution, 
which was initiated by presidential decree.
Some of the essential elements of the programme laid down by Boycko and his colleagues 
shall briefly be discussed
1. Corporatisation
The programme divided larger firms50 into those to be included in mandatory privatisation 
(light industry: textiles, food and furniture), those requiring the approval of the cabinet (larger 
manufacturing firms) and those firms that privatisation was to be prohibited (firms involved in 
natural resources and defence).
Firms that had achieved a certain level of employment and assets were to be corporatized. 
Corporatization demands that enterprises be re- registered as joint stock companies with 
100% of equity being owned by the government, a corporate charter and a board of 
directors. The board would represent the government, general manager, workers and local 
government. This was a considerable step towards the subsequent privatisation process.
49 And for this, was much criticised. See J. Rogozinski who claimed that the rejection of this method was 
owing to “Too much vodka!” The International Economy, 1993.
50 The discussion shall be limited to medium and large firms, as this is the focus of this study.
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As a result, corporatized firms came to be governed by their board of directors, liberating 
them from the tight reign of industrial ministries. Furthermore, by converting firms to open 
joint stock companies, guaranteed that firms did not become closed entities, being owned 
singly by workers and managers. Managers and workers were obviously against 
corporatization and demanded some form of compensation.
2. Insider benefits.
The government recognised that by providing benefits for managers and workers in 
privatisation would win political support, many managers hoped that by giving firms to 
themselves and employees would allow them to turn them into closed partnerships, thus 
preventing “interference” from outsiders. Insider control was also supported by many 
prominent politicians and western supporters of worker ownership(see Gates 1998).
Similar to the corporatization programme, workers under the direction of their 
managers had the right under privatisation to chose their own benefits option (see below). 
Managers were then required to submit a privatisation plan that outlined how the remaining 
shares would be sold, usually by voucher auctions or investment tenders. This feature of the 
programme appealed to managers as they had almost entire control on their chosen strategy 
for privatisation without the interference of government or ministry officials.
3. The details of the programme
Employees of each enterprise were allowed to chose one of three options, which transferred 
40-51% of ownership to managers and employees. The remaining shares were then to be 
sold at auctions or at an investment tender.
• Optionl: allowed 40% of shares to be sold to workers, while the other 60% could be 
sold at an auction or held by the state. Workers were awarded 25% of shares (non 
voting) for free and could by another 10% at 30% discount from book value. Managers 
could buy 5% at the nominal value. This resulted in minority employee ownership, 25% 
of enterprises chose this method.
• Option 2: allowed 51% of the shares to be sold to workers for 1.7 times the book value. 
Other shares could be sold at an auction, or by a pension plan, this had important 
implications for efficiency; the trading of vouchers and the use of investment funds have
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helped create outsiders and blockholders. The liquidity of the voucher market ensured 
that in time core investors would arise in major companies. This secured majority 
employee ownership, 73% of enterprises chose this method 
• Option 3: was only applicable to only medium sized enterprises: and in essence was a 
management buyout by those willing to restructure the firm. A managing group including 
managers and workers would take responsibility for ensuring the firm’s financial health 
and privatisation plan. Under this option the managing group could buy 30% of the 
shares and workers and managers could buy 20%. If privatisation and restructuring did 
not occur then the managing group would be forced to sell its shares. This option has 
been accused of being over complicated and thus seldom selected, in fact only 2% of 
firms selected this method 
After workers and managers had chosen their option, remaining shares had to be sold, the 
law specified that at least 20% of the shares be sold to bidders, the auction left 10-20% in 
the states’ hand to be sold at a later date.
However, to make sure that certain members of society such as those employed in 
medicine, education, transport, students, KGB or agriculture were not alienated, the 
privatisation programme gave each citizen a voucher for 10,000 mbles to buy shares in any 
enterprise.
The auction mechanism51 was designed so that bids by individual citizens would have priority 
over banks, corporations and outsiders. But it was hoped that anyone could participate in a 
voucher auction, which made managers try to prevent outsiders from buying shares. It was 
believed that outside investors would undermine their control and enforce assertive 
restructuring policies.
Yet, this was exactly what the designers of the programme wanted: the creation of core 
shareholders who would own at least 5% of a firms total shares. These blockholders could 
be expected to have the incentives and power to monitor management behaviour closely and 
induce restructuring.
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2.3 c What have been the results of the Russian Privatisation programme?
Megginson and Netter (2000) make an important point when analysing the effects of 
privatisation in Russia, they argue that the transition process has been more difficult for 
Russia compared to Central and eastern Europe, therefore it is harder to conclude on the 
results of the privatisation programme.
The first voucher programme was finished by 1994 involving some 15,000 medium and 
large sized firms which employed over 80% of the industrial workforce, and was in many 
aspects a success. The cash based phase of privatisation faced some obstacles, while the 
small and medium enterprise sector underwent privatisation, the firms from the large 
enterprise sector were subjected to stalls in the process. The government’s programme for 
1998 was to privatise 37 SOE’s and sell blocks of 29 partially privatised firms, with a 
revenue target of $3mn52. These plans were finally curtailed due to fears of devaluation and 
a collapse in the equity market.
Foreign ownership continues to be limited, particularly in the strategic industries. By 1997 
foreigners owned less than 2% of Russia’s medium and large enterprises. Insider ownership 
has appeared to snub any outside equity financing, particularly that of foreigners53.
4. Governance and restructuring
Both governance and restructuring have been hindered by dominant insider ownership, even 
in cases where outsiders have a majority ownership, their holdings are so dispersed that the 
monitoring of management is sub optimal54. Aututsionek et.al (1998) highlight that, “ proper 
mechanisms o f  corporate governance must create incentives or constraints on 
individual managers,” as managers remaining from the previous system are unable to 
enforce restructuring activities following privatisation. Their research finds that poor 
corporate governance will lead to inefficient business development strategies.
In the longer term, it can be expected that outsiders will try to acquire core holdings which 
will allow outsiders to participate actively in decision making and the monitoring of
51 For a more detailed discussion of the mechanics of the voucher auction, see Boycko, p81-92.
52 EBRD Transition Report, 1997.
53 At the end of this section a theoretical model shall be presented which illustrates the optimal level of 
outside ownership in a firm.
54 Dispersed shareholders may be characterised by free riding and thus be unwilling to undertake the 
costs of monitoring.
84
managerial attitudes.55 Shareholder activism may be developed by core holdings being 
acquired by investment funds, banks and other financial institutions in transition economies, 
improving governance from the threat of exit and active monitoring. In countries where 
corruption is rife institutional investors may collude with management teams, particularly if 
investors are relational56 (whereby investors have ongoing business relations with the firm) 
or the institutional investor is pressure sensitive57 to managerial influence. Additionally, 
Coffee (1996) notes that outside institutional investors may not be interested in long term 
efficiency, but short term income gains.
Nevertheless, the La Porta et al. (1999) study finds that the image of the modem 
corporation58 is not as it appears in the seminal work of Berle and Means. In reality firms 
are not widely held, that’s to say there is not a dispersion of ownership, unless they are 
situated in economies with a very sound legal system that protects minority shareholders. 
Thus at least in the medium term, in Russia, we can expect some degree of concentration of 
ownership, where “these controlling shareholders are ideally placed to monitor the 
management59,” until a legal and regulatory system is built
These studies all have serious implications for the optimal ownership structure in transition 
economies.
As for bankruptcy, the threat is very weak, by mid 1997 only a 1000 enterprises had been 
declared bankrupt. The reason for this is political opposition and a weak regulatory 
environment preventing creditors commencing bankruptcy proceedings. The new 1998 law, 
while much improved still favours the wishes of regional authorities at the expense of 
individual creditors. Much of the problem lies in the political sphere with the government 
often selecting enterprises for survival.
The lack of a credible bankruptcy threat has caused firms to rely on inter enterprise arrears 
and tax evasion. By late summer of 1998 total enterprise arrears amounted to 43% of GDP, 
stimulating a growth in barter. As a result market signals are dulled which delay the creation 
of incentives for further restructuring.
55 Shleifer and Vishny, (1986).
56 See Wagner (1998).
57 Brickley, J, Lease,R and Smith, C, (1988).
58 As envisaged by Berle and Means (1932).
59 La Porta et al. (1999).
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Enterprise restructuring is also in its early stages with most activities being “reactive”: 
achieved by changes in the product mix and labour shedding.
In the Blasi et a l (1997) sample mangers and workers ended up owning, on average 65% 
of shares, with outsiders owning just 21.5%. From this, 11% of outsiders’ shares are held 
by blocks greater than 5%, and the rest are held by private individuals or investment funds. 
Evidence has shown that large shareholders will have positive effects for restructuring and 
corporate governance. For example, an outsider investor in Vladamir tractor works 
eventually gained full control and installed a new management team and Bioprocess coerced 
the management of Uralmash to agree to a far reaching restructuring plan.
As means of conclusion it is fair to say that the Russian privatisation programme has 
achieved a great deal: political control is in most cases reduced and some advances have 
been made to curb the activities of self interested managers, with some firms experiencing 
some degree of managerial turnover. What remains is for outside ownership to increase in 
order to develop scope for a more efficient system of corporate governance and plans for 
deeper restructuring. As Shleifer and Treisman (2000) state, Russia’s reforms have achieved 
many crucial successes, given the many political, economic and cultural constraints (p i78). 
However, as Blasi et al. (1997) notes managers have been the “winners” of the privatisation 
process, and in some cases employee ownership has simply been a vehicle for managers to 
maintain property rights. Failing to separate ownership from management has had serious 
consequences for the Russian economy. Capitalist theory offers three solutions to this type 
of problem: firstly, managerial labour markets should act as discipline to prevent self 
interested behaviour, yet these labour markets do not function well in Russia, secondly 
shareholder discontent reflected by stockmarket exit can act as a serious disciplining factor 
to managers, but the Russian stockmarket is insufficiently liquid and lastly investment funds 
may have the incentive to monitor managerial behaviour, yet in the Russian case investment 
funds may not have superior knowledge to individual citizens, or may even consist of 
managerial personnel.
2 .4  U k r a in e  a n d  B elarus
The privatisation programmes of Ukraine and Belarus were adapted from the Russian 
blueprint, but as we shall see in this last descriptive section the results were far from uniform.
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Table 4: Progress and methods of privatisation of medium and large enterprises
EBRD
TRANSITION 
INDICATOR 60
DIRECT
SALES
VOUCHERS MEBO61
RUSSIA 3+ SECONDARY PRIMARY -
U k r a in e 2+ SECONDARY - PRIMARY
Bela ru s 1 - SECONDARY PRIMARY
Source: EBRD, Transition Report, 1999.
Table 5: Privatisation results
1994 1995 1996 1997
Russia
Private sector 
share in GDP
50 55 60 70
Privatisation 
revenues as % of 
GDP
0.11 0.38 0.12 0.90
No..of firms 
privatised.
23,000 8,414 3,675 1,546
Ukraine
Private sector in 
GDP
30 34 40 50
Privatisation
revenues
0.21 0.13 0.25 0.13
Share of med-large 
firms privatised
12.2 12.7 53.3 72.4
Belarus
Private sector in 
GDP
15 15 15 20
Privatisation
revenue
0.30 0.26 0.00 0.15
Share of firms 
privatised
11.7 14.3 19.7 25.5
EBRD Transition Report, 1998.
In Ukraine large scale privatisation began in 1992, predominantly using managerial- 
employee buy outs and leasing to employees, yet eventually this method was rejected for a 
more ambitious plan of voucher based programme, namely the MPP in 1994. By 1997,
86% of citizens had received their vouchers and more than 45% had invested them in joint 
stock companies or in investment funds, assisting the creation of core investors. Additionally 
compensation certificates have been issued to recompense for the erosion of the value of
60 For large scale privatisation.
61 Management employee buyout.
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savings, which can also be used to buy unsold shares, or equally they can be sold to other 
investors.
However, despite a substantial share of medium and large firms being privatised the 
programme has been delayed: at the beginning of 1997, 150 enterprises had been 
earmarked for privatisation, but by the last quarter of 1997 only 118 enterprises had 
completed the process. Yet, the government’s need to raise revenue for it’s ever increasing 
budget in 1998 gave rise to the implementation of cash sales for some of the largest 200 
enterprises in the Ukraine. More recently the State Property Fund identified another 650 
industrial companies, in which stakes could be sold (Transition Report, 2001). In the future 
further efforts are needed to reduce the political opposition surrounding privatisation. 
Domination of insiders in privatised firms, poor financial discipline and weak bankruptcy law 
have slowed the pace of industrial restructuring. By mid 1998 inter enterprise arrears 
amounted to a staggering 80% of GDP and barter trade accounted for 42% of industrial 
sales. Paired with complex bankruptcy law it is not surprising that foreign investors have 
been repelled so far by a weak corporate governance and a poor financial and regulatory 
environment
The Belarussian privatisation programme began in 1993 with the intention of privatising 
8,500 republican and communal enterprises by 2000, however by the beginning of 1997 
only 2,122 enterprises had been partially privatised - just 24% of their target. This appears 
to be an annual trend. The transfer of ownership has passed form the state to mainly 
management and employees, largely bypassing private investors.
The main method for privatisation was to convert the SOE’s into joint stock companies, 
with 1% being sold at auctions, and as a result the state has maintained a majority 
ownership or a “golden share” in 33% of cases. Furthermore, joint stock companies have 
been created but in 1997 90 companies had not undergone any kind of privatisation.
The Belarussian programme seems to be plagued with problems, in March 1998 a 
presidential decree gave local authorities the right to privatise and restructure local 
companies, removing the requirement of parliamentary approval for the privatisation of every 
firm. Nevertheless, another presidential decree in June 1998 ordered the re-nationalisation
of a large department store in Minsk, and prohibited the privatisation of 2 other department 
stores.
This stop- go attitude has obviously serious implications for corporate governance and 
restructuring. In May 2001, the government adopted a five year economic development 
plan, which outlined that the state would still play a dominant role in the economy, however 
the government is planning to restart the privatisation process for small and medium firms. 
According to the EBRD (1997) over a half of enterprises are loss making, yet virtually none 
of them have been declared bankrupt, additionally the government still provides indirect 
subsidies to “selected enterprises” via tax concessions, import duty exemptions and directed 
credits. This reduces the urgency for restructuring quite substantially. Despite the share of 
loss making firms declining to 20% in 1998 the main cause of this is a growth in state 
subsidies and inter enterprise arrears, the former reaching 40% of GDP in i997.
Surprisingly, the government appears to be encouraging joint ventures with foreign partners 
such as Ford Motor company, hopefully providing much needed capital and expertise for 
restructuring and inducing an inflow of other foreign investors62. This influx may soon be 
hampered by a decree instilling uncertainty in the investment climate by annulling tax and 
customs privileges to foreign investors, coupled with an erratic macroeconomy it is unlikely 
that there will be a constant stream of foreign investors interested in international joint 
ventures.
For a discussion on privatisation policies in other former communist countries, particularly 
on how country characteristics affect policy and in turn firm strategy see 
De Castro and Uhlenbruck (1997).
By examining the outcomes of the privatisation programmes in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus 
one common thread is clear: an aversion to outside or private investors. This is shown below 
in the table examining ownership trends for this sample in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus form 
1994-6, while there has been some increase in the average percentage of voting shares of 
private external individual and foreign owners, this has been very small, particularly in 
Russia. What is striking is that both Russia and Ukraine have experienced an increase in 
managerial ownership, this may represent an effort on the managerial staff to prevent outside
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ownership. In Russia this has been at the expense of private external individual ownership, 
however there is the question: just how external is this type of ownership? Do managers 
invite their friends from other companies or relatives to buy shares, or more generally those 
members of society who do not have any incentive to monitor managerial behaviour. 
Another surprising feature of this sample is that Belarus has the highest average percent of 
voting shares of foreigners, this may appear strange given Belarus’ political stance. See 
chapter five for more details of the ownership structure in this sample.
Table 6: Average percentage of voting shares: 1995-7.
1994 1996
Russia
Manager 11.5 15.36
Total employee 55.34 52.97
Government 8.38 6.02
Foreign 0.28 0.89
Private individual 11.33 12.37
Belarus
Manager 11.06 10.96
Total employee 61.06 57.56
Government 27.74 22.60
Foreign 0.00 1.24
Private individual 6.47 10.42
Ukraine
Manager 9.86 11.74
Total employee 69.59 57.27
Government 9.59 8.21
Foreign 0.87 0.76
Private individual 9.38 14.82
Source: University of Nottingham database.
2.4b T r a n s f e r  o f  o w n e r s h ip : t w o  m o d e l s
In this section two theoretical models shall be presented: the first to illustrate the problems of 
transferring ownership from managers and employees to outsiders, and the second to 
attempt to find the optimal amount of outside ownership.
A simple model based on the resale to outsiders is the Aghion- Blanchard model of 1996, 
who note that in Russia a Presidential decree enforced insider owned firms to have a
62 Oligopolistic reaction will be explored in the internationalisation section.
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majority of outsiders on their board. Despite only a very few firms heeding this by 1994, 
44% of firms had some outsider representation on the board, with those firms with large 
average outside blockholders being particularly represented on the board. Concentrated 
ownership apparently then has positive implications for corporate governance, when 
measured by board representation.
The Aghion and Blanchard model illustrates how the transfer of insider ownership to 
outsiders can be problematic (although a full treatment of the model shall not be given here): 
the following results are found.
• the initial privatisation programme should minimise the chance of workers colluding and 
encourage anonymous trading.
• management ownership maybe sub-optimal as compared to employee ownership, which 
will depend on the probability of the management team remaining employed and his 
relevant human capital level
• the social safety net for workers should be developed and labour and housing markets 
made more flexible to reduce the cost of being unemployed for workers. In short the 
reservation wage, R should be increased to ease the transfer of ownership to outsiders. 
This could become an increasingly troubling problem for the counties of this study as 
gross involuntary dismissals as a percentage of the productive employees, in this sample 
is 8.3, 7.2,9.4% for Belarus, Russia and Ukraine respectively.
The model illustrates the problems of resale to outsiders in three different situations: when 
the firm is employee owned and workers act non co-operatively, when workers collude and 
finally when the firm is majority owned by a manager.
Following Aghion and Blanchard’s assumptions we have:
A firm initially has n workers whose productivity without restructuring is x, when 
restructuring occurs productivity will bey, wherey>x.
It is assumed that restructuring will require new capital and expertise, which only an outsider 
can bring, providing he becomes the dominant equity holder.
Restructuring will also involve “reactive activities” such as labour shedding, involving laying 
off a fraction, A of workers (it is assumed that A = 1).
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R will represent the reservation wage of workers or the wage equivalent of being 
unemployed and w will be the post restructuring wage, by making efficiency wage 
assumptions we have w>R. For workers the cost of being unemployed will be C = w- R.
1. Outcome of resale when workers do not collude
In the transition economies, especially Russia the free rider effect may have less of an impact 
due to liquidity problems, with almost 40%63 of the Russian population being in poverty ( 
41% and 23% respectively for Ukraine and Belarus), it can be expected that workers will 
sell at less than the minimum price. When the scale of poverty and liquidity tightness is 
accounted for it is probable that transfer o f ownership to outsiders will not be 
problematic when workers do not collude.
Why then, has the transfer of ownership to outsiders been hampered? It is due to the ability 
of managers to coerce workers into not selling shares, by implementing non anonymous 
trading measures and by actively seeking to purchase workers’ shares for themselves64.
2. Outcome of resale when workers collude.
When worker shareholders collude we can expect resale to be less likely. Resale will only 
occur if qb~cf ^ y - x  > w-R =c, where qb is profit per share and cf will be the minimum 
price at which each worker is willing to sell his share.
When assuming that it is worker shareholders involved in the resale of shares to outsiders it 
must be noted that they will always take into account that they will become unemployed if 
the firm is sold, so they will demand compensation. In short, if c the cost of being 
unemployed, is greater than the surplus generated by restructuring (y-x) no resale will occur. 
However, the Aghion and Blanchard model assumes perfect knowledge when it is more 
likely that their is a situation of asymmetric information: it is unlikely that the worker 
shareholder will know his exact probability of keeping his job or not, this will obviously 
figure in his decision whether to sell or not. Additionally, worker incentives could work in 
two ways: if a worker fears unemployment he may increase labour productivity to reduce 
the probability of being made unemployed, or he may become discouraged and loose all 
interest and thus decrease x. this in turn, could effect the outsiders decision to buy in the first 
place.
63 UNDP (1997) figure with poverty being defined as $4 PPP.
64 Blasi et al. (1997) and Filatotchev et al. (1999).
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Thus the greater the probability of being made unemployed, A and the greater the cost of 
being unemployed, c the less likely resale to outsiders becomes.
3. Manager ownership
Here assume that the manager has the dominant ownership share, so that he holds a 
majority, m > n/2, resulting lfom insider privatisatioa Dominant managerial ownership is 
particularly relevant to this sample, with Russia experiencing an increase in average 
managerial ownership of almost 4%, whereby Russian managers have seen the biggest 
ownership increase as compared to other ownership types. The situation in Ukraine is 
somewhat similar as managerial ownership has increased by nearly 2%. The probability that 
he remains as manager after resale is equal to K , which will depend on his relevant skills, 
experience, and age etc. The probability of a manager remaining in his post does not look 
particularly high in Russia or Belarus, where the percentage of firms that has had a manager 
replaced is 50 an 40% respectively65. If B are the manager’s benefits of control then resale
kB
will occur when m (y-x) > — , compared to the resale condition under workers behaving
m
collusively the following conclusions have been arrived at:
• if the probability of managers losing control is not very high then resale will be facilitated. 
Also if he owns all shares this makes resale even easier- due to the scale effect of 
managers needing to be compensated less per share.
• However, there maybe reasons to believe that n  is high ( in the pooled sample 44% of 
firms have experienced a change in management) signalling effects of being laid off will 
increase the benefits of being in control, B. If B and n  are quite high, resale will be 
unlikely. This sample gives evidence of B, benefits of being in control being high, with 
66.2% of managers admitting to blocking domestic outsiders. To build on the model it 
would be illuminating to quantify n  and A , using personal characteristics of age, 
experience, political leanings etc.
Despite the success of the Russian privatisation programme it seems that it did not, in some 
respects account for conclusions illustrated in the model: from the outset outsiders were 
disfavoured, managers, in some cases, have managed to buy shares from employees to
65 The percentage for Ukraine is somewhat lower at 35%.
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increase the concentration of their ownership, (in the data set here for all three countries as a 
whole, 19% of managers have bought shares from employees and 31% intend to in the 
future66), and as yet there is little evidence of a comprehensive social safety net being built 
Social support, particularly health, child care and housing are still provided by the enterprise, 
yet these are now in decline. This decline has not been met by an improvement in 
unemployment benefits from the state, the table below provides a comparison of the benefits 
level in other transition economies.
Table 7: Social services provided by enterprises in 199367
April August December
Subsidised meals 14 9 9
Subsidised goods 21 13 20
Training/education 6 4 4
Income support 14 12 11
Source: VCIOM Survey of the Working population (1993)
Table 8: Unemployment Benefits in selected transition economies
Current law Qualifying
conditions
Benefit level Duration
Bulgaria 1989 6 months 
employment in 
last year
60% of average 
earnings: 90- 
140% of MW68
6-12 months
Czech Republic 1992 12 mnthof 
employment in 
last 3 years
50-60%
earnings.
6 months
Poland 1994 180 days in 
employment in 
last year
36% average 
national earnings
12-24 months
Belarus 1993 - 50-70% of 
earnings
26 weeks
Russia 1994 employment of 
12 weeks in last 
year
45-75% average 
wage in past 
year
1-2 years
Ukraine 1992 no other income 
exceeding MW
50-75% average 
wage in previous 
job
12 months
World Employment Outlook (WEO), 1996/7.
66 The figure for Russian managers is higher- 30.1% have bought shares and 28.7% plan to.
67 % of surveyed individuals who received these services.
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Although, federal expenditure on social policy has increased overall, but this may not be 
enough to prevent the social hardship caused by open unemployment. The table below 
shows government expenditure for the countries of our study.
Table 9 :Federal expenditure for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus in 1997, in % of GDP.
Expenditure
Russia 40.4
Ukraine 44
Belarus 42.1
Source: WEO (1998) p98-99, table 17-19.
However expenditure on pensions in Russia has decreased and the fixed real monthly 
pension size in 1998 was only 95% of the figure for 1997. The table below shows that 
Russia does not compare favourably to Belarus and Ukraine when examining expenditure 
for pensions.
Table 10: Public pension expenditure in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, in 1996 as % of GDP.
Pension expenditure
Russia 4.5
Ukraine 8.7
Belarus 8.4
Source: WEO (1998), pi 15, box 10.
Boycko (1996) acknowledges that privatisation also involves shifting the supply of capital 
from public to private means. This would remove the state from the role of allocating capital, 
subsidies and cheap credit By inducing firms to look for outside sources of finance this will 
also create a corporate governance system where outsiders’ interests must be accounted 
for, so that decisions are made which benefit shareholders, not entrenched managers. 
Eventually, insider owned firms will start to feel the effects of cuts in cheap credits and 
subsidies initiated first by the Chernomyrdin government in 1993-4 in his stabilisation plan 
(see the table below for details of credit and budgetary subsidies to enterprises as a 
percentage of GDP) created a “push” factor for enterprises to seek outside capital. If 
enterprises are to survive in the long run (assuming government subsidies will decline further) 
they must restructure, which will demand new capital investment, with political sources of 
capital being reduced, insiders must look for private sources of capital.
68 MW= national minimum wage.
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Table 11: Credit to enterprises 1994-7
1994 1995 1996 1997
Belarus
Budgetary
subsidies69
6.3 3.4 2.9 1.3
Credit to 
enterprises70
16.5 5.5 10.9 11.7
Russia
Budgetary
subsidies
NA NA 6.2 6.4
Credit to 
enterprises
12.1 8.5 7.2 8.7
Ukraine
Budgetary
subsidies
na na na na
Credit to 
enterprises
11.9 6.7 6.1 6.0
EBRD, 1998.
Chernomyrdin’s stabilisation plan excited various methods of private capital allocation: firstly
investment tenders were used where firms received core investors for equity stakes of up to 
15-20%, attracting foreign and domestic outsider investors. One problem with this method 
is that managers fear core outsiders (as hinted above, core investors will have power to 
begin monitoring managerial behaviour and possibly even bring about accelerated managerial 
turnover) as a result managers will do everything in their power to prevent equity being 
acquired by these investors.
Managers seem to appear to favour issuing new equity to dispersed investors who pose 
much less of a threat. As Boycko et a l (1997) note the issue of new equity has led to many 
invaluable reforms as potential investors require an enforceable contract, which assists the 
birth of a system of property rights, also they require the disclosure of information, a 
transparent share register and easy access to stock trading. In the longer term investors will 
demand a solid legal and regulatory structure to govern the market for private sectors to 
protect their investment.
69 As a % of GDP
70 Ibid.
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Another method for enterprises to raise capital is via the banking sector, but as Boycko et 
al claim that “Russian banks have not been a major force in providing private capital to 
firms,” for example, in the sample here, the average percentage of voting shares held by 
banks was 1.3% for all the three countries pooled, in 199671.
As it has somewhat been briefly shown that the development of the private capital markets 
induces further reforms, assist restructuring and boost the creation of a corporate 
governance system, it would be useful to know how insiders choose their optimal level of 
outside financing. For this, we turn again to the seminal work of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976).
Their model makes the explicit assumption that the original owner has enough wealth to 
finance an investment function alone, but decides that he can increase his welfare by selling 
off* part of the firm for equity, to minimise the risk of the investment Obviously, this will not 
be the case in transition economies: it is unlikely that insiders will have enough capital to 
finance restructuring projects alone, for reasons discussed above, so they will be forced to 
issue equity.
The total wealth reduction insiders can expect is denoted by the agency cost function: AT 
(E*;K;V*), where E represents the manager’s incentives to exploit outsider holders of 
equity, V denotes the scale of the firm and K is the fraction of firm financed by outsiders. 
This function will be S shaped as total agency costs for a given scale of firm increase at an 
increasing rate at low levels of outside financing, and at decreasing rates for high levels of 
outsider ownership, as outsiders can impose higher monitoring constraints on insiders’ 
actions.
Eqationl shows marginal agency costs as a function of K, the fraction of the firm financed 
by outside investment, assuming that the scale of the firm is fixed ( in transition this 
assumption may have to be relaxed, as investment projects for restructuring may involve 
downsizing of the plant or labour force).
Thus we have:
(1) A a (E*,K;V*)
71 For Russia alone, average percentage of voting shares held by banks in 1996 was 1.96%.
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Jensen and Meckling develop a diagrammatic treatment of this72. The vertical axis represents 
marginal agency cost and the marginal value of having equity financing (A), while the 
horizontal axis represents the fraction of firm financed by outside claims (K).
The demand curve of the owner- management for outside financing represents the marginal 
value of increased diversification ( possibly not a major issue in the Russian case) which the 
insiders obtain by reducing his ownership claims and crating a diversified portfolio. It can be 
measured by the amount he would pay to be allowed to reduce his ownership claims in 
order to minimise risk of the investment/ restructuring project 
The intersection of the demand curve and the marginal agency curve will then decide the 
optimal fraction of the firm to beheld by outsiders, this in turn depicts the agency costs to be 
borne by the owner. This represents a Pareto optimal situation.
Filatotchev and Mickiewicz (2001) also examine ownership structure and its impact upon 
the firm, yet within a transition context They state the importance of the institutional and 
legal environment, and that subsequent performance is conditional on these factors73.
It would be premature to attempt to quantify the optimal level of outside ownership at this 
stage in transition of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, what is more important is to encourage 
insiders to consider widespread outside financing, and stop firms which Chubais claims that 
are suffering from “inertia”. These firms seek to lobby local governments for subsidies 
instead of endeavouring to attract outside capital.
Developing channels of product market competition will induce firms to restructure and seek 
private capital sources. By liberalising trade and allowing new entrants into previously 
monopolistic markets, firms will be subjected to intense competition via imports on their 
domestic market. Exports will affect competitive pressures indirectly, by offering foreign 
markets as opposed to domestic declining markets, firms will have to improve on price, 
product quality and design to compete abroad.
While both theoretical models offer interesting insights into the transfer of ownership neither 
deal with transition specific corporate governance issues such as the protection of minority 
shareholder rights, this is an area for further research. However it was decided to include
72 See figure 8 in their paper.
73 See chapter five for more details of their research on this matter.
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them in this review as they offer interesting theoretical, as opposed to empirical, insights 
concerning the transfer of ownership, and the problems associated with this.
The impact of ownership on the degree of internationalisation will be a key point in this 
study, and will be explored in greater depth in chapter five when determining a firm’s export 
intensity and propensity.
Having reviewed a substantial amount of literature concerning ownership and 
internationalisation we will now move on to the methodology chapter, which will describe 
how the hypotheses will be tested.
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C h a p t e r  t h r e e : r e s e a r c h  m e t h o d o l o g y
3.1 SURVEY DESCRIPTION
Having carried out secondary data analysis (SDA) on the dataset I was not present at the 
questionnaire design and interview stage, therefore I have included a description of the 
survey design and implementation taken from existing work by the research team at the 
University of Nottingham. The choice of SDA brings with it many advantages (such as time 
and cost saving), but most importantly as Hyman states “SDA can assist in enlarging 
theory,” (1972, p23-4).
Since no list of privatised companies exists on a national level in Russia, Ukraine or Belarus 
it becomes impossible to acquire a stratified sample, which requires prior knowledge of the 
population1. Therefore it was decided to seek a random sample of privatised industrial 
companies in each of the countries. Alan and Skinner (1991) document other sampling 
strategies such as the cluster sample, where a random sample is taken from selected groups, 
or a quota sample, where the interviewer is required to achieve a specific number of 
complete questionnaires.
Thus the aim of the Russian survey was to collect a sample of medium and large sized 
industrial firms, spanning the main industrial regions and branches. As for Ukraine and 
Belarus the aim was to collect data from firms which vary in terms of size, industry and 
region.
Buck et al, (1999) state that it is “difficult to evaluate the representative nature o f  
these samples” (p464) without data on the population of privatised firms. However the 
ownership distribution in the Russian sample is similar to those reported in other research 
studies (see below).
1 Moder and Kalton (1975) document that stratification is a common method for obtaining a precise 
sample design. The procedure is carried out by dividing the population into a number of strata, such as 
age, sex, and then taking a random sample from each strata. A common design involves the use of a 
uniform sampling fraction for each stratum-proportionate stratified sampling. Alternatively one may 
adopt a disproportionate stratified sample, where the sample size from the stratum is proportional to 
the population size of the stratum. (p85).
100
Table 1: Ownership structure in Russia, various samples
Average 
shareholdings %
Higher school of 
Economics (1998)
N o t t in g h a m  
Un iv e r s it y  (1997)
Blasi et al, (1996)
Inside shareholders 42.1 54.8 58.0
Managers 11.0 12.1 18.0
Workers 31.1 42.7 40.0
Outside shareholders 47.3 36.1 32.1
Individuals 18.6 11.2 6.0
Other enterprises 13.9 13.3 15.3
Commercial banks 1.3 1.8 1.6
Investment funds, 
holding companies
9.8 8.3 7.6
Foreign investors 3.7 1.5 1.6
State 8.4 9.1 9.0
Other 2.2 - 0.9
Source: Filatotchev et al., (2001)
Yet, concerning firm size the sampled firms are generally larger than average, as the sample 
does not include start ups, as the focus here was on the main privatisation programme, 
excluding both start ups and tender privatisation.
Table 2: employment distribution %
Number of employees Share of total Russian 
industrial employment 
(1995)
Share of total 1997 REB 
sample industrial 
employment
less than 200 11 6
200-499 13 24
500> 76 70
Total 100 100
Source: Aukutsionek et al., 1998, taken from estimates from Rossiiskii Statisticheski Ezhegodnik, 
Moscow, Goskomstat, 1996, p497.
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As for Ukraine the ownership structure is similar to that documented by Estrin et al, 
(1998). The Belarussian sample is also rather representative as it covers 32% of all 
privatised firms in that country (see Buck et al, 1999, p466).
Concerning industrial distribution, in Russian and Ukrainian samples the food sector is over 
represented, while firms in the metallurgy and chemical sectors are under represented, as 
they featured strongly in the privatisation programme (Filatotehev et al, 2001b).
Table 3: industrial structure (excluding fuel and energy industries)
Industry Share of total Russian 
industrial firms employment
Share of total 1997 REB 
sampled firms employment
Metallurgy 11 4.4
Chemical and petrochemical 7.1 3.5
Engineering 41.5 34.2
Timber, forestry, pulp and 
paper
10.5 7.9
Building materials 7.4 16.7
Glass, porcelain and glazed 
pottery
0 0
Light industries 10.6 14
Food 11.9 19.3
Total 100 100
Source: adapted from Aukutsionek et al., 1998, Promyshlennost ’ Rossii (Moscow, Goskomsta, 1996.)
The surveys were carried out by bodies which had in depth knowledge of local conditions 
and networks. Surveys were carried out by the Russian Economic Barometer, The 
Ukrainian Free Economic Foundation and The Belarussian Institute of Social and Economic 
Political Studies.
The Pilot Study
In the first instance a pilot study was undertaken in order to identify if the questionnaire 
could be easily understood. Moser and Kalton (1975) recommend that a pilot study be 
undertaken in order to provide guidance on the adequacy of the sample frame, variability 
within the population to be estimated, the non response rate to be expected and the 
suitability of the data collection method. Furthermore, Allan and Skinner (1991) recommend 
a pilot study when research is to be based on large scale use of a structured questionnaire 
(p!70).
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Following this the questionnaire could be modified and the final survey be administered 
The main aim of the pilot study was to reduce the level of response error2. Results from the 
pilot study revealed that the questionnaire was relatively easily understood by Russian 
managers, so it was decided that the survey could be carried out successfully by mail3. 
Advantages of mail surveys are their cost effectiveness, easy coverage of wide geographic 
areas, and ease at which respondents can complete the survey. However Allan and Skinner 
(1991) note that although mail surveys reduce interviewer bias there is no guarantee that the 
respondent will complete the questionnaire.
During the pilot study managers in Belarus and Ukraine appeared to be unsure of western 
terminology, therefore face to face interviews were used. The main advantage of this 
technique is that the interviewer can ensure that the respondent fully understands the 
question and prompt where necessary (Allan and Skinner, 1991, p227). However the risk 
of interviewer bias is higher, as is the cost
See Curran and Blackburn (2001) for other survey techniques such as the CATI (telephone 
interview) approach.
Questionnaire design and content
Following the pilot study the same questionnaire (which had been translated from English 
into Russian) was undertaken in all three countries, which included structured4 and closed 
end questions. The first set of questions related to numerically measurable company 
characteristics, such as investment, exports and employment.
Secondly the questionnaire sought to measure strategic intent and managerial attitudes, 
whereby responses are based upon a seven Likert point scale, which ranges from 1 
(unimportant) to 7 (most important). Moser and Kalton (1975) note that the Likert scale is a 
useful tool for indicating various strengths of agreement and disagreement, when non neutral 
questions are to be asked. The application of these scales does raise some serious questions
2 Response error occurs when a respondent misunderstands a question, which leads to missing cells.
3 Cavusgil (in Czinkota andTesar, 1982) and Dosoglu-Guner (2001) also uses a mail survey in their study 
of exporting firms.
4 For business research it is considered that structured questions are superior to “unstructured 
questions”, which can lead to unclear, unclassified responses (Curran and Blackburn, 2001, p73).
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concerning validity and reliability of answers5. For these reasons two senior members of the 
research team randomly selected 5% of the companies and visited them to check that no 
deviations existed in the collected data and company records, confirming inter rater 
reliability.
The surveys.
The first survey was carried out in 1997 and reported firm performance, strategy, equity 
distribution and board structure. The survey also attempted to capture data from 1994- 
1996, which hoped to account for some post privatisation adjustment, but this may have 
created some recall loss (where respondents fail to recall information). Finally 105 
responses were collected from Russia, 68 from Belarus and 100 from Ukraine.
The second survey was launched in April-June 1998, the same respondents were 
approached from the first survey, but several had become bankrupt, merged or simply 
refused, thus some new firms were contacted6. Nevertheless a test of non response bias was 
made between the second round of respondents and non respondents on variables, such as 
ownership structure, firm size etc., which indicated no significant difference (see Filatotchev 
et al., 2001b).
This survey produced a longitudinal dataset o f229 firms, which was used as the pooled 
dataset, for 1994-6 and 1998.
3.2 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The survey design facilitated a quantitative approach, using positivism as a rationale for 
research (see Stiglitz and Driffill, 2001), rather than a normative framework.
Allan and Skinner (1991) document that statistical analysis with large scale surveys reduces 
many of the problems associated with smaller surveys. For example with a small survey it is 
difficult to disentangle the effects of various factors with confidence (p269). Large scale
5 However Moser and Kalton (1975) note that the Likert scale is more reliable than the Thurlstone scale 
(an interval scale of measurement), p361.
6 Moser and Kalton (1975) discuss reasons for non response and state that interviewers need to decide 
who is “interviewable”, and if substitute respondents are needed. Furthermore adjustment maybe 
needed for non response bias, which would require some knowledge of the non respondents, (pi 66).
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surveys allow us to adopt statistical model building, particularly via linear regression. 
However the subsequent chapters attempt to employ other statistical techniques, such as 
logistic regression, WLS and repeated measures analysis.
Curran and Blackburn (2001) document that positivist explanations based on quantitative or 
statistical techniques have become more popular, as they have become easier and quicker to 
implement with computer packages (such as SPSS, used in analysis here).
However it is important to note that other approaches may be adopted successfully in the 
social sciences or more specifically in the transition economics field. For example Curran 
and Blackburn (2001) state that in small business research qualitative research has become 
more popular over recent years: computer packages such as NUDIST or Ethnograph can 
be used to store and analyse qualitative data.
In the transition economy field researchers have successfully implemented a more qualitative 
approach by carrying out case studies. For example Yoruk (2002) has examined the 
importance of networks and production in several transition economies, while Djankov and 
Pohl (1998) have focused on the restructuring of large firms in the Slovak Republic. 
Exporting research has also been carried out with case studies (see Johanson et al, 1975).
3.3 DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISON OF METHODOLOGY USED IN OTHER EXPORTING 
PAPERS.
METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION
By describing and comparing methodological issues in other output of existing export 
research it will become clear that my research has succeeded in employing several 
techniques, whereas the majority of existing research has concentrated upon correlation 
analysis and linear or logistic regression. Furthermore I have merged an international 
business, strategy and economics approach in chapter five. By adopting an international 
business and strategic management approach it has been assumed that international 
diversification is a key role in the strategy of firms (Hitt et a l, 1997) and that successful 
internationalisation requires a change in strategy (McDougal and Oviat, 1996). In addition 
the learning by exporting research has also been employed from the economics literature 
which states that a number of performance measures are greater in exporting firms than in 
non exporting firms, for example productivity growth is greater in exporting firms (Delgado
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et al., 2001) and exporting firms have a higher chance of survival and greater employment 
growth (Bernard and Jensen, 1999). By blending the three fields of literature, a greater 
understanding of exporting at the firm level can be gained.
Other export research that has successfully adopted a multi disciplinary approach can be 
found in Bhavani and Tendulkhar (2001) which amalgamates international trade theory with 
an industrial organisation framework.
As Bilkey (1976) notes much of previous export research has focused upon either internal 
or external change agents. External agents include government agencies, other firms and 
other market factors such as the level of industrial decline. Internal agents may be the 
structure and behaviour of a firm’s top management In Dosoglu-Guner’s (2001) export 
study she notes that the failure to include industrial conditions in her analysis is a major 
shortcoming, which should be addressed in future research. One of the contributions of my 
research is to fuse internal and external change agents, by merging export determinants such 
as industrial decline, with firm ownership structure and size, among others factors.
Thus in similar lines to other cause and effect models (see Etgar and McConnel, 1976) we 
arrive at the following:
X = f(E,I)
Where X are export related behavioural decisions, E represents external change agents such 
as legal and economic forces, and I represents internal change agents, such as ownership 
structure, managerial turnover, and firm size etc.7
Bilkey (1976) notes that an important methodological question is whether export behaviour 
should be included in a multi- activity behavioural model of the firm, incorporating strategies 
such as increasing product lines and expanding domestic markets, or should exporting be 
modelled as a single activity. In line with other export research (Cavusgil, 1984, Bernard 
and Jensen, 1999) the model employed here shall assume a single activity model.
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3.3B METHODOLOGY IN EXISTING EXPORT RESEARCH
MODELS EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF OWNERSHIP AND ORGANISATIONAL 
CHARACTERISTICS ON EXPORT BEHAVIOUR
Cavusgil (1984) represents one of the first studies to examine the impact of organisational 
characteristics on export behaviour. His literature review identifies the need for additional 
research to link internal firm characteristics with exporting activity. In his research he argues 
that there are four types of organisational characteristics which may influence export 
behaviour: sources of firm differential advantage, managerial aspirations towards export, 
profit and growth, managerial expectations and managerial resource allocation to exporting 
activity (such as market exploration or development of an export policy.)
There are two types of methodological difference between my work and that of Cavusgil. 
Firstly Cavusgil takes a more psychological view of internal organisational characteristics by 
introducing decision theory (McGuire, 1964) in order to measure aspirations. Secondly, 
Cavusgil uses different empirical methods such as multiple classification analysis, which can 
examine interrelationships between several predictors and a dependent variable, within an 
additive model8. Finally he uses Automatic Interaction Detector analysis to search for 
predictors which increase the power to account for variance in the dependent variable, 
which allows the identification of characteristics of the most passive and aggressive 
exporters.
Although the multiple classification analysis deals with multicollinearity and non linear terms, 
it only can deal with dummy variables, which mean many other continuos variables, which 
could affect export behaviour have had to be omitted. Furthermore AID analysis only 
provides us with profiles of firms operating at the extremes of export activity, and a profile is 
also needed for “intermediate” exporting firms. Thus it could be argued that Cavusgil should 
supplement his data analysis to remedy these shortcomings.
Interestingly he claims that further research should include other internal characteristics and 
include external determinants of exporting, my research attempts to do both.
7 Etgar and McConnel (1976) also include a variable which represents information processing, which 
was not included in my analysis, however it should be noted that no empirical test was taken on their 
variables.
8 In essence, it is similar to multiple regression, but uses dummy variables only as predictors.
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More recent research by Javalgi et al, (1999) empirically investigates the influence of firm 
characteristics upon export propensity. They include variables such as the number of 
employees, total sales, firm age, industrial classification and firm ownership. Several of these 
variables are included in my analysis, however it should be noted that Javalgi et a l, only use 
a very narrow measure of ownership, and includes a dummy variable to show whether a firm 
is publicly or privately owned. In contrast my analysis includes a wider range of ownership 
variables, and analyses the decision to export and the extent o f  export activity.
However they make three important criticisms of existing export research which are 
beneficial from a methodological point of view:
1. little has been done to document the impact of firm characteristics on export propensity 
across industry, i.e. inclusion of contextual factors.
2. research designs have restricted the generalisation of results
3. need for larger databases.
My research hopes to target some of these criticisms: by including industry dummies the 
impact of contextual factors will be considered, although using data from the fSU makes 
results not easily comparable. This study represents one of the first studies of exporting firms 
in the region (except existing research from the University of Nottingham research team). 
Furthermore a sample of over 200 firms is credible when considering the challenges of 
collecting data from such an area.
Research by Javalgi et a l, (1999) also attempts to correct for these criticisms by empirically 
investigating the impact of firm characteristics across industry type, with an enviable dataset 
o f20,204 firms. However this research only includes a logistic model, whereas the analysis 
in chapter five, here, aims to amalgamate several empirical techniques. Furthermore the 
inclusion of two independent variables representing firm size (total sales and number of 
employees) does not account for possible multicollinearity problems.
Bhavani and Tendulkar (2001) attempt to identify variables affecting export propensity and 
intensity in India They hypothesise that the form of business organisation, firm size, wages 
and share of sales expenses are important determinants of both functions. This is an 
interesting approach as they manage to merge international trade aspects, such as wages and 
competitive advantage with industrial organisation theory.
108
Variables common to my study are firm size, and the form of business organisation, yet in 
their study only a dummy variable is inserted to represent if a firm is a single proprietorship. 
They assume that the form of business organisation reflects access to capital (p65) or the 
firm’s ability to raise finances, which is “the basic resource at the firm level and hence 
the probability o f its undertaking production fo r  exports, ” (p71).
Their techniques are empirically advanced In order to model export propensity a tobit 
model is used, which is suitable for a binary choice model, and assumes a normal distribution 
(Greene, p814), however one criticism of this paper is that they do not include results of the 
appropriate statistical test to show this assumption is tenable. In order to model export 
intensity they employ a censored tobit model, which is suitable for analysing data when some 
of the observations of the dependent variable are zero (Greene, p906).
A major problem of this research is that their data is cross sectional which leads to causality 
problems, for example we do not know if export causes firm growth or vice versa. 
Furthermore their data is restricted to textile firms in India, so their results maybe only 
comparable to other labour intensive industries.
Lastly, Dosoglu-Guner (2001) attempts to demonstrate that export activity is caused by 
behavioural attributes, as opposed to financial determinants by examining the impact of 
organisational culture and ownership on export intention of US firms, which she notes is 
under researched.
Her framework is multi disciplinary and assumes that organisational culture affects corporate 
behaviour and strategy, therefore we can expect organisational culture to impact on 
exporting, if we consider international expansion as a part of corporate culture (p74).
She employs the usual firm variables such as firms size, but also variables on organisational 
culture9 which are constructed from questions based on a Likert scale, concerning 
organisation type, leadership practices etc. In addition she includes dummy variables to 
represent if a firm is controlled by the owner, insiders or externally controlled.
Dosoglu- Guner then uses logistic regression to model export intention, following factor 
analysis to assess the construct validity of the multi item scales.
The main limits of this study is the use of a very subjective dependent variable- export 
intention, a firm which is “interested in exporting” may have no actual intention of exporting,
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thus it may have been more sensible to adhere to typical measures of export behaviour. 
Finally, a criticism common to many export studies is the cross sectional data analysis, which 
fails to account for time lags, is a major shortcoming, however this may be compensated by 
the innovative measurement of organisational culture.
GENERAL EXPORT MODELS
A literature search of the strategy, economics and international business fields identified 
several papers analysing determinants of export behaviour10, thus the methodological 
aspects of papers which specifically determine either export intensity or propensity shall be 
discussed.
Working in chronological order we begin with a study by Andersen, although undertaken 
ini993, it critically analyses some of the seminal works on exporting in the mid 1970’s. 
Firstly he notes that the internationalisation process has been subject to widespread 
empirical research, yet theoretical and methodological problems remain.
Andersen critically examined the Uppsala internationalisation model accredited to Johanson 
and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) based upon four case studies of Swedish firms, which 
assumes that firms develop according to a chain of establishment:
1. No exporting activities
2. Exporting via agents
3. Establishment of an overseas sales subsidiary
4. Overseas production/manufacturing
The model hypothesises that firms enter new export markets with successively greater 
psychic distance, and emphasises the incremental and experiential nature of firms committing 
resources to export markets. In short the model explains internationalisation as a process of 
increasing experiential knowledge11. Meyer and Skak (2002) also highlight the importance 
of experiential knowledge in international entry, which they define as expertise in cross 
cultural management, leadership and foreign business cultures (p i80). However Andersen 
criticises this model as firms may not always export markets on a step by step basis (e.g. a
9 Namely market, adhocracy, hierarchy and clan culture.
10 Several were discarded as they discussed other elements of internationalisation, such as the 
perceived costs of exporting (Eriksson, 1997) or exporters performance (Domiguez and Sequiera, 1992)
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firm with large resources may jump some stages in the chain), also in times of stable market 
conditions market knowledge can be gained from other sources than experience.
More importantly, no initial conditions are presented and the model does not explain why 
the internationalisation process starts as Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) expect that 
“the internationalisation process once started will tend to proceed regardless o f 
whether strategic decisions are taken in that direction or not, ” (p i2), which appears to 
be a strange assumption.
Andersen lastly criticises the cross sectional nature of the studies, which does not allow us to 
examine how and when a firm moves from one stage to the next, thus longitudinal data 
would be desirable. Bilkey (1976) also notes similar phenomena in earlier export research 
by Etgar and McConnel (1976) who limit their research to static models 
In conclusion Andersen makes the following recommendations for further research in the 
field:
1. incorporate assumption that decision maker is strategically conscious
2. introduce a time dimension, e.g. longitudinal data analysis.
My research attempts to adhere to these recommendations by attempting to examine why a 
firm begins the exporting process (a strategy to improve performance), and assumes that a 
decision maker selects exporting as a strategy for this reason. Also my study does allow for 
a time dimension, with time lags in regression models. This is particularly important owing to 
the possible endogeneity of ownership, therefore lagged ownership variables are used so 
that the dependent variable has no feedback effect upon ownership factors12. Of course it is 
accepted that a one period lag may not be sufficient in some cases, especially where the 
sample is relatively small. One method of testing for endogeneity would be to use a Granger 
causality test (see Greene, 2000, p657).
The table below compares my exporting research with that of the Upssala school, based on 
Andersen’s criterion.
11 This reduces the risk involved in going abroad and also provides a vehicle for acquiring knowledge of 
internal and external resources.
I l l
Table 4: A summary of the evaluation based on explanatory criteria
Upssala Model My research
Aspects evaluated
Type of scientific explanation
Genetic (historicist) Non historicist(not based on 
a prior state)
Boundary assumption 
Space
Time
No restriction 
Unbounded
Privatised manufacturing 
firms in the fSU 
Mid 1990’s
Causality 
Model type
Explanatory variables
causal cycle 
only one
Corporate governance 
impact on exporting, 
many variables- firm 
characteristics
Utility-scientific 
Assumption about firm 
behaviour
incremental decision making, 
little influence from market 
factors
explains why firms export 
does allow for the impact of 
market forces (e.g. industrial 
decline)
Variable definition no operational definition clearly defined
Utility-intuitive useful for government, 
management
useful for export promotion, 
export profiles
Source: adapted from Andersen (1993) and author’s own comments.
Clearly, my research meets many of Andersens’ research criteria: variables are clearly
defined, analysis involves more than one explanatory variable and is scientifically and 
intuitively useful.
Research in the 1980’s was somewhat dominated by Ursic and Czinkota (1984). Their 
study of 182 small and medium firms in the US. They propose that the experience curve is 
the major factor explaining export activities13, by using age as a proxy for experience they 
then split the firms into two groups: old and young. Following this, t-tests were undertaken 
on attitudes towards exporting, levels of export intensity and growth in order to determine 
differences between the two types of firm.
Limitations of this study are twofold: while t-tests are useful for exploratory data analysis 
they do not determine the direct impact of age on the level of export intensity, also by using 
age as a proxy for experience may lead to bias, for example, some young “inexperienced”
12 See Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) for the debate on the endogeneity of ownership.
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firms may be taken over or merged with old experienced firms, which would give the young 
firm an experience advantage.
Next in 1996, Douglas analysed the determinants of exporting in Peruvian small and medium 
firms, by concentrating upon the impact of firm characteristics and marketing strategies.
In common with many other studies she uses firm size as a determinant and strategies 
towards diversification, however she also uses an innovative variable, perhaps seen only in 
export studies in global marketing journals, the marketing mix.
Her data analysis is mainly descriptive, as opposed to predictive and relies on correlation 
analysis and Mann Whitney U tests. However, the major limitations of the paper is the cross 
sectional data which does not allow us to examine the feedback loops between strategy and 
outcomes and lastly "findings are based on a performance average, which lacks 
precision, ” (p41). As Douglas comments at the end of her research, analysis is needed 
accounting for the time factor.
Roberts and Tybout (1997) seminal study of export propensity in Colombia emphasises the 
hysteresis model by examining the significance of sunk costs to exporting, thus they 
hypothesise that prior market experience significantly affects current decisions to export (see 
p547 for a treatment of the theoretical discussion).
As well as start up costs, they include a wide selection of variables hypothesised to affect 
the decision to export, such as capital intensity, relative wages, plant age, industry and 
location dummies and lastly, similar to my study they include a proxy for firm ownership. 
Their sample size is extensive, giving 5850 observations from 1981-1989, which they use to 
model the decision to export. Their principal research methods are the simulated moments 
method, which is suitable for panel data analysis, and in addition they account for serial 
correlation.
Their theoretical section and methodology can not be criticised, owing to sophisticated 
empirical techniques and wide application of their results.
Next, Wakelin (1998) examines the role of innovation in determining export propensity with 
a sample of 320 UK firms, spanning a period of five years.
13 A firm is said to move up the experience curve when they increase sales volume rapidly, thereby 
lowering costs.
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She uses sound econometric techniques, namely the tobit model and the censored probit 
model to determine the impact of innovation, capital intensity, wage and labour cost (all 
scaled to reduce heteroscedasticity) on export propensity.
However, a methodological problem may exist in her measurement of innovation as she only 
uses a categorical variable to represent if a firm is an innovator or not14, this does not 
capture the scale or intensity of innovation. Furthermore, Wakelin states that some firms 
maybe mis-classified as an innovator, due to the timing of the survey (p834). Lastly although 
missing data appears to be a problem, there is no evidence of an attempt to solve the 
problem.
Samiee and Walters (1999) examine the relationship between acquired structural export 
knowledge15 and export intensity in 160 US firms. They measure the firms level of interest in 
structural export knowledge on a five point Likert scale (although it could be argued that this 
is not as accurate as obtaining data on actual export knowledge). In addition, measures 
were made to quantify a firm’s commitment to exporting by determining whether a firm 
possesses an export department, or deals with exporting on an ad hoc basis (p388). 
Interestingly, they use two measures of export behaviour: export intensity, and the export 
transaction size16, however their analysis is limited to correlation analysis, which does not 
allow us to explore the causal relationship between structural export knowledge and export 
behaviour.
14 As firm level expenditure on R&D is only available for quoted firms in Wakelin’s sample.
15 Structured export knowledge can be defined as an education programme involving "a comprehensive, 
diploma level course o f export training, " (p381)
16 They hypothesise that larger export transaction size leads to greater absolute profits.
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Table 5: summary of research on the impact of ownership characteristics on exporting
behaviour: 1984-2001
Author Variables Techniques Criticisms
Cavusgil (1984) Sources of differential 
advantage
Managerial aspirations, 
expectations and 
resource allocation
Multiple classification
analysis
AID analysis
Omits important 
continuous variables 
Concentrates on 
extreme export profiles 
only
Javalgi et al., (1999) Number of employees 
Total sales
Industry classification 
ownership
Logistic regression Uses a narrow measure 
of ownership 
Possible 
multicollinearity
Bhavani and Tendulkar 
(2001)
Business organisation
Firm size
Wages
Sales expenses
Tobit regression 
Censored Tobit 
regression
Cross sectional dataset 
only
Applicability of results
Dosoglu-Guner (2001) Organisational 
structure 
Ownership 
Firm size
Logistic regression Subjective dependent 
variable
Cross sectional dataset 
only
Source: Author’s own
3.4 METHODOLOGY USED IN CHAPTER SIX: FOREIGN PARTNER SELECTION IN THE FSlJt 
CONSIDERATIONS AND COMPARISONS
The aim of this chapter is to account for the extent of partner presence in Russia, Ukraine 
and Belarus and to provide explanations for the presence or non presence of foreign 
partners. The following section shall describe the methods used to investigate these research 
questions.
The first section of the chapter is mainly descriptive and examines the extent of 
collaboration with foreign partners and the extent to which firms are seeking foreign 
partners. In addition, foreign partner perceived objectives, local firm attractiveness and 
perceived resource contribution are also explored. As one of the main research aims is to 
explore the heterogeneity of the region, non parametric tests were undertaken to see if the 
number of collaborations with foreign partners were the same over time and to examine 
whether mean scores on Likert scales were the same for all three countries.
As described in the following chapter presenting exploratory data analysis, the assumptions 
of normality were broken, thus non parametric tests must be used, such as the Wilcoxon Z
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test and the Kmskall Wallis test. It must be noted that there are some downsides of using 
these tests as they may reduce the power to reject the null, should it be false (Kinnear and 
Gray, pl63,1999). However they do not assume normality or homogeneity of variance and 
use measures such as the median which are not affected by outliers. Furthermore, the 
Wilcoxon Z test provides exact significance values calculated on the basis of the normal 
distribution (Field, p55,2000).
In order to test if the number of established links were the same in 1996 and 1997 in each 
country and if the number of firms seeking foreign partners were the same in 1996 and 1997 
the Wilcoxon Z test was employed which is based on ranks (see Field, p55,2000). This 
test is suitable for related samples, as the same subjects have been measured in both years. 
In this test we assume that the null hypothesis (Ho) states that there is no difference between 
the number of established links in 1996 and 1997. If the p value of the Z statistic is greater 
than 0.05 we can accept the null. If the p value is less than 0.05 we reject the null, and we 
can say that there is a significant difference between the number of established links in 1996 
and 1997.
In order to test if the mean responses were the same for each country, concerning issues 
such as local firm perceptions on what foreign partner are seeking, the Kruskall Wallis test 
was employed This is suitable for when we have K independent samples (i.e. the subjects 
are not the same across the three groups).
The null hypothesis is that the means are the same across all three groups. The test gives us 
the chi square test statistic and its p value (asymptotic significance), if this is less than 0.01 
then the Kruskall Wallis test confirms that the mean is not the same across all three countries 
(see Kinnear and Gray, p i88,2000).
The final part of the paper sought to explain the reasons behind a firm having a foreign 
partner, for this logistic regression was used, which is described below, in section 3.5.
3 .4 b  m e t h o d o l o g y  u s e d  in  s i m i l a r  r e s e a r c h
Several other papers have also attempted to examine issues concerning partner selection in 
emerging markets.
Some researchers have focused upon trans-national companies’ (TNCs) strategies for 
entering transition economies, as opposed to the host country perceptions and objectives.
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For example, Meyer and Skak (2002) examine international entry of Danish and Austrian 
(small and medium) firms into Russia, by using a “multiple lens” approach (pi 82) of survey 
data and case studies. An innovative part of their theoretical fiamework was their inclusion 
of network theory and the idea of serendipity in the internationalisation model They 
hypothesise that business networks (long term business relationships) facilitate 
internationalisation (pi 80), furthermore they highlight an element of serendipity- “fortunate 
and unexpected discoveries made by chance, ” (p i81), such as meeting a foreign business 
contact at a trade fair, can assist the internationalisation process.
Their descriptive analysis shows that both Austrian and Danish firms rank personal 
connections very highly as a source of information on Russia (pi 84), and that reactive 
entry17 is a very common entry mode into Russia (p i85).
A minor criticism of their research is the failure to account for the dynamic process of 
internationalisation, however this may be caused by the fact that research on serendipity is in 
its infancy.
In addition, Manea and Pearce (1999) surveyed 26 enterprises in Romanian manufacturing 
and extracting sectors, and asked TNCs to evaluate the importance of a number of factors 
when deciding to invest in Romania, the importance of market seeking and the importance of 
sources of technology, on a three or five point scale. Their main finding from their descriptive 
analysis was that TNCs main motives for investing in Romania was to create a market 
seeking subsidiary, which operates on standardised technology, leading to a limited 
contribution to the industrial transformation process. One of the main limitations of their 
research was the small sample size, caused by a low response rate of 25% and response 
scale design: 3 or 5 point scales allow very little variance in answers. However, their survey 
does manage to classify efficiently the strategies of TNCs.
Bridgewater (1999) examines the entry behaviour of multi-national companies entering 
Ukraine. Unlike our study of foreign partner selection she uses a multi disciplinary 
fiamework: economic based theories (oligopolistic reaction), incremental models and 
network theory in order to enrich the understanding of international market entry.
Similar to Manea and Pearce, Bridgewater assumes a case study approach and her analysis 
is mainly descriptive as opposed to using quantitative methods. For each of her four case
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studies she examines firstly the firms’ network relationships and then the selected market 
entry process. One limitation of her study is the lack of analysis of how the multinational 
company selects the Ukrainian partner.
Research by Banai et al., (1999) takes a similar thread to ours, where the focus is on the 
perceptions of the host firm, as opposed to those of the entering firm. Their work describes 
managers’ perceptions of prospective Russian-US joint ventures, provides insights into 
benefits and expected problems, preferred equity structure and system of managerial 
control.
Thus their methodological framework is much the same to the one adopted here: examining 
managerial expectations of international joint ventures as a background for improving the 
performance of potential international joint ventures. This is a relatively new perspective as 
most of previous research has examined the characteristics of the joint venture on 
performance, or examined the behavioural dimensions (such as technology) on performance. 
Their main research questions are why is a joint venture attractive, what problems are 
envisaged, what strategic decisions are important to Russian managers, what is their ideal 
equity structure and managerial philosophy?
To investigate these questions a survey was undertaken of Russian managers attending a 
training programme in the US, during the period 1992-1995. They achieved a high response 
rate (70.6%) and received usable responses from 226 managers. In the survey managers 
were asked for example, to rank their motives for entering a joint venture on a scale of 1-10 
and to assess to what extent ideal US managers should act like from a wide range of 
scenarios.
They then adopted a quantitative approach based upon non parametric tests. The Friedman 
test (which is suitable for ordinal variables) was employed to compare distributions of 
several related variables, and test the null hypothesis that scores for each topic come from 
the same population (i.e. the mean scores are the same for Russian motives and the Russian 
perceptions of US motives.) For interval scales the Chi square was used to test the equal 
distribution of variables, if the null is rejected, it can be argued that means are different due 
to differences in the populations.
17 Reactive entry is a case where contact with foreign partner occurred by chance.
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Only two criticisms can be made of the research by Banai et al, firstly, the survey was 
undertaken in the US, which could lead to some response bias, and secondly some of the 
questions are based on Western theories or models, which may mean some topics are hard 
to understand for Russian managers. I am confident that managers surveyed by the 
University of Nottingham research team were able to understand the questions as the survey 
instrument was piloted successfully. In addition in the case of Belarus and Ukraine 
interviewers were on hand to check that respondents fully understood each question.
Hitt et al., (2001) propose that there has been little research on how firms select partners 
for strategic alliances in emerging markets, they use a resource based and organisational 
learning fiamework to examine partner selection in emerging markets and the developed 
world They make a number of hypothesises concerning the priorities of executives in 
emerging markets and in the developed world when entering a joint venture (such as the 
emphasis on financial assets, managerial capabilities, technological assets etc.)
To test these hypotheses they carried out telephone interviews in Canada, US and France 
with company executives (receiving a 23% response rate, and usable responses from 85 
firms), in order to capture the priorities of executives in the developed world. In Poland, 
Romania and Mexico it was decided that personal contacts were needed, this brought about 
a response rate of 70%, providing responses from 97 firms. Interviews in all countries were 
carried out during the period 1995-1998.
The survey instrument included demographic questions, definitions of partner selection 
criterion, and also included a series of case studies, for which managers had to make 
decisions on, given the information presented
The first part of their data analysis used hierarchial linear regression in order to rank criterion 
for foreign partner selection in developed market firms and those in emerging markets. This 
method is appropriate when controlling for autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity.
Finally, Hitt et al, carried out a number of t-tests in order to highlight the differences in 
foreign partner selection in the two market contexts.
Their main results were that emerging market firms put more emphasis on financial assets, 
technological capabilities, intangible assets, willingness to share expertise in selecting a 
foreign partner. As for developed market firms, they put more emphasis on market access 
and local knowledge and unique competencies.
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Further research needs to focus on the fact foreign partner selection is a dynamic process, 
and several stages of negotiations maybe needed until an agreement is made, during this 
process motives and objectives may change. Furthermore, as Hitt et al, claim further 
research needs to examine how partner selection leads to joint venture success. Our 
research presented in chapter six hopes to partly meet this challenge and shed light on the 
foreign partner selection process in the fSU.
3.5 D e sc r ip t io n  a n d  R atio na le  fo r  qu a n tita tiv e  tec h n iq u es
LINEAR REGRESION
The starting point of analysis was OLS linear regression, which has already been used 
widely in the exporting and transition economics literature (see Bernard and Jensen (1999), 
Bleaney et al, (2000) and Buck et al, (1999).
This improves on the research of Douglas (1996) who uses only descriptive statistics and 
correlation analysis in her study of exporting firms in Peru.
Greene (2000) explains that the multiple linear regression model is used “to study the 
relationship between a dependent variable and several independent variables, ” 
(p210).
The multiple linear regression model takes the form:
y, = A*,i + A*,2 +A** +£,■
i = l,...n,
Where y is the dependent variable, x are the independent variables and et is the disturbance 
term.
Subsequent econometric investigation allows us to estimate unknown parameters in the 
model and to test the validity of a theory in light of available data. One of the most common 
methods of estimating the parameters of the linear regression is used here, the least squares 
method; see Greene (p223,2000) for details of the fitting criteria etc.
However the classical linear regression model relies on several assumptions, namely 
(Gujarati, p69,1995):
1. The regression model is linear in the parameters
2. X’s are assumed to be non stochastic
3. The disturbance term has a mean value of zero
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4. Homoscedastic or equal variance of disturbance term.
5. No autocorrelation between the disturbance terms.
6 . Zero covariance between the disturbance term and x*
7. The number of observations (n) must be greater than the number of parameters to be 
estimated.
8. Variability in x values
9. No specification bias or error in the model
10. There is no perfect linearity.
The following chapter presents non parametric tests where it is revealed that most variables 
to be included in the analysis were non-normal, thus breaking assumption two of the 
classical regression model (independent variables are assumed to be non stochastic) since 
the variables are shown to be stochastic.
Although some of the positive statistical properties associated with the assumption of non 
stochastic regressors will be lost, Kmenta (1986) notes the following,
"relaxing the assumption that X  is non stochastic and replacing it by the assumption 
that X  is stochastic but independent o f  [u] does not change the desirable properties 
andfeasibility o f least squares estimation, ” (p338).
By plotting independent variables against standardised residuals we can see that this 
assumption is tenable.
In addition, in chapters five and six, other data analysis techniques shall be used, which 
either allow for or correct for diversions away from assumptions about data.
LOGISTIC REGRESSION
Firstly, logistic regression does not rely on distributional assumptions in the same sense as 
other techniques, yet the presence of multicollinarity can cause biased estimates and inflated 
standard errors.
In this manner export propensity shall be determined, i.e. which factors determine if a firm 
decides to export or not. Bhavani and Tendular (2001) in their study of Indian firms estimate 
both the export decision function and the export performance function (or the share of 
exports in total output). Chapter five shall also follow a similar pattern. Dosloglu - Guner’s 
(2001) research has a similar theme to mine: it examines the impact of organisational culture
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and ownership on export propensity or intention, by adopting logistic regression. My work 
improves on this by examining the impact of ownership upon export intention and intensity, 
with a wider selection of techniques.
Logistic regression is the ideal technique as it is used when an outcome variable is a 
dichotomous or categorical variable, such as whether a firm is an exporter or not, or 
whether it has a foreign partner or not Logistic regression involves predicting the probability 
of the outcome variable, given known values of the explanatory variables.
As a result the logistic regression equation takes the form:
P(Y) =— —-  where z = p0+ p,X,+j i ,X2 + B X .  + e. (Field, 2000) 
l + e
The parameters are estimated using the maximum likelihood method which chooses 
coefficients which make observed values most likely to have occurred.
The beta coefficients can be viewed as the impact on the odds ratio of export propensity. 
For example, if the beta is positive then this indicates an increase in odds of a firm being an 
exporter or having a foreign partner, similarly if the beta is negative this represents a 
decrease in odds. Results in subsequent chapters shall also discuss the marginal effects that 
are elasticities evaluated at the mean.
In order to analyse the usefulness of the model we can refer to classification tables, which 
shows how many cases are correctly classified (in the analysis tables this is labelled “% 
correct”). Additionally, Hosmer and Lemeshow’s R2 can be used to evaluate how the 
inclusion of the explanatory variables improves the model. It is calculated in the following 
manner:
R2 = model chi squared/original -2 log likelihood.
Values can vary from 0-1, where a value of 0 represents a case where explanatory variables 
poorly predict the outcome variable, and where a value of 1 represents a case where 
explanatory variables predict perfectly the outcome variable.
WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES ANALYSIS - CORRECTING FOR HETEROSCEDASTICTTY. 
Similarly, weighted least squares regression provides optimal model estimates when variance 
is not constant within the population of study, compared to standard linear regression. The
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weight estimation procedure can compute the coefficients of a linear regression model using 
WLS so that more precise observations are given greater weight in determining the 
regression coefficients.
The scatter-plots below show that the fourth assumption of the classical linear regression 
model of homoscedastic disturbances has been broken, thus
e|w(2 * 0 - 2  J where i= 1,2,.. .and w,2 represents the disturbance term which is equal to a 
constant a  ^ (Gujarati, 1995, p356.)
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The plots of the standardised residuals against the standardised predicted values of the 
dependent variables in 1997, and 1996, reveal heteroscedasticity. Chapter five, table nine 
includes specification details and results of regression using the WLS technique.
Field (2001, pi 57) cites that the above plots should show a random display of dots equally 
dispersed around zero. Instead, the residuals appear to be clustered around -1. This makes 
remedial measures necessary.
Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) recommend a method called weighted least squares 
(WLS)18 which is appropriate when error terms are heteroscedastic (see Gujarati, 1987, 
p381, for other methods).
Therefore the following model can be estimated:
as a weight, and <r, is the standard deviation of exports. This technique gives more weight 
to precise observations, and less weight to highly variable observations. Gujarati (1987) 
states that these estimators are known as General Least Squares estimators and are BLUE 
(best, linear and unbiased).
However, Johnston and DiNardo (1997) note that unfortunately there are several 
disadvantages linked with this technique, <7,2 (or the structural form of heteroscedasticity) is 
rarely known, and the independent variables must be linear.
The SPSS 8.0 package allows us avoid the first problem by allocating a weight to the 
appropriate variable20.
POOLED REGRESSION TECHNIQUES
Given that we have several time points for the dependent variable it may be useful to pool 
the data, where the same cross sectional unit, in this case a firm, is surveyed over a period of 
time (Gujarati, 2001).
Here the GLS19 procedure minimises a weighted sum of residual squares with 1/c r2 acting
18 This is a type of Generalised least squares (GLS) procedure where regressors are multiplied by 
weights which vary across observations.
19 Note that the terms GLS and WLS can be used interchangeably in the context of heteroscedasticity.
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Baltagi (1995) lists several advantages of pooling data or using panel data techniques.
For example panel data offers more variability, reduces the problems of collinearity, and 
provides more degrees of freedom and efficiency. In addition by surveying the same unit 
over time, panel data allows us to examine dynamic relationships. Since the exporting 
process is believed to have a dynamic dimension, panel data techniques may prove 
beneficial.
In the first instance the following fixed effects model was estimated21:
Y« =A  + PiX 2„ + P)x n,+--P„x „« + U i ,  (see Gujarati, p642,2001)
Where i = 1,2,3,4 .. .229 and stands for the ith cross sectional unit and t denotes the fth 
time period. The X’s are assumed to be non stochastic and the error term has the following 
distribution: E(ujt) ~N(0, <r2).
As each firm or cross sectional unit has the same number of time series observations, we 
have what is known as a balanced panel.
As results showed the time dummy variable to be highly significant and the F test revealed 
that the inclusion of the variable was valid, an additional regression equation was estimated 
using interactive slope dummies22 taking the following form.
Y„ = a  + PlTIME + p2X 2t + TIMEp2X 2t+...pnX nt + TIMEpnX nl + uit.
If these slope dummies are statistically significant we can conclude that it is not advisable to 
pool the data and single year regressions are more suitable.
REPEATED MEASURES ANALYSIS.
Bergh (1995) highlights the benefits of adopting a repeated measures design, whereby 
subjects are measured two or more times for a particular dependent variable. These designs 
can be used to test differences in means over a certain period. In chapter four mixed 
repeated measure design shall be used, the within groups design which tests whether 
means vary for a group of subjects and the between groups designs which tests if the 
means change over time for two independent groups.
20 The weight function = l/(weighted variable)powCT, the power can range from -6.5 to 7.5, and is used to 
compute the weights, the power which produces the best maximising log likelihood function is stated in 
the results section. The weighted variable is related to the variability in the dependent variable.
21 It should be noted that the t (number of years available) is too small to run more sophisticated 
dynamic panel data techniques.
22 Which are defined as the time dummy multiplied by the main ownership variables.
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By using repeated measures techniques the Mauchly’s sphericity test will examine the 
variance-covariance matrix of an orthomormalised dependent variable to ensure that the 
sphericity assumption holds. If the assumption is violated then an adjustment will be made to 
the degrees of freedom when validating the significance of the F ratio.
Bergh (1995) also warns of the dangers of not adhering to the analytical assumptions of 
repeated measures designs. His in depth content analysis of studies focusing upon the 
relationship between diversification and performance, shows that very few studies recognise 
the symmetry assumptions, which is otherwise known as the assumption of homogeneity of 
covariance between repeated assessments23, and even fewer adopt contrasts24 in order to 
test the differences in multiple measurement of means. Games (in Von Eye, 1990) also notes 
that this procedure for adjusting the degrees of freedom to compute an index of sphericity 
“is one o f  the great neglected areas o f  statistical application, ”(p91), and many 
programmes, even journals, ignore the “epsilon factor”.
Following these criticisms of previous research the Mauchly sphericity test will be used in 
order to test for violations in symmetry, in line with recommendations of Bergh (1995) and 
Keselman et al., (1980), consequently epsilon modification will occur, which multiplies the 
degrees of freedom for the ANOVA univariate model by the epsilon value. The 
Greenhouse- Geiser epsilon is typically employed, where generally:
l/(k -l) < £ < 1.0, where k = number of levels of the repeated measures factor, J.
Games (1990) notes that the lower the index the further away we are from the desired 
condition of sphericity. However, in cases where e is greater than 0.75 the Huynh- Feldt 
epsilon shall be used instead25 (see Field, 2000, p334).
Furthermore contrasts will be used, namely the repeated contrast, which is particularly 
useful where levels of the independent variable are presented in a meaningful order. In this
23 McCall and Appelbaum (1973) focus on solutions for cases where this assumption is violated, and 
state that when time is a factor, research can often not meet this criterion. They offer the Greenhouse- 
Geisser procedure and the MANOVA approach to combat the problems of heterogeneity of covariance.
24 A contrast can be used in order to evaluate changes in three or more measures of means 
simultaneously, a simple contrast tells us if the difference in mean is constant over time, or a more 
complex contrast can test whether a difference in measurement means is non linear.
25 Games (1990) argues that the Hunyh Feldt epsilon may produce type 1 errors in small samples, 
however the sample used here is not particularly “small.”
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case the independent variable is measured at successive points in time (see Field, 2000, 
p329).
Following these suggestions repeated measures design was carried out firstly using a 
between subjects and within subjects design. The between subjects factor determines 
whether a firm has increasing or decreasing levels of export intensity during the period 1994 
to 1997, the within subjects factors, or the independent variables are observed for three 
points in time, 1994,1996 and 1997.
T he  P r o b l e m  o f  M issin g  d a t a
Analysis was not only hindered by the fact that some of the assumptions of the classical 
linear regression model were broken, but also by the existence of missing data. The solution 
to this problem is discussed in this section
One of the most difficult estimation problem in research is that of missing data, and the 
selection of techniques to deal with this problem should depend on the pattern of missing 
data (Rovine and Delaney, in Von Eye, 1990).
Missing values in the data used here are defined as system missing?6 which occurs when a 
respondent does not answer a question. The SPSS package27 and Rubin (1996) claim that 
missing data can cause several problems: firstly standard statistical methods assume 
complete data; units with missing data represent missing information, so overall there is a 
loss of information, and units with complete information are systematically different from 
units with incomplete data. The implications are twofold: estimation may be subject to bias 
and estimates will be inefficient
Rovine and Delaney (1990) emphasise that the first step in missing data analysis should 
involve determining the pattern of missing data. In order to employ most statistical 
techniques a model is needed for the data and missing value mechanism. The missing data 
mechanism model may assume that the data is missing completely at random (MCAR)28 or 
missing at random (MAR). In this case, we have repeated measures of a variable over a
26 This is opposed to the case where a missing value is defined as user defined missing, where the 
researcher declares certain cases as missing if s/he does not want them included in the analysis.
27 See http://www.spss.com/spss/mva/mva_example.htm
28 This refers to the instance where the “missingness” of variables is not related to values or patterns of 
other variables in the dataset.
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three year period, which complicates matters further for missing data patterns, due to drop 
outs from the survey (e.g. firms becoming bankrupt). However Rovine and Delaney note 
that again the optimal missing data pattern is MCAR, where no mechanism affects the 
occurrence of missing data.
In order to determine which assumption is correct for the data there are several statistical 
tests, for example Kim and Curry (1977) use a log linear model to test whether the 
incidence of missing data of one variable predicts the incidence of missing data on another 
variable. Given the statistical software available Little’s multivariate test of MCAR was 
employed in my analysis, and gave the following result: a chi square statistic equal to 5059.1, 
significance level of 1.0.From this result we can not reject the null hypothesis that the data 
are missing completely at random (MCAR).
Rovine and Delaney list a number of methods for dealing with missing data, simple 
procedures include mean insertion, list wise deletion and likelihood estimation suitable for 
nested29 missing data (p59). The table below presents some of the pros and cons of various
methods.
Table 6: Methods of missing data estimation for longitudinal studies
Method Assets Liabilities Required Pattern
Listwise deletion consistent matrices decimates data MCAR
Pairwise analysis uses all available 
data
can yield inconsistent 
matrices
MCAR
ML estimation use of maximum 
amount of predictive 
information
not easy to compute MAR
Mean insertion easy to compute depresses variance 
may give strange 
correlation/covarianc 
e matrices
MAR
Subgroup mean 
insertion
maintains some 
variance
dependent on the 
selection of groups 
and waves
MAR
Source: adapted from Rovine and Delaney, in Von Eye, 1990, p59.
However, SPSS presents a solution to the problem of missing data with the Maximum 
Likelihood (ML) approach.
29 Missing data can be deemed to be “nested” when respondents remain missing in subsequent waves 
o f the survey.
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As we can assume that the data is MCAR the danger of biased information is reduced, yet 
there is still a loss in efficiency, therefore an EM algorithm method can be employed to 
impute missing data in order to improve the preciseness of results. The Expectation 
maximisation (EM) approach involves an iterative procedure, the first step is to compute the 
expected value of the complete data log likelihood, secondly the M (maximisation) process 
substitutes the expected values for the missing data and then maximises the likelihood 
function in order to estimate new parameter estimates. The procedure continues until 
convergence is m et Thus this EM procedure shall be implemented in order to impute 
missing values. This modified data shall be used for the regression analysis in further 
chapters. Rubin (1996) recommends a multiple imputation technique which is not possible 
with the software packages available, thus the EM procedure shall be adopted instead, 
which can be expected to give better results than the method of “fill in the mean and 
ignore ” (p480, Rubin, 1996) which Rubin claims not to be statistically valid30.
Thus the regression analysis shown in following chapters is undertaken with the dataset 
where missing values have been replaced by the EM procedure.
However I acknowledge potential problems with the EM technique. Some researchers have 
criticised it for inflating standard errors, yet with the software available there is no clear 
method for correction (see Allison, 2002). Despite this drawback it is still being used in 
several papers (see Fitzmaurice and Laird, 1997).
30 An alternative to the EM procedure would be to run a Monte Carlo experiment, using a data 
generating process (DGP) which will involve a number of replications. This results in a new set of data 
being generated and calculations of estimators of test statistics. As the number of replications can reach 
5000, the computer software available is unable to perform this procedure. Thus the EM process is used.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS
4.1 D e sc r ipt iv e  st a t ist ic s
This chapter shall deal with the descriptive statistics for the ownership, corporate 
governance and exporting variables used in the two data analysis chapters, five and six. Also 
some statistics shall be given for general firm characteristics such as employment levels, 
investment and industrial decline will be acting as controls. This section, along with the 
literature search has assisted in the development of the hypotheses presented in chapter one.
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
Firstly the variable description for the correlation table shall be given.
BFOR = percentage of seats on the supervisory board held by foreign investors 
BINS = percentage of seats on the supervisory board held by mangers and employees. 
BOUT = seats on the supervisory board held by banks, investment funds, private 
individuals, industrial companies and foreign companies.
EMPL = the percentage of voting shares held by all employees collectively.
FRGN = the percentage of voting shares held by foreign investors.
GVRT = a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm has experienced a decline in state 
ownership, and zero otherwise.
INSTN = the percentage of voting shares held by institutions (the sum of trading partners, 
banks and investment funds).
OUT = sum of percentage of voting shares held by outsiders (the percentage of voting 
shares held by banks, investment funds, private individuals, industrial companies and 
foreigners)
INTOUT = an interaction variable consisting of board seats on supervisory board held by 
outsiders divided by the total number of board seats multiplied by the percentage of voting 
shares held by outsiders.
NE W DIR = a dummy variable equalling one if a firm has a new general director and 
zero otherwise.
EABR = exports to outside former CMEA as a percentage of sales.
DOMOWN = a dummy variable equalling one if a firm has a dominant owner, and zero 
otherwise
DOMOUT = a dummy variable equalling one if a firm has an outside dominant owner, and 
zero otherwise.
INVT = annual investment in million current roubles.
LOGEMP =the logarithm of the number of employees.
GD96_94= an industry’s reported decline in real output over the period 1993-1996, as a 
percentage of 1993.
GD95_94= an industry’s reported decline in real output over the period 1994-1996, as a 
percentage of 1993.
These are derived from the questionnaire show in the appendix.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for Ownership and firm size in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*
All three countries 
pooled
Russia Ukraine Belarus
Ownership/board
structure
% of seats held by 
foreigners
% of seats held by 
foreigners
% of seats held by 
foreigners
% of seats held 
by foreigners
1994 OH.M <>«» 0(0) 0(0)
1996 0.2(1.8) 0.38(2.6) 0.1(0.57) 0(0)
1997 08(5.5) 0.004(0.03) 0.85(5.65) 1.47(7.5)
% of seats held by 
insiders
% of seats held by 
insiders
% of seats held by 
insiders
% of seats held 
bv insiders
1994 77.9(27.3) 76.15(24.88) 82.06(29.09) 76.46(29.71)
1996 74.9(28.9) 72.63(27.74) 79.54(29.72) 72.87(29.89)
1997 70.8(28.6) 70.52(29.49) 66.33(29.25) 74.87 (27.03)
% of seats held by 
outsiders
% of seats held by 
outsiders
% of seats held by 
outsiders
% of seats held 
by outsiders
1994 12.4(20.2) 18.45 6.93(15.81) 7.37(18.65)
1996 17.7(25.3) 24.78(26.06 12.64(23.14) 13.51(24.73)
1997 15.6(24.2) 26.98(28.66) 25.16(27.83) 13.28(21.87)
Foreign ownership Foreign ownership Foreign ownership Foreign
ownership
1994 0.5(3.6) 0.39(2.44) 1.14(6.76) 0( 0 )
1996 0.8(5.5) 0.84(3.46) 0.75(5.44) 1.49(7.5)
1997 1.9(9.9) 0.89(4.95) 3.15(14.33) 2.57(10.75)
Government
ownership
Government
ownership
Government
ownership
Government
ownership
1994 13.2(24.0) 5.86(12.72) 12.41(28.0) 28.04(30.24)
1996 10.2(20.9) 4.01(11.8) 10.0(22.09) 20.17(26.83)
1997 10.9(20.8) 7.56(17.44) 8.44(17.43) 18.69(26.58)
Institutional
ownership
Institutional
ownership
Institutional
ownership
Institutional
ownership
1994 3.5(9.4) 5.88(11.62) 3.18(10.93) 1.3(3.32)
1996 8.0(15.5) 9.91(18.82) 8.7(15.85) 5.69(11.49)
1997 9.5(16.9) 10.56(18.01) 10.18(19.22) 7.16(11.98)
Outsider ownership Outsider ownership Outsider ownership Outsider
ownership
1994 17.5(21.7) 21.86(22.16) 16.91(26.24) 9.32(13.0)
1996 25.1(24.6) 24.23(22.97) 30.53(27.8) 19.17(19.29)
1997 25.1(24.6) 29.46(25.55) 27.0(25.41) 21.87(20.09)
Outsider corporate 
control**
Outsider corporate 
control**
Outsider corporate 
control**
Outsider
corporate
control**
1994 275.5(823.1) 358.49(808.73) 222.87(837.89) 181.16(842.6)
19% 761.7(1442.5) 827.87(1584.42) 593.17(1341.33) 528.28(1334.48)
1997 780.8(1527.8) 827.87(808.73) 945.44(1934.98) 493.38(969.39)
Firm size Log employment Log employment Log employment Log employment
1996 2.7(0.4) 2.56(0.49) 2.73(0.43) 2.82(0.37)
1997 6.0(1.1) 5.72(1.14) 6.04(0.97) 6.51(0.88)
*mean and standard deviation in parentheses. ** Defined as % of seats held by outsiders multiplied by 
% of shares owned by outsiders. For insider ownership see chapter five, table one, other descriptive 
statistics such as investment, managerial turnover can be found in Chapter six, section 6.5, table one.
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Table 2: Frequency chart for countries pooled
As the impact of a group of dominant owners on exporting is an important element of
this study, the following statistics are presented
% of firms with: Pooled Russia Ukraine Belarus
a group of dominant owners in 1994 71.7 71.6 66.2 78.9
a group of dominant owners in 1996 71.7 71.6 66.2 78.9
a group of dominant owners in 1997 71.2 75.0 71.8 64.2
a group of dominant outsider owners in 
1994
6.6 12.2 4.1 1.8
a group of dominant outsider owners in 
1996
7.0 11.1 4.1 1.8
a group of dominant outsider owners in 
1997
19.3 19.8 18.9 18.9
a group of dominant insider owners in 1994 63.2 62.8 59.5 68.4
a group of dominant insider owners in 1996 51.2 66.7 36.5 57.9
a group of dominant insider owners in 1997 57.6 56.5 52.8 64.2
a new director in 1996 27.2 27.1 26.8 10.5
a new director in 1997 19.1 14.1 32.4 28.1
Table 3: Evolution of export intensity1 (standard deviation in parentheses). %.
Export intensity 
1994
export intensity 
1996
export intensity 
1997
Countries pooled 4.2(13.3) 6.4(17.1) 6.0(17.8)
Russia 2.1(7.5) 3.4(9.5) 4.0(14.3)
Belarus 8.8 (21.0) 10.8(23.6) 7.8(18.1)
Ukraine 3.3(10.3) 6.6(17.3) 6.2(19.2)
Tables one to three suggests several findings about the evolution of ownership structure and
export intensity during the period 1994-1997.
Firstly if we look at insider ownership and control, this has fallen over the period 1994-7 in 
terms of percentages of voting shares and board representation. In contrast outside 
ownership has increased in terms of percentage of voting shares, however there seems to be 
a discrepancy between outside ownership and outsider board representation, as the latter 
has experienced only a very small increase.
Foreign ownership has also increased, albeit very slightly to 1.9%. This level of foreign 
ownership can be deemed as “low penetration o f foreign capital (less than 6%)” by 
Molero (2001), who finds that different levels of foreign ownership can be expected to have 
different effects upon economic variables such as technical complexity, employment levels
1 Export intensity is defined by exports/total sales.
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and the specialisation index. Bldmstrom and Sjoholm (1999) find differing results for 
Indonesian firms: plants with high and low levels of foreign ownership still positively affect 
labour productivity. Results from chapter five show that foreign ownership affects exporting, 
reflecting that even low levels of foreign ownership will affect exports in different manners. 
Institutional ownership has increased by 5.2% over the period 1994-7, suggesting that 
managers are becoming more open to outside ownership or that they are beginning to sell 
their shares in order to restructure.
Conversely, there is some evidence also that the State’s percentage of voting shares is 
declining over this period also.
As for dominant ownership the number of firms with a group of dominant owners has 
remained quite stable, in addition, firms with an outside dominant group of owners has also 
increased In contrast firms with a group of inside dominant owners has decreased by 
approximately 6%.
Managerial turnover also seems to have slowed over the period from 1996 to 1997, 
perhaps suggesting that this process is reaching completion.
Lastly, the interaction variable which represents outside ownership has more than doubled 
over the period 1994-7.
As for exporting intensity, this is low for all three countries, compared to other transition 
economies, for example Filatotchev et al., (2001) find that average export intensity for 
Hungary in 1997 is 39%. In the case of Russia, export intensity has increased during the 
period 1994-1997. As for Belarus and Ukraine, export intensity increased during 1994- 
1996, and has fallen during 1996-1997.
Table 4: Correlation table
Table four (please see over) illustrates the correlation table using the Pearson correlation 
coefficient for continuous variables and point biserial correlation for dichotomous variables. 
The dependent variable, export intensity, is measured in 1997, and independent variables 
are measured in 1996. Refer to variable description above for codes 
The correlation matrix reveals several interesting associations.
Firstly, export intensity is significantly correlated to industrial decline and firm size (both 
positively, at 5% and 1% levels respectively), reflecting perhaps, that industrial decline acts 
as push factor to external markets and that firm size represents resources or political clout
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assisting export activity. These results differ from those of Aw and Batra (1998) who find 
that small to medium sized firms are more likely to be exporters, yet agree with those of 
Delgado et a l, (2001) who find that firm size is positively associated with exporting. 
Table four correlation table
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Out
Intout Newd
ir
GD Lem
P
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1
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0.0
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*** Significant at 0.001; ** Significant at 0.01; * Significant at 0.05; f  Significant at 0.1
Interestingly the percentage of voting shares held by outsiders and employees are both 
positively related to the number of board seats held by these shareholders. This reflects that 
share ownership is mirrored in the composition of the board.
The 1994 law was designed to ensure that only one third of board members are insiders, 
which attempted to prevent ownership structure of firms being mirrored in their board 
structure, however this law was largely ignored by many firms.
As for insider ownership this is negatively correlated to the variable representing a change in 
directorate, providing evidence that insiders do not enforce changes in directorship.
Lastly, the presence of a group of dominant outside owners is negatively related to the 
number of board seats held by insiders and negatively correlated to government share­
holding.
As for the chapter concerning foreign partner selection we have the following descriptive 
statistics;
Table 5: Extent of collaboration and firm seeking foreign partners
% of firms with a foreign 
partner in 1996
% of firms seeking a 
foreign partner in 1996
Russia 27 56
Belarus 51 63
Ukraine 24 71
OVERALL 34 63
%  of firms with a foreign 
partner in 1997
% of firms seeking a 
foreign partner in 1997
Russia 15 28
Belarus 16 61
Ukraine 24 60
Overall 18 50
Table five alarmingly reveals that the number of firms with a foreign partner in all countries 
has dropped over the period 1996 to 1997. This may be caused by joint venture conflict or 
macroeconomic instability; unfortunately the data does not allow us to extrapolate why the 
number of collaborations has declined. However the fact that the number of firms seeking a 
foreign investor has also declined may reflect that firms in a similar industry have had
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negative experiences with foreign partners, or that firms have adapted their expectations if 
searching for a foreign partner is costly.
Table 6: Why do you have or are seeking a foreign partner?*
Introduction 
of new 
technology 
for existing 
products
Introduction 
of new 
technology 
for new 
products
Rehabilitati 
on of 
existing 
machinery
Training 
mangers in 
marketing, 
finance etc
Access to
foreign
markets
General 
advice and 
consultancy
Russia 5.1(2.4)a 5.6(2.1) 5.0(2.2) 3.9(2.2) 4.9(2.4) 2 .6(1.8)
Belarus 5.8(1.5) 6.3(1.1) 6 .1(1.1) 4.7(1.9) 5.8(1.8) 4.2(2)
Ukraine 5.9(1.9) 6 .1(1.6) 5.9(1.8) 4.9(2.2) 5.6(2.1) 4.5(2.2)
OVERALL 5.5(2.1) 5.9(1.7) 5.6(1.9) 4.5(2.1) 5.4(2.2) 3.4(2.2)
*mean score on Likert scale 
A= standard deviation in parentheses
Table six shows that one of the main reasons for having/seeking a foreign partner is to obtain 
technology for new products in all three countries (see question 18 in the Questionnaire for 
this section). Surprisingly access to foreign markets is not particularly important, given 
unstable domestic demand.
Table 7: Do you consider your firm to be attractive to a foreign investor?
% of firms who consider their firm to be 
attractive to a foreign investor?
Russia 56
Belarus 71
Ukraine 79
OVERALL 69
Table seven reflects some differences in how managers view their firms and how potential 
foreign partners view firms in this region. Clearly managers have overestimated their 
attractiveness, as when we examine table eleven which shows the extent of established links 
the level is much lower than we would imagine given table thirteen’s results.
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Table 8: If not Why?*
Majority 
stake owned 
by employee 
shareholder
Size of 
needed 
investm 
ent
Unstable
demand
More
attractive
industries
elsewhere
Management 
hostility to 
outsiders
Lack of 
underst 
anding 
of
compan
y
potentia
1
Shortc
oming
in
skill
base
Ecologic
al
problem
s
Russia 2.9(2.5)a 4.9(2.3) 4.7(2.0) 4.1(2.5) 1.8(1.2) 2.9(0.2) 2.9(1.5 
)
1.8(1.5)
Belarus 3.4(2.8) 3.5(2.4) 3.2(23 ) 2.7(2.5) 2.1(1.8) 2.8(2.2) 2.8(2.2 
)
2.1(1.7)
Ukraine 2.7(2.6) 3.4(2.3) 4.9(2.1) 5.3(2.4) 1.8(1.7) 2.2(2.0) 4.3(2.3 
)
3.1(2.5)
OVERA
LL
3(2.6) 3.8(2.4) 4.3(2.2) 4.0(2.6) 1.9(1.5) 2.6(2.0) 3.3(2.0 
)
2.3(1.9)
*mean score on Likert scale 
A= standard deviation in parentheses
For both Russia and Belarus the size of necessary investment is a major deterrent to foreign
investors. As for Ukraine it seems that there are more attractive firms in the same industry. 
Table 9: If yes. Why?
Acquisition
of
undervalued
assets
Access to 
Russian 
market via 
local
production
Access to 
Russian 
market via 
acquisition 
and closure
Access to
Russian
technology
Access to 
knowledge 
of local 
conditions
Preservation 
of former 
links
Russia 5.5(1.9) 5.4(1.80 3.3(2.3) 1.7(1.1) 3.2(1,7) 2.8(2.1)
Belarus 4.1(2.5) 4.2(2.4) 1.9(1.7) 2.1(1.8) 3.6(2.4) 3.7(2.5)
Ukraine 4.4(2.40 5.8(1.8) 2.4(2.1) 3.1(2.0) 4.9(2.1) 4.7(2.2)
OVERALL 4.7(2.4) 5.1(2.10) 2.5(2.1) 2.3(1.9) 3.9(2.4) 3.7(2.4)
Lastly the table above shows that Russian managers believe their firms to be attractive due 
to their undervalued assets, which could lead to resentment and conflict, a possible reason 
why the number of firms with a foreign partner has declined. As for Belarus and Ukraine the 
most important factor appears to be access to the Russian market, thus managers there 
anticipate they will become export platforms to the larger Russian market.
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4.2  Ex p l o r a t o r y  d a t a  a n a l y s is  : N o n  p a r a m e t r ic  t e st s  
Having carried out preliminary skewness tests it became apparent that all of the variables 
were non normally distributed,2 apart from the insider ownership variable, EMPL94 and 
EMPL96. This meant that in order to test if there is a significant difference between 
ownership structures and export activity from 1994 to 1996 it was imperative to use the non 
parametric Wilcoxon test3, which does not make any assumptions about population 
distributions and variance.
The results of these tests are shown below and are informative of the evolution of ownership 
and form the basis of the explanatory data analysis. They examine the differences in means in 
1994 and 1996.
Table 10: Non parametric tests for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus pooled
Export
intensity
Foreign
ownership
Outsider
ownership
Institution­
al
ownership
% of 
board 
seats held
ty
insiders
% ofboard 
seats held
by
outsiders
Outsider
corporate
control
T 2 .89** -1 .8 3 f _5 4*** -2 .9** -1 .9 t -3 .3** -2 .9**
a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. ***p<0.00l, **p<0.0i, *p<0.05 
Table 11: Parametric tests for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus pooled
Insider ownership
t statistic 4 j***
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05
Tables 10 and 11 reveal that there is a significant difference between ownership 
structure and export activity in 1994 and 1996. For example, export intensity is quite 
strongly and significantly different between 1994 to 1996. Also outside ownership is 
significantly different in this period too, perhaps representing a move away from majority 
insider ownership, as mean levels of outsider ownership appear to have increased (see
2 By using the Kolmogorov and Smirnov test, skewness vales (a value greater than 1 refers to a non 
normal distribution) and kurtosis graphs, non normality could be deduced.
3 See Kinnear and Gray, 1999, ppl64-167.
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descriptive statistics table). Blasi et al, (1997) document a similar finding from their survey 
on Russian ownership structures (p54).
As for board structure, there is a weak significant difference between the average number of 
seats held by insiders in 1994 and 1996, and a strong significant difference between the 
average number of seats held by outsiders in 1994 and 1996. Therefore, when data from 
the three countries are pooled, we find a situation where changes in ownership structure are 
matched with changes in board structure.
Running the tests separately for each country yield slightly different results.
Table 12: Non parametric tests for Russia
Export
intensity
Foreign
ownership
Outsider
ownership
Institution­
al
ownership
% of 
board 
seats 
held by 
insiders
% ofboard 
seats held 
by
outsiders
Outsider
corporate
control
T -1.5 1 -2.7** -1.5 - 1.6t -3.4** -2 .2*
a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05
Table 13: Parametric tests for Russia
Insider ownership
t statistic 0.5
For Russia it appears that there are significant differences between outside ownership, 
insider board representation, outsider board representation and the level of corporate 
control for outsiders from the period 1994 and 1996. However, for mean levels of insider 
ownership, export intensity, and foreign ownership between 1994-1996, the differences are 
insignificant Presumably representing that insider ownership in Russia has not fallen that 
dramatically, and that foreign ownership and export intensity has remained fairly static.
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Table 14: Non parametric tests for Belarus
Export
intensity
Foreign
ownership
Outsider
ownership
Institutional
ownership
% of 
board 
seats 
held by 
insiders
% of 
board 
seats 
held by 
outsiders
Outsider
corporate
control
z 3 -1.4 -1.3 _4 3*** -2.7** -0.2 -0.8 -1.2
aWi coxon Signed Ranks test. ***p<0.00l, **p<0.01, *p<0.05
Table 15: Parametric tests for Belarus
Insider ownership
t statistic -2 .1*
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05
As for Belarus there were significant differences in mean levels of outside, institutional and 
insider ownership during the period 1994-1996. Yet mean levels of exporting intensity, 
board structure and foreign ownership has not changed during the period 1994-1996.
Table 16: Non parametric tests for Ukraine
Export
intensity
Foreign
ownership
Outsider
ownership
Institutional
ownership
% of 
board 
seats held
insiders
% of 
board 
seats held
by
outsiders
Outsider
corporate
control
T -2 .2* -1 -2.7** - 1.2 -0.4 -1.1 -0.9
a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05 
Table 17: Parametric tests for Ukraine
Insider ownership
t statistic 1.8*
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05
Lastly, for Ukraine export intensity, insider ownership and outside ownership are all 
significantly different during this period.
141
From these tests we can see that board representation of insiders and outsiders has not 
changed significantly in Belarus and Ukraine, while the level of outsider ownership has 
changed significantly in all three countries. However foreign ownership has only changed 
significantly when all three countries are pooled. Furthermore we can say that changes in the 
percentage of voting shares of different types of owners have not been mirrored in board 
structure.
In order to test whether a firm has a group of dominant owners or dominant 
insiders/dominant outsiders in both 1994 and 1996, a Chi test was applied4, as this is the 
appropriate test for dichotomous variables. If the Chi square statistic is significant then we 
can conclude that the number of firms which have a group of dominant owners etc. in 1994 
is different in 1996.
Table 18: Chi test statistics for dichotomous variables (1994-1996)
Group of dominant 
owners
Group of dominant 
insider owners
Group of dominant 
outsider owners
All 3 countries 4.7* 8.2** 21.3***
Russia 13.8*** 13.6 13.0*
Ukraine 0 10.3** 10.2***
Belarus a
a all differences insignificant, ***p<0.001, **p<0.0l, *p<0.05
Firstly, from table 18 it is clear that the number of firms with various types of dominant 
ownership in Belarus in 1994 is not significantly different from the number of firms in 1996. 
In Russia, the number of firms with a group of dominant owners and a group of outside 
dominant owners in 1994 is significantly different from the number of firms in 1996. Lastly, 
in the case of Ukraine the number of firms with a group of dominant insiders and outsider 
owners in 1994 is significantly different from in 19965.
Before more sophisticated analysis was applied, Mann Whitney U6 tests were applied in 
order to test the equality of means of export intensity in 1996 for different types of 
ownership structure.
4 Namely the McNemar test, see Kinnear and Grey, 1991, p i65.
5 Comparisons with other studies cannot be made as my study deals with groups of dominant owners.
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Table 19: Testing for the equality of means of export intensity in 1996 for different 
ownership types using Mann U Whitney test for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.
Pooled
Z statistic
Russia
Z statistic
Ukraine
Z statistic
Belarus
Z statistic
For firms with or without:
outside ownership -1.8f 0.2 -0.3 -0.7
foreign ownership -0.9 -2.3f na -0.5
institutional ownership - 1.2 -0.3 -0.4 -1.4f
dominant owner -0.1 -0.2 -0.9 -1.4
a new director -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 -0.01
a dominant outsider -0.9 -0.4 -0.8 -0.9
insider board ownership -1 .9 | -2 .0* -0.1 -0.7
outsider board ownership -2 .2* -2 .2* -0.4 -0.2
***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05,tp<0.1
By referring to table 19 several observations can be made, by pooling the data for the three 
countries average export intensity levels are significantly different for firms with outside 
ownership from those without outside ownership. Similar findings hold for firms with insider 
board representation and those without, and again for firms with and without outsider board 
representation.
Foreign and non foreign owned firms’ average export intensity levels are not significantly 
different, in addition to firms with institutional and non institutional ownership. Whether a firm 
has had a new director or a dominant owner also does not lead to a significant difference in 
export intensity levels, suggesting that outsider ownership and board representation is a 
more important factor in determining the level of export intensity.
Examining table 19 for each county separately reveal slightly different results. For Russia 
alone, it appears again that average levels of export intensity are significantly different in firms 
with insider and outsider board representation from those without Interestingly, export 
intensity levels are also significantly different in firms with foreign ownership and those 
without, therefore the hypothesis concerning foreign ownership may have pertinence.
6 Mann U Whitney tests are suitable for 2 independent samples, see Kinnear and Grey (1999), pl06.
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As for Belarus different types of ownership structure or corporate governance do not 
appear to lead to different average export intensity levels, maybe because state control is so 
predominant7.
In Ukraine the position is similar to Belarus except that firms with institutional ownership 
have significantly different mean levels of export intensity from those firms without 
institutional ownership, thus the hypotheses concerning institutional share ownership may 
prove useful, in determining export activity
Aside from tables 5-9 in this chapter exploratory data analysis concerning foreign partner 
selection is detailed in tables 2-5 of chapter six.
4.3 Repeated Measures
It was seen in the previous chapter that Bergh (1995) highlights the benefits of adopting a 
repeated measures design, whereby subjects are measured two or more times for a 
particular dependent variable.
Descriptive statistics for the independent variables in this procedure (see chapter three for a 
description) will be shown below.
In order to avoid the problem of missing data the mixed design repeated measures design 
was undertaken for the modified data using the EM algorithm procedure, with the intention 
of improving the precision of the results8.
7 For Belarus in 1995 the average state percentage of voting shares was as high as 27.8%. State control 
is also known to be high, which can be expected to affect formal ownership structures.
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Table 20: Descriptive statistics for the independent variables: 1994-1997a.
1994 1996 1997
Insider’s share 
ownership
Group 1 65.9 63.8 57.4
Group 2 72.5 60.3 60.9
Foreign share 
ownership
Group 1 0.4 0.4 0
Group 2 0.2 1.4 1.4
Outsider’s share 
ownership
Group 1 10.6 19.8 30.6
Group 2 15.2 21.7 22.6
Institutional share 
ownership
Group 1 5.1 8.3 10.9
Group 2 3.0 5.6 7.8
% of seats held by 
insiders
Group 1 78.9 74.2 79.6
Group 2 77.5 77.8 77.4
% of seats held by 
foreign owners
Group 1 0 0.3 0.2
Group 2 0 0 0
% of seats held by 
outsiders
Group 1 10.9 16.9 16.8
Group 2 7.6 8.8 13.9
* Group 1 has decreasing exports over the period 1994-1997, for which n =53 , group 2 has increasing 
exports over the same period for which n=62.
8 The repeated measures analysis was also carried out using the dataset with missing values, the main 
results were that foreign ownership, institutional ownership and time all impact upon whether a firm has 
increased or decreased its export intensity. Board structure appears not to play a role.
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Again the results of the Mauchly’s sphericity tests in table 21 show that the assumptions of 
sphericity have been violated.
Table 21: Mauchlv’s test of sphericity
Mauchly’s W Approx. Chi square significance
Ownership 0.1 1079.7 0.00
Time 0.8a 11.8 0.003
Ownership*Time 0.1 1978.5 0.000
a As the Green House Geisser epsilon is greater than 0.75 the Hunyh-Feldt epsilon shall be used for the 
time factor in order to adjust the F statistic.
Table 22: Tests of within subjects effects corrected for violations in sphericity.
Greenhouse
-Geisser
epsilon
Adjusted F 
statistic
df Sign. Multivariate F 
statistic
Sign.
Ownership 0.2 265.7 1.9 0.000 331.0 0.000
Timea 0.9 4.9 1.7 0.01 4.7 0.01
Ownership
*Time
0.3 5.7 4.4 0.000 4.4 0.00
* The Hunyh -Feldt epsilon is adopted.
In table 22 we can see that the two main effects and the interaction are significant. For 
example, the main effect of ownership is significant (F( 1.9,17) = 265.7, p<0.000). Thus we 
can conclude that ownership structure is different for firms (ignoring the time factor) with 
increasing and decreasing export intensity. The time main effect is also significant, so we can 
conclude that whether a firm has increasing or decreasing export activity is modified over 
time. Also the multivariate method produces the same significance levels as the univariate 
technique.
However by examining the tests of within contrasts in table 23 it is apparent that there are 
significant differences in export levels between specific ownership types.
146
Table 23: Tests of within subjects contrasts
F Significance
Ownership*time
Foreign share ownership vs. 
Insider ownership, 1996 vs. 1997
6.6 0.01
Outsider ownership vs. 
Institutional ownership, 1994 vs 
1996.
22.1 0.000
Outsider ownership vs. 
Institutional ownership, 1996 vs. 
1997
6.1 0.02
Institutional ownership vs. 
Outsider ownership, 1994 vs. 1996.
16.4 0.000
% of board seats held by insider 
vs. Institutional ownership, 1994 
vs. 1996.
8 2 0.006
Ownership*time*Xchange*
Foreign ownership vs. Insider 
ownership, 1994 vs. 1996
3.5 0.07
Outsider ownership vs. Foreign 
ownership, 1996 vs. 1997.
4.3 0.04
% of board seats held by foreign 
owners vs. % of board seats held 
by insiders, 1994 vs. 1996.
2.6 0.1
“Xchange is the between subjects factor, and compares firms with increasing and decreasing levels of 
export intensity.
Please see chapter one fo r  a list o f  hypotheses.
For the first contrast comparing foreign ownership and insider ownership from 1994 to 
1996 we have a significant result This reflects that an increase in foreign share ownership, 
compared to an increase in insider ownership is associated with firms with increasing export 
intensity during the period 1996-7. This analysis provides support for hypothesis 5.
From table 23 it is clear that outsider share ownership compared to foreign ownership, 
when 1994 is compared to 1996, foreign ownership is associated with those firms with 
increasing export intensity. This provides support for H3.
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The contrast between outsider ownership and institutional ownership, when 1994 and 1996 
are compared, shows that an increase in institutional ownership compared to other outside 
ownership is positively linked to firms with increasing export intensity, this result was also 
found in analysis, where missing values were not imputed (not presented here). From this we 
can tentatively accept hypothesis 14b.
Next, we arrive at another significant contrast: that which compares the percentage of board 
seats held by insiders compared to institutional share ownership, when 1994 is compared to 
1996. Thus, we can conclude that share ownership held by institutions is linked with firms 
with an increasing export intensity, thus this enables us to accept hypothesis 14b.
Next if we come to the ownership, time and between subjects interaction, there are now 
several contrasts which are significant. Again foreign ownership compared to insider 
ownership for the years 1994 to 1996 is significant. This shows that an increase in foreign 
ownership compared to insider ownership, is linked to firms with increasing exports, also for 
the period 1994-1996.
Secondly the contrast which compares outside ownership with foreign ownership, between 
1996 and 1997 is significant, and shows that an increase in outside ownership over this 
period is associated with firms with increasing export intensity.
Finally the contrast which compares the percentage of board seats held by foreigners with 
those held by insiders, from 1994 to 1996 is significant at the 10% level. This reflects that 
the decline in the percentage of seats held by foreigners is associated with those firms 
experiencing a decline in export intensity, finding indirect evidence to support hypothesis 9. 
Thus by adopting the repeated measures design with imputed missing values we arrive at the 
following results: the contrast between foreign and outside ownership is significant for the 
whole period of 1994 to 1997 and contrasts between the percentage of board seats held by 
insiders compared to institutional ownership, and the percentage of board seats held by 
foreigners (for 1994 to 1996) are significant9.
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Table 24: Summary table
KEY RESULT
1 Insider ownership and control decreased 
over the period 1994-96.
2 Outsider ownership increased yet board 
representation has not increased by the same 
magnitude.
3 Foreign ownership has increased only 
slightly.
4 Institutional ownership has increased.
5 The number of firms with a dominant owner 
has remained stable.
6 In Russia export intensity has increased 
(1994-1997), yet in Ukraine and Belarus 
export intensity has increased during 1994- 
6, but declined in 1996-7.
7 Firms with a foreign partner has declined 
during the period 1996-1997.
8 Firms seeking a foreign partner has declined 
during the period 1996-1997.
9 For pooled data average export intensity 
levels are different for firms with outside 
ownership and those without
10 For pooled data average export intensity 
levels are different for firms with insider 
board representation and those without.
11 FROM REPEATED MEASURES Ownership structure is different for exporting 
and non exporting firms
12 F ro m  r e p e a te d  m e a su r e s Contrast between foreign and outside 
ownership us significant for the period of 
1994-7.
Observations relate to the period 1994-6 or 1997.
9 Thanks to Dr T. Mickiewicz for the following point: the repeated measures technique does have one 
disadvantage- differences between groups may result from the fact that groups of firms have different 
characteristics, such as size etc., for which the technique does not control.
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4.4 MODELS FOR ESTIMATION
In chapter five the following models were estimated, where the dependent variable is 
measured in 1997 and 1996, by a variety of techniques:
Model 1: Export intensity or propensity = a  + log of employeest-i10 + industrial 
decline11 +log of investmentt.i + decline in state ownership^ + % of shares held by 
foreignerst-i + % of shares held by outsiderst-i + % of shares held by institutionst.i + % of 
shares held by insidersn+ presence of a new director^ + Russian country dummy + 
Ukrainian country dummy + e t
Model 2: Export intensity or propensity = a  + log of em ployees^ industrial decline + 
log of investmentt-i + % of seats held by insidersn + % of seats held by foreignersn +% 
of seats held by outsiders^ + % of seats held by insiderst_i*% of shares held by insiderst-i 
+ Russian country dummy + Ukrainian country dummy + £ t
Model 3: Export intensity or propensity = a  + log of employeeSt_i+ industrial 
decline + log of investmentt.i + presence of a group of dominant ownersn + presence of a 
group of outsider dominant ownerst-i + Russian country dummy + Ukrainian country 
dummy + e t
As for chapter six the following model was estimated for the dependent variable in 1997 
and 1996, by using logistic regression.
Model 1: Incidence of having a foreign partnert = a  + export intensity.2 + presence of 
a new director^ + firm sizet-2 + required investment t-2 + foreign partner’s perception of 
local market + foreign partner’s perception of local technology + firms aspiration for 
gaining access to technology + firms aspiration for gaining access to markets + managerial 
resource allocation to domestic market +greater than average insider shareholding t -2 + 
greater than average foreign shareholding t-2 + Russian country dummy + Ukrainian 
country dummy +£ t
Model 2: Incidence of retaining a foreign partner = a  + export intensity^ + presence of 
a new director^ + firm sizet-2 + required investment t-i + foreign partner’s perception of 
local market + foreign partner’s perception of local technology + firms aspiration for 
gaining access to technology + firms aspiration for gaining access to markets + managerial 
resource allocation to domestic market ^greater than average insider shareholding t-2 + 
greater than average foreign shareholding x-i + Russian country dummy + Ukrainian 
country dummy +£ t
10 When the dependent variable is measured in 1996, the independent variable is lagged by two years
(t-2).
11 Description given on page 130 under variable description.
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Model 2b: Incidence of retaining a foreign partner = a  + firm sizet-2 + investment t-2 + 
capacity depreciation.i + labour productivityn+job gainst.i +export intensityt-i+ profitu 
+liabilitiest-i + Russian country dummy + Ukrainian country dummy + £ t
Model 3: Incidence of gaining a foreign partnert = a  + export intensity^ + presence of a 
new director^ + firm sizet-2 + required investment t_2 + foreign partner’s perception of 
local market + foreign partner’s perception of local technology + firms aspiration for 
gaining access to technology + firms aspiration for gaining access to markets + managerial 
resource allocation to domestic market +greater than average insider shareholding x-2 + 
greater than average foreign shareholding t-2 + Russian country dummy + Ukrainian 
country dummy +£ t
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Ch a pt e r  fiv e: o w n e r sh ip  a n d  c o r p o r a t e  g o v e r n a n c e  e ffe c t s  u po n  e x po r t in g
IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.
5.0 INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OUTLINE
This chapter will seek to determine how the corporate governance structure in Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus has effected one element of strategic restructuring, namely export re­
orientation at the firm level.
The literature presents several definitions of corporate governance, for instance it has been 
described as the pattern of share-holding within the firm (ownership structure) and 
distribution of control rights among shaie-holders by the EBRD, 1995. Shleifer and Vishny
(1997) state that corporate governance deals with ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. However, it is now 
widely recognised by the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance that good corporate 
governance should not only be concerned with share-holders but other stakeholders, such 
as investors and employees. More specifically, "corporate governance provides the 
structure through which the objectives o f  the company are set and the means o f  
attaining these objectives and monitoring performance are determined, ” Kuznetsova 
and Kuznetsov (2001).
All of these definitions shall be taken into account in this analysis and thus the impact of 
voting rights, board composition and the existence of groups of dominant share-holders1 on 
export activity shall be examined.
Hypotheses concerning foreign ownership, the insider/outsider ownership debate and the 
presence of groups of dominant owners, in addition to other corporate governance factors, 
such as board structure will be tested using linear and logit regression. This is suggested by 
Wakelin (1998) who proposes that firstly, export propensity should be used, making the use 
of logit regression appropriate, and secondly export intensity.
Next, weighted least squares regression, the fixed effects model and repeated measures 
analysis shall be used to deal with heterogeneity and the ‘time’ issue.
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In order to deal with endogeneity problems and selection bias, common to studies of 
transition economies, ownership and corporate governance variables shall be lagged, in 
order to alleviate causality problems, as advocated by Bromiley (1991), who shows that 
ownership structures can have an impact on firms in subsequent years. Filatotchev and 
Mickiewicz (2001) also highlight that changes in corporate governance do not have an 
immediate effect on performance.
Studies of the impact of ownership on firm performance in Western Economies and in 
transition economies shall be described in 5.2-5.6, along with the hypotheses, and the 
evolution of ownership and corporate governance in this sample, while sections 5.7- 5.10 
shall deal with analysis, and 5.11 concludes.
R e se a r c h  o u tl in e .
The literature described below provides evidence that ownership may effect diversification2, 
and thus firm performance.
For example, Morrisey and Filatotchev (2001) claim that, “ownership and governance 
structures o f  firms underpin their ability to integrate into the world economy,” (pi). 
Indeed, exporting decisions involve corporate risk taking, which may be affected by 
ownership structure.
Cavusgil (1984) documents that within the exporting literature additional research should be 
carried out examining the organisational and internal characteristics of firms and their impact 
upon export activity. This will provide an understanding of the characteristics associated with 
export activity at the firm level. Also it is important to take into account that Russia has a 
highly concentrated export product structure3.
Cavusgil shows that variations in export activity can be explained by managerial expectations 
towards exporting, technology level of the firm, managerial attitudes towards risk and 
resource allocation for exporting policy. However Cavusgil ignores one important
1 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also examine other corporate governance mechanisms, such as take-over 
threat, yet they are not covered in this chapter. Klein (1998) also examines the impact of board 
committee structure on performance.
2 Several studies cited in this chapter consider exporting to be a part of diversification.
3 Radsoevic and Hottop (1999) find that in 1994 the export of petroleum oils accounted for 28.20% of 
total trade, Radosevic, Hottop and Bishop (2001) find that in 1999 Russia’s export structure has largely 
remained static during the period 1994-1999.
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organisational characteristic, that of the impact of ownership structure of the firm on 
exporting; this study hopes to fill this void.
Dosoglu- Guner (2001) also states that the possible link between ownership and exporting 
decisions has been largely ignored in the literature. Ownership might act as a crucial 
component of exporting activity due to its influence upon firm commitment to international 
expansion and external strategy.
The Dosoglu -Guner study examines the impact of organisational culture and ownership type 
on exporting intentions of 175 US manufacturing firms and finds that an adhocracy4 culture is 
positively associated with firm intention to export.
Moreover, she finds that externally controlled firms exhibit a higher intention of exporting, 
whereby power is dispersed and where dominant stock holders are not part of the 
management team. Owner controlled firms (those run by families) are least likely to intend to 
engage in export activity.
While my study largely ignores the impact of organisational structure it intends to improve on 
the above study by examining export intensity and propensity5, as opposed to export 
intention, the latter could be viewed as very subjective, by ignoring differences between 
“might be interested” and “not interested” groups of firms.
In addition I shall include the possible time lags between ownership structure and exporting 
behaviour to account for selection bias. Furthermore I shall use a wider choice of ownership 
variables, such as insider, outsider, foreign and institutional ownership, along with variables 
to represent the existence of groups of dominant ownership. Also I shall extend this analysis 
to the composition of board structure.
Buck et al., (2001) defend this approach, they state that international trade theory is limited 
in this context, ‘‘particularly as productivity related variables are subject to large 
measurement errors in the FSU, ” (p 51). For example, the work by Gaddy and Ickes
4 This is defined as entrepreneurial, adaptable, risk taking and future orientated. This is an environment 
that could be expected to view exporting as part of their corporate culture.
5 As recommended by Buck et al., (2000) export propensity and intensity are used. They note that export 
propensity maybe a useful measure in the FSU environment as "any actual export sales, however 
small, represent a considerable achievement, ’’ p20. In a similar vein, Aw and Batra (1993) note that the 
very activity of exporting, (independent of levels) has a significant impact (on productivity).
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(1998) highlights the fact that Russia is characterised by a “virtual economy”, which must be 
bome in mind when analysing data6.
Thus they recommend that the incentives of firms in transition economies be examined, 
which in turn lie within the structure of ownership and control. Furthermore Filatotchev et 
a/., (2000) claim that the majority of research has so far failed to examine the impact of 
privatisation on exporting activities in the FSU, along with their detailed studies, this chapter 
hopes to shed some light on the matter.
The Transition Report 2001 highlights that the integration into the world economy and the 
benefits from globalisation are likely to be “far reaching ” for the transition economies, as it 
will provide access to global markets, technology and capital (p5). Therefore one of the 
contributions of this study will be to examine how ownership structure affects the ability of 
firms to integrate into the world economy, which is deemed a “matter o f  survival” by the 
Transition Report, 2001.
5.1 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Section 5.2 will document studies of the impact of ownership on performance in Western or 
developed economies7. This strand of literature is pertinent in a study of the effects of 
ownership structure on exporting activity for two reasons. First, in some research it has been 
postulated that exporting itself, is a measure of performance.
For example, Douglas (1996) in a study of small and medium firms in Peru, adopts export 
sales volume as a performance measure. She examines the impact of firm size, age, 
managerial strategies (such as the marketing mix) and motives on performance.
In the transition environment Filatotchev et al., (1999) look at the impact of firm 
performance on the probability of managers buying shares from employees in Russian firms. 
Among the performance measures used are labour productivity, pre tax profits and export 
sales. Thus it is clear that, in at least, developing countries and transition economies,
6 However, Russian Economic Trends for July 2001 cites that Russian businesses are managing to 
increase the share of monetary payments, as a total of industry sales, yet this is still only to a level of 
75%.
7 However it is acknowledged that in more recent research by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Bishop, 
Mickiewicz, Filatotchev (2001) that ownership is treated as an endogenous variable, and consequently 
no correlation is found between firm performance (measured by return on assets) and ownership 
structure, however they do find a relationship between labour productivity and ownership.
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exporting has been used as a performance measure, thus the ownership-performance 
literature will be useful when analysing the relationship between ownership and exporting. 
Bomstein (2000) and Filatotchev and Mickiewicz (2001) argue that there may be difficulties 
in measuring performance in transition economies. Filatotchev and Mickiewicz (2001) state 
that “the transition environment is characterised by radical adjustment ...In such a 
dynamic environment it becomes ...important not to disregard apparent time lags 
between the three stages... 1) changes in corporate control regimes, 2) induced 
changes in strategies ...which result in restructuring, 3) post adjustment improvement 
in efficiency indicators. As a result, several assumptions must be made concerning the 
ownership- exporting-performance relationship.
The doctrines of international business and strategic management state that exporting is a 
strategy. For example, Hitt et al., (1997) note that international diversification plays a key 
role in the strategic behaviour of large firms. Moreover, McDougall and Oviatt (1996) find 
that successful internationalisation (measured by the percentage of foreign sales to total 
sales) requires a change in strategy, in their study of 62 manufacturing firms in the US. 
Furthermore they note that the relationship between firm performance and 
internationalisation is moderated by firm strategy and industrial environment Yet, previous 
internationalisation literature fails to consider that corporate governance can be treated as an 
antecedent to export promoting strategies.
More generally, Child (1972) notes that when a firm’s environment changes, strategies must 
also be changed, to be congruent with the new environment This is highly applicable to firms 
in the FSU, the dramatic change in trading conditions8 make it imperative for firms to adapt 
their strategy in order to be able to trade effectively with non CIS countries.
Theoretical work by Barker and Duhaime (1997) has also asserted that “strategic change 
is a key element o f  many successful turnarounds9, ” (pi 3).
MacBean (2000) states that in transition economies “managers...were almost cut o ff 
from foreign markets as foreign trade was the monopoly o f  the state trading
8 Hoekman and Djankov (1996) note that the collapse of the CMEA, meant that shifting exports to hard 
currency markets was crucial, yet a lack of knowledge of foreign quality standards, foreign tastes and 
distribution networks made this process difficult, see also Smith, (1995).
9 A turnaround is deemed necessary when a firm is suffering from performance decline, or an 
organisational crisis, which could be applicable to the FSU. The collapse of the CMEA and liberalisation 
caused an organisational crisis for some firms in the region.
156
companies ” (p5). In these countries managers would need to change their strategy to one 
of upgrading production techniques, acquisition of new machinery and skills to successfully 
export.
Similarly, McDougall and Oviatt note that successful internationalisation may require that 
“mangers may need to learn...about foreign laws, language, culture and 
competitors, ” (p27.) The identity of firms’ owners and managers is likely to affect their 
ability to meet these requirements and the formulation of a suitable internationalisation 
strategy, which is the key theme of this chapter, how does the ownership structure affect 
exporting activity?
However, why might mangers decide to select the strategy of exporting?
Hitt et al., (1997) document that international diversification10 offers advantages to firms, for 
example, foreign markets allow greater firm growth and present market opportunities, that 
firms selling solely on domestic markets would not enjoy. Furthermore this kind of 
diversification allows firm to exploit internalisation11, these benefits present themselves in the 
guise of “economies o f  scale, scope and learning. ” (p771). For example, previous 
research by Kochar and Hitt (1995) showed that increased learning result from the 
economies of scope gained by international diversification. Thus exporting can be viewed as 
a strategic outcome of the strategic decision and choice process of managers and owners to 
improve firm performance by exporting activity. For example, in the West it has been found 
that one of the principal managerial motivations for exporting was long term profit through 
market diversification and long term growth (see Simpson, 1973). More succinctly,
“managers o f  exporting firms tend to have a positive attitude towards exporting as 
they regard it as one o f  the critical elements o f their company’s growth, profit and 
success, ” (Dosoglu-Guner, 2001, p73).
Belkaoui (1998) assumes a unique approach by adopting multivariate adaptive regression 
spline modelling, in order to test if the relationship between the degree of internationalisation 
and performance12 is non linear in US multinational enterprises, over the period 1985-1993.
10 Hitt et al., (1997) define internationalisation as "the expansion across borders o f  global regions and 
countries into different geographic locations, or markets, " p767. We can assume that exporting is part 
of international diversification.
11 Internalisation refers to the operation of performing many activities internally, (see Rugman, 1981).
12 He measures the degree of internationalisation by foreign revenues dived by total revenues and 
performance by return on assets.
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His results do find evidence of a non linear relationship: the relationship is positive between 
14% and 47%, but negative at degrees of internationalisation below 14% and greater than 
47%, concluding that more “multi-nationality ’ is not always better (p319).
The economics literature also documents evidence of the positive effects of exporting, in the 
learning by exporting field
Bleaney et a l, (2000) find that there is evidence of learning by exporting ( "or in other 
words whether there is feedback from exporting to firm performance”, p i) in firms in 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Their results show that current employment is significantly and 
positively related to share of exports in output, in the previous period, confirming the idea 
that exporting accelerates the learning process in transition economies.
Furthermore, Hamar (2001) finds in her study of industrial networks in Hungary that the 
“most export orientatedfirms have turned out to be the most dynamic in terms o f  
output growth, ” (pi 5). She concludes that the improved performance of foreign owned 
firms is related to their increased export orientation, and in turn, this increased economic 
openness allows firms to benefit from improved product and market structure 
Djankov and Hoekman (1996) find similar results for another transition economy, Bulgaria. 
Their econometric analysis shows that the re-orientation of export production to global 
markets13 is positively associated with total factor productivity growth. In addition, Clerides 
et al, (1998) find evidence of learning by exporting in their study of exporting firms in 
Morocco14. In the case of the Moroccan apparel, leather and metal working sectors15 they 
find evidence of learning by exporting.
Aw and Hwang (1995) in their study of Taiwanese exporting firms find that there are 
significant differences in productivity levels between exporting and non exporting firms. They 
claim that the superior performance of exporting firms is due to their more efficient use of 
inputs, compared to domestically orientated firms, as they are subject to intense foreign 
competition16 (p330). Chibber and Majumdar (1999) also find evidence of learning by 
exporting in the case of Indian firms. They claim that firms which have higher levels of export
13 This is represented by a dummy variable equalling one if a firm has re-orientated its exports to the 
OECD and zero otherwise.
14 It should be noted that Clerides et a l, also study exporting firms in Mexico and Columbia, where they 
find little evidence of learning by exporting.
15 They measure this by the firm’s average cost trajectory.
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sales face greater competitive pressures, which means that they have to be efficient and 
provide high quality produce. Moreover, there are benefits to be obtained from operating in 
overseas markets, such as skills acquisition, which they conclude “lead to superior 
performance as a whole, ” (p219). Their econometric evidence confirms this: export 
intensity is positively associated with return on sales and assets.
Delgado et al, (2001) adopt a non parametric approach in order to examine the 
relationship between firm productivity and exporting in Spanish firms, during the period of 
1991-96. They also find some evidence of learning by exporting. When they restrict their 
sample to firms which have only been in the market for a short time, they find that post entry 
(into export markets) productivity growth is greater for exporters, than non exporting firms. 
Although firms in this sample are not young in terms of existence, they are “young” in that 
they are inexperienced in exporting to the West, so learning by exporting may exist in 
transition economies.
Research by Bernard and Jensen (1999) examines the important issue of causality between 
exporting and performance in their panel data analysis of US manufacturing 
firms. They state that “good firms become exporters ” as they are able to meet the 
additional costs involved in selling in foreign markets (p7). Their results confirm this: 
performance measures such as labour productivity, wages, and size are all higher ex ante for 
exporting firms. More importantly, they also find evidence of learning by exporting: exporting 
firms have a higher chance of survival, and greater employment growth, than non exporting 
firms.
However, Hitt et al, (1997) document also that there are several costs of exporting. They 
state that although exporting brings new opportunities, it also presents increased competitive 
challenges. For example, they note that international diversification is complex and difficult 
to manage, and demands a great deal of managerial information processing, increased 
distribution and co-ordination costs (p772). This complexity is heightened by the presence 
of various trade laws and regulations. For example, Kogut (1985) emphasises the magnitude 
of these cultural and institutional barriers to international trade. In transition countries it is
16 However their data is cross sectional, therefore we are unable to say if learning by exporting has 
occurred.
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clear that these kind of barriers will be especially strong, given their previous trade regime 
under communism17.
More importantly, Hitt et al., recommend that further research examines the ability of 
organisational structure to manage operations on international markets, a key focus of this 
chapter. Research by Roberts and Tybout (1997) examine the decision to export in firms in 
Columbia, and they have also included a dummy variable to control for ownership structure. 
However the contribution of this chapter will be to include a much wider selection of 
ownership variables.
Thus we have seen from the research mentioned above that exporting in many cases, brings 
certain benefits to the firm, and therefore owners or managers may use exporting as a 
strategy to improve performance (shown in the diagram below). When making this 
hypothesis we can employ the ownership-performance literature presented in the following 
section.
Diagram one: illustrating the analytical framework used in chapter five.
Owners, managers 
adopt and select a 
strategy to improve 
performance.
Exporting Improvements in firm 
performance
( ^ D ecision m akers^ ) ----------------------------------Strategy Outcome
17 Bleaney et al., (2000) note that under communism the relationships between customers and suppliers 
were different, as was the quality of produce. (p2)
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5.2 OWNERSHIP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL IN THE WESTERN WORLD 
AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES.
The literature described below originates from Western schools of thought, however it may 
be relevant for the transition economies as the following issues are common to both 
environments: for example, the existence of agency costs.
However it is accepted that there may be some problems associated with applying Western 
literature to the transition environment. For example, in some countries a principal -principal 
situation (as opposed to principal- agent problem) could exist, in the case where there are 
conflicts between majority and minority shareholders. Furthermore literature pertaining to 
ownership concentration may not apply in some countries where the stock exchange and 
other financial institutions are not functioning properly, preventing shareholders from gaining 
large blocks of shares. Despite these drawbacks it is hoped that Western literature can offer 
some valuable insights along with a few of the recent studies concerning ownership in 
transition economies.
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) document that, “the institution o f ownership accompanied 
by secure property rights18 is the most common and effective institution fo r  providing 
people with incentives to create, maintain and improve assets. ”
The theory of private property rights has three principal elements: the owner’s right to 
control assets, to transfer these assets, and enjoy the fruits of the assets. These private 
property rights create an alliance between owner’s rights to choose how to use his assets 
and the impact of the consequences of that choice.
Gravelle and Rees (1992) document that the system of property rights must be complete 
with perfect excludability and transferability (p514). This means that the property rights 
of a commodity must allow exclusion by one individual of all other individuals form the 
utilisation of the asset This requires a legal environment which provides the individual with 
the ability to enforce this right of exclusion. Furthermore the property rights must be 
transferable, reflecting that the owner of the asset or good has the legal right to transfer use 
or ownership to any individual, on any terms.
18 Property rights are the rules (formal, legal or informal) which specify what individuals are allowed to 
do with resources and the output from these resources. ''''Property rights define which o f  the 
technologically feasible economic decisions individuals are permitted to make, ” Gravelle and Rees, 
1992, plO. Or, “ these (property) rights define the lines to which the assets may be put,” ibid, p513.
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Pejovich (1994) states that governments of transition economies need to recognise that the 
performance of all organisations depends on its system of prevailing property rights19, and 
the law of contract in which they operate. As a result governments must create and 
introduce a legal environment that would make a credible guarantee of the protection of 
property rights20.
In the transition environment, the centrepiece of the transition to a market economy was the 
massive privatisation of the state sector (Pejovich, 1994), rather than the immediate concern 
for transferable and excludable property rights. Lieberman and Nellis (1995) claim that only 
post privatisation does the need for legal reform to protect property rights become essential 
and politically feasible. Consequently, Shleifer (1994) notes that property rights have been 
enforced by organised crime in Russia and many of the CIS countries, until a stable legal 
framework can replace this system.
The principal aim of privatisation was to transfer ownership from public to private hands, 
which will alter the relationship between management {the agent) and their principal 
(previously the government, and now replaced by an entrepreneur). This suggests a change 
in the relationship between those responsible for firms’ decisions and the beneficiaries of its 
profits flows, arising in a new type of agency conflict McFaul (1995) documents that 
agency problems existed previously in the Soviet era, between the State and the enterprise 
director.
In reality, the three option privatisation programme in Russia (see chapter 2 for an in depth 
description) mainly served the interests of the enterprise directors and prevented majority 
outside owners from gaining a majority. Managers could then purchase workers’ shares or 
remain content with shares being dispersed widely among the workforce.
Dispersed ownership
Berle and Mean’s (1932) seminal work highlight the dangers of dispersed ownership, which 
manifest themselves in divided control, absenteeism and free riding, as no shareholder has
19 Coase theorem states that if  property rights are correctly defined and transaction costs are low, then 
economic agents will be forced to pay for any negative externalities they impose on others, and so 
marker transactions will produce efficient outcomes. (Coase, 1960)
20 It is well known that there are two schools of thought on effective corporate governance: the “market 
orientated” or “exit” and the “network orientated ” or “voice” control mechanism (Moerland, 1998). The 
market orientated approach can be seen in the US or UK corporate governance regime, and the network 
based regime can be found in Germany and Japan. Although differences do exist (see Short et al., 1997 
for details), Shleifer and Vishny (1997) point out that both systems legally protect shareholders.
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the incentive to monitor or control. As a result management may become entrenched and 
pursue objectives other than the profit maximisation of the firm, and instead maximise plough 
back returns to themselves. This can be contrasted with the situation discussed by 
Filatotchev and Mickiewicz (2001) whereby the concentration of cash flow rights in the 
hands of a large block shareholder lead to greater incentives to distribute dividends in a non 
distortionary way (pi3).
Grossman and Hart (1988) highlight the dangers of individual small shareholders, claiming 
that monitoring of management will be limited due to free rider problems, and that small 
shareholders may find it optimal to vote with management and tend not to devote time to 
“form an independent view” (p201). Yet of course this depends on characteristics of the 
capital market, such as the protection of property rights (see for example, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997).
In Russia it was anticipated that managerial ownership would align their financial interests 
with the profits of the firm, as Demsetz and Lehn (1985) described in the Anglo-US 
environment
However if no special monitoring arrangements exist then management may act 
opportunistically: this renders the role of corporate governance essential to align the interests 
of managers and decision makers with the interests of the owners.
McFaul (1995) shows that monitoring apparatus does not yet exist in Russia, for example 
managers are not disciplined by managerial labour markets, as they are not yet present in the 
Russian economy. In addition shareholder exit and discontent will not affect management as 
the stock market is not fully functioning. Estrin and Wright (1999) note that there is little 
threat of take-over in much of the FSU, due to the difficulty of purchasing shares. In short 
capital markets are very illiquid in the FSU with market capitalisation ratios reaching only 
29.4% in Russia and 6.1% in the Ukraine, (EBRD, 1998).
Relational investors, such as investment funds could be expected to have certain 
informational advantages (explored further below) yet in Russia it is not sure that these 
institutions have superior information compared to citizens. Blasi et al, (1997) show that 
mutual funds such as Asko Kapital and Promradtekhbank can negotiate with management to 
buy blocks of stock. In addition Black et al, (1999) also paint a dismal picture of
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investment funds, “too often, they looted companies they invested in and were looted 
themselves, ” (p64).
Akerlof and Romer (1993) discuss other examples of looting in developing Latin American 
countries, along with the US, such as inflated net worth, riding the yield curve and 
acquisitions, development and construction loans.
They also study the financial crisis in Chile whereby an anticipated decrease in asset values 
stems from an expected depreciation in exchange rates.
In addition, they a find evidence of looting of savings and loans in 1980’s in the US. They 
claim that investments were designed to yield artificially high accounting profits and strategies 
implemented to pay large sums to firm officers and shareholders, eventually culminating in 
the crisis of the savings and loans sector (p23).
Managerial/insider ownership
The impact of managerial ownership has also been widely discussed in Western literature. 
The entrenchment hypothesis (Demsetz, 1983) states that insiders with greater equity enjoy 
an influence which allows them to guarantee their employment This may produce decisions 
and strategies that are not consistent with corporate risk taking and enhancement of firm 
value and performance.
A study by Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) uses piece-wise regression to examine the 
non linear relationship between managerial ownership and market valuation, measured by 
Tobin’s Q. The main results are that medium levels (5-25%) of managerial ownership are 
correlated with a fall in Tobin’s Q and managerial entrenchment. Reasons for this could be 
that managers do not have the incentive to pursue value maximising or they maybe colluding 
with board members. However, low levels of managerial ownership (0-5%) are associated 
with increasing Tobin’s Q, as managers may have incentives to maximise firm value in hope 
of promotion or the acquisition of more shares.
In addition, Wright et al, (1996) also document a non-monotonic relationship, yet between 
insider ownership and corporate risk taking. They claim that at low levels of insider 
ownership, insiders are less likely to be entrenched and less prone to consume perquisites, 
due to fear of being discharged from their post At higher levels of insider ownership, the 
relationship between insider equity and corporate risk taking is likely to be negative, as
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insiders wealth becomes “undiversified.” This means that the majority of the insiders wealth 
is concentrated into a single investment, thus the insider may not want to increase risk taking 
with respect to that particular investment (p443). Bowles and Gentis (1993) also find that 
insider controlled firms have a “tendency to engage in sub-optimal levels o f  risk 
taking, ” as members are not wealthy or compelled by outside interests to take risks.
In chapter two Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) model of the agency relationship was 
documented which examines the reduction of the market value of the firm associated with 
the owner manager’s consumption of perquisites. Their main result to note is that whenever 
ownership and control are separated agency costs occur due to the self interested 
behaviour of managers.
Yet, agency costs are balanced by benefits, as Fama and Jensen (1983) note in their seminal 
work. They show that the separation of decision management and control can contribute to 
firm’s survival via improved decision making by delegating decision functions to agents who 
have specialised knowledge, compared to many residual claimants, in addition to access to 
financial capital, which may be provided by outside owners.
In the transition context, Blasi et al, (1997) show that in Russia the transfer of ownership to 
outsiders has been hampered, however if firms are to survive in the long run they must 
restructure, which will demand new capital investment As political sources of capital in 
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are drying up insider owned firms must begin to seek private 
sources of capital.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) develop a model which illustrates how insiders choose their 
optimal level of outside financing. This could be relevant for transition economies attempting 
to reach their optimal ownership structure, see chapter 2 for a full treatment of the model.
In more recent research Young et al, (2001) find that the potential conflict does not 
concern the transfer of ownership to outsiders but problems between majority (principals) 
shareholders and minority shareholders (principals). They label this corporate governance 
problem the “principal- principal problem Thus in some cases the application of the 
classic principal-agent model may not apply.
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5.3 The Insider/outsider ownership debate.
The mass privatisation of state owned enterprises during the period 1992-1994 led to the 
creation of manager controlled -employee owned firms, in CIS countries (Buck et a l, 
2001).
Although the incidence of insider ownership is lower than it was in Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus, from the tables below it can be seen that it is still rather high.
Table 1: Mean levels of inside ownership from 1994-1997 in sample used in this research 
(measured by average percentage of voting shares)
1994 1996 1997
Russia
Managerial ownership 11.5 15.4 16.3
Employee ownership 43.9 38.0 39.3
Total insider ownership 55.4 53.4 55.6
Belarus
Managerial ownership 11.1 10.9 10.6
Employee ownership 56.8 50.8 43.9
Total insider ownership 67.9 61.7 54.5
Ukraine
Managerial ownership 9.9 11.7 16.1
Employee ownership 63.6 43.5 36.5
Total insider ownership 73.5 55.2 52.6
Source: University of Nottingham database.
The table shows that insider ownership has fallen in Belarus and Ukraine, albeit the highest
decline has been in Ukraine, however, managerial ownership has increased in Russia and 
Ukraine21.
Western literature and some studies of the developing world offer several views of the 
impact of insider ownership on firm performance, corporate risk and diversification.
Insider ownership, exporting viewed as corporate risk taking and firm performance.
One such study by Wright et al, (1996) looks at the impact of equity ownership of 
corporate insiders upon firm risk taking. They define corporate risk taking as the analysis
21 The Blasi et a l,  (1997) study mirrors this.
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and selection of projects that have different uncertainties associated with their expected 
outcomes and cash flows.
The scope of this chapter looks at the effect of ownership on exporting behaviour, however 
exporting could be viewed as corporate risk taking: a strategy to improve 
performance. For example there are several costs associated with exporting, which may 
involve risk taking as anticipated profits from exporting may not always cover these costs 
(Roberts and Tybouts, 1997, p548). Furthermore, Chhibber and Majumdar (1999) find 
that exporting firms in India are likely to be “more progressive and risk orientated, ” 
(p219).
Wright et al, show that insiders may be influenced by three factors: their total wealth 
portfolio, pecuniaiy/non pecuniary benefits and costs and benefits derived from their 
position22. In the first instance, the undiversification of an insider’s wealth is concentrated in a 
single investment, this may cause the insider to avoid risk taking activities with respect to that 
investment The presence of pecuniary/non pecuniary benefits and costs may also lead 
insiders to avoid risk taking, in order to prevent personal costs of risk taking, such as loss of 
employment
Fama and Jensen (1983) postulate that insiders with higher equity are not fired for this 
behaviour as they have sufficient influence to guarantee their post, due to the entrenchment 
effect. Conversely, insiders with lower amounts of equity will be less prone to consume 
these benefits from their position as they are afraid of being fired.
Several analysts have argued that insider ownership can be beneficial, for example Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) maintain that with the existence of an effective corporate governance 
system, which would create an appropriate incentive structure, the interests of insiders and 
shareholders could be aligned, as their financial interests converge. Put more simply, by 
Gates (1998) “people are likely to become better stewards o f  all those systems o f  
which they are a part... as they gain a personal stake in the economic system, with the 
rights and responsibilities that implies, ” pp xix. Similarly Myron Scholes (1991) claims 
that inside ownership improves firm performance via two mechanisms. Firstly insiders are 
encouraged and have the ability to dispute managerial decisions they deem to be poor, and
22 These costs and benefits derived from an insiders position are analogous to Grossman and Hart’s 
(1988) benefits o f  control, such as perquisites.
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secondly management become aware of this and the implications it has for monitoring, and 
thus strive to improve performance.
Ownership structure and meeting the costs of exporting.
The strategic management literature documents the costs of diversification Hitt et a l , (1997) 
(see analytical fiamewoik) and Kogut (1984) highlights the institutional costs to be 
overcome from exporting, which maybe hard to cover for employee owners, particularly in a 
transition environment However, the economics literature also highlights sunk costs of 
exporting. Roberts and Tybout (1997) Clerides et al, (1998) and Aw and Batra (1998) 
claim that entry into export markets involves sunk costs, in the form of costly investment in 
product quality upgrading, reputation and the creation of an exporting infrastructure.
In their study of the decision to export in Colombian firms, Roberts and Tybout (1997) find 
from their survey evidence, that Colombian producers attempting to sell in developed 
markets are often required to invest in product quality upgrading, and to acquire knowledge 
of an exporting infrastructure, to provide information on transportation, customs and 
shipping services. Clerides et al, (1998) also give examples of sunk costs: the costs of 
"researching foreign demand and competition, establish marketing channels, and 
adjustment fo r  product characteristics and packaging to meet foreign tastes,
A similar situation could also be anticipated in the former Soviet Union, as there is an 
absence of agents which deal with trading services, therefore we can expect firms to 
undergo considerable sunk costs to export from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.
As we have seen, Wright et al., (1996) postulates insiders may not want to undergo risk 
taking activities, as they base decisions "solely upon an evaluation o f  personal gains and 
losses generated by a particular firm strategy, ” (p442).
The insider/outsider ownership debate in transition economies and less developed 
countries.
As for literature based on transition economies, Estrin and Wright (1999) claim that if 
outside owners possess ownership and control rather than managers, this will have a positive 
effect upon profits of the firm. Conversely insider ownership maybe prone to "a reluctance 
to shed labour, slower restructuring, lower levels o f investment and difficulties in 
obtaining access to capital, ” (p408).
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Filatotchev et al, (1999b) highlight that managers are prone to opportunistic behaviour and 
that entrenched managers will resist restructuring programmes. They suggest that 
management in Russian firms attempt to maintain insider control as it acts as an insurance 
against difficult restructuring decisions and protects income and employment By using 
probit regression analysis they find that management entrenchment proxies are a significant 
determinant of management strategy focused at the preservation of insider control. In an 
exporting context Filatotchev et al, (2000) find that ownership and control of management 
biases firms towards non exporting strategies.
Bim (1996) highlights several important interesting facets of ownership structure in Russia 
which may prove relevant for the following hypotheses. From his survey he finds that 
managers have strengthened their positions at the firm level, and none of the directors 
interviewed expressed problems concerning a lack of autonomy. In Bim’s sample 
employees maintained that managers were in complete control of enterprises in 80% of 
cases in 1994.
Bim then reflects upon the consequences of this ‘‘managerialism in Russia” or the 
concentration of ownership in the hands of managers and concludes that there are two 
contrasting types of managerial strategy. Optimistically there is the “constructive strategy 
whereby managers attempt to adapt the enterprise, involving the restructuring of the product 
mix, supply chains, and improving intra firm organisation. Bim found 
that approximately 26-28% of managers followed this strategy. The second strategy is 
termed as “destructive” which Bim finds to be the dominant strategy among 60% of the 
managers interviewed. In this case managers do not try to adapt and restructure their 
enterprises but extract income for their personal gain.
More generally, Akerlof and Romer (1993) note that bankruptcy for profit is likely to occur 
in environments where poor accounting and regulation exist or low penalties for abuse give 
owners the incentive to pay themselves more than their firm’s worth and then default on their 
debt obligations. This type of economic underground can flourish “i f  firms have an 
incentive to go fo r  broke fo r  profit at society's expense (to loot) instead o f to go for  
broke (to gamble on success)” (p2). This presents an environment highly applicable to that 
of many transition economies. As a result bankruptcy for profit can become a more 
attractive strategy for owners rather than to maximise true economic values. Thus owners
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attempt to maximise current extractable values, not economic value, causing social losses. 
Therefore bankruptcy for profit is known as “looting”, (p3).
Gurkov and Asselbergs (1995) document the disconnection of ownership and control in 
their survey of Russian firms, and show that the distribution of shares does not conform to 
the real structure of control. In their sample employees hold more that 51% of shares in eight 
companies yet only 17% believe themselves to be the real owner, while 75% of workers 
claim that the real owners are the general director and his top managers.
Similarly, Filatotchev et a l, (1999) find from their survey that "ownership per se is not 
synonymous with control, ” (p i028), particularly in Russia, compared to Ukraine and 
Belarus.
Bim also emphasises the role of outside owners in corporate governance in Russian private 
companies. He makes several observations, firstly that those outsiders without a “sizeable” 
stake will be unable to advance enterprise performance, while those enterprises dominated 
and controlled by outsiders have implemented restructuring programmes, however in some 
cases outside ownership has been associated with “company raiding” (See Gurkov, and 
Earle and Leshenko, 1995).
Blasi et al, (1997) also documents the delay of the transfer of shares from insiders to 
outsiders. Yet by 1996 outside ownership had begun to increase and on average they 
owned 32% of shares, however this type of ownership is believed to be concentrated in a 
small number of firms. The effect of this outside ownership on financial conditions of firms is 
negligible, reports Bias?3, yet it is found to influence positively the level of exports and 
downsizing (p69), this will shape the subsequent hypotheses.
However, we can expect the objective of outside owners to be the maximisation of the long 
run value of the firm, yet their ability to restructure depends on their control rights within the 
firm and their access to finance and capital (EBRD, Transition Report, 1995). Restructuring 
is influenced by several forces: the aims of the owner of the firm and the distribution of 
control rights24. The Transition Report (1995) confirms the suggestions of economic
23 Estrin and Wright (1999) also state that economic performance is not influenced by ownership 
structure or their dynamics.
24 As well as the availability of new funding and budget constraints, EBRD, 1995.
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analysis, restructuring other than reactive, requires capital and occurs in firms with outside 
ownership, with access to finance25.
Bhavani and Tendulkar (2001) use the form of business organisation as a proxy for access 
to capital and the ability to raise finance, which they adopt as a determinant of export 
intensity and propensity, in their study of Indian textile firms. Similarly, we have sufficient 
evidence to assume that inside owners do not have sufficient access to capital in the FSU26. 
For example, Aukutsionek et al, (1998) find in the Russian case that most managers cannot 
secure capital to modernise (pi23) and Estrin and Wright (1999) find that insider owners 
also have difficulties gaining access to capital. One of the reasons for this is that in 1995 the 
government ended its position as a source of lending to companies, meaning that firms now 
had to compete for bank loans, also banks only wanted to be involved with short term 
loans and small projects, as they were wary of the risk of lending to enterprises. This was 
exacerbated by the fact that there was a trend for banks to lend to the government, leaving 
firms “starvedfor capital, ” (Blasi et al.,1997, pl43). Therefore we can expect insider 
ownership to be negatively associated with exporting, especially when we consider the sunk 
costs of exporting to be covered, mentioned above.
For example Craig and Pencavel (1995) document why insider controlled firms27 have 
difficulty in raising capital and why the cost of capital is so high for them. Firstly, these firms 
are deemed as “risky institutions ” (pi26) as workers wealth is undiversified, and they 
have little access to collateral, which can be forfeited in the event of the inability to meet 
repayments. Secondly lenders, such a banks or credit institutions are not allowed much say 
in what the insider controlled firm does, as the board of directors has much more 
involvement in day to day business, than in conventional firms (pi28). Furthermore a moral 
hazard28 problem exists as the actions and decisions of the insider controlled firm will affect
25 Their study of ownership and restructuring in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic shows that 
restructuring is greater in firms with most outside ownership.
26 For example, the Transition Report (1998) documents that there has been a "significant under 
provision o f loans to the private sector, ” (pi 27), as many banks in the region do not have the 
opportunity or incentive to expand its loan portfolio. Also many banks are hindered by macroeconomic 
instability or general problems with the transition process. These institutional factors may prevent firms 
from exporting as they do not have access to funds to cover the sunk costs of exporting.
27 Craig and Pencavel (1995) use data from an unbalanced panel of 34 firms in the plywood industry in 
the US during the period 1968-1986.
28 Moral hazard occurs when the actions of an insured agent can alter the accident probability, and 
those actions are not observable by the insurer. (Gravelle and Rees, p672,1992).
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the probability of defaulting on repayments, but their actions will not be visible to the bank, 
or lender. Bowles and Gintis (1993) also note that “democratic firms ”29 operate at a 
competitive disadvantage, as they face higher capital costs due to agency problems in capital 
markets and the limited wealth of their workers. Furthermore, a lack of capital prevents 
them from borrowing funds from banks, which they deem the “wealth in equality 
constraint”.
Thus raising capital in the former Soviet Union maybe troublesome considering the extent of 
insider ownership.
Jones and Mygind (1999) find that insider ownership may bring other problems: it is often 
associated with strategic inertia, thus we can expect a negative impact upon trade re­
orientation.
Finally, Filatotchev et al., (1999) note that managerial entrenchment may prove to be an 
obstacle to export promoting strategies and results show that managerial ownership is 
negatively associated with exporting, in previous research using this database. Therefore 
HI: inside owners may have reason to block exporting strategy and thus lagged 
insider ownership shall be negatively associated with exporting levels, shall be 
tested.
Throughout this research export intensity shall be treated as the percentage of sales which 
go beyond the FSU, as we can expect that exports to the former CMEA utilise former 
distribution networks30 etc. (see Filatotchev et al., 2001b).
Given the results previously found by Blasi et a l, (1997) concerning the effects of outside 
ownership on exporting in Russia, and the fact that ownership could be used as a proxy for 
access to capital, and a firm’s ability to raise finance (Bhavani and Tendulkar, 200131), we
29 These are firms which are owned and run by their workers.
30 Estrin (2001) states that although Russia and Ukraine exported a large share of their GDP, it was 
mostly within the CMEA trading arrangement, for example, 64% of Russia’s exports were within the 
CMEA, while the figure stands at 82% of Ukraine. This is an indicator of their “market 
interconnectedness” (p6).
31 They argue that the form of business organisation may reflect a firm’s ability to access capital in their 
study of Indian export performance. They represent a firm’s business organisation with three types of 
dummy variables (p71).
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can expect outsider owners to have greater access to capital, which will allow them to cover 
the initial costs of exporting.
In addition, Filatotchev et al., (2001) note that outsider control can have a positive effect on 
corporate restructuring, which could include export orientation, and Djankov and Murrell 
(2002) conclude in their exhaustive literature review that outsider owners have the largest 
effects on restructuring in central and Eastern Europe and CIS countries.
Thus H2 is developed.
H2: lagged outside ownership shall be positively associated with exporting.
Foreign ownership
In previous research it has been hypothesised that foreign ownership has a powerful effect 
on the exporting activity of firms.
The classic text by Caves (1996) highlights that foreign ownership is determined by a desire 
to market seek or export extensively (termed foreign sourcing) (p215). Firstly, market 
seeking can be defined as a foreign owner wishing to serve and take advantage of a 
domestic market; given the relatively large domestic market of Russia, this may be a vital 
incentive for foreign investors. Alternatively, foreign owners may wish to engage in export 
processing or foreign sourcing activities, whereby raw materials or part manufactured goods 
are exported, and then re-exported after additional processing.
Molero (2001) in his study of Spanish firms tests whether foreign ownership attracted to the 
host country for reasons of foreign sourcing. He finds that it is common for foreign owned 
firms to adopt the strategy of using the host country as an export platform (p41), and in 
some cases exports are at least as important as domestic sales.
Empirical evidence from transition economies and less developed economies has shown that 
foreign sourcing has been a strong incentive for foreign ownership. For example, Willmore 
(1992) has found that among Brazilian firms “foreign ownership ...has a very strong, 
positive independent effect on export performance, ” (p333). The reason for this 
relationship is that transnational enterprises have links to other countries, therefore it may be 
advantageous for firms to exploit these links and export to these countries (p315).
McMillan (1993) makes a similar hypothesis concerning foreign ownership and foreign trade 
in transition economies. He proposes that foreign investment can help to channel capital to
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firms and industries that are capable of competing in an international sphere, thus foreign 
ownership can assisting the long term expansion of trade (p ill).
Konings (1999) states that firms with some foreign ownership have enhanced access to 
technological know how and finance, which is necessary to update equipment and bring 
about strategic restructuring, of which exporting is an element. Furthermore he states that 
foreign participation in domestic firms can impose an efficient corporate governance system 
on insiders in privatised firms. Using a large data set on Polish, Bulgarian and Romanian 
firms Konings finds evidence that foreign firms induce restructuring, which results in a variety 
of performance benefits, such as higher productivity. In addition, Rojec et al, (2000) find 
that in the case of Slovenia foreign firms are more likely to export a larger proportion of their 
output, than majority domestically owned firms.
In his book ‘Trade and Transition” Alasdair MacBean (2000) summarises some of the 
main results from his research project, for example, Sass finds that in Hungary 80% of 
exports are accounted for by foreign owned companies. Again, this motivation for exporting, 
is similar to that found by Willmore. Companies with foreign participation often have close 
links with a foreign company, which develops its trade relations, alternatively it may be able 
to trade with affiliates of the controlling foreign company. Furthermore, MacBean concludes 
that in the transition economies the output of foreign owned firms is very export orientated, 
he quotes the case of the Czech Republic where Volkswagen Skoda is the largest exporter 
of machinery and transport goods. As for the export success of much of Eastern Asia, this 
can also be largely contributed to foreign ownership and joint ventures. Thus we can 
anticipate that foreign ownership in the former Soviet Union will also have a positive effect 
upon exporting activity.
Furthermore, Bhavani and Tendulkar (2001) suggest that foreign owners may have greater 
access to capital to cover the costs of exporting, by assuming that ownership or the form of 
business organisation is a proxy for access to capital.
In order to test whether foreign ownership is motivated by foreign sourcing we shall test H3: 
lagged foreign ownership shall be positively associated with exports
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State ownership
The extent of state ownership could also be expected to affect export activity in a transition 
environment, note Buck et al, (2000). They note that state ownership may negatively affect 
productivity and in turn exporting activity, on the other hand state involvement may provide 
access to soft credits and export licenses, which would increase exports. The Buck (2000) 
study uses a continuous variable to represent state ownership, in this study a dummy variable 
shall be constructed, equalling one if a firm has experienced a decline in state ownership and 
zero otherwise, in order to test
H4: a decline in state ownership in year Yt.i will lead to an increase in exporting 
activity in year Y.
The reason for this dummy variable being used is that state ownership over the period 1994- 
1997 has not declined dramatically32, as a result we can expect that a decline in state 
ownership will have a more dramatic impact on firm strategy, as this could represent more 
freedom from bureaucratic control and an absence of preferential export credits. Therefore 
a dummy variable is used to represent a decline in state ownership, as opposed to the 
absolute level represented by a continuos variable.
5.4 Board structure and stake in equity
A further issue identified in the western literature is board structure. For example, Drucker 
(1981) highlights that the compositional characteristics of boards can influence organisational 
performance. We can expect board structure to be a determinant of exporting as the 
board’s function is to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, Klein (1998). 
Moreover, Daily and Dalton (1994) postulate that a company’s board structure, 
characteristics and processes can influence a firm’s strategic choice and organisational 
outcome. Secondly Hermalin and Wesibach (2000) also highlight the importance of the 
board in stating, “boards o f  directors are an economic institution that helps solve the 
agency problems inherent in managing any organisation, ” (pi).
In particular, the firm’s board of directors may contribute to its corporate governance 
system by selecting and monitoring the CEO. Moreover it can influence the firm’s strategy
32 In 1994 the percentage of voting shares held by the state, in this sample (for all three countries) was 
13.5%, in 1997 it had only fallen to 11%.
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and general setting and evaluation of firm productivity. Thus we can expect that board 
structure will affect the level of export activity, and the decision to export.
The role of insiders, outsiders and bankers on boards.
Wagner et al, (1998) document that researchers have determined several roles for boards 
of directors. Those working under the resource dependence perspective (see Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978) claim that outside directors (those who are not current or former 
employees) can facilitate the acquisition of resources and share their breadth of knowledge 
to enhance firm performance. Furthermore, those working under the auspices of the agency 
framework claim that outside directors can reduce managerial opportunism and thus boost 
firm performance (p656).
Kroszner and Strahan (2001) research the special case of having a banker as a member of 
the board, this may be relevant as a variable is used in this chapter, which represents the 
number of seats held by outsiders, in which bankers are included. Their research documents 
the benefits of having a banker on the board. For example, they state that a close bank 
relationship "can improve information flow between the bank and the firm ” (p419). 
This can assist the firm in obtaining finance from the bank, which can lower the cost of 
external financing. Also if a banker joins the board of a firm it may act as a signal to the 
market that the firm is unlikely to suffer from financial distress.
Lastly, Kroszner and Strahan note that bankers on boards may bring greater rewards to 
"more volatile firms ”, with information asymmetry problems, this maybe especially 
pertinent for firms in the former Soviet Union33.
However, some researchers propose that insider directors have specialised knowledge and 
expertise about their organisation, which can be used to promote performance (Baysinger 
and Hoskisson, 1990).
Using a meta analysis of 29 studies Wagner et a l attempt to find empirical evidence of these 
proposals. They find that greater levels of insider or outsider presence are both positively 
related to superior levels of organisational performance, supporting the hypothesis of 
homogeneity of board structure, which states that greater numerical superiority allows either
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insiders or outsiders to make use of their relevant strengths and develop extra organisational 
connections (p667). This can be expected to lead to higher levels of social integration and 
cohesion and a reduction in the tendency for inter group conflict (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984). Upper echelon researchers have then continued to show that this homogeneity effect 
can lead to superior organisational performance.
Wagner et al, then test this homogeneity hypothesis with a sample of 301 firms in the US, 
during the period of 1990-4. They find support for the homogeneity effect: both insider and 
outsider directors can be expected to positively affect firm performance (measured by return 
on assets).
Board structure and performance34
A study by Vance (1983) uses data from 250 manufacturing firms in the US and provides 
results that would suggest that firms with a majority of insider directors have superior 
performance compared to firms which possess a board with a majority of outsiders, as 
“directors who have a financial stake in a company are unlikely to dash their own 
cash, ” (1983, p.274).
Agency theorists (such as Hoskisson and Baysinger) also highlight the advantages of having 
a board structure characterised by insider directors. Insider directors may provide an 
efficient internal monitoring system, and act as an invaluable source of information 
concerning the activities and achievements of the CEO. However we will see below that 
inside directors are not immune from the powers and authority of the CEO.
In contrast, some researchers have claimed that inside directors may make inefficient 
monitors, Goforth (1994)35 shows that directors are often selected by their willingness to 
support managerial decisions. It is not surprising that these directors feel awkward when 
evaluating the performance of CEO and TMT (top management team), their loyalty to the 
CEO and fear of possible retaliation may prevent them from monitoring efficiently. However, 
Baysinger and Hoskisson, (1990) also document that inside directors may provide superior 
information to outside directors, as they do not have to rely only upon financial data of CEO
33 However, Kroszner and Strahan (2001) also note that there can be "significant costs o f  active bank 
involvement in firm  management, ” (p420), as bankers may suffer from a conflict of interest between 
fiduciary duty to a firms owners’ and to his or her bank employer, if the bank also lends to the firm.
34 Of course it is accepted that firm performance may affect board composition, see Hermalin and 
Wesibach (1988) for an endogenous treatment of board structure.
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attainment, also they are bared to the workings of the firm on a daily basis, and do not suffer 
from criticisms of outside directors, who are often directors of other boards, or act as a 
CEO, which puts pressure on their time to monitor successfully other firms’ CEO’s. 
Nevertheless, outside directors36 are claimed by some researchers to be more efficient 
monitors than insider directors. By being an outside director these board members render 
themselves independent of the CEO.
Yet, outside director’s independence has often been questioned, these directors may have 
personal or professional links with the firms or its management. For example, if they play a 
legal or consulting role within the firm, they may be under obligation to the CEO, note 
Johnson et al, (1996). Other affiliated directors such as clients or suppliers may also be 
unwilling to question CEO behaviour or performance if they fear the severance of their 
economic relationship.
On the whole, it seems that the role of the outsider as a potential monitor of managerial 
performance and provider of a diverse knowledge base is undeniable, which can be of use 
for the formulation of strategy.
Klein (1997) refutes the relationship between firm performance and board structure, yet she 
does find a relationship between performance and committee composition. By examining the 
role of director via participation on board committees (such as finance, strategic 
development and long term investment) she claims that internal management contribute 
valuable specific information about the organisation and that outside directors can provide 
effective monitoring for firms with strategic difficulties. Her results show a significant and 
positive relationship between the percentage of insider directors on financial and investment 
committees and accounting and stock market performance. Thus participation in board 
committees could be a source of further research, as opposed to general board 
composition.
35 See Goforth, C, “Proxy reform as a means of increasing shareholder participation in corporate 
governance: too little but not too late,” The American University Law Review, Vol.43, pp379-465.
36 Classified as all non management members of the board (Daily and Dalton, 1992)
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The role of the board in times of financial distress: an application to transition 
economies.
Perhaps more relevant to the transition economies is the research pertaining to board 
composition and the firm’s ability to overcome financial distress. For example, Filatotchev 
and Bishop (2001) note that when an organisation encounters uncertain environmental 
conditions a board of directors may provide an important strategic contribution by 
formulating and developing the firm’s strategy and mission plan.
Given that the majority of industrial companies in the three countries at question here have 
suffered from severe industrial decline the configuration of the board may prove important in 
inaugurating a successful turnaround. For example, outside directors with affiliations to 
financial institutions may prevent or cure financial distress, if they can provide access to loans 
and consultancy. Steams and Mizruchi (1988) provide evidence of this: firms appear to 
appoint directors from financial institutions at times when profit and solvency are in decline. 
On a more general note Pearce and Zahra (1992) show that board composition is 
determined by environmental uncertainty, firm strategy and financial performance.
Thus we should expect some changes in board structure in the FSU over the period of 
industrial decline.
Presently, in the Russian case, insiders dominate boards, and usually are more similar to a 
management council, comprising the general manager, his senior staff, plus possibly a 
representative of local government, documents Blasi, et a l, (1997). Consequently, although 
outsiders hold a certain level of stock, they have been denied seats on the board, and are 
not allowed to be involved in decision making activities, (see p202, Blasi, for an overview of 
the discrepancy between ownership and board representation).
The details of board structure for the sample used in this study are shown below, for 1994- 
7. Again board seats are concentrated in the hands of managers or workers in all three 
countries, and also foreign companies are very poorly represented. In the Russian sample 
the maximum number of seats held by a foreign company is one, for Belarus zero, and 
Ukraine, three.
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Table 2: Average number of seats held by the following members on the Supervisory Board
1994 1996 1997
Russia
Managers 3.3 3.2 4.8
Investment funds 0.2 0.4 0.7
Belarus
Managers 4.6 4.1 3.9
Investment funds 0.0 0.0 0.1
Ukraine
Managers 5.3 4.4 6.0
Investment funds 0.3 0.3 0.2
Source: University of Nottingham database. Also see C4 for more descriptive statistics on board 
structure.
From this section the following hypotheses are arrived at:
As we can expect insider directors within the transition environment do not have access to 
resources and consultancy services, therefore we shall test H5, H6, and H7.
H5: lagged board representation of insiders can negatively affect exports in 
representing the entrenchment hypothesis.
H6: lagged board representation of outsiders can positively affect exports 
representing resource dependence roles.
H7: lagged board representation of foreign owners can positively affect exports.
Following this, an interaction variable representing outsider control37 shall be constructed 
allowing us to test
H8: the lagged interaction of outside share holding and percentage of board seats 
held by outsiders can be expected to have a positive affect upon exports.
5 .4 b  m a n a g e r ia l tu r n o v e r
In the transition milieu it is becoming evident that outside ownership may not be enough to 
provide the correct incentives for managers to improve performance, document Estrin and 
Wright (1999); instead, existing management may need to be replaced New managers may 
provide the skills and resources necessary for restructuring.
In the Western literature, Lausten (2002) in his study of CEO turnover and firm
37 Defined as the percentage of seats held by outsiders* percentage of voting shares held by outsiders.
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performance in Danish firms, notes that principal agent theory predicts that the threat38 of 
turnover encourages the CEO to do his best (p395). This draws from pay-performance 
literature, based on agency theories on optimal and incentive contracting, which claims that 
CEO turnover acts as a incentive to force the CEO to act in the interest of the share-holder. 
As a result, the threat of dismissal for poor performance acts as an incentive to CEOs. 
Lausten goes on to test the hypothesis that the relationship between CEO turnover and 
performance is negative. His results from a longitudinal database confirm this: poor 
performance is positively and significantly related to CEO turnover, being consistent with 
principal-agent theory, in that the threat of turnover ensures that CEOs act in the best 
interests of the shareholder. (See Jensen and Murphy, 1990, and Rosen, 1992 for more 
empirical evidence.)
In contrast, researchers studying the former Soviet Union find that turnover precedes 
performance39. Barberis (1996) found that managerial turnover improved enterprise 
performance in Russia, later Filatotchev et al., (1999) note that former “Red Directors” are 
unable to implement restructuring programmes, thus CEO replacement maybe required. In 
the case of Ukraine Warzynski (2001) finds that managerial turnover boosts productivity in 
privatised enterprises. More recently, Filatotchev et al, (2001b) note that top management 
inertia and resistance to change is common. Similarly, Ocasio (1994) noted that a change in 
the top management team led to an increase in the probability of a change in organisational 
strategy. Thus this leads to the development of the next hypothesis,
H9: a change in directorate can be expected to positively affect exporting.
5.5 Ownership concentration
Filatotchev and Mickiewicz (2001) document several roles for large block-holders, some 
being value enhancing and some being value detracting. This section shall attempt to 
describe these roles, particularly in an environment where the protection of minority 
shareholders is low.
38 The threat of replacement may induce changes in managerial performance akin to actual managerial 
replacement.
39 Harrison (1988) noted the causality problem between the relationship between performance and top 
management turnover, and stated that there is no general theory of turnover as yet.
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Above we saw that in the presence of free riding by small dispersed shareholders as 
discussed by Grossman and Hart (1988), ownership concentration may evolve, in order to 
overcome principal-agent problems.
La Porta et al, (1999) document that widely dispersed ownership described by Berle and 
Means is only common for organisations in wealthy countries with common law, and 
effective legal protection. La Porta et al, find that ownership concentration is common 
where legal protection is poor for minority shareholders from their study of 27 wealthy 
economies.
Ownership concentration, firm performance and monitoring.
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) focused upon the determinants of ownership concentration in 
some 511 US firms. They argue that the larger is the firm size, ceteris paribus, the larger is 
the firm’s capital resources and in general, this gives rise to a greater market value of a given 
fraction of ownership. Thus ‘‘the higher price o f  a given fraction o f  the firm should, in 
itself, reduce the degree to which ownership is concentrated, ” (pi 158). This implies 
that firm size and ownership concentration shall be negatively related. Since the firms 
included in this study are medium or large, size should be controlled for when examining the 
impact of ownership concentration. In addition they claim that a firm’s environment will 
effect control potential40, for instance market stability, where prices, market shares and 
technology are stable allow management to be monitored at a relatively low cost, the need 
for tighter control and concentration is reduced. The firm’s environment in the three 
countries of this study, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, is much less stable and characterised 
by industrial decline thus we can expect managerial performance to be difficult to monitor, 
leading to a higher degree of concentration.
Demsetz and Lehn then continued to test the Berle and Means hypothesis which states that 
ownership concentration and profit rate should be positively associated. However, their 
empirical results show that there is no significant relationship between ownership 
concentration and accounting profit rate, in feet the sign on the concentration coefficient is 
negative.
40 Control potential is defined as “the wealth gain achievable through more effective monitoring o f  
managerial perfo rm a n cepi 158.
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Similarly, Thomsen and Pedersen (1996) find no relation between ownership concentration 
and company performance.
In contrast, a study by Bethel and Liebeskind (1993) confirms agency predictions that 
block-holders exert a disciplinary effect upon management. From a sample of firms in the 
1980’s that had undertook corporate restructuring they find that block holders act as a 
disciplining influence upon managers and attempt to support the goals of the other 
shareholders, as opposed to the goals of the management team.
Other studies from the Western literature focus on the relationship between ownership 
concentration, firm performance and firm value.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) develop a model focusing on the role and influence of large 
shareholders on performance. Their detailed analysis using comparative statics, shows that 
large shareholders raise expected profits, and the more so the greater the percentage of 
ownership (p465).
Wmck (1989) posits that a greater level of ownership concentration may have two 
opposing effects upon firm value. The relationship maybe positive when a blockholder uses 
his power to ensure that corporate resources are governed efficiently. In this case the 
concentrated owner will have the incentive to reduce shirking or free riding, and thus will be 
willing to undergo the costs of monitoring, in order to enhance firm performance. 
Nevertheless, Wmck finds that blockholders may have a negative effect upon firm value in 
some cases. Blockholders may not always use their votes to see that corporate resources 
are managed effectively, instead they may entrench mangers and insulate them from market 
discipline (pi 2 and 15), creating “impediments to the alignment o f  interests ” (p23). Her 
final results examining the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value, 
using a sample of US firms, find that the effect of concentration on firm value is positive on 
average ” (p23).
The evolution of ownership concentration in transition economies. Evidence of a 
possible relationship with performance?
In the case of transition economies, Blasi et al, (1997) document that open trading of stock 
and independent shareholder registers are not particular common in Russia, which may 
hinder stock holders from acquiring a block of shares. Without an active regional stock
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market blockholders who wish to increase their stake must apply directly to management to 
identify other shareholders, additionally the stock market is still nascent with only 20-50 of 
the largest companies being traded, these environment specific factors may hinder 
concentration (see Filatotchev and Mickiewicz, 2001 and the next page for more on this). 
Estrin (2001) documents that the lack of concentrated ownership in Russia has been caused 
by the nature of the privatisation process, as voucher privatisation leads to dispersed 
ownership structures (pl4).
Furthermore Blasi, et al, (1997) points out that it may not be enough to be a blockholder 
in order to initiate change to management or capital investment as the use of cumulative 
voting is ignored, thus ownership stakes are not translated into the appropriate number of 
seats on the board. As a result only 5% of firms in Russia are majority owned by several 
blockholders (p206, Blasi et al., 1997). Fiydman et al., (1993) note that the presence of 
blockholders has been allowed by the privatisation programme, yet they face the 
“formidable power o f  the manager, ” (pi 87) owing to the prevailing dominance of insider 
ownership in Russia.
Fiydman et al, (1997) claim that the privatisation programme in central and East European 
countries led to very highly concentrated levels of ownership, as owners cannot rely on 
institutions and arrangements to monitor managerial performance. In their study of Hungary, 
Czech Republic and Poland they incorporate a dummy variable which identifies the largest 
owners of the firm, a similar methodology shall be used in this chapter.
More importantly, the transition literature also identifies that a relationship exists between 
company performance and ownership concentration.
A study by Aukutsionek et al, (1998) provides evidence that Russian privatised firms 
which are dominated by outsiders and managers exhibit superior performance compared 
with those firms dominated by employees.
Andreyeva and Dean (2001) test the hypothesis that company performance in Ukraine 
improves with ownership concentration, and moreover that concentrated insider owned 
firms perform better than their outsider counterparts. Using a sample of 1170 open joint 
stock companies they find evidence of a positive relationship between concentrated private 
ownership and company performance (measured as sales per employee). Furthermore the 
identity of the concentrated owner is of importance: “insider owned firms perform the
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best ” (p524). The reason for this may lie with the persistence of institutions and informal 
norms inherited from the Soviet era within the Ukrainian economy. Outsiders may not know 
or want to adhere to non market practices, whereas existing managers have personal 
connections and experience of the political elite41.
In a study of 85 Russian firms Filatotchev et al, (2001) find that there is a negative 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance and investment (p310). 
However, this relationship is not affected by the identity of the shareholders, in contrast to 
the findings of Andreyeva and Dean (2001). They suggest that the reason for this negative 
relationship is that the entrenchment effect of concentrated ownership is stronger than the 
incentive effect, in an environment where minority shareholders’ rights are not protected. 
Previous research by La Porta et al, (2000) has also indicated that concentrated ownership 
produces a trade off between incentives and entrenchment.
Regulation, institutional and legal environments.
Regulation has been identified as another factor that will impact on concentration. Following 
the view that regulation may provide some “subsidised monitoring” of management, it is 
anticipated that regulation should reduce the need for ownership concentration. Considering 
that the regulatory framework is viewed as poor in the FSU it is possible that incentives for 
ownership concentration will be high, despite the privatisation process leading to dispersed 
ownership initially. For instance, after privatisation, fundamental institutions to monitor 
management and controlling stockholders did not exist Black et a l, (1994), state that by 
1994 a Securities Commission had been created, but lacked funds and political leverage to 
investigate seriously any claims of misdemeanours.
Lastly, “amenity potential’ of a firm’s output is also likely to affect ownership 
concentration. Some industries are more prone to amenity consumption42, and some are 
more prone to the reigns of tight control, and this will in turn lead to a higher degree of 
concentration.
In the example of the FSU it has been documented that managers have had the occasion to 
consume amenities, thus ownership concentration can be expected. For example, Fox and
41 Of course self selection may occur with insiders selecting ownership of better performing firms.
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Heller (1999) document a case where a director of an oil company was skimming 30 cents 
per dollar of revenue, thus destroying the vale of minority shares in the company. Black 
(1999) claims that insiders such as managers and controlling shareholders often engage in 
“inside dealing” and asset stripping, which is exacerbated by an unfriendly business milieu. 
Lieberman and Nellis (1995) cite that in Russia outsider shareholders have difficulty 
exercising minority rights, even obtaining information, contacting fellow shareholders and 
voting their shares is troublesome. When outsiders have tried to exercise control, insiders 
have employed various extra- legal methods to prevent them, thus ownership concentration 
can be expected.
However we have seen above that a tendency for concentration may not occur in transition 
economies, due to a poorly functioning, illiquid capital market Also insiders may be prone 
to block this concentration of ownership. Fox and Heller (1999) identify poor corporate 
governance practices occurring in Russia, one of them being non pro rata distributions, 
whereby firms fail to prevent diversion of claims, often by diluting shares held by outside 
minority share holders.
Filatotchev and Mickiewicz (2001) state that in a transition context results concerning 
ownership and performance are conditional on institutional and legal environments. For 
example, dominant shareholders may be more likely to monitor management and exercise 
their voice function in a poorly defined, weak legal environment However, Filatotchev and 
Mickiewicz (2001) highlight that the actions of dominant owners may be detrimental to 
minority shareholders, given the poor legal protection of these shareholders in central and 
Eastern Europe.
A study by Gurkov and Asselbergs(1995) show that outsider blockholders, (from a survey 
of 27 privatised Russian firms) do not always seek to invest and improve firm performance 
in the long term. Bim (1996) suggests that the cause of this is the very nature of these 
outsiders, for example some domestic investors may be associated with “mafiosi” structures, 
causing contamination in the behaviour of businesses, while some foreign owners may be
42 Defined as the utility consequences of being able to influence the type of goods produced by the 
firm,pll61.
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from “marginal” companies, (p493)43. Lastly, Blasi et al, (1997) states that blockholders 
are not effective at bringing capital to firms (pl48).
Data considerations.
Thus, it will be hypothesised that the presence and identity of a dominant shareholder will 
affect the level of export activity, as it is assumed in this chapter that exporting is a strategy 
undertaken to improve firm performance. The aforementioned studies have focused upon 
concentration and firm performance, however here it is assumed that exporting is a strategy 
to improve performance (see the analytical framework.).
Since the dataset used in this study does not allow the calculation of ownership 
concentration, as the percentage of share ownership of the largest shareholder is not 
included, the presence of and identity of a group of dominant owners shall be used44. In 
fact, this may be useful as the level of ownership concentration is low in Russia (Blasi et a l , 
1997, p206).
Although a major shortfall of this chapter is the absence of a direct measure of ownership 
concentration, it will be illuminating to see whether the presence of a group of dominant 
owners and their identity have a similar effect on exporting activity. Furthermore, one of the 
contributions of this study will be to determine whether groups of concentrated owners 
behave in a similar fashion to a single concentrated owner. It may be found that groups of 
concentrated owners co-operate in order to form export orientated strategies, and thus 
improve firm performance. In any case, the role of coalitions between large blockholders is 
recommended as a line for further research (see Filatotchev et a l , 2001). For example, 
Dyck (2000) suggests that multiple blockholders maybe efficient in environment where legal 
protection is poor.
The reason for including the presence of dominant owners stems from agency theory, having 
seen that dispersed ownership does not allow the direct monitoring of management, we can 
expect that dominant shareholders will be more active in the monitoring of managerial 
behaviour. The identity of the dominant shareholder may also effect the degree of monitoring
43 Foreign investors in Russia are not always from the best Western companies, but from those based 
on activities of former exiles where domestic capital is illegally exported, these are “marginal companies”.
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carried out. For example a dominant owner which is a financial institution may suffer from 
the problems being associated with being a “pressure sensitive investor” or in contrast it 
maybe ''pressure resistant” and fully undertake monitoring behaviour. A pressure sensitive 
investor is likely to be influenced by management, whereas its counterpart, a pressure 
resistant investor does not enjoy a business relationship with the firm and is able to exercise 
voice over the firms’ actions, (see Kochhar andDavid, 1996 for further details and below, 
where this is explored in the following section).
Thus, in order to test if a group of dominant owners act as superior monitors of managerial 
behaviour and are able to implementing performance enhancing strategies such as exporting 
we have H10: the presence of a dominant owner in year Yt.i shall positively affect 
exports in year Y.
In order to test if the identity of this group of dominant owners affects exporting we have the 
following hypothesis H ll, by creating an identity variable, to represent if the group is 
dominated by outsiders.
H ll: the presence of an outside dominant owner in year Yt_i shall positively affect 
exports in year Y, as we can expect these kind of dominant owners to have more 
power and incentive to become involved in restructuring.
5.6 Institutional owners
In recent years institutional investors have become important players in capital markets45. By 
referring to several studies in the literature we can note that these types of investors may 
have a role to play in the restructuring in the firms in transition economies.
The role of institutional owners in the developed world.
Prowse (1990) documents that in Japan financial institutions take large positions in debt and 
equity of the same firm. He shows that when financial institutions are allowed to be leading 
shareholders in the firms to which they lend, the agency costs of issuing debt should fall, as
44 A dummy variable was used to measure this, for example the variable representing if a firm has a group 
of dominant owners equals one if one particular group of owner have greater than 50% of shares. 
Frydman (1997) also used a dummy variable approach.
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they will have little incentive to pursue wealth transferring tactics if they are major debt 
holders of the firm.
This could be relevant for transition economies. Restructuring, requiring investment and debt 
issuing could be made easier if large debt holders are allowed to acquire large equity 
holdings, which would reduce any possible agency conflict, as the share holders will be able 
to monitor the firm, and prevent it from making sub-optimal investments. In addition, 
allowing financial institutions to monitor corporate policy may also reduce the scope for 
managerial opportunism, thus also reducing agency conflicts between shareholders and debt 
holders and shareholders and managers. Prowse (1990) documents that in a situation 
where major shareholders are financial institutions they will have little incentive to engage in 
wealth transferring policies, if they are also debtholders, reducing the potential for agency 
costs. Also there may be a reduction in agency conflict between managers and owners, 
when financial institutions attempt to control managers consumption of perquisites and curb 
managerial opportunism. Gerschenkron (1962) also provides evidence that a “bank 
centred” approach to corporate governance is particularly useful for developing countries.
In contrast, La Porta et al., (2000) argue that bank lending ignores the important role of 
stock markets in the external financing, as equity financing is “essential fo r  the expansion 
o f  new firms whose main asset are the growth opportunities,46>> (pi 9). Also they 
document that since the collapse of the Japanese “bank centred” economy this type of 
system may not be so efficient as Japanese banks have been found to collude with managers 
on a range of issues.
However, institutional investors may bring advantages to the firm. A study by Kochhar and 
David (1996) highlights these benefits. They use a sample of 135 firms traded on the New 
York Stock Exchange to test three competing hypotheses47. By examining differences in 
institutional investors and their ability to influence firms’ activities (namely an outcome based 
measure of innovation, representing a long term orientation), they provide evidence that
45 It has been found by Useem (1993) that institutional investors now control more than 50% of stock in 
large publicly held corporations.
46 However they also argue that the distinction between bank centred and market centred financial 
systems is not always practical.
47 Firstly they test if  institutional ownership is negatively associated with the rate of new product 
development, i.e. institutional investors are pressure sensitive. Next they test if institutional ownership 
is positively associated with the rate of new product development and thus investors are pressure
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institutional investors are active and pressure resistant48. In this case institutions are 
“active” when exit from an equity holding is difficult, thus they will be motivated to exercise 
their “voice” and attempt to influence managerial decisions. Usually these institutions have no 
business relationships with the firms except an investment connection, in this category come 
public pension funds, mutual funds and endowments. Thus again institutional investors 
assume the role of reducing agency conflict. Pound (1988) refers to this as the “efficient 
monitoring hypothesis”.
However, in the same study, Kochhar and David mention several other types of institutional 
investors, namely the pressure sensitive institution, such as insurance companies, banks, 
and non bank trusts (p76). These kind of institution normally assumes a dual role of 
investor and that of a business relationship, which can hinder the institution’s ability to 
influence managerial strategy and policy. For example Kochhar and David claim that,
“Institutions that are seeking to maintain an amicable business relationship may be 
hesitant to influence managerial action. ” Pound (1988) also notes this phenomenon, 
which he identifies as the conflict of interest problem, occurring when “fiduciaries are 
alleged to be frequently swayed in their voting behaviour by existing business 
relationships with incumbent management, ” p243.
Wahal and McConnell (2000) also attempt to address the proposal that institutional 
investors may cause managers to under-invest in projects with long term payoffs. They note 
that in the US during the 1980’s institutional investors were often held responsible for 
making corporate managers behave myopically. The reason being that institutional investors 
are impatient (as they are judged upon their short term portfolio performance) and this 
sentiment is transmitted to corporate managers via pressure on stock prices. As a result 
managers are forced to concentrate upon projects with a short term pay off.
Thus in the US institutional investors have been accused of focusing solely upon short term 
earnings, and are eager to drop stock at the first suggestion of a decline.
However Wahal and McConnell also paint a more favourable picture of institutional 
investors. They state that institutional ownership may act as a “buffer” between impatient 
individual shareholders and corporate managers, which allows managers to focus on
resistant if they influence managerial actions to pursue investment, or lastly they maybe superior 
investors if they select more innovative firms.
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projects with longer term pay offs (p309). Furthermore, they document that institutional 
owners may have an informational advantage as compared to individual shareholders, 
consequently they may be less tempted to judge corporate managers on the basis of short 
term reported earnings.
Their results, using a variety of techniques confirm this and show that institutions do not 
cause myopia, in fact institutional ownership is associated with greater expenditure for plant, 
property and equipment and R&D, than is ownership of shares by individual investors. 
Furthermore, their results show that active institutional trading is not associated with 
corporate myopia, in fact it allows managers to adopt a longer investment horizon.
In addition, Johnson et al., (1996) document that the surge in institutional investor stock 
ownership has evolved into an important monitoring body and “in many aspects 
institutional investors have become the monitors o f  firms ’ appointed monitors - the 
board o f directors. ” This body has mainly concentrated upon improving director quality, 
composition and accountability.
The role of institutional owners in transition economies and the special case of 
FIGs in the FSU.
Nevertheless, institutional investors in transition economies may evolve to be affected by 
short -termism or pressure sensitivity, or moreover still be linked with the State or a financial 
industrial group (see below), which would dampen their incentives to monitor management 
and attempt to enhance firm performance.
Johnson (1997) researches the potential roles of financial industrial groups49 in Russia, such 
as the industry led FIGs: Skorostnoy Flot, Magnitogorsk steel and the bank led FIGs such 
as Menatep, Most Group. She attempts to uncover whether FIGs lobby the government for 
special privileges successfully, collude with each other to restrict competition, or undertake 
investment and restructuring. Her main findings concerning the industry led50 FIGs suggest 
that they have not been able to restructure enterprises due to a lack of investment capital. 
Also, they have not been able to succeed in lobbying the State. Conversely, bank led FIGs 
have to some extent lobbied the State for special privileges successfully (e.g. AlfaBank,
48 Jensen also found that institutional investors were active in 1991.
49 Russian legislation defines FIGs to be a “group o f  enterprises, organisations, lending and financial 
institutions and investment institutions officially registered at the federal lever.
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p347) as well as having discouraged potential competitors. Yet, several bank led FIGs have 
undertook tentative restructuring, for example, Menatep’s Rosprom implemented a 
restructuring plan, which involved downsizing the workforce in 1996. Similarly to industry 
led FIGs, restructuring has been delayed by a lack of capital51 as they have not sought 
capital from foreigners or other domestic institutions due to a fear of relinquishing control. 
Other criticisms of FIGs have been made by Wright et al, (1998) who claim that the 
evolution of FIGs represents a continuation of late Soviet era networks, and that in some 
cases they are created to pressurise enterprises in which they share a relationship, to sell 
their shares to them.
Perotti and Gelfer (2001) highlight that in the developed world conglomerate firms have 
been criticised for reallocating resources sub - optimally across divisions, by shifting funds 
from better performing firms to support investment in less successful sectors. For example, 
various studies have found evidence that internal power conflicts create inefficient 
redistribution of resources to badly performing sectors (see Rajan et a l,  1998).
However, in developing countries industrial-financial groups have been praised for 
performing a governance function, creating internal capital markets and monitoring 
managerial activities (p i602). In the case of Russia, Perotti and Gelfer (2001) state that a 
shortage of external capital and a weak legal system has advanced the development of 
FIGs. Using a dataset of 71 Russian public companies in 1995-6, they find that bank led 
FIGs do partake in extensive financial reallocation, yet they allocate capital comparatively 
better than other firms.
Financial institutional investors are also examined by Filatotchev and Mickiewicz (2001) in 
the transition context They point out that relational financial investors imply both negative 
and positive effects on company strategy and subsequent performance. The investor’s ability 
to influence the firm depends on their particular characteristics, such as industry membership. 
In general terms, Filatotchev and Mickiewicz (2001) claim that financial institutions may 
provide “bank debt market expertise” (pi7), representing positive effects. This ability to 
evaluate alternative debt contracts and pricing arrangements may prove to be a very
50 These are FIGs which are based in old industries, in the regions, particularly in defence, Johnson,
1996, p334.
51 Johnson suggests that the cause of this may be a tendency for FIGs to acquire new companies, rather 
than improve enterprises they already own (p359).
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attractive characteristic for constrained firms in transition economies. On the other hand 
relational investors may not be beneficial for firm strategy and performance: they may 
collude with other stakeholders to extract private benefits, or may be unable to provide any 
kind of efficient enterprise monitoring.
In the Russian case, Bim deems outsiders such as voucher investment funds, in Russia, as 
“modest and inefficient shareholders” (p483) as evidence from his survey shows that they 
are not particularly interested in monitoring management or improving performance.
The financial crisis of 1998 in Russia may cast doubts on the efficacy on the banking sector 
as an institutional investor. For example, Wright et al, (1998) show that some banks in 
Russia became insolvent and lost their licenses and their ability to monitor firms. Also 
Filatotchev and Mickiewicz (2001) state that in a transition context there may be a risk 
involved in placing the control of enterprises in the hands of relational or institutional 
shareholders, such as banks, given their direct links with the state.
The studies above have focused on the effect of institutional investors on the level of 
investment and R&D of the firm, managerial monitoring and firm performance. However in 
this study, I will examine the impact of institutional investors on exporting activity. In the 
analytical framework section, it was shown that exporting acts as a strategy undertaken in 
order to improve performance, thus it is possible that institutional investors endeavour to 
encourage exporting, in order to gain performance benefits.
From this evidence we have H12 and H12b.
H12: institutional share-holding in year Yt.i shall be negatively associated with 
exporting in year Y, in order to test if institutional investors are “pressure 
sensitive
In this case institutional investors will be only focused upon short term gains, and thus will 
not push for changes in organisational strategy such as exporting, in order to boost firm 
performance. In some cases these types of investors may be seeking to maintain a business 
relationship with the firm, and may not be able to influence managerial actions. We also test 
the alternative hypothesis
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H12b: institutional share-holding in year Yt.i shall be positively associated with 
exporting in year Y in order to test if institutional investors are “pressure 
resistant
The pressure resistant investor is unlikely to have a business relationship with the firm (apart 
from an investment link) and is able to influence managerial actions, and push for 
performance enhancing strategies, such as exporting.
Having reviewed a substantial amount of literature a summary table of principal research 
findings shall be given.
Table 3: Summary table of literature
Issue Independent
variable
Dependent
variable
Relationship
1. Insider/Outsider 
debate
Wright et al, (1996) insider ownership corporate risk taking negative
Filatotchev et al., 
(2000)
managerial
ownership
exporting strategies negative
Bhavani and 
Tendulkhar (2001)
organisational form 
(limited company)
export propensity positive
Filatotchev et al, 
(2000)
outsider ownership corporate
restructuring
positive
Foreign ownership
Willmore (1997) foreign ownership exporting positive
Molero (2001) foreign ownership exporting positive
Rojec et al, (2001) foreign ownership exporting positive
2. Board structure
Vance(1983) insider directorships performance positive
Daily and Dalton 
(1994)
board structure strategic choice and
organisational
outcomes
varies
Klein (1997) board structure performance no relationship
Wagner et al, 
(1998)
homogeneous board 
structure
performance positive
3. M anagerial 
turnover
M anagerial 
turnover and 
performance
Filatotchev et al, 
(1999)
managerial turnover performance positive
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Issue Independent
variable
Dependent
variable
Relationship
Lausten (2002) performance managerial turnover negative
M anagerial 
turnover and 
strategic change
Ocasio (1994) top management 
turnover
changes in
organisational
strategy
positive
4. Ownership 
concentration
Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985)
ownership
concentration
performance no relation
Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986)
ownership
concentration
profit rate positive
Wruck (1989) ownership
concentration
firm value positive
Transition
economies
Andreyeva and Dean 
(2001)
ownership
concentration
performance positive
Filatotchev et al. 
(2001)
ownership
concentration
performance negative
Identity of owners
Andreyeva and Dean 
(2001)
insider concentration performance positive
Filatotchev et al., 
(2001)
identity of dominant 
owners
performance no relationship
Aukutsionek (1998) outsider and
managerial
concentration
performance positive
5. Institutional 
ownership
Kochar and David 
(1996)
institutional
ownership
influence on 
managerial decisions
positive
Wahall and 
McConnnell (2001)
institutional
ownership
expenditure on plant, 
property, equipment 
andR&D
positive
Transition
economies
Bim(1995) institutional
ownership
managerial 
monitoring and firm 
performance
no relationship
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CONTROLS
Apart from the variables to be tested in the hypotheses 1-12 above, three controls were 
included in the analysis:
Cl: the official reported level of industrial decline (measured as the corresponding 
industry’s reported decline in real output over 1993-1996, as a percentage of the 
1993 level) shall be positively associated with exporting intensity and propensity, 
reflecting that a fall in domestic sales acts as a “push factor” for exporting.
The extent of industrial crisis should also be accounted for, claim Pearce and Robbins 
(1994). In the transition context this can be related to the collapse of the CMEA. Buck et 
al, (1999) explore how the level of industrial crisis exposes firms to the need for retrenching 
in terms of labour and capital disposal. They hypothesise that retrenchment actions in terms 
of gross involuntary dismissals and gross physical disposals of capital assets capital are 
negatively related to managerial and employee ownership. This is caused by managerial 
entrenchment, entailing collusion with other employees, which reduces the likelihood of a 
programme of labour dismissals being passed Simultaneously it is proposed that the extent 
of retrenchment activity is influenced by the level and direction of changes in industrial 
demand, which is found to be an important predictor.
Liuhto and Jumppononen, (2001) examine the internationalisation of largest firms in the 
Baltic countries, their survey shows that domestic factors, such as small country size push 
companies abroad In addition, the second most frequent reason given by firms for 
internationalisation is “the necessity to survive ” (p i2) as the EU can offer a more stable 
market.
In an exporting context, Pavord and Bogart (1975) hypothesise that adverse market 
conditions cause managers to consider exporting, as a means of survival.
Barker and Duhaim (1997) extend the impact of decline, they suggest that firm based 
decline, where performance is below the industry average, the need for strategic change is 
high. Yet a firm in decline, which is in a relatively competitive position, compared to other 
firms in that industry, can be expected to exhibit less particular strategic change, especially if 
they are amidst a cyclical decline. This is a particularly important issue for firms in transition 
economies, which have endured a transformational decline.
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Thus it can be argued that the extent of industrial decline and the general state of the 
domestic environment, within the transition context, will affect the decision to export.
Industry membership will also alter a firm’s decision process (Rao, 1977), several other 
studies (see Johnason and Williamson Paul, 1975 and Lim et al., 1991) of the export 
developmental model concentrate upon certain industrial sectors, such as engineering, metals 
and industrial equipment.
Dominguez and Sequeira (1992) examine the determinants of exporter’s performance in 
central America and find that industry membership is an important determinant of export 
strategy. Their findings show that the food industry is least reactive (i.e. not concerned with 
export incentives) while paper and chemical industries were the most reactive. In a latter 
study by Roberts and Tybout (1997), who analyse the export participation of Colombian 
firms, also include several industry dummies. Finally, Javalgi (1999) examines the impact of 
firm characteristics upon exporting across industry type with a dataset o f20,204 firms in the 
US state of Ohio, they find that industry type does effect whether a firm is an exporter or 
not.
Obviously some industries are more export orientated, as we have seen above, in Russia the 
oil industry is heavily involved in foreign trade, thus when studying export propensity it is 
necessary to consider industry membership. However when industry dummies were included 
a multicollinearity problem arose, and their removal led to an increase in R2 and the F 
statistic. More formally, the F test shows that the removal of the industry dummies is valid 
(see table 5).
C2a: firm size in year Yt.i will be positively associated with exporting intensity and 
propensity in year Y.
Firm size has been often included in the existing research as a determinant of exporting 
activity. For example, Bonnacorsi (1992) highlights the channels in which size may influence 
the firm: through limited resources, scale economies and risk perception. Empirical 
conclusions have been very mixed on this matter, Perkett (1963) found a positive correlation 
between firm size and the percentage of firms that export, others have found no significant 
relation (Bilkey and Tesar, 1975). Cavusgil (1976) found that very small firms do not 
export, and after firms reach a certain size, there is no correlation, but in-between these
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points exporting is correlated with firm size. More recently, Aw and Batra (1998) report 
that in Taiwan small and medium enterprises are more likely to diversify geographically, 
while large firms are more likely to diversify in terms of production. Conversely, Delgado et 
al., (2001) find that during the period 1991-1996 large firms in Spain have a higher export 
intensity than small firms. However, Bonaccorsi (1992) raises the important issue of 
causality, exporting may provide firms with the opportunity to grow, and his analysis of 
exporting firms in Italy allows him to refute the hypothesis that size is positively related to 
exporting intensity, as small firms also have access to external resources which may assist 
the exporting process.
Dharwan (2001) states that the superior advantages of large firms may lie within their ability 
to gain access to capital, enjoy market power and economies of scale.
Alternatively, we may find large firms may suffer from organisational and managerial 
lethargy, this is particularly relevant to firms in the former Soviet Union, where some firms 
have been classified as “dinosaurs”, for example Wright et al, (2001) cite that these 
enterprises are remnants of the Soviet era.
In prior export research Javalgi et al., (1999) use two measures of firms size in their logit 
specification: the number of employees and total sales, here in order to avoid 
multicollinearity, only the number of employees are used.
C3: annual investment in year Y shall be negatively linked to exporting intensity 
and propensity in year Y.
Soderbom and Teal (2001) examine the complex relationship between investment, exporting 
and skills in manufacturing firms in Ghana using panel data from the 1990’s. One of their 
research questions is to determine whether investment has been higher in exporting 
orientated sectors. Their results refute this by showing that exports firms are not more likely 
to be undertaking investment
Thus in the case of the former Soviet Union we may hypothesise that exporting and 
investment are negatively correlated, suggesting that they are competing strategies to 
improve firm performance.
These controls and hypotheses allow us to test the following model:
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Diagram two: A model of export behaviour
f  Model 1: '
Ownership
1. Decline in state 
ownership(+)
2.Foreign owners- 
hip(+)
3. Outsider owner- 
ship(+)
4. Institutional ow- 
nership(+)
5. Insider ownner- 
ship(-)
6. New director (+'
fModel 3: Dominant 
Ownership
1. Presence of dominant 
owner (+)
2. Presence of dominant 
outside owner (+)
— ------ v
 ____________
Export intensity 
Export propensity
Model 2: Boards
Seats held by
1. Insiders (-)
2. outsiders (+)
3. Foreigner (+) 
Outside control (+)
Controls
Firm size(+)
Industrial decline (+) 
Investment (-) 
Country membership
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5.7 Regression analysis
Firstly linear and logit regressions were used to examine the relationship between exporting 
and ownership and board structure. A dataset adjusted for missing values was also adopted 
in order to improve the robustness and preciseness of results, as described in the previous 
methodology chapter.
Several models shall be presented, in this section where the Expectation Maximisation (EM) 
procedure has been used. Model one examines some of the principal hypotheses concerning 
ownership structure. Model two then includes board structure and corporate control, while 
model three tests the hypotheses concerning the impact of a group of dominant owners.
I have chosen Belarus as the numeraire country dummy as this has been the method used by 
the originators of the dataset (see for example Filatotchev et <3/. (200 lb).
Table 4: Linear regression results.
D ep en d en t v a r iab le  = ex p o rt in ten sity  in 1997.
In d e p en d en t v a riab les  a re  m easu red  fo r 1996.
Model 252 Variance Model 3 Variance
b o a r d inflating d o m i n a n t inflating
s t r u c t u r e factor o w n e r s h i p factor
Constant -29 .36 (14 .92 ) -31 .68 (16 .44 )
Log o f  number o f  
em ployees
0 .27(2 .71)** 1.25 0 .2 6 (1 .8 9 )f 1.34
Presence o f  a 
dominant owner
0 .2 6 (1 .9 )f 1.25
Presence o f  
dominant outside 
owner
-0 .1 5 ( - 1.19) 1.06
% o f  seats held by 
insiders
0 .15(0 .88) 3.46
% o f  seats held by 
foreigners
-0.11 (-0 .96) 1.61
% o f  seats held by 
outsiders
0 .11(0 .44) 8.42
Industrial decline 0.22(2 .07)* 1.42 0 .2 7 (1 .8 5 )t 1.44
Log o f  investment -0 .07 (-0 .79 ) 1.16 -0 .12 (-0 .91 ) 1.27
% o f  voting shares 
held by outsiders* 
% o f  seats held by 
outsiders
-0 .009(-0 .04 ) 5.13
RUSSIA -0 .1 3 ( - l . 14) 1.56 -0 .19 ( - 1.38) 1.44
UKRAINE -0 .04 (-0 .35 ) 1.46 -0 .01 (-0 .07 ) 1.55
n 223 223
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.09
F statistic 1 .78 f 1 .86f
52 Model 1 is tested using pooled data, see following sections.
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* this is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the percentage of shares of the government has fallen 
during the period 1996-1997, and zero otherwise.
b standardised beta coefficients are reported and t statistic is in parentheses. 
tp<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Logistic regression was also used following recommendations by Wakelin (1998), and is 
described in more detail in chapter three. Results from logistic analysis are shown in tables 5 
and 7, where the EM procedure is used again to replace missing values.
Table 5: Logistic regression
Dependent variable = is a firm an exporter in 1997.
Independent variables are measured for 1996_______________ ________________
Model 1
ownership structure1*
Model 2 
board structure
Model 3
dominant ownership
Constant
7.81(5.12)
-5.67
(2.14)**
-8.91(2.86)
Log of no. of employees 0.25(1.84) c 1.28 133(0.6)
*
c3.79 2.72(0.94)
**
c15.17
Decline in state ownership*
0.26(1.68)
9.58
% of shares held by foreigners 0.25(0.16)
t
01.28
% of shares held by outsiders
0.08(0.06)
t
0.9
% of shares held by institutions 0.19(0.11)
t
1.2
% of shares held by insiders 0.002
(0.002)
1.0
Presence of a dominant owner 1.45(0.89)
*
0.39
Presence of an outside dominant 
owner
1.07(1.0) 0.23
% of seats held by insiders -0.02
(0.16)
0.98
% of seats held by foreigners -0.16
(0.13)
0.99
% of seats held by outsiders 0.02
(0.03)
0.98
% of voting shares held by -0.0006 1.02
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Model 1
ownership structure1*
Model 2 
board structure
Model 3
dominant ownership
outsiders* % of seats held by 
outsiders
(0.0004)
Industrial decline -0.009
(0.04)
0.99 0.01
(0.02)
1.02 -0.006
(0.02)
0.99
Log of investment
0.65(0.62)
0.52 0.16
(0.36)
1.16 0.016
(0.36)
1.02
RUSSIA
4.97(2.34)
*
144.58 -1.59
(0.59)
4.88 -1.29(0.8)* 3.62
UKRAINE
3.29(2.34)
27.09 -0.41
(0.99)
1.51 -0.94(1.12) 0.39
n 223 223 223
% correct 82.05 78.26 73.44
Hosmer and Lemeshow’s R2 0.6 0.19 0.28
Chi square 19.24* 23.92** 18.02*
* this is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the percentage of shares of the government has fallen 
during the period 1996-1997, and zero otherwise.
b standard error is in parentheses. c This is the indicator of change in odds resulting form a unit change 
in the independent variable, i.e. the derivative. In SPSS output this is termed as EXP( f5).
tp<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Note H9 is not tested due to a failure to meet an iterative 
solution.
Before results of the analysis are given, attention must be paid to multicollinearity statistics or 
the variance inflating factors given in tables above.
An assumption of the classical linear regression model is that there is no multicollinearity 
among regressors in the regression model. Unfortunately Field (2000) states that some 
degree of collinearity is unavoidable and Gujarati (1995) notes that the fact that explanatory 
variables are highly collinear is “a fact o f  life” (p319). Yet multicollinearity can still be a 
problem, despite OLS estimators still being BLUE, precise estimation will be difficult, as 
estimators have large variances and covariances. Also Field (2000) highlights three 
particular problems of multicollinearity: it limits the size of R, prevents choosing which 
variable is important and leads to unstable beta coefficients, (see Field, p i32 for more 
details).
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Consequently, variance inflating factors (VIFs) have been calculated, which represent the 
speed with which variances and covariances increase, and shows how the variance of an 
estimator is inflated by the presence of multicollinearity.
Montgomery and Peck (1982) highlight that multicollinearity may be caused by several 
factors, one of them being model specification.
One solution to multicollinearity53 is to acquire more data or increase the number of 
observations. One method of doing this is to use the EM algorithm procedure, which 
imputes missing values in the dataset. As the number of observations increase, the variance 
of the regressors decrease, along with their standard errors, making estimation more 
precise54.
Also it should be noted that various specifications were tried, in addition to those presented 
here, in particular it was found that by removing industry dummies55 the problem of 
multicollinearity was resolved, without altering the main results.
As for results, general firm characteristics or controls shall be considered firstly. In both the 
linear and logistic results, by examining the standardised beta coefficients it is evident that 
firm size (measured by the logarithm of the number of employees) is positively linked to 
export intensity and propensity. Past research on firm size and exporting has provided mixed 
findings, yet results presented here tend to agree with that of Bleaney and Wakelin (1999), 
who find that in the case of UK exporting firms, larger firms export a larger proportion of 
their total output They claim that firm size is expected to have a positive relation with 
exporting as larger firms have more resources to enter foreign markets. These resources are 
useful for covering the fixed costs of exporting, such as information gathering. Delgado 
(2001) obtains similar results in his study of Spanish exporting firms: large firms have a 
higher export intensity than smaller firms.
The logarithm of annual investment is found to be insignificantly associated with export 
intensity and propensity reflecting that annual investment does not have an impact on 
whether a firm is an exporter or not or the level of export activity.
53 See Gujarati (1995) for details of solutions (p339-346).
54 Also multicollinearity has been reduced from the original specifications by testing several of the 
hypotheses separately.
55 It is hoped that industry characteristics are captured in the “industrial decline” variable.
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Caves (1990) suggests that variables representing general business conditions should 
be included in firm level studies, here the levels of industrial decline are used to represent 
industry characteristics56. Table four shows that the level of industrial decline is positively 
associated with export intensity, and so a decline in domestic demand acts as an incentive to 
increase exporting activity.
Hypotheses 6-8 deal with board structure of firms. Specifically 6 tests the relationship 
between the percentage of board seats held by insiders and export intensity and propensity. 
Tables 4 and 5 show that there is no significant relationship between these two variables.
H6 and H7 tests the relationship between the percentage of board seats held by outsiders 
and foreigners respectively and export intensity and propensity. Tables 4 and 5 reveal that 
both relationships are insignificant. It is possible that outsider and foreign board members do 
not have the power to influence exporting strategy, furthermore they may not be fully 
independent of the CEO and thus forced to adhere to his policies. Baysinger and Hoskisson 
(1990) also document that outsider directors often hold other directorships and do not have 
time to carefully monitor firm strategy.
H8 examined the relationship between the interaction variable of outsider share-holding and 
the percentage of board seats held by outsiders and exporting. The relationship was found 
to be insignificant, and so H8 was rejected.
Also hypotheses were made surrounding the presence of a group of dominant owners and 
their identity, H10 postulates that the presence of a group of dominant owners shall have a 
positive effect on exporting activity. The tables above show that there is support for this 
hypothesis in model 3 .This finding differs from that of Gurkov and Asseleberg (1995), 
whose results suggest that blockholders do not improve performance in Russia. However, 
HI 1 examines the identity of a dominant owner and claims that a group of dominant owners, 
which consists of outsider ownership, is positively associated with exporting intensity.
Results in tables 4 and 5 refute this relationship, thus HI 1 can be rejected. Yet is interesting 
to note that these results differ from those of Andreya and Dean (2001) who find that in 
Ukraine a concentration of insider ownership improves firm performance, but agree with 
Filatotehev et al., (2001), who find that the identity of a dominant owner does not affect 
performance.
204
Lastly a brief note on the EXP( ft) or derivatives shall be given, which are shown in the 
logistic regression results tables shall be mentioned As for the ownership regression in 
model 1 we can see that a decline in state ownership has the largest EXP(p) at 9.57, as 
this value is greater than 1 this indicates that as state ownership declines the odds of a firm 
being an exporter increases. In this case we can say that the odds of a firm which has 
experienced a decline in state ownership and also being an exporter is almost 10 times more 
likely than those of a firm without a decline in state ownership. Other interesting findings are 
those EXP(P)  for firm size (1.27) and foreign ownership (1.28), both of which indicate a 
positive effect on whether a firm is an exporter or not
Firm size also has a large and positive EXP(p) in models 2 and 3 at 3.79 and 15.17.
Model 3 also exhibits an EXP(p) of 2.91 for the presence of a dominant owner, thus the 
odds of a firm which has a dominant owner and is an exporter is almost three times higher 
in firms than those without a dominant owner.
From the linear regressions in table 4 we can see that all models have modest R2 .
As for logistic regressions, models 1 may be the most useful as it successfully classifies 
almost 80% of the cases. Model 3 has a reasonable value of Hosmer and Lemeshow’s R2, 
which is an indicator of how well independent variables predict the outcome variable.
It should be noted that to test model one pooled data regression was used, as the test for 
time invariance was accepted for this model only (see section 5.9). In addition the pooled 
dataset was used for logistic regression, yet this produced insignificant results and a poor 
classification rate, therefore the results are not presented here.
The analysis described above was then carried out using export intensity and propensity in 
1996 as the dependent variable, and independent variables were taken from 1994. The 
reason for the two year lag is that the survey provided responses for 1997,1996, and 1994, 
thus it was decided to take advantage of this time lag57.
56 As mentioned previously industry dummies were removed to reduce multicollinearity.
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Table 6: Linear regression results.
Dependent variable = export intensity in 1996 
Independent variables are measured for 1994
Model 2 Variance Model 3 Variance
board inflating dominant inflating
structure factor ownership factor
Constant -34.16(11.37) -35.39(10.55)
Log of number 
of employees
0.25(3.20)** 1.34 5.42(1.54)* 1.33
Presence of a 
dominant owner
0.03(0.35) t 1.09
Presence of 
dominant 
outside owner
0.06(0.83) 1.05
% of seats held 
by insiders
0.08(0.82) 1.9
% of seats held 
by outsiders
-0.36(-
2.83)**
3.65
Industrial
decline
0 .2 1 (2 .8 8 )** 1 . 2 1 0.21(2.7)** 2.96
Log of 
investment
0.09(0.75) 3.16 0.004(0.03) 2.97
% of voting 
shares held by 
outsiders* % of 
seats held by 
outsiders
0.25(2.22)* 2 . 8 6
RUSSIA -0.09(-1.02) 1 . 6 8 -0.12(-1.3) 1.59
UKRAINE -0.14(-1.06) 3.61 -0.19(-1.41) 3.53
n 223 223
Adjusted R2 0.17 0 . 1 2
F statistic 5.81*** 4.48***
57 Another possible technique would be to pool the data; see the following section.
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Tests for the inclusion of industry dummies : H0= metal dummy =engineering 
dummy = food dummy = paper dummy =058
Model 2
Board structure
Model 3
Dominant owners
F
statistic
2.09 1.7
F critical 
value 
(Fo.oi(4,2 
06)
3.41 3.41
Result Accept Accept
“ this is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the percentage of shares of the government has fallen 
during the period 1996-1997, and zero otherwise.
b standardised beta coefficients are reported and t statistic is in parentheses. 
tp<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Note. I was unable to test the effect of board seats held by foreigners on exporting, as this variable had 
to be dropped in order to find an iterative solution
Table 7: Logistic regression results.
Dependent variable = export propensity in 1996 
Independent variables are measured for 199'__
Model 1
ownership structure
Model 2 
board structure
Model 3
dominant ownership
Constant -16.49
(5.09)**
-7.69
(1.91) 7.81(1.79)
***
Log of no. of employees 2.06
(0.67)*
*7.82 0.85
(0.23)**
*
c2.35 0.9(0.23)* c2.46
Decline in state ownership* 0.29
(1.39)
0.75
% of shares held by 
foreigners
-0.27
(0.33)
0.76
% of shares held by outsiders 0.0008
(0.03)
1 . 0
% of shares held by 
institutions
0.009
(0.04)
1 . 0
% of shares held by insiders -0.006
(0 .0 2 )
0.99
Presence of a dominant 
owner
-0.93(0.59) 0.39
58 See Gujarati (1995), pg58 for a description of the F test.
207
Model 1
ownership structure
Model 2 
board structure
Model 3
dominant ownership
Presence of an outside 
dominant owner
-6.6(23.52) 0 . 8 6
% of seats held by insiders 0.003
(0 .0 1 )
1 . 0
% of seats held by outsiders -0.03
(0 .0 2 )t
0.97
% of voting shares held by 
outsiders*% of seats held by 
outsiders
0.0004
(0.0005)
0.97
Presence of a new director 0.41
(0.87)
0 . 6 6
Industrial decline 0.03
(0.04)
1.03 0 . 0 1
(0 .0 1 )
1 . 0 1 0 .0 1 (0 .0 1 ) 1 . 0 1
Log of investment -0 . 0 2
(0.17)
0.98 0.14
(2.82)t
1.16 0.12(0.08)
t
1 . 1 2
RUSSIA 0.54
(1.39)
1.71 -0.65
(0.44)
0.52 -0 . 2 2
(0.460
0.79
UKRAINE 1 . 2 1
(1.28)
3.34 0.73
(0.74)
2.07 0.82(0.72) 2.28
n 223 223 223
% correct 80.0 74.14 72.87
Hosmer and Lemeshow’s R2 0.63 0.78 0.79
Chi square 31.51*** 50.43*** 42.49***
* this is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the percentage of shares of the government has fallen 
during the period 1996-1997, and zero otherwise.
b standard error is in parentheses.c This is the indicator of change in odds resulting form a unit change 
in the independent variable, i.e. the derivative. In SPSS output this is termed as EXP( ). 
tp<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Note the variable for the percentage of seats held by foreigners was removed due to a failure to meet an 
iterative solution.
Results in tables 6 and 7 show that the relationship between exporting intensity and 
propensity and ownership structure changes when a two year lag is used, and is thus 
unstable over the period 1994-7. Bilkey (1976) in his detailed review of export studies 
notes that unstable equation coefficients are common, when the firm moves from one stage 
of the export process to the next (p42).
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Beginning with firm characteristics we can see that firm size is again, positively and 
significantly related to export intensity and propensity.
However the relationship between lagged investment and export propensity is positive and 
significant for this period in models 2 and 3. This refutes C3 perhaps suggesting that 
investment and exporting are complementary strategies to improve performance.
The relationship between industrial decline and export intensity is positive in models 2 and 3 
(similar to results in table 4), thus a fall in domestic sales act as a “push factor'’ to increase 
export intensity. However, it does not act as an incentive to begin exporting per se. Similar 
to the analysis using 1997 as a dependent variable, industry dummies are not included in the 
regression equation, the table above provides a formal F test, proving that their exclusion is 
valid
As for ownership variables only those that have significant relationships shall be discussed 
Linear and logistic regression results reveal that the percentage of board seats held by 
outsiders reduce the likelihood that a firm is an exporter and export intensity, providing 
evidence to reject H659. The reason for this could be that outside board members monitor 
managers from over diversifying60, and thus leads to a negative relation between board seats 
held by outsiders and exporting activity. For example, Chen and Ho (2000) found that for 
firms in Singapore outside blockholders prevent over-diversification.
Alternatively, Wagner et al, (1998) state that the resource dependence perspective 
proposes that outside directors ease the acquisition of resources required by firms to survive 
and function, however in the FSU outside directors may not have the experience or means 
to acquire these important resources.
Model 2 from the linear regression also shows that H8 can be accepted: outsider control is 
positively associated with export intensity. This may reflect complementarities between the 
voting shares and presence on boards: outsiders need both to impact on exporting.
Turning to the presence of a group of dominant owners, model 3 shows that this is positively 
associated with export propensity, thus we may accept H10. Again the identity of the group 
of dominant owner does not affect the relationship.
59 This result differs from the findings in the previous regression, which revealed an insignificant 
relationship.
60 Whereby the agency cost hypothesis states that managers derive private benefits from diversification 
which exceed their private costs, (Chen and Ho, 2000).
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Once again a brief observation of the EXP(ft)  shall be given which are shown in table 7. 
Similarly to table 5 firm size has a relatively laige and positive EXP(ft); 7.81 in model 1, 
2.34 in model 2 and 2.46 in Model 3, again suggesting that the odds of a firm being an 
exporter is higher in larger firms. As for industrial decline in model 1 this is positive at 1.03 
reflecting that the odds of a firm that is suffering from industrial decline and is an exporter is 
1.03 times more likely to be an exporter than a firm which is not suffering from decline. 
Lastly coming to model 3 the EXP( ft)  for dominant owner is 0.86, as this is less than 1 this 
suggests that the odds of the firm being an exporter decreases when the firm has a dominant 
owner.
By examining the F statistics in table 6 for the linear regression we can see that they are 
significant, thus we can reject the hypothesis that the regression coefficients are equal to zero 
and say the relationship between the dependent and independent variables is valid. In order 
to evaluate the success of the logistic regression in table 7, Hosmer and Lemeshow’s R2 can 
be used: the highest value is 0.79, reflecting that the independent variables are fairly good 
predictors of the outcome variable, in addition all four models correctly classify greater than 
74% of all cases (this is favourable compared to similar analysis by Javalgi et al., (1999) 
who achieved a correct classification of 72%).
5.8 Accounting for Heteroscedasticity
The scatter-plots in the chapter three show that the fourth assumption of the classical linear 
regression model of homoscedastic disturbances has been broken, thus the weighted least 
squares procedure has been used.
In addition, a more formal test was carried out in order to detect heteroscedasticity 
By employing the Goldfield Quandt test (see Gujarati, p374 for a detailed treatment of the 
method) it was found that we cannot accept the hypothesis of homoscedasticity for three out 
of four models, as shown in the table below.
The Goldfield Quandt61 test takes the following form:
; Rssi/df 
R S S l /d f
61 RSS refers to residual to residual sum of squares, df refers to degrees of freedom
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If we find that A is greater than the F critical value then we may reject the hypothesis of 
homoscedasticty, A and the critical F value are shown in the last rows of table 8.
Results are shown using the WLS procedure (refer to chapter three for a description of this 
technique) for dependent variables measured in 1997 and 1996. We have two models for 
each year, model one examines the impact of ownership structure on export intensity and 
model 2 examines the impact of board structure on export intensity^2.
Table 8a: Regression results using WLS.
Dependent Variable 
measured in 1997 
Ownership structure
Dependent Variable 
measured in 1997 
Board structure
Dependent Variable 
measured in 1996 
Ownership structure
Dependent Variable 
measured in 1996 
Board structure
Constant 15.21(9.04) -29.26(14.97)* -39.77(12.54)** -28.44(8.67)**
Log of 
employees63
-2.24(3.09) 10.24(3.77)** 6.72(1.69)*** 4.56(1.33)***
Decline in state 
ownership
1.58(2.51) 4.07(4.56)
% of shares held 
by institutions
0.42(0.13)** -0.14(0.16)
% of shares held 
by foreigners
3.7(0.22)*** 1.25(1.17)
% of shares held 
by outsiders
-0.2(0.07)* -0.03(0.11)
% of shares held 
by insiders*
0.01(0.07)
Presence of a new 
director
-2.89(2.46) -1.49(3.55)
Industrial decline 0.24(0.09)* 0.23(0.11)* -0.05(0.13) 0.22(0.09)*
Log of investment -3.59(1.02)** -1.97(2.53) 0.42(0.54) 0.38(0.48)
% of seats held by 
insiders
0.09(0.11)
% of seats held by 
foreigners
-0.88(0.9) n.a
% of seats held by 
outsiders
0.07(0.19) -036(0.09)***
% of shares held 
by outsiders *% 
of seats held 
outsiders
0 .0 0 0 1 (0 .0 0 2 ) 0.004(0.002)*
Russia -2.37(3.44) -4.6(4.18) 2.26(5.18) -1.79(2.89)
Ukraine -9.96(3.42)** -2.79(7.55) 7.33(4.78) -2.89(4.47)
Adjusted R 
square
0.96 0.06 0.26 0.19
F statistic 66.08*** 1.77f 3.12** 7.04***
Goldfield Quandt 
test for OLS
62 Model three which previously examined the impact of dominant owners is not presented as it 
produced insignificant results.
63 Independent variables are lagged, as before in linear/logistic regression
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Dependent Variable 
measured in 1997 
Ownership structure
Dependent Variable 
measured in 1997 
Board structure
Dependent Variable 
measured in 1996 
Ownership structure
Dependent Variable 
measured in 1996 
Board structure
technique
A value 11.69 1.44 1.04 1.44
F critical value F0.oi(6.31)=3.47 F01(36,45) =1.29 F„2,(60,9)=1.54 F„ ,(36,45)=1.29
Result Reject
homoscedasticity: 
apply WLS
Reject
homoscedasticity: 
apply WLS
Accept
homoscedasticity
Reject
homoscedasticity: 
apply WLS
*Source variable for weight. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05, fp<0.1
Table 8b: WLS results using pooled data
Ownership structure Board structure
Constant -24.52(8.87} -37.12(10.03)
Log of employees 0.81(1.3}*** 0.58(1.29)***
Decline in state ownership -0.11(-1.27)
% of shares held by institutions 0.09(0.1)
% of shares held by foreigners 0.61(0.34)***
% of shares held by outsiders -0.09(0.07)
% of shares held by insiders*
Presence of a new director -0.05(2.2)
Industrial decline 0.07(0.07) 0.21(1.29)***
Log of investment 0.39(-0.08) 0.05(0.47)
% of seats held by insiders 0.09(0.05)
% of seats held by outsiders -0.21(0.08)**
% of shares held by outsiders 
*% of seats held outsiders
0.15(0.001)*
Russia 0.04(2.63) -0.12(2.48)1
Ukraine -0.04(2.93) -0.13(4.1)
Time 0.55(5.31)* 0.49(5.16)***
Adjusted R square 0.47 0.14
F statistic 8.93*** 6.59***
* Source variable for weight. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05,
By employing the WLS method allows us to make the following observations.
By referring to table 8, when the dependent variable is measured for 1997, we can see that 
outsider ownership is negatively and significantly associated with export intensity, thus H264 
must be refuted.
64 HI cannot be tested, as insider ownership is used to compute the weighted variable.
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This raises the issue of endogeneity as insiders may be preventing outsiders from acquiring 
shares in better performing firms (i.e. those firms which are exporting), thus accounting for 
the lack of a positive relationship between exporting and outsider ownership.
H3 concerns the relationship between foreign ownership and exporting, the results provide 
support for H3 reflecting that foreign ownership furthers exporting, and that we can deduce 
that foreign owners are using foreign sourcing as a means of production, as suggested by 
Caves (1996).
However this relationship only holds when the dependent variable is measured in 1997, not 
1996, this may suggest that it takes foreign owners time to build up power and ability to 
influence corporate strategy.
The relationship between board structure and export intensity is examined in H5 and H6. H5 
examines the relationship between the percentage of seats held by insiders and exporting, 
from the results we can see that the association is insignificant, so the hypothesis cannot be 
accepted As for the percentage of board seats held by outsiders, the relationship is negative 
and significant, (when the dependent variable is measured in 1996) reflecting that outsider 
board members may be focused upon domestic strategy, consequently, H6 is rejected, as in 
linear and logistic regressions above.
Hermacht and Weisbach (2001) state that boards are not often involved in the day to day 
business of the firm, therefore we may be able to hypothesise that board members focus on 
financial performance, as opposed to general exporting policy.
By using the WLS technique, results reveal that the relation between the interaction of 
outsider shareholders and their board seats is positive and significant, allowing us to accept 
H8. This reflects that ownership in terms of voting shares may not be enough to allow 
shareholders to affect strategy, rather they require a presence on the board to be able to 
initiate performance improving activities, such as exporting. Thus board members in the FSU 
are involved in export policy, not just financial performance, as found previously by 
Hermacht and Weisbach (2001).
Lastly, institutional ownership appears to be “pressure resistant”, as institutional share­
holding is positively associated with exporting H12b can be accepted, and H12 can be 
rejected. This result agrees with past research by Kochar and David (1996) in that 
institutional investors are found to be “active” in improving firm performance. Results here
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show that institutional investors are “active” and act as “efficient monitors” (Pound, 1988) in 
improving export activity, as we assume that exporting is a strategy to improve firm 
performance these results become comparable
As for controls, several models in linear and logistic regression above revealed that industrial 
decline is positively associated with exporting, results from WLS mirror this (see model 2). 
The country dummy for Ukraine was negative and significant in models 1, reflecting that 
export intensity is lower in Ukraine, as compared to the control, Belarus.
In addition, the logistic regression revealed that investment is positively associated with 
exporting, however in models 1 for 1997, we find that the relationship takes the opposite 
sign. This result agrees with that of Soderbom and Teal (2001) who find that investment is 
not higher in exporting African firms, thus exporting and investment maybe competing 
strategies to improve performance.
Lastly we have strong evidence that firm size is positively associated with export intensity, 
this further consolidates results presented in the regression section above in 5.7.
Table 8b shows results of pooled regressions using WLS techniques.
Once again we have evidence to support H365 and H8, but H5 must be rejected, these 
findings are consistent with previous results above.
5.9 Pooled regression analysis
In order to take advantage of the fact that we have several time points for the dependent 
variable the data was pooled, and the appropriate techniques applied. I did this by 
“stacking” the appropriate variables by year, so for example the dependent variable, export 
intensity observations are stacked for 1994-6 and 1997. However it is noticeable that the 
sample size does not increase by any great magnitude, the reason being that the dataset is 
not longitudinal for Belarus and Ukraine, so some observations had to be deleted. 
Furthermore, some Russian firms did not appear in both waves of the surveys due to 
bankruptcy or non response. However it is anticipated that pooling does bring some benefits 
(see chapter 3 for details).
65 In order to determine whether the data was “poolable” separate equations were run including 
interactive slope coefficients. For the ownership model (1) institutional ownership and employee 
ownership interacted with time dummies were significant, suggesting that the single year equations may
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As to the question whether the countries are similar enough to pool Filatotchev et al. (1999) 
note that Russia, Ukraine and Belarus share a “common heritage ” in that they inherited 
some partial privatisations under the USSR’s legislation of 1989, which allowed enterprise 
collectives to lease their plant and machinery from the state. Later in 1992 legislation 
allowed these three countries to buy out their enterprises within the period of their lease 
(pi015). Although Russia and Ukraine and Belarus went on to adopt different centralised 
privatisation programmes enterprise managers all faced similar problems with restructuring 
and adapting their products to be exported beyond the CIS.
Firstly it is assumed that all coefficients are constant across time and firms, however I have 
included a dummy variable to represent which year the dependent variable was measured in. 
The coefficients are estimated via OLS technique (see chapter three for more details of 
pooled regression techniques).
be more suitable. See the following section for more details on pooling data and the appropriate 
techniques.
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Table 9: Pooled regressions
Model 1 Variance
ownership inflating
structureb factor
Constant -35.41(3.97)***
Time dummy 0.91(3.66)*** 9.15
Log of number 
of employees
1.07(4.67)*** 7.74
Decline in 
state
ownership*
-0.13(-1.39) 1 . 6 6
% of shares 
held by 
foreigners
0.37(4.13)*** 1 . 2 1
% of shares 
held by 
outsiders
-0.06(-0.54) 9.15
% of shares 
held by 
institutions
-0.04(-0.36) 1 . 6 6
% of shares 
held by 
insiders
-0.13(-1.08) 2.27
Presence of 
new director
-0.03(-0.29) 1 . 2 1
Industrial
decline
0.03(0.35) 1.36
Log of 
investment
-0.02(-0.18) 2.45
RUSSIA 0.03(0.31) 1.74
UKRAINE 0.07(0.52) 2.81
n 229
Adjusted R2 0.32
F statistic 4
'  this is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the percentage of shares of the government has fallen 
during the period 1996-1997, and zero otherwise.
b standardised beta coefficients are reported and t statistic is in parentheses. 
fp<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Focusing on significant independent variables only, we can see that several of the results in 
table nine reinforce results found in previous linear, logistic and WLS regressions shown in 
the sections above.
For example, we have evidence to support H3 once again: foreign ownership is positively 
associated with export intensity. In addition, firm size is positively associated with export 
intensity as before.
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5.9b Allowing for time variance
Considering that I assumed that coefficients are constant across time it is interesting to see
that the time dummy variable is highly significant in table nine. In order to test the validity of
the inclusion of this time dummy an F test was carried out, taking the following form:
F = (R2„r - R2rVm 
( l -R 2„)/(n-k)
(See Greene (2000), p300 and Gujarati (1995), p258).
Where UR represents the unrestricted regression, R represents the restricted regression, m 
represents the number of restrictions (1 here only) and k represents the number of 
parameters to be estimated.
The null hypothesis to be tested was Ho: f t Time = 0, and results are shown in the table 
below:
Table 10: F
Model 1
F statistic 2 7 . 6 7
F critical value 6 . 7 6
F „ . o , ( 1 , 2 1 6 )  =
6 . 7 6 “
Result Reject null
Gujarati (2001) warns that not all data is “poolable” and panel data regression models may 
not be appropriate in every situation (p646). In addition, we assumed that coefficients do 
not vary across time, but table ten shows that this assumption may not be tenable, as the 
time dummy is highly significant, and we cannot accept the null hypothesis that the coefficient 
on the time dummy is zero. Therefore we will test a regression model which includes 
interactive slope dummies to account for differences in slope coefficients, by multiplying 
the main independent variables by the time dummy, as shown below. Once again we are 
using this “stacked” dataset as explained above:
Y„ = «  + A TIME + [32X 2, + TIME&X,, +...p„X„, + TIME$„X„, + u,,
If one or more of the coefficients on the interactive variables are statistically significant, it will 
reflect that the slope coefficient is different from the base group (where the dependent
66 For model three we use the following F critical value F0 .o5 (1,216) = 389.
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variable is measured in 1997), and thus there may be little point in estimating a pooled 
regression model (Gujarati, p645,2001).
Results shown in the table below demonstrate that for model 1 it may be advantageous to 
pool the data, but as for models 2 and 3, several interactive variables are significant (such as 
the interaction of the time dummy with percentage of seats held by outsiders and the 
presence of a dominant owner), therefore it may be advisable to consider the single 
equation models, in section 5.7, as the export equations are changing over the time period.
Table 11: pooled regressions with interactive variables
Model 1 
ownership 
structure b
Variance
inflating
factor
Model 2
Board
structure
Variance
inflating
factor
Model 3
dominant
ownership
Variance
inflating
factor
Constant -39.73(-3.57)** -33.87(-3.0)** -33.27(-
3.51)**
Time dummy 1 .2 1 ( 1 .6 8 ) 73.92 0.22(0.49) 71.95 0.08(0.18) 50.25
Log of number 
of employees
1.18(4.58)*** 9.43 0.51(3.23)** 8.83 0.51(3.37)** 5.8
Log of number 
of
employees* 
TD (time 
dummy)
-0.17(-0.24) 66.38 0.27(0.99) 26.24 0.23(0.61) 36.58
Decline in 
state
ownership*
-0.13(-1.3) 1.4
% of shares 
held by 
foreigners
0.24(1.2) 5.35
% of shares 
held by 
foreigners*TD
0.18(0.94) 5.31
% of shares 
held by 
outsiders
-0.14(-0.11) 2.52
% of shares 
held by 
outsiders*TD
-0.14(-0.62) 7.02
% of shares 
held by 
institutions
-0.14(-1.04) 2.67
% of shares 
held by 
institutions*T 
D
0.2(1.33) 3.27
% of shares 
held by 
insiders
1.01(0.35) 1186.07
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Model 1 Variance Model 2 Variance Model 3 Variance
ownership inflating Board inflating dominant inflating
structure1* factor structure factor ownership factor
% of shares 
held by 
insiders*TD
-1.16(-0.39) 1271.459
Presence of a
dominant
owner
0.15(1.43) 2.25
Presence of a
dominant
owner*TD
0.19(1.54)t 4.03
Presence of 
dominant 
outside owner
0.08(0.95) 1 . 6 8
Presence of 
dominant 
outside 
owner*TD
-0.12(-1.39)t 1.87
% of seats 
held by 
insiders
0.08(0.87) 3.21
% of seats 
held by 
insiders*TD
-0.02(-0.09) 18.06
% of seats 
held by 
outsiders
-0J7(-2.79)** 6.34
% of seats 
held by 
outsiders*TD
0.19(1.41)* 6.31
Presence of 
new director
-0.03(-0.36) 1.31
Industrial
decline
0.004(0.03) 2.64 0.23(2.86)** 2 . 2 1 0.22(2.76)* 1 . 6 8
Industrial
decline*TD
-0 . 0 1  (-0.06) 9.22 -0.05(-0.34) 8.74 0.02(0.09) 6.76
Log of 
investment
-0.03(-0.18) 2.72 0.08(0.94) 2.82 0.04(0.37) 2.56
% of voting 
shares held by 
outsiders*% 
of seats held 
by outsiders
0.4(2.19)* 11.75
% of voting 
shares held by 
outsiders *% 
of seats held 
by
outsiders*TD
-0.29(-1.54)* 12.43
RUSSIA 0.06(0.51) 2.08 -0.11 (-1.52) 1.72 -0.14(-1.86) 1.54
UKRAINE 0.07(0.47) 2.94 -0.11(-1.17) 3.09 -0.14(0.19) 3.01
n 229 229 229
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Model 1 
ownership 
structure b
Variance
inflating
factor
Model 2
Board
structure
Variance
inflating
factor
Model 3
dominant
ownership
Variance
inflating
factor
Adjusted R2 0.29 0.14 0 . 1 2
F statistic 3.34*** 4  4 9 *** 3.88***
* this is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the percentage of shares of the government has fallen 
during the period 1996-1997, and zero otherwise.
b standardised beta coefficients are reported and t statistic is in parentheses. 
tp O .l, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
The F test proved that for model 1 it may be valid to pool the data as shown below in table 
12.
The null hypothesis to be tested for model 1 was Ho: Log of employees*TD= % of shares 
held by institutions*TD= % of shares held by employees*TD = % of shares owned by 
foreigners*!!) = % of shares owned by outsiders*!!) = industrial decline*time dummy = 0.
Table 12: F
Model 1
F critical value F 0 . o i ( 6 , 2 1 0 )  =  2 . 8 9
F statistic 1 . 2 9
Result Cannot reject null
As for models two and three, several of the interactive slope dummies are significant thus we 
can conclude that there is little use in pooling the data for these equations, and thus it maybe 
advantageous to run regressions for each year separately, therefore results in section 5.7 are 
more reliable.
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5.10 Summary and conclusion
The table below compares selected main results from regression analysis using OLS and 
WLS.
Table 13: Summary of results
1= insignificant relationship.
A= accept hypothesis
R= reject hypothesis
NA = not applicable in this specification
OLS, Pooled 
Model 1
Dependent 
variable 
measured in 
1997 (WLS) 
Ownership 
structure
Dependent 
variable 
measured in 
1996 (WLS) 
Board 
structure
HI
insider
ownership
I NA NA
H2
outsider
ownership
I R NA
H3
foreign
ownership
A A NA
H4
decline in 
state
ownership
I I NA
H5
% o f board 
seats held by 
insiders
NA NA NA
H6
% o f board 
seats held by 
outsiders
NA NA R
H7
% o f board 
seats held by 
foreigners
NA NA NA
H8
outsider
control
NA NA A
H9
change in top 
management
I I NA
H10 NA NA NA
OLS, Pooled 
Model 1
Dependent 
variable 
measured in 
1997 (WLS) 
Ownership 
structure
Dependent 
variable 
measured in 
1996 (WLS) 
Board 
structure
presence o f a 
group o f  
dominant 
owners
H ll
presence o f  a 
group o f  
dominant 
outside 
owners
NA NA NA
H12a
pressure
sensitive
institutions
I R Na
H12b
pressure
resistant
institutions
I A NA
In addition table 13 summarises results of the logistic regression analysis
Table 13b: Summary of results
1= insignificant relationship.
A= accept hypothesis
R= reject hypothesisNA= not applicable to this specification
Logistic
regression:
Dependent
variable
measured in
1997
Logistic
regression:
Dependent
variable
measured in
19%
HI
insider
ownership
I I
H2
outsider
ownership
R I
H3
foreign
ownership
A I
H4
decline in 
state
ownership
I I
H5
% o f board 
seats held by 
insiders
I I
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Logistic
regression:
Dependent
variable
measured in
1997
Logistic
regression:
Dependent
variable
measured in
1996
H6
% o f board 
seats held by 
outsiders
I R
H7
% o f board 
seats held by 
foreigners
I NA
H8
outsider
control
I I
H9
change in top 
management
NA I
H10
presence o f  a 
group o f  
dominant 
owners
A I
H ll
presence o f  a 
group o f  
dominant 
outside 
owners
I I
H12a
pressure
sensitive
institutions
R I
H12b
pressure
resistant
institutions
A I
This section shall aim to give a summary of the principal findings and make some tentative 
conclusions from the analysis.
Several firm characteristics were included in the regression analysis, such as firm size, 
measured by the number of employees. This is positively associated with export intensity 
and propensity. From this analysis it is clear that the advantages of economies of scale and 
scope associated with firm size assists exporting activity.
The lagged annual investment level has been insignificant for most models. When it is 
significant we have mixed evidence, as shown in tables seven and eight.
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Country dummies for Ukraine and Russia, appear to be negatively associated with 
exporting, compared with the control, Belarus, for some of the models, possibly reflecting 
that Belarussian firms have a greater incentive to send surplus products to export markets, 
due to a relatively smaller domestic market
As for ownership characteristics, despite concerns that insiders may have reason to block 
exporting, due to the risk and sunk costs involved, tables show mixed, insignificant results, 
thus it can only be tentatively concluded that insider owners do not hinder exporting activity. 
Surprisingly outside ownership has not been found to be positively linked to exporting 
activity, this may reflect that outside owners concentrate on domestic strategy, or do not 
have the power or incentive to initiate exporting policy, which can be explained by their lack 
of representation on the board
Data analysis showed that foreign ownership positively influences exporting, reflecting that 
foreign owners are concentrating upon servicing foreign market, and are foreign sourcing 
(Caves, 1996).
Several models using logistic regression and WLS has shown that institutional owners are 
“pressure resistant”, and therefore, are positively associated with exporting. This contrasts 
with the conflict of interest hypothesis advocated by Pound (1988) yet agrees with Kochar 
and David (1996), who found that institutional owners positively effect firm performance. 
Results consistently showed that a decline in state ownership is not significantly associated 
with exporting activity, reflecting that the state does not have much involvement with export 
strategy.
The effect of board structure upon exporting also featured in the analysis. It was found that 
the board representation of insiders was not significantly associated with exporting.
In addition, board representation of foreigners was found not to be positively linked to 
exporting, suggesting that their weak position on boards does not allow them to further 
exporting policy or that they are forced into colluding with other board members on 
exporting issues. However, board representation of outsiders is negatively associated with 
export intensity and propensity, thus suggesting that outsider board members focus on 
monitoring domestic strategy and directing sales to the domestic market Furthermore, the 
interaction of outside ownership and board representation appeared to be a positive factor
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in determining export intensity, reflecting that it is necessary for outsiders to have influence in 
terms of voting shares and presence on the board.
Lastly, the effect of a dominant owner on exporting was explored. It appears that groups of 
dominant owners are responding to the poor legal environment and exercising their voice 
function. Results show that the presence of a group of dominant owners is positively 
associated with exporting activity, suggesting that when similar groups of owners are in a 
dominant position they are able to monitor managers more easily, and ensure that corporate 
resources are used correctly. This confirms Pound’s (1988) efficient monitoring hypothesis. 
Furthermore, results show that groups of dominant owners may behave in a similar fashion 
to a single dominant owner. For example, Wmck (1989) finds that single blockholders also 
undergo the cost of monitoring in order to enhance firm performance. In addition these 
results confirm the hypothesis of Dyck (2000), in that multiple blockholders maybe efficient 
in an environment where legal protection is poor.
Nevertheless, the presence of a group of dominant outside owners is not associated with 
exporting activity, suggesting that the identity of a group of dominant owners does not affect 
its ability to monitor and implement corporate policy.
As means of conclusion, analysis has shown that larger firms, foreign ownership, a group of 
dominant owners, and some degree of institutional ownership, along with outsider 
representation on boards and ownership are associated with exporting activity.
The following chapter assumes that foreign ownership or more exactly the existence of a 
foreign partner brings certain benefits to the firm. As we have seen from the literature review 
in section 5.3 above foreign ownership is expected to bring several positive attributes to the 
firm, and results have shown that foreign ownership furthers exporting activity. Thus we 
attempt to determine which firms attract a foreign partner. More importantly we aim to 
explain the presence or non presence of foreign partners in the three countries in question.
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CHAPTER SIX: FOREIGN PARTNER SELECTION IN THE FORMER 
SOVIET UNION1
5.1 RATIONALE FOR STUDY 
Benefits of Foreign ownership
The literature documents the many benefits2 of foreign ownership3 for the host economy, in terms of 
export performance, economic growth, spillovers4 and industrial transformation, some of which are 
documented below.
The role of foreign direct investment (FDI) has been expected to be great, “FDI is often seen as 
an important catalyst fo r  the economic transformation o f  the ECE economies, ” as 
documented by the UN ECE, 2001.
More recently, Radosevic (1999) notes that FDI has a direct impact on the local economy by 
increasing capacity and improving productivity, and an indirect impact through the training of local 
suppliers and diffusion of technology and knowledge. However he notes that the dynamic effects of 
FDI, such as increases in human capital stock, productivity and positive spillovers are more 
important. Nevertheless, there are qualifications to these advantages, for example the host country 
must have reached a certain threshold of development and have the absorptive capacity5to benefit 
from FDI. Furthermore the host country must have social capabilities, such as a sound education 
and legal system (UN ECE, p i 87,2001). In addition the nature of FDI may affect the magnitude of 
spillovers, as export orientated FDI bring less potential spillovers than if orientated to the domestic 
market (Radosevic, p i 13).
1 This chapter draws upon research carried out with Professors. Mike Wright, Igor Filatotchev and Trevor Buck. 
Many thanks to them for allowing me to use this research in my PhD.
2 Of course it is accepted that foreign ownership can bring several problems to the host economy, such as 
dualism, the crowding out of indigenous entrepreneurship, see Thirlwall (p401,1999). The UN ECE 2001 also 
documents some negative aspects of FDI: foreign owned enterprises may provide affiliates with too few or the 
wrong kind of technology, or limit access to technology, or it may limit downstream producers to low value 
added activities, reducing the scope for technology transfer (pi 87).
3 In a similar manner to Aitken et al,. (1997) we shall assume that a firm with positive foreign equity can be termed 
a multinational enterprise, or a recipient of FDI.
4 Positive spillovers may occur in the local economy through linkages with local suppliers, the creation of 
competition, training and imitation (UNE, ECE, p l85 ,2001).
5 Defined as the “ability to identify, assimilate and exploit outsider knowledge, ” Damijan et al., (2001), p6 . 
Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) also assume that the magnitude of the effects of FDI depend on characteristics of 
the host country and industry and policy environment (p916).
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In fact there is empirical evidence to show that foreign ownership of firms (not necessarily wholly 
foreign owned entities) are positively associated with exporting activity, and although this may not 
produce such prolific spillovers, the impact on the trade balance should be positive6.
One example in the literature is Willmore (1992) who finds that transnational firms in Brazil, “export 
more than otherwise comparable Brazilian firms, ” (p314), as these foreign owned firms have 
links to other countries, making it profitable to export
Similarly, Aitken et al, (1997) test the hypothesis that multinational enterprises act as an export 
catalyst in Mexico. With a panel dataset and by employing probit regression he finds evidence to 
support this hypothesis. Thus the probability of being an exporter is correlated with the local 
concentration of MNE activity, due to their superior knowledge of foreign markets and ability to 
attract specialised input suppliers.
Lastly, my research documented in the previous chapter has shown that foreign ownership is 
positively associated with exporting activity in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.
Co (2001) examines the impact of foreign investment upon industry price-cost margins (PCM) in the 
US. She proposes that FDI may lower the PCM as it may increase domestic capacity and 
production (assuming that incumbents do not exit the market). In a transition context, this may lead 
to an increase in competition, yet could lead to bankruptcy for those firms unready to face such 
strong competition.
Conversely, FDI may increase PCMs if the entrant firm brings or adopts sophisticated technologies. 
By using two stage least squares to control for possible endogeneity7 Co finds that both greenfield 
and non greenfield FDI augments PCM, with a lag, as it takes time for incumbents to “learn 
technology that they have acquired, ” (p i79). In the transition economies FDI may cause PCMs 
to rise if the entrant firm brings new technology to the host market, which local firms can adopt (with 
a time lag). Thus this maybe another channel which FDI can benefit the local economy, furthermore 
if FDI does lower PCMs this may accelerate the restructuring process in transition economies. 
Damijan et al, (2001) employ endogenous growth theory by assuming that knowledge is a 
determinant of growth, and that new knowledge is essential for transition economies to catch up 
with the EU. They study the effects of FDI on technology transfer in eight transition economies, and 
hypothesise that the presence of transnational companies (TNCs) is one channel for transition
6 Assuming that the firm has an export/import ratio of greater than 1.
7 Co (2001) also controls for industry concentration as it is hypothesised that margins are higher in more
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economies to catch up, via spillovers. For example, they claim that “FDI is potentially the most 
important vehicle o f technology transfer for firms, ” as it allows them to restructure quickly, 
imposes an efficient corporate governance system and even create positive spillovers to local firms
(p6).
By using a large panel dataset (1994-8) and a growth accounting approach they find that FDI is an 
important channel for technology transfer in Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Romania and 
Slovenia. In addition, they also find evidence of intra -industry spillovers in Romania.
Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) also test for the evidence of spillovers in Indonesian firms. Using 
data from 13,663 firms, and 329 industries they find that foreign ownership is positively and 
significantly related to labour productivity, and also leads to intra industry spillovers. However, when 
they add two dummy variables for minority and majority foreign ownership they find that the degree 
of foreign ownership has no impact upon labour productivity and intra industry spillovers.
Chhiber and Majumdar (1999) examine the impact of foreign ownership and firm performance in 
India, whereby they state a common hypothesis in the foreign investment literature, “firms in which 
there is a higher share o f  foreign ownership will on average perform better than their 
domestic counterparts, ” (p210). However, Chhiber and Majumdar extend this by adopting the 
ownership concentration literature by Demzsetz and Lehn (1985) and hypothesising that in Indian 
firms, where foreign owners have a 51% shareholding will display superior performance relative to 
other firms (p214).
Their results confirm this, firms with “high”8 levels of foreign ownership are positively correlated with 
both return on sales and return on assets9. Thus at higher levels of foreign ownership “capabilities 
that help generate superior performance are likely to be supplied, ” (p227). Furthermore, they 
find that foreign ownership brings other benefits such as higher wages, higher export growth rates 
and faster asset turnover ratios, bringing welfare benefits and reinvestment opportunities (p232). 
Borensztein et al., (1995) assume a more macroeconomic approach when examining the benefits of 
FDI, by exploring the role of FDI in economic growth, from industrial economies to 69 countries in 
the developing world. They state that FDI may be responsible for growth as multinational companies
concentrated industries.
8 Chhiber and Mujumdar use three dummy variables, low, medium and high degrees of foreign ownership.
9 Interestingly, Blomstrom and Sjoholm (1999) find that the degree of foreign ownership does not affect the level 
of labour productivity or spillovers in foreign establishments in Indonesia.
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are some of the most technologically advanced, and are responsible for a large fraction of the 
world’s research and development.
By using data from the OECD from 1970-1989 they find that FDI has a significant and positive 
effect upon economic growth, and the level of overall investment, due to complementarities between 
foreign and domestic production. However, these relationships depend upon a threshold on the level 
of educational attainment being met, which is assumed will boost the absorptive capacity of the host 
country.
Barrell and Pain (1999) also stress that FDI may affect the economic growth of economies, as 
“inward investment is ...a channel through which new ideas, working practices and 
technologies can arrive in host economies, ” (p931). They use panel data techniques to analyse 
the impact of economy wide inward investment on technological change in the UK, France, 
Germany and The Netherlands. Their principal results show the benefits of FDI: an increase in the 
real stock of inward investment is shown to raise the level of technological progress which implies 
that FDI does affect the pace of economic growth.
The UN ECE, 2001, also states that FDI can be expected to generate growth endogenously, their 
analysis of transition economies shows that there is a positive relationship between FDI and 
economic growth. For example, in Hungary FDI driven export growth appears to be responsible for 
the improvement of economic performance in the latter part of the 1990’s.
Haskel et al, (2001) focus on whether domestic owned firms are more productive when foreign 
owned plants are present in the domestic firm’s region or industry. With their dataset which spans 
the entire manufacturing industry in the UK from 1973-199210 they estimate a wide range of 
specifications of a production function for domestic plants, augmented for foreign presence (in 
industry and region) and controls (such as product competition). Their results consistently showed a 
positive correlation between domestic plants’ total factor productivity and the foreign owned share 
of activity in that plants’ industry11. Haskel et al, also highlight the importance of the absorptive 
capacity and attempt to augment their specifications with a proxy, such as employment and skill 
intensity (see p i9, for more details).
McMillan (1993) assumes a more qualitative approach when examining the benefits of FDI. He 
notes that foreign ownership creates pressure on the domestic country to build institutions such as
10 This large time series allows them to use lags to correct for possible endogeneity (pi 1).
11 Results were positive, but less significant for foreign owned share of activity by region.
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financial services and accountancy norms. The existence of these institutions create positive 
spillovers for domestic firms, as they will also benefit from the availability of financial services etc. 
Thus, considering that the presence of foreign ownership or a foreign partner can bring several 
advantages12 to the local economy and host firm, the determinants of foreign partner presence 
should be studied for policy purposes.
Furthermore, foreign partner selection is crucial for UV success. As we saw in chapter two Koot 
(1988) states that foreign partner selection is a crucial procedure which contributes to the success or 
failure of the international joint venture. Given that Banai (1999) notes that the failure rate of 
international joint ventures in Russia is high, this becomes an even more pressing research topic.
A SPECIAL ISSUE: THE ENDOGENEITY OF OWNERSHIP
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) provide empirical evidence showing 
that ownership structure is endogenous and determined by firm specific factors and past firm 
performance by using two stage least squares regression.
Bishop et al, (2001) in light of these findings argue that the equity structure in the largest Hungarian 
firms should not be treated exogenously. As they note much of research on the economics of 
transition has developed and tested models describing the impact of corporate governance structure 
on firm performance. However existing empirical studies have found conflicting results, which may 
indicate that the underlying theoretical assumptions are flawed. Thus Filatotchev and Mickiewicz 
(2001) claim that ownership structure maybe an outcome of firm specific factors, such as size, 
performance and industry structure. Yet, so far this is rarely accounted for in transition economics 
research
For example, Djankov and Murrell (2002) note in their meta analysis of studies on ownership and 
economic restructuring that simultaneous causation may exist (pl2), yet only 53% of studies 
analyzed, accounted for selection bias. Carlin et al., (2001) warn that they were unable to 
implement corrective procedures and van Winbergen and Marcinell (1997) find that selection into 
Czechoslovakia’s voucher programme was non random, and should be accounted for when 
analysing the impact of voucher programmes on outcomes.
12 Assuming the host economy has the absorptive capacity to benefit from spillovers and the technology gap 
between the host and entrant is not too large (Radosevic, pi 13,1999).
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Only a rare study by Aukotsionek et al, (1998) of 150 privatised firms in Russia shows that 
selection bias exists as outsiders buy shares of relatively successful firms. Similarly, Damijan et al, 
(2001) note that transnational companies tend to acquire more capital and skill intensive firms in 
Slovenia, while in Estonia export orientated firms are preferred by TNCs.
Thus in this chapter ownership shall be treated endogenously, or more specifically the presence of a 
foreign partner shall be treated as an endogenous variable.
There are parallels with this chapter and the research by Bishop et al, (2001) who explore the 
determinants of equity shares held by foreign investors13 in Hungarian firms. Bishop et al, use 
independent variables such as firms size, export intensity, performance and industry affiliation to 
determine the level of equity held by foreign investors. This chapter also uses firm size and export 
activity, managerial perceptions and other firm specific characteristics, such as level of investment 
required for modernisation.
6.2 FOREIGN PARTNERS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
At first sight, emerging economies starting to generate positive income growth, offer major 
opportunities for business (Hoskisson et al, 2000). Certainly, the break-up of the Former Soviet 
Union (FSU) and the subsequent liberalization of former State socialist economies, facilitating 
transitions to market-dominated systems, open the way for firms from developed countries to enter 
these markets. The GDP of these countries is unarguably significant. For the three main industrial 
economies of the FSU countries examined here, official GDP in 1997 was equivalent to US$631 
billion for Russia, US$110 billion for Ukraine and US$13 billion for Belarus, and unofficial incomes 
add to these totals.
However, emerging economies are quite heterogeneous, involving both countries that had previously 
been undeveloped as well as those adapting from communism (Hoskisson et al., 2000). This 
heterogeneity introduces different problems and prospects regarding the links with foreign partners. 
Unlike the emerging economies of Latin America and South East Asia, growth rates in the non- 
Baltic countries of the FSU have until recently been low and even negative. The average annual 
growth rate in GDP between 1990 and 1997 in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus was -7.7%, -13.1%
231
and -4%, respectively. In this sense, many of the republics of the FSU may be accurately described 
as transitional economies, but also “non-emerging” to date.
The legacy of central planning continues to pose major problems for enterprises seeking to become 
commercially viable in a market economy. Economic reforms, including liberalization and 
privatization, were intended to promote global integration across all sectors of the FSU. However, 
industrial sectors have experienced different degrees of competition and/or demand collapse, and 
different exposure to, and opportunities for, internationalisation. In addition, even within a particular 
region, the progress of different countries in transition generally (Estrin & Wright, 1999) and 
towards the development of links with foreign partners in particular may be heterogeneous. This 
heterogeneity needs to be understood by both international executives and researchers because of 
its implications for foreign firm entry strategies.
Enterprise restructuring in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus may be affected by different contextual 
factors since the three countries followed different paths to transition (Filatotchev et a l , 1999b). 
Although each country has a common institutional background as part of the FSU, and each has 
employed centralised privatisation programs using vouchers distributed freely to citizens, in practice 
reforms have been slower and shallower in Belarus and Ukraine than in Russia. In Russia, managers 
are exposed to hardening budget constraints in a substantially liberalized market environment 
(Filatotchev et a l , 1996) whereas the reform process in Belarus has been very slow. The Ukrainian 
economy is somewhere in between these two extremes, with the government using a mixture of 
‘stop-go’ policies in relation to market reforms. Moreover, the privatisation process in the three 
countries also differed, with Belarus focusing on a smaller set of more attractive larger enterprises 
while in Russia the process was more widespread.
High country risks and low asset productivity have characterized each of these countries. Not 
surprisingly, foreign direct investment as a proportion of GDP remains well below the levels seen in 
Latin America and South East Asia at 1.4 per cent in Russia, 0.6 per cent in Ukraine and 1.4 per 
cent in Belarus. Despite these difficulties, real opportunities for partnerships with enterprises 
undoubtedly exist given the potential size of the market, low costs of production, the proximity of 
Western markets, etc. (McCarthy et a l , 2000). The key issue is to identify the opportunities.
This chapter, therefore, explores the scope for the development of links between local enterprises 
and foreign partners in three countries from the FSU, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. After this
13 They also determine the equity shares held by domestic institutional investors.
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introduction in which the main research questions are posed, it begins with a short review of the 
transition context of the FSU, followed by a consideration of the role that institutional theory may 
have in its comprehension. This chapter then utilizes this institutional lens to focus on the importance 
of strategic alliances to the FSU, and considers the key role of partner presence by local firms and 
foreign investors. Some significant findings are presented from successive surveys of actual partner 
presence in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, and finally there is a discussion of important conclusions. 
The research builds on a significant body of literature on the extensive development of strategic 
alliances and joint ventures between enterprises, particularly in transitional economies (Brouthers & 
Bamossy, 1997). Partner presence is an important but not yet well understood aspect of alliances in 
particular and of internationalization in general (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). Research suggests that 
partner presence is an important ingredient for the success of alliances between foreign and local 
firms. Partners may, in general, be admitted because they bring much needed resources to 
enterprises (Barkema, Bell & Pennings, 1996), but previous research on foreign partners has been 
mainly focused on the perspective of the developed country partner (Peng, 2000; Kotabe et al., 
2000), with little consideration of local partners in would-be emerging economies. A recent 
exception is provided however by Hitt et al., (2000), who use resource-based and organizational 
learning theories to analyze partner presence in a sample of emerging countries that includes the 
transition cases of Poland and Romania. However, their main focus is on comparing the general 
economic contexts of developed versus emerging markets. The addition here of three “non­
emerging”, yet transition countries from the FSU arguably provides a more balanced and complete 
picture and, by considering differences between countries, emphasizes the need to understand the 
heterogeneity of the transition phenomenon.
It seems important therefore to extend this analysis to the FSU and to consider, in the context of 
major institutional changes, the relevance of institutional theory, albeit with implications for other 
theoretical approaches to partner presence, i.e. for company resources and organizational learning 
(Hitt et al., 2000). In addition to a lack of emphasis on institutions, a focus on non-local partners 
and a neglect of the FSU, previous research has also been concerned primarily with cases of 
successful partnerships and subsequent alliances actually implemented. To complete the picture, in 
the context of the “non-emerging” countries of the FSU, it seems equally important to analyze why 
partners are not selected, and thus alliances not consummated. Understanding these issues may be
233
of crucial importance since failure to address institutional impediments may lead to a decline the 
extent of links with foreign partners rather than an anticipated increase.
In the unique institutional circumstances of the FSU, it is therefore proposed that (i) the perceptions 
of local managers in relation to potential foreign partners and (ii) how local managers believe that 
foreigners perceive local firms as partners, can be as important as actual local/foreign perceptions of 
each other in the determination of actual alliance formation. For example, search and deliberation 
processes are found to be quite different for local and multinational firms and contribute to ‘psychic 
distance’ between firms and inertia (Rangan, 2000). Throughout this study, four main research 
questions are posed in the context of three former republics of the FSU. The first requires a 
descriptive response: to what extent have partnerships occurred? The second is more analytical and 
asks, what are the most feasible explanations for the presence and non-presence of partners? If 
alliance formation in the FSU is shown to be inadequate, the answer to this second question should 
give clues for the design of actions aimed to make an improvement Thirdly, I determine which 
factors influence retained foreign partner presence, and lastly factors determining a firm gaining a 
foreign partner over a two year period14. A final, discussion section draws attention to the 
implications of our study for partners in developed and transitional economies.
63 INSTITUTIONS IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES
While the resource-based view of the firm and organizational learning may be the appropriate base 
for the analysis of foreign partner presence in emerging economies (Hitt et al., 2000), massive 
institutional changes in the FSU since 1991 and the inheritance of formal and informal constraints 
from the past emphasizes the need to adopt an institutional perspective here. This approach is built 
on the notion of an institutional framework comprising a fundamental set of formal and informal rules 
that govern and constrain production, exchange and distribution (Davis & North, 1971). Formal 
constraints include economic contracts and political and judicial decisions, while informal constraints 
cover codes of conduct and norms of behavior that are socially sanctioned (Peng, 2000). While 
national culture undoubtedly plays a role in this social sanctioning, it can be argued that the 
individuals and groups who hold power within an economy influence institutional systems of
14 These may also be important research questions as a significant number of firms experience a loss of a foreign 
partner from 1996-1997 (see table two).
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education, social provision etc. that conform with national culture yet reinforce their own positions. 
In this sense, culture and institutions interact and it is not meaningful to employ an analysis that treats 
them separately (Buck et al, 2000).
It is controversial to describe the pre-reform Soviet Union as a “centrally-planned” economy, since 
plans were ignored when ministers, enterprise incumbents and others colluded to simulate the 
achievement of planned targets. In addition the operation of an unplanned, informal sector and 
networks were vital to industrial output Nevertheless the old institutions mainly comprised a system 
in which principals (in ministries and branch ministries) announced output targets to their agents in 
industrial enterprises, and applied rewards and penalties for achievement and non-achievement. 
Such a system was supported in the FSU by national cultures characterized by high tolerance of 
power-distance and high uncertainty-avoidance (Naumov, 1996).
Within this framework, employees enjoyed negligible levels of unemployment (outside the enterprise 
at least) and relatively generous welfare facilities, mainly provided through enterprises. Large 
investments were centrally financed in line with planned priorities, while innovations were risky for 
enterprises in the sense that they threatened the achievement of output targets; most innovations 
were developed in central research institutes and imposed on reluctant enterprises.
The existence of “soft budget constraints” (Komai, 1998) under State socialism in the FSU meant 
wasted resources within enterprises, and a shortfall of intensive growth. Problems with coordination 
and incentives ultimately made deep, market-based reforms necessary in the FSU, but employees 
and managers feared increased uncertainties, leading in the post-reform period to the manager- 
controlled, employee-owned privatized firms alluded to earlier.
Institutional theory is an important lens through which to view the problems of post-reform 
enterprises of the FSU (Hoskisson et al., 2000). For example, Newman (2000) explains that, as 
with individuals subjected to ever-increasing environmental uncertainty and stress, firms can be 
exposed to too much change. With deep, simultaneous and repeated institutional upheavals, 
organizational learning and the search for the appropriate organizational template by firms becomes 
impossible, and the extent of a firm’s embeddedness in the old institutions may become a key to 
enterprise survival. Alignments with old template norms may continue where new norms cannot be 
perceived, and firms continue to focus on domestic markets with existing products, ignoring new 
technologies and structures. Foreign investors are now perceived as threats rather than 
opportunities, but, in any case, (Peng, 2000) foreign investors are discouraged by an institutional
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environment featuring the non-enforcement of private property rights, a lack of political stability, high 
country risks and an absence of strategic factor markets, especially markets for finance.
Each of these formal constraints on enterprise reform can be attributed to the entrenched institutional 
positioning of enterprise and ministerial employees, and informal constraints may be imposed by 
network contacts carried over from the old regime (Peng 2000). In addition, a culture of 
uncertainty-avoidance, high power-distance and local collectivism (1996) and associated institutions 
(e.g. insider ownership of firms) may create great distrust of non-local partners, especially 
foreigners.
In these circumstances, it is important to make empirical surveys of privatized firms, with particular 
reference to important strategic decisions concerning partner presence, and to the few cases in the 
FSU of successful partnerships and alliance formation in the face of institutional discouragement
6.4 POST-TRANSITION FOREIGN PARTNERS IN THE FSU
With institutional barriers to direct exporting to the FSU and the cheapness of local factors, entry 
modes with higher levels of commitment by foreign investors become attractive (Leonidou & 
Katsikeas, 1996). However, enterprise incumbents, justifiably fearing the loss of short-term job 
security and social provisions following foreign acquisition, are likely to demand job guarantees and 
the sale of firms as complete entities, including the social liabilities that are a major institutional 
feature of privatized firms in the FSU. On the other hand, high country risks in the context of under­
developed legal structures and enforcement are likely to force foreign investors to consider entry 
modes with lower levels of commitment Where high foreign costs deter direct exports, alliances in 
the forms of strategic cooperation and equity-based joint ventures, lying somewhere between direct 
exports and the acquisition of complete firms, now assume greater importance, and impose 
important demands on partner acquisition.
For potential foreign entrants, it is necessary to identify the kind of local firms that may be potential 
partners. The rest of this section develops arguments suggesting that the nature of foreign partner 
links will be influenced by institutional echoes of the old regime (embodying cultural influences), by 
factors relating to local managers’ perceptions of what foreign partners are seeking and the 
resources they bring, local enterprise strategies and the governance of local enterprises. As a novel 
feature of this study, we seek to distinguish between the views of managers of enterprises both with 
and without foreign partners. In the sections that follow, possible influences on the extent of
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partnerships are considered with reference to (a) how local firms perceive themselves to be seen by 
potential foreign partners, and (b) the possible resource contributions of foreign partners. Since 
actual partnerships are likely to depend on both local firm strategies and the incentives offered to 
local managers after privatisation, subsequent sections consider (c) firms’ strategies towards foreign 
markets and (d) corporate governance. Each of these elements is analysed in relation to two main 
research questions posed concerning levels of foreign partner presence and their determination.
6.4B15 Foreign Partners’ Perceived Objectives and Local Firm Attractiveness
It seems likely that institutional influences on local firms to resist change will give them objectives 
diametrically opposed to those of potential foreign partners. These differences may be magnified by 
prevailing institutions that encourage local firms to perceive incompatible objectives in foreigners. 
Studies of the objectives of local firms and of outside investors in alliances elsewhere in transition 
economies have already identified such conflict (Hoon-Halbauer, 1999). Foreign partners are 
typically motivated by saturated home product markets and the need to establish a “bridge-head” in 
potential, previously isolated, foreign markets. In contrast, local firms, forced by the prevailing 
institutions of State socialism to focus on secure domestic markets, are usually anxious to improve 
technological levels in terms of new products and processes designed to secure export sales. 
Subsequently, local partners have often been disillusioned by an inability to export and by low levels 
of local procurement, as foreign partners protect employment levels at home (Buck, Filatotchev, 
Demina & Wright, 2000).
In Russia, Fey (1995) similarly reported diametrically opposed objectives for local and foreign 
partners. The most frequently cited reasons by local partners for JV formation were access to 
export markets and inward transfers of capital and technical expertise16. On the other hand, these 
objectives were not once cited as important by foreign partners, who emphasised access to local 
product markets and cheap labour. Such conflict of objectives may add to the distrust of foreigners 
inherent in an institutional and cultural environment where local solidarity in the face of distant 
authority has always created low levels of trust.
Where trust is tolerably high, foreign firms have a number of potential entry modes into foreign 
markets, with entry already explained as progressing through a number of stages from low to high
15 Of course it is accepted that the presence of a foreign partner may alter the perceptions’ of a firm, concerning 
their objectives, however here, it was decided that foreign partner presence is treated as the endogenous factor.
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commitment (Leonidou & Katsikeas, 1996). Foreign firms may seek partnerships with local firms in 
order to establish themselves as local producers in the market before competition arrives (Luo & 
Peng, 1998). A local partner can offer incumbent advantages as a result of institutions carried over 
from the old regime, e.g. relating to local information, political contacts, distribution networks, 
customer bases, etc. Foreign firms may thus be perceived as being interested in developing local 
production through partnerships with local enterprises. There may, however, be a number of reasons 
why potential foreign partners are perceived to be seeking to acquire local firms in order to close 
capacity and thus remove competition. Local enterprises may have a customer base but their 
equipment may be outdated and require considerable investment to become viable. Outdated 
technology could also be easily overtaken by later entrants with access to newer technology. The 
asymmetry of objectives between foreign and local enterprises may also be a rationale for acquiring 
local enterprises and closing capacity (Beamish, 1985). Foreign entrants may be seeking to 
maximise the benefits from transferring technology to local markets while local enterprises are 
seeking to obtain benefits from acquiring this technology and using it in other contexts, some of 
which may involve competition with the foreign firm. Given the institutional environment of the FSU 
that placed little emphasis on individual property rights, and the associated difficulties in obtaining 
influence with a minority equity holding, acquisition may be important to exert some form of control 
over the relationship (Peng, 2001); alternatively, a minority relationship with a local partner may be a 
stepping-stone to eventual full acquisition (Filatotchev et a l , 1996).
Local managers may perceive they are able to meet foreign partners’ needs for access to their 
knowledge of local conditions and networks inherited from the old regime (Peng & Heath, 1996). 
However, foreign firms may place relatively little emphasis on the technology of local enterprises or 
local managers’ technical expertise since in the changing market conditions involved in transition, 
local managers’ past local knowledge and decision template may be of little relevance.
Managers and employees of local firms are embedded in, and dependent upon, social institutions 
inherited from the FSU whereby firms themselves provide a wide range of social benefits as well as 
incomes. These benefits are of course recognised as financial liabilities by western investors. Such 
liabilities, and other factors, may mean that managers of local enterprises do not perceive their 
enterprises as being attractive to potential foreign partners. Similarly, long-established management 
may be hostile to outsiders who are perceived to threaten their positions. Although employees may
16 This forms the basis for H5 and H6.
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be technically well-educated as a result of Soviet institutions, where most strategic decisions were 
made centrally within ministries, these skills may not be highly valued with a new commercial 
environment and more advanced technology.
The Soviet inheritance was of giant, vertically-integrated industrial firms now requiring large 
investments to approach global standards of product design and build, and these two factors (size 
and required investments) may also reduce the value of local firms to foreigners. A particular 
problem in the FSU also concerns the costs of rectifying the consequences of decades of pollution. 
This section provides us with the following controls and hypotheses:
Control 1: firm size decreases the likelihood of a firm having a foreign partner.
Control 2: required investment increases the likelihood of a firm having a foreign partner. 
We also control for country effects and therefore include a dummy variable for Russia and Ukraine, 
while Belarus is our control17.
HI: perceptions that foreign partners are seeking access to local markets via local 
production are positively associated with the likelihood of a firm having a foreign partner. 
H2: perceptions that foreign partners are seeking access to local technology are 
negatively associated with the likelihood of a firm having a foreign partner.
6.4C Perceived Resource Contributions of Foreign Partners15
Kotabe et al, (2000) examine the motivations for seeking partners from the perspective of local 
Latin American enterprises and argue that foreign firms seeking entry into Latin America via a 
partnership with local firms need to address why local firms are motivated to collaborate. They find 
that access to technical expertise, marketing expertise, financial resources, foreign markets, risk and 
cost reduction and competitive markets are the most important factors. The legacy of central 
planning institutions in the FSU was that for many privatised enterprises, equipment was outdated 
and inefficient, producing inferior finished goods (Linz, 1996). The voucher privatization programs in 
FSU noted above did not introduce significant additional finance to enable firms to invest This was 
because firms were essentially “given away” in exchange for citizens’ vouchers and hence negligible 
funds changed hands. Under-capitalised banks, weak capital markets and a central government 
without funds meant that capital was not available to enable firms to invest in new plant and
17 This is following existing work by the University of Nottingham, which uses Belarus as the control. However it 
is accepted in the literature that the country with the largest number of observations should be the numeraire.
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equipment (Newman, 2000). The financial infrastructure has also been slow to develop since 
privatisation, so that access to funds for investment is also heavily restricted (EBRD, 1998). 
Enterprises may thus perceive that foreign partners bring the resources required to renew existing 
equipment unavailable in domestic capital markets.
The lack of investment in FSU enterprises is also likely to mean that technology is outdated both for 
existing products and new products. Even in military-industrial-complex enterprises, which, as a 
high-priority sector, received significant amounts of capital investment under the previous regime, 
there may be a major need for access to new technology that is appropriate to the production of 
commercial goods (Filatotchev et al., 1993). Foreign partners may thus be seen as sources of 
financial resources to invest in new technology as well as bringing technological know-how (Gillespie 
& Teegen, 1995).
In the environment of the FSU, firms were guaranteed markets for their output, in the FSU and in 
the rest of CMEA. However, the break-up of the FSU after 1991 generally exposed firms in 
manufacturing industries to a massive collapse in demand. In these new circumstances, FSU firms 
may seek foreign partners in order to provide access to new markets. Access to new markets 
outside the FSU may be achieved through either direct or indirect exporting, the latter being 
undertaken by outside export intermediaries (Peng, 2000). This is a potentially important and 
distinctive issue in FSU since most firms with export experience under central planning would export 
through State trading companies that did not allow direct contact with overseas customers.
However, alliances between developed market firms and emerging market firms are typically 
focused on developing the latters’ local markets (Hitt et al., 2000), and the conflicting aims of local 
and foreign firms in relation to target markets may contribute to the erosion of mutual trust, and 
already damaged by different institutional and cultural inheritances, but so vital to the success of all 
alliances (Fey, 1995).
The education system in the FSU is generally considered to have produced highly technically 
competent outputs. However, these skills may not be effective in situations that are not stable and 
predictable (Shama, 1993). Further, the centralised institutions of State socialism meant that the 
capabilities of managers in privatised enterprises were likely to be low in marketing, in finance on 
“hard” market terms or even in quality control (Filatotchev et al., 1996; Lyles & Baird, 1994). 
Acquisition of these capabilities is important to enable management to compete both domestically 
and internationally. Foreign partners may thus be sought to provide managerial capabilities.
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In addition to managers’ perceptions about what foreigners are seeking and the resources they 
bring, a number of other factors relating to strategy and governance may influence the presence of a 
foreign partner.
This leads us to the next group of hypotheses:
H3: attitudes of firms in the former Soviet Union concerning access to technology from 
foreign partners is negatively associated with a firm having a foreign partner.
H4: attitudes of firms in the former Soviet Union concerning access to markets from 
foreign partners is positively associated with a firm having a foreign partner.
6.4D Exporting Strategy
In the FSU, strategic decisions to focus on domestic or export markets were made centrally, and 
exporting brought few direct benefits to the firm (Michaelopoulos & Drebentsov, 1997). The 
presence of foreign partners may therefore be contingent upon managers’ strategic priorities in the 
new environment, where exporting may at last be conducted by the firm itself rather than by central 
trade monopolies. Managers may now try to market existing products on world markets. 
Landesmann (2000) highlights that export performance of firms is a signal of “active 
restructuring”, and change in the behavioural response of the firm, this evidence of restructuring 
may well attract a foreign partner. Alternatively, innovation through product diversification and 
development may yield new products for export. A product development strategy that focuses on 
the needs of overseas markets is complex and difficult to implement, however, and may require 
foreign partners to provide necessary expertise and access. Risk-averse managers may opt for the 
less risky strategy of promoting existing products and developing new products for domestic 
markets (Hitt et a l, 1997). These approaches may have opposite effects on the presence of 
foreign partners.
The skills and knowledge necessary for successful involvement in export activities may be obtained 
through long-term relationships with foreign partners (Eriksson et a l, 1997). Foreign partners may 
also provide critical resources relevant to exporting otherwise unobtainable (Bonaccorsi, 1992). 
Hooley et al, (1996) find for Hungary that domestically owned firms without foreign partners were 
least likely to export. This may play a crucial role in the environment of the FSU, where direct 
foreign investment is currently the only feasible source of significant funding for former state owned 
enterprises (Filatotchev et a l, 2000). However, the willingness of enterprises to admit foreign
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investors may be heavily influenced by their existing corporate governance and the incentives for 
managers that depend upon governance.
Therefore the following hypotheses are developed:
H5: managerial strategy geared towards domestic strategy is negatively associated with 
the likelihood of a firm having a foreign partner.
H6: exporting activity increases the likelihood of a firm having a foreign partner 
6.4E Corporate governance
After 1991, manufacturing enterprise incumbents in the FSU represented a powerful political force, 
and they were able to influence the government’s design of new institutions, especially in the form of 
privatisation programs. The subsequent voucher privatisation programs used in the three countries 
generally favoured insiders, and this degree of control may lead to entrenchment behaviour by 
insiders who may seek to resist restructuring strategies in privatised firms that have been described 
above as “employee-owned, manager-controlled” enterprises. They may resist downsizing of 
employment levels in the short term as there are few alternative employment opportunities 
(Filatotchev et al., 1999), and insider control is associated with lower levels of exporting (Buck et 
al., 2000a), this leads to the formation of H8, as foreign partners may be repelled characteristics of 
insider control.
Another manifestation of the institutional inheritance may be a reluctance to seek foreign partners. 
Where it has occurred, however, the influence of outsiders through ownership or board 
representation (Estrin & Wright, 1999) has been associated with strategic restructuring and may be 
more likely to lead to foreign partnerships.
Foreign partners also may seek firm with ownership structures which share their views on managerial 
monitoring and corporate strategy, therefore we arrive at H9.
Entrenchment behavior may be exacerbated by the existence of so-called ‘Red Directors’, i.e. those 
directors appointed under the former communist regime, who may be technically excellent but who 
have little experience of commercial activities (Filatotchev et al., 1996). When these managers are 
replaced with more able and better trained managers there may be a more positive attitude towards 
outsiders (Barberis et al., 1996). In addition, Warzynski (2001) find that managerial turnover leads 
to an increase in productivity in Ukraine Therefore, senior managerial turnover may increase the 
probability of having a foreign partner.
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Bearing in mind these possible mechanisms concerning the perceived attractiveness of local firms, 
the potential contribution of foreign partners, exporting strategies and corporate governance, surveys 
were conducted to address the main research questions concerning the extent and determination of 
foreign partnerships, this brings us to the following hypotheses:
H7: managerial turnover is positively associated with the likelihood of a firm having a 
foreign partner.
H8: greater than average employee share holding is negatively associated with a firm 
having a foreign partner.
H9: greater than average foreign share holding is positively associated with a firm having 
a foreign partner.
This allows us to test the following model, shown in diagram one below18.
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Diagram 1.
^  Controls
Size, required investment, country 
^  factors _
Foreign partner presence
Managerial strategy
Export intensity 
Domestic versus 
external
Corporate governance
Managerial turnover 
greater than average 
foreign/ employee ownership
Resource contribution 
of foreign partner
access to technologies 
and market
Perception of foreign 
partner objectives
Access to market and 
technologies
18 This model is also used in section 6.9 (gaining and retaining a foreign partner).
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6 .5  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 1: Firm characteristics19
Russia Ukraine Belarus
Investment 1997 7994.65(44412.37)* 8265.92(16365.23) 2.43(11.61)
Investment 1996 5004.03(16065.78) 5214.44(8894) 0.84(2.5)
Export intensity 1997 3.37(9.5) 10.81(23.6) 6.56(17.29)
Export intensity 1996 2.12(9.5) 8.82(21.02) 3.21(0.3)
% of firms with a new 
director in 1997
35.2 28 2.0
% of firms with a new 
director in 1996
14 15 18
% of firms with greater 
than average foreign 
ownership20 in 1997
5 3 3
% of firms with greater 
than average foreign 
ownership in 1996
1 0 2
% of firms with greater 
than average employee 
ownership21 in 1997
47 57 45
% of firms with greater 
than average employee 
ownership in 1996
33 60. 64
* Standard deviation in parentheses
The data were analysed using bivariate tests of differences between countries and over time, while 
logistic regressions were used to analyse factors affecting differences between enterprises 
with/without foreign partners, those enterprises which (did not) gain a foreign partner and those who 
(did not) retain a foreign partner.
6.6 RESULTS
This results section addresses the two main research questions outlined above, i.e. (i) what has been 
the extent of actual partner presence for strategic alliances and (ii) what are the most feasible 
explanations for the presence and non-presence of partners?
6.6 B Collaboration with Foreign Partners
In relation to research question (i), enterprises embedded in old institutional structures may be 
expected to be slow to respond to new opportunities that may be perceived as threats. Table 2 
shows established links between privatized FSU enterprises and foreign partners are generally low.
19 For ownership descriptive statistics see Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
20 Defined as greater than 0.35% for 1995 and 0.94% for 1997
245
These levels are low in comparison with another transition economy like China (Buck et al., 2000b) 
and also in comparison with the extent of links desired by local firms (Table 2). It is also evident 
that the extent of collaboration has declined over the two years (1996-97), suggesting inertia that is 
gaining ground A high proportion of enterprises surveyed had foreign partners in 1996, but this too 
declined significantly by 1997. The share of firms with foreign partners fell significantly in Russia 
between the two years from an already low level. A significantly higher proportion of enterprises in 
Belarus was found to have a foreign partner, possibly reflecting the nature of the government 
program that involved the privatization of a small number of favored enterprises. However, it is clear 
that the most significant fall in the presence of foreign partners between the two years occurred in 
Belarus, reflecting the prevailing negative attitudes towards private business noted above.
Table 2: Extent of Established and Sought Links with Foreign Partners
Established (%) Seeking (%)
1996 1997 1996 1997
Russia 27 15* 56 28
Belarus 51 !^*** 63 61
Ukraine 24 24 71 60
All 34 jg * * * 63 50
Sig. Levels: * = p<0.05; *** = p<0.001 and relates to Wilcoxon Z test between 1996 and 1997 for each country 
and for established partnerships and seeking links with foreign partners.
In terms of joint ventures, the form of alliance involving the highest level of commitment, a very small 
proportion of the sample (only 6 per cent) had a minority joint venture with a foreign partner and 
only 5 per cent had such a majority joint venture in 1996; these figures had fallen even further to 3 
per cent and 0.3 per cent respectively by 1997. In Belarus, however, 13 per cent of the sample had 
minority joint ventures with foreign partners. Only one per cent of the sample held minority stakes in 
foreign firms abroad. Although most of the sample of FSU enterprises in 1997 had received visits 
from prospective foreign partners, the extent to which these visits have as yet resulted in firm 
relationships is relatively low.
The following sections analyse research question (ii), what are the most feasible explanations for the 
presence and non-presence of partners? Following the discussion above, the key issues are
21 Defined as greater than 64.5% in 1995 and 55.63% in 1997.
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examined in terms of: foreign partners’ perceived objectives and local firm attractiveness; perceived 
resource contributions of foreign partners; and the factors influencing the likelihood of having a 
foreign partner. As a result of the differing pace of institutional transformation in Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus, significant differences are expected between the three countries.
6.6C Foreign Partners’ Perceived Objectives and Local Firm Attractiveness
Despite a post-Soviet inheritance of obsolete machinery, commercially inexperienced managers and 
social obligations to employees, the majority of managers surveyed considered that their enterprise 
was attractive to a foreign partner, and therefore an influence on foreign partner acquisition. 
However, mirroring our evidence that the extent of established and sought links has declined, the 
percentage of managers making this claim fell significantly between the two surveys from 69 per cent 
to 51 per cent. This may represent an improved awareness of commercial valuations. In the first 
survey, managers of enterprises in the Ukraine (79%) and Belarus (71%) were significantly more 
likely to take the view that their enterprises were attractive to foreign partners than was the case for 
Russian managers (56%). In the second survey undertaken in 1998, these figures had fallen to 66%, 
49% and 39%, respectively. Managers considering their enterprise was attractive to a foreign 
partner perceived that foreign partners were principally seeking access to the local market through 
local production and through the acquisition and closure of local capacity (Table 3). Access to local 
technology and local managers’ knowledge of local conditions were perceived as least important 
This implies that FSU managers have become aware of the low values foreigners place on networks 
developed within the old institutional environment
There were significant differences between the three countries, with access to local markets through 
local production being rated as significantly more important by managers in Russia than was the case 
in Belarus and Ukraine. Similarly, access to local markets through acquisition and closure of 
production capacity was significantly less important in Belarus. Managers in Ukraine in particular, 
were significantly more likely to hold the view that foreign partners were seeking to acquire assets at 
undervalued prices.
These results contribute to the existing literature on the objectives of local firms and foreign partners. 
While previous surveys reported above found that their objectives have in the past been in
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fundamental conflict, the results here suggest that local firms have at least perceived this conflict 
correctly and are aware that foreign partners are mainly motivated by access to local markets.
Table 3: Local Firms’ Perceptions of What Foreign Partners are Seeking
Russia Belarus Ukraine All
1996 1996 1996 1996
Access to local market 
through local 
production
5.5 (1.9) 4.1 (2.5) 4.4 (2.4) 4.7 (2.4)*
Access to local market 
through acquisition & 
closure of production 
capacity
5.4 (1.8) 4.2 (2.4) 5.8 (1.8) 5.1 (2.1)**
Access to local 
Technology
3.3 (2.3) 1.9 (1.7) 2.4 (2.1) 2.5 (2.1)**
Access to local 
managers’ knowledge 
of local conditions
1.7 (1.1) 2.1 (1.8) 3.1 (2.0) 2.3 (1.9)***
Acquisition of 
undervalued assets
2.8 (2.1) 3.7 (2.3) 4.7 (2.2) 3.7 (2.4) **
Preservation of former 
links
3.2 (1.7) 3.6 (2.4) 4.9 (2.1) 3.9 (2.4)***
Note: responses relate only to 1996, measured by 1-7 Likert scale; Sig. Levels: *** = p<0.001; ** = p<0.01, * = 
p<0.05 and relate to Kruskal-Wallis tests of differences between all three countries on each variable. Standard 
deviation in parentheses.
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For those cases where managers did not consider that the enterprise was attractive to foreign 
partners, the most important reasons, as scored by respondents across all three countries taken 
together, were the instability of consumer demand, the size of the investment that was necessary and 
the existence of more attractive companies in the same industry (Table 4). Perhaps surprisingly, 
ecological problems, shortcomings in the skills base, and majority control by employees were seen 
to be relatively unimportant factors.
There were some notable significant differences between the three countries with respect to the 
importance attached to each of these factors. For Russian enterprises the size of investment was 
significantly more important than for the other countries. For Belarus enterprises, the instability of 
consumer demand was significantly less important. For Ukrainian enterprises, the presence of more 
attractive enterprises in the same industry and shortcomings in the skills base were significantly more 
important.
Table 4: Local Firms’ Perceptions of Why Enterprises are not Attractive to Foreign Partners
Russia Belaru
s
Ukraine All
1996 1996 1996 1996
Size of necessary investment 4.9
(2.3)
3.5
(2.4)
3.4 (2.3) 3.8
(2.4)*
Instability of consumer 
demand
4.7
(2.0)
3.2
(2.3)
4.9 (2.1) 4.3
(2 .2)*
More attractive companies in 
same industry
4.1
(2.5)
2.7
(2.5)
5.3 (2.4) 4.0
(2.6)*
Management hostility to 
outsiders
1.8
(1.2)
2.1
(1.8)
1.8 (1.7) 1.9 (1.5)
Shortcoming of skills base 2.9
(1.5)
2.8
(2.2)
4.3 (2.3) 3.3
(2.0)*
Ecological problems 1.8
(1.5)
2.1
(1.7)
3.1 (2.5) 2.3 (1.9)
Note: scores based on Likert scale 1-7 where 1= very unimportant through 7= very important; Sig. Levels: * = 
p<0.05; and relate toKruskal-Wallis tests for difference between all three countries for each variable. 
Standard deviation in parentheses.
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6.6 D Perceived Resource Contributions of Foreign Partners
Again, respondents seemed generally aware of the shortcomings of inherited technologies and 
resource capabilities. Across the enterprises surveyed as a whole, the most important resources that 
foreign partners were perceived as being able to bring were, in order of declining importance, 
rehabilitation of existing machinery, the introduction of new technology for new products, the 
introduction of new technology for existing products, access to foreign markets, training of managers 
in marketing, quality management, finance, etc., and general advice and consultancy (Table 5). Some 
notable significant differences between the countries were evident. Rehabilitation of existing 
machinery, access to foreign markets, general advice and training of managers being consistently 
significantly more important in Belarus and Ukraine than in Russia. New technology for existing 
products was significantly more important in Ukraine than in Russia.
There were also some indications that perceptions of the resources that foreign partners might bring 
were changing significantly over time. Across all enterprises in the three countries combined, the 
perception that foreign partners would bring new technology for new products was weakly 
significantly lower in 1997 than in 1996 while the reverse was the case in respect of the rehabilitation 
of existing machinery. There were some notable differences over time in individual countries. In 
Russia, the perceived contribution of foreign partners to bringing new technology for existing 
products and general advice were weakly significantly more important in 1997 than in 1996. In 
Belarus, the perceived contribution of foreign partners to bringing new technology for existing 
products and for new products was significantly less important (at 10% and 1% levels, respectively) 
over the two years of the study. In Ukraine, the perceived contribution of foreign partners to 
rehabilitation of existing machinery became significantly more important (at 1% level). These findings 
suggest a realisation over time on the part of managers in the three countries that foreign partners 
were unlikely to bring major new technological investment. This shift to a more realistic perspective 
was most marked in Belarus and Ukraine where, arguably, less progress in transition has occurred 
and where privatisation involved more of the respective countries major enterprises.
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Table 5: Resources that Foreign Partners Might Contribute
Russia Belarus Ukraine All
1996 1997 1996 1997 1996 1997 1996 1997
New
technology 
for existing 
products
5.1
(2.4)
5.4
(2.3)
5.8
(1.5)
5.4
(1.0)
5.9
(1.9)
5.8
(1.7)
5.5
(2.1)t
5.5
(1.9)
Rehabilit­
ation of 
existing 
m/cry
5.0
(2.2)
5.1
(2.2)
6.1
(1.1)
6.1
(1.5)
5.9
(1.8)
6.4
(1.2)
5.6
(1.9) *
5.9
(1.7)
***
Training
managers
3.9
(2.2)
4.2
(2.1)
4.7
(1.9)
4.6
(1.8)
4.9
(2.2)
5.6
(1.5)
4.5 
(2.1) *
4.8
(1.8)
♦♦♦
Access to
foreign
markets
4.9
(2.4)
4.3
(2.3)
5.8
(1.8)
5.5
(1.9)
5.6 2.1) 5.7
(1.8)
5.4
(2.2) f
5.2
(2.9) **
General
advice
2.6
(1.8)
2.8
(1.9)
4.2 (2) 3.9
(1.9)
4.5
(2.2)
4.7
(2.1)
3.4
(2.2)
♦♦♦
3.8
(2.2)
♦♦♦
Note: Means of responses; responses were scored on a 1 -7-point Likert scale Standard deviations are in 
parentheses.
Sig. Levels: *** = p<0.001, ** = p<0.01, * = p<0.05, f  = p<0.1 and relate toKruskal-Wallis test between all three 
countries for each variable.
6.7  L ik elih o o d  o f  H a v in g  a  Fo r eig n  Pa r tn er
Perceptions about foreign firms’ objectives and the resource contributions of foreign partners, 
together with enterprises’ export orientation and the nature of the corporate governance regime 
influence the likelihood of enterprises being with/without foreign partners. Taking into account the 
effects of firm size, country of location and investment needs, this analysis provide indications of the 
extent to which firms are breaking free from the institutions of the past. The results are shown below 
in table 6 and table 6b.
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Table 6: Factors Influencing Existence of Foreign Partner
The formal analysis of the factors distinguishing enterprises with and without foreign partners was 
conducted using the following logistic regression equations. Given the decline in incidence of foreign 
partners between the two years of the study, separate equations were run for each year.
Variable 1996 1997
Export/Sales (%) 0.1* 0.04***
New Director 1*21 0.7
Employment (‘000) -0.08 -1.0*
Required Investment (‘000) 0.1* 0.09*
Perception that Foreign Partners 
Seeking Access to Local Markets 
Through Local Production
-0.2 N.a.
Perception that Foreign Partners 
Seeking Access to Local 
Technology
-0.4* N.a.
Looking for Foreign Partners to 
Gain Access to technology
0.02 -0.03
Looking for Foreign Partner to Gain 
Access to Markets
03  f 03  f
Directors Give Priority to Domestic 
market strategy
-0.4* 0.03
Russia Dummy 1.8* -1.1
Ukraine Dummy 1.5 -0.7
Greater than average employee 
shareholding
0.6 -0.1
Greater than average foreign 
shareholding
11.9 4.2**
Constant 12.4 -4.2**
-21og likelihood 77.7 104.1
Chi square 49.4*** 42.5***
% correct predictions 80.7 80.0
Hosmer & Lemeshow R2 0.4 0.3
McFadden’s R2 0.6 0.4
Na 273 292
Notes: Sig. levels: *** p<0.001; **p<0.01; * p<0.05; f  p<0.1 Dependent variable is existence or not of a foreign 
partner. Presence of a foreign partner was coded 1, while no foreign partner present was coded 0. Checks were 
made for the existence of multicollinearity problems; all VIFs were well below 10.
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The analysis was carried out using several different definitions of the relevant variables, with this model 
producing the best specification.
A A note on sample size; in this chapter the number of observations has increased, due to an increase in valid 
cases. Possibly this is due to the fact that respondents find it easier or are more willing to answer Likert scale 
questions, as opposed to detailed ownership structure, corporate governance or performance questions.
In addition, the data was pooled (see chapter three for a description of the technique and section 
5.9 in chapter 5 for notes on pooling in this sample) and results are shown below.
Table 6b: Pooled results
Variable Pooled specification
Export/Sales (%) -0.04
New Director 1.32f
Employment (‘000) -0.8
Required Investment (‘000) -0.03
Perception that Foreign Partners 
Seeking Access to Local Markets 
Through Local Production
-0.07
Perception that Foreign Partners 
Seeking Access to Local Technology
0.07
Looking for Foreign Partners to Gain 
Access to technology
-0.03
Looking for Foreign Partner to Gain 
Access to Markets
0.16
Directors Give Priority to Domestic 
market strategy
0.13
Russia Dummy 1.01
Ukraine Dummy 0.91
Greater than average employee 
shareholding
2.12*
Greater than average foreign 
shareholding
4.38
Time dummy 0.32***
Constant 0.46**
-21og likelihood 54.34
Chi square 17.75
% correct predictions 71.15
Hosmer & Lemeshow R2 0.23
McFadden’s R2 0.29
N 565
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Notes: Sig. levels: *** pO.OOl; **p<0.01; * p<0.05; f  p<0.1 Dependent variable is existence or not of a foreign 
partner. Presence of a foreign partner was coded 1, while no foreign partner present was coded 0. Checks were 
made for the existence of multicollinearity problems; all VIFs were well below 10.
Firstly, in terms of strategic intentions and outcomes relating to exporting and differences in external 
versus domestically oriented product and market development were significant in differentiating 
between enterprises that had a foreign partner. In particular, where directors gave priority to seeking 
new domestic markets for existing products in 1996, enterprises were significantly less likely to have 
a foreign partner, supporting H5 (the relationship becomes insignificant in 1997, yet the sign of the 
coefficient is the same). Furthermore, we can accept with confidence H6 as the greater the 
percentage of sales exported, the greater the probability of having a foreign partner. This implies that 
existing exporters represent the firms that have broken away from the institutions of the past, and are 
more aware of the need for foreign partners. Clearly, actual exporting and foreign partners are not 
substitutes for each other. Bishop et al., (2001) find similar results for Hungarian firms, where 
export intensity is also positively associated with the presence of foreign investors.
The perception among managers in FSU enterprises that potential foreign partners were seeking 
access to local technology significantly reduced the probability of having a foreign partner, in 1996, 
allowing us to accept H2. There was no significant association between the other perceptions noted 
in Table 3 concerning the objectives of foreign investors and the probability of having a foreign 
partner. Taken together, these results from HI and H2 suggest that local firms have no illusions that 
foreigners are anxious to take advantage of human and physical assets inherited from the old regime. 
Technology transfer from the foreign partner to the host and vice versa may prove to be 
problematic, due to reasons of competition, as mentioned above.
Turning to the potential contributions of foreign partners, the perception that foreign partners could 
bring access to new markets was significantly more likely to be associated with having a foreign 
partner, allowing us to accept H4. The perception that foreign partners could bring access to new 
technology, managerial skills etc. were not significant in differentiating between the firms with and 
without foreign partners.
In terms of corporate governance, higher insider ownership and control potentially reflects stronger 
ties with the old regime, as management styles may adhere to the “Red Directors” fashion, but this 
was not significantly associated with the presence/absence of a foreign partner, so we cannot accept 
H8. There was evidence that the probability of a firm having a foreign partner increases when a firm
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does have a greater than average foreign share-holding, allowing us to accept H9. This could 
indicate that foreign investors prefer a homogenous ownership structure, research by Bishop et al, 
(2001) found similar findings: equity structures converge towards homogeneity.
Replacement of the chief executive is another important aspect of corporate governance. Indeed, 
changing the CEO was found to be significantly associated with having a foreign partner, i.e. the 
probability of having a foreign partner increases when a firm has had a new CEO, allowing us to 
accept H7 This suggests that CEO replacement is a significant proxy for a break with the old regime 
and a willingness to admit foreign partners.
In addition to the above factors, it is necessary to control for a number of firm-level and external 
factors. First, we take into account that firm size may affect the demand for, and supply of, foreign 
partners. Larger enterprises -  a remnant of Soviet-era gigantism - may be both more outward 
looking and more attractive to foreign partners for reasons of economies of scale and scope. On the 
other hand, however, larger enterprises may be the problematical ‘dinosaur’ institutions left over 
from the old regime. (For differing perspectives on the impact of firms size see: Kotabe & Czinkota, 
1992; Bonaccorsi, 1992.) We find that in 1997, size made firms less likely to attract foreign 
partners, perhaps implying that industrial “dinosaurs” are unappealing to foreign investors, this allows 
us to accept Control 1. This differs from the results of Bishop et al., (2001) who find that size is 
positively associated with the presence of foreign investors in Hungary^2.
Secondly, national political, cultural and social (i.e. “institutional”) environments (represented by 
country dummies) may influence strategic actions at a firm level, so we take into account that the 
presence for foreign partners may be affected by country-specific, systemic factors (Dominguez & 
Sequeira, 1993). In 1996, firms in Russia had significantly higher levels of foreign partner presence, 
probably indicating the more fundamental economic reforms in Russia compared with the more 
conservative Belarus and Ukraine.
Lastly, there was a significant positive relationship between the estimated amount required for 
modernising investment and the probability of having a foreign partner, allowing us to accept control 
2. This suggests that firms with the greatest need for foreign partners successfully achieved more 
partnerships. In turn, this implies that foreign partnerships are constrained on the FSU side, and that 
a firm that breaks with the institutions of the past is able to find partners.
22 However, this positive relationship between size and the presence of a foreign partner does not exist when the 
percentage of equity held by foreigner is equal to 100.
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Surveys of two consecutive years facilitate some comments on changes over time in reported 
associations, this may help to explain the reduced incidence of foreign partners noted earlier. For 
example, between the two years, size as measured by employment and above average foreign 
ownership become significant explanatory variables, while change of chief executive, location in 
Russia and directors’ priority towards developing domestic markets become insignificant 
Lastly, a comment should be made on the R2 statistic, Hosmer and Lemeshow’s R2 shows that the 
model can account for 30-40% of the variance in foreign partner presence.
The pooled results were disappointing with poor R2 and classifications23, however they reinforce one 
of the results found in table 6: the probability of a having a new director increases when a firm has 
had a new director, allowing us to accept H7. In addition, we have evidence to reject H8, as greater 
than average employee ownership is positively associated with a firm having a foreign partner, 
perhaps suggesting that foreign partners prefer a homogenous ownership structure, as opposed to 
diffuse ownership.
The results are summarised in the final section.
6.8 DISCUSSION
This study of managers in the FSU concerning their approaches to foreign partners has yielded 
important insights both for local managers and potential foreign partners. In contrast to much of the 
foreign partner literature that focuses on the selection of local partners by incoming firms, this 
chapter details one of the analyses to focus on foreign partners from local firm viewpoint. The need 
to examine the local firm’s perspective is recently emphasised by Peng (2000), with Hitt et al., 
(2000) also providing some evidence from the local firm perspective. An important and novel 
dimension of this research is to draw attention to the need to understand the heterogeneity of country 
experiences within the emerging market context. The study’s findings have implications for both 
foreign partners and for local firms in transition economies.
23 In order to test if the data could be poolable an additional specification was run, which included interactive 
slope coefficients, several of which were significant, suggesting that it may be more appropriate to adhere to 
single year equations in table 6. (See Gujarati, p645,2001).
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6.8 B Implications for Foreign Partners
The study shows that, although foreign partnerships are rare and ties with the old institutions of the 
FSU are strong, it is nevertheless possible to identify potentially attractive local partners. Potential 
entrants can increase the level of interest of local firms in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus especially by 
bringing resources that enhance technology, helping to renew equipment and providing access to 
markets. Kotabe, et al, (2000), in respect of Latin America, and Buck et al, (2000b), with regard 
to China, note the problems that can arise when partners bring only earlier-generation technology 
and equipment. Of course, investments involving the latest technology run the risk of technology 
leakage. This raises the important issue of the need to build trust in partner relationships where 
economic and political systems only recently were so different. The finding that local enterprises 
place considerable importance on the perception that prospective partners are looking to make 
acquisitions and close capacity implies a lack of trust about their motives.
While many enterprises in FSU are problematical, with entrenched managers who are reluctant to 
change, this is not always the case. There is also evidence that foreign firms have been able 
successfully to turnaround enterprises in the region (Meyer & Moller, 1998). Hence, foreign firms 
may find benefits in establishing trust with local enterprise managers. Of course trust depends largely 
on the harmony between partners’ objectives and the evident conflicts that characterise JVs in the 
FSU indicate a need for frank and open discussions among potential partners before commitment to 
JVs, if their survival chances are to be high.
The finding of a fall in the extent of and search for foreign partners over time, amounting to a serious 
collapse, raises particularly important issues. This may be because local managers have become 
more realistic about the attractiveness of their business to potential foreign partners. Alternatively, 
the entrenched behaviour of local managers, in the style of the FSU, may have frightened-off 
potential foreign partners who may have been potentially interested in establishing a partnership. A 
further possibility is that foreign partners, after initially being interested, have decided that the 
business or the market is not attractive after all, i.e. that institutional change has been insufficiently 
deep. Further analysis is required to derive clearer policy recommendations for potential foreign 
entrants.
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6.8 C Implications for Transition and Emerging Economies
Privatisation and foreign partner issues are important features of other transition and emerging 
economies but these economies are quite heterogeneous with respect to the importance of state- 
owned firms in the economy, economic growth/decline and success in internationalisation 
(Hoskisson et a l , 2000). Former centrally planned economies, where economic reforms have been 
unable to enforce well-defined property rights in the face of opponents of reform, may face quite 
different problems in establishing partner relations than is the case in emerging economies such as 
Brazil, India, etc. Similarly, the effects of demand collapse have generally been more severely felt in 
economies emerging from communism than in economies emerging from an undeveloped status, 
which have often experienced rapid growth. Clearly, there is a need for comparative studies 
involving enterprises in transition and emerging economies.
Overall, however, the trend observed towards a reduction in foreign partner presence across the 
three countries is quite alarming, and suggests that the patterns of power established under the old 
regime may not be dead yet. For this reason section 6.9 shall investigate the determinants of foreign 
partner presence over the two year period and determinants of a firm gaining a foreign partner, 
hopefully enriching and complementing the results presented in tables 6 and 6b.
Despite major institutional differences, the findings of this study indicate that the motivations of local 
enterprises in FSU for having foreign partners are similar to those identified by Kotabe et al,
(2000) in Latin America. However, while accessing technology and renewing equipment were found 
to be important resources, a principal distinguishing feature in FSU between enterprises with foreign 
partners and those where this was not the case was gaining access to new markets. Directors of 
enterprises in FSU who want to establish links with foreign partners need to be less focused on the 
domestic market. In order to achieve this shift in attitude it may be necessary to replace the chief 
executive with someone who is more open to internationalisation. The importance of the negative 
relationship between size and the presence of foreign partners suggests that developing relationships 
with foreign partners is likely to be problematical for the large “dinosaurs”, designed for survival in 
the environment of the former regime.
With respect to the heterogeneity of the markets, Russian managers appeared to be more realistic 
about the attractiveness of their enterprises to foreign partners and about what foreign partners might 
bring. There was some evidence, however, that managers in Belarus and Ukraine where, arguably,
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less progress in transition has occurred and where privatization involved more of the respective 
countries major enterprises, were becoming more realistic in their expectations. The decline in the 
extent of established and sought foreign partner links also emphasizes this growing realism. The most 
significant fall in the presence of foreign partners found in Belarus, indicates a much more negative 
environment for foreign private business than is the case in Russia in particular.
Understanding foreign partners’ objectives is crucial in preparing firms for collaboration (Dacin et 
a l , 1997). The need to address this problem is highlighted in this study, which makes a contribution 
to the literature by considering the whole analysis from the point of view of the local firm and by 
providing analysis of similarities and contrasts between countries from an initial common institutional 
starting point. The negative relationship between the presence of a foreign partner and a perception 
that potential foreign partners are seeking access to local technology suggests that many enterprises 
have unrealistic expectations in relation to their ability to attract foreign partners. Policy makers and 
advisors might usefully devote effort to enlightening local managers’ perceptions. At the same time, 
international executives seeking to make links with local firms in these countries need to be aware of 
the attitudes of the managers with whom they may be negotiating and target environments that may 
be more receptive to these links.
6.9 Retaining and gaining a foreign partner
Many firms lost a foreign partner over the two year period; table two shows that the percentage of 
firms with an established link with a foreign partner fell from 34% in 1996 to 18% in 1997. 
Therefore, it was decided to test hypotheses 1-9 on those firms which had retained a foreign partner 
both in 1996 and 1997.
Furthermore logistic regression was used to determine the factors which influenced whether a firm 
had managed to gain a foreign partner or not in 1997.
It will be interesting to see whether the same factors which influence foreign partner presence also 
influence whether a firm retains or gains a foreign partner 
We start with some descriptive statistics.
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Table 7: The extent of firms which gained/retained a foreign partner
% of firms which retained a 
foreign partner
% of firms which gained a 
foreign partner
Russia 4.1 11.2
Ukraine 7.4 8.5
Belarus 9.0 8.0
Pearson Chi square 1.95a 0.7a
Cramer’s V statistic 0.082a 0.0493
a Insignificant statistic 
Table seven shows:
1) the Chi square statistic, which detects whether there is a significant measure association between 
two dichotomous variables (here country status and retained/gained foreign partner presence), and
2) the Cramer’s V statistic. This measures the strength of a statistical association between two 
categorical variables.
From the table above it is clear that there is no association between which country a firm is from and 
whether firms gained or retained a foreign partner, furthermore the Cramer’s V shows that the 
strength of the association is very weak24.
Following this, the two specifications seen in table six were estimated again, this time using two new 
dependent variables: (1) presence/non presence of a foreign partner in both 1996 and 1997, and (2) 
evidence of gaining a foreign partner in 1997. The results are shown below.
24 Cramer’s V is the more appropriate statistic, as one of the categorical variable has more than two categories
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Table 8: regression results
Variable Retaining a foreign partner 
in both years
Gaining a foreign partner in 
1997
Export/Sales (%) 0.0009 0.02
New Director 0.12 1.12t
Employment (‘000) -3.12** 0.29
Required Investment (‘000) 1.87** 0.39
Perception that Foreign Partners 
Seeking Access to Local 
Markets Through Local 
Production
-0.13 0.26f
Perception that Foreign Partners 
Seeking Access to Local 
Technology
0.11 -0.13
Looking for Foreign Partners to 
Gain Access to technology
-0.002 -0.003
Looking for Foreign Partner to 
Gain Access to Markets
0.0004 0.28t
Directors Give Priority to 
Domestic market strategy
-0.3f 0.29f
Russia Dummy -0.79 1.02|
Ukraine Dummy 1.1 0.85
Greater than average employee 
shareholding
-0.51 1.39*
Greater than average foreign 
shareholding
0.32 3.35**
Constant 1.94 -4.63f
-2 log likelihood 121.89 159.06
Chi square 20.05| 35.542***
% correct predictions 93.16 90.6
Hosmer & Lemeshow R2 0.16 0.22
N 292 292
(country membership), see Field (2000, p262).
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Notes: Sig. levels: *** p<0.001; **p<0.01; * p<0.05; f  p<0. Presence of a retained/gained foreign partner 
presence was coded 1, while non foreign partner presence was coded 0. Checks were made for the existence of 
multicollinearity problems; all VIFs were well below 10.
Beginning with retaining a foreign partner over the two year period we can see that there are several 
factors in common with the results shown in table six. For example, we can accept control 1 again, 
as firm size is negatively associated with retaining a foreign partner. This may suggest that foreign 
firms found strategic alliances more problematic with larger firms and therefore morel likely to sever 
relations.
In addition we find that control 2 can be accepted again, as foreign partners are forming alliances 
with firms that require their presence the most, i.e. higher levels of required investment are positively 
associated with a firm retaining a foreign partner.
Lastly, we can see that managerial priority geared towards domestic market strategy is negatively 
associated with retaining a foreign partner, thus we can accept H5. This suggests that if a host firm 
continues to pursue a domestically orientated strategy foreign partners may break the established 
link.
Surprisingly, strategic outcomes (such as exporting), perceptions of foreign partner resource 
contributions, perceptions of foreign partner objectives and ownership structure do not significantly 
affect whether a foreign partner is retained.
By referring to the R2 statistic and Chi square it is clear they are both low. In addition the Chi square 
statistic is not highly significant, thus the model does not predict very well if a firm has retained a 
foreign partner. For this reason section 6.9b shall include financial indicators and evidence of 
industrial restructuring in attempt to improve the model related to determinants of retaining foreign 
partner presence.
Next the factors which determine whether a firm gained a foreign partner in 1997 will be discussed. 
Beginning with foreign partner’s perceived objectives, we can see that the perception that the foreign 
partner’s objective to gain access to markets via local production is positively associated with a firm 
gaining a foreign partner, therefore we can accept HI. Similarly, we can accept H4 as the host firm 
seeking a foreign partner for access to markets is also positively associated with a firm gaining a 
foreign partner. This suggests that both the foreign partner and host firm are seeking a strategic 
alliance in order to gain access to foreign markets25, this maybe a more feasible objective, as
25 Interestingly, Banai et al,. (1995) finds that gaining access to foreign markets rates highly on the list of motives
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compared to technology transfer26. Although insignificant, the perception that a foreign partner is 
seeking local technology and the anticipated resource contribution to the host firm is access to new 
technology are both negatively associated with gaining a foreign partner. This suggests that 
technology transfer is problematic and therefore policy should focus upon the enforcement of 
property rights, contracts and trust. For example, Fey (1995) highlights that the transfer of 
technological expertise is a major source of conflict in Russian joint ventures, also local partners may 
have reason to not trust foreign partners if they are likely to close capacity (Beamish, 1985).
As opposed to results shown in Table 6, managerial strategy geared towards domestic markets is 
now positively (yet weakly) associated with gaining a foreign partner. This suggests that by 1997 
potential foreign partners are possibly becoming more inward looking, and perhaps focusing on the 
possibility of servicing a large domestic market rather than use the host partner as an export 
platform, one reason for this could be difficulties in gaining export licences. This slight trend towards 
foreign partners being gained when managers focus on domestic market is reinforced by the fact that 
export intensity no longer significantly affects whether a firm gains a foreign partner.
As for ownership structure and managerial turnover these appear to be strong determinants of 
whether a firm has gained a foreign partner in 1997, perhaps suggesting that as foreign partners 
become increasingly aware of the importance these factors they place grater emphasis on this issue. 
Firstly, we can accept H7 as the presence of a new director positively affects whether a firm gained 
a foreign partner, reflecting that foreign partners are attracted to firms where “Red Directors” have 
been replaced, signifying a break from the old regime and old managerial skills and style. 
Interestingly greater than average foreign and insider ownership positively affects whether a firm has 
gained a foreign partner, thus we must reject H8 but accept H9. From this we can infer that foreign 
partners prefer ownership structures to be dominated by similar groups of owners, as opposed to 
diffiise ownership structures27, in anticipation of greater managerial monitoring. Hitt et al, (1999) 
state that diffuse ownership produces weak monitoring of managerial decisions (p361), therefore 
potential foreign partners may seek firms with greater than average employee or foreign ownership, 
which although is not a measure of ownership concentration, this kind of ownership structure may
for entering a Russia-US joint venture (p23).
26 O f course this assumes that the firm is not operating within a monopolistic industry, but given that the firms in 
this Siample are not from typically monopolistic industries such as oil, gas or timber (Blasi et al., 1997, p30) and 
that Brown et al (1994) found that few civilian manufacturing firms were monopolies, this assumption maybe 
reasonable.
27 In earlier chapters the benefits of ownership concentration were discussed, for example Shleifer and Vishny
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allow owners to co-ordinate their actions more effectively, if they belong to a homogenous group. 
Furthermore, greater than average foreign ownership being a significant factor makes it apparent that 
there are complementarities between the current ownership structure and foreign partner objectives, 
which should boost firm performance due to reduced inter firm diversity (Adler and Greene, 1989). 
Lastly, country differences play a slightly significant role in determining whether a firm has gained a 
foreign partner or not: Russian firms are more likely to have gained a foreign partner, reinforcing 
results in table 7.
6.9b The factors which determine whether a firm has retained a foreign partner: an 
alternative approach.
Since results in table eight show that perceptions of foreign partner’s objectives and resource 
contributions, managerial strategy, and ownership structure factors are poor predictors of whether a 
firm has retained a foreign partner in 1996 and 1997, an alternative model was developed, as shown 
below.
Diagram 2:
Lagged
Financial
Performance
Retaining a foreign 
Partner
«----------------------------------►
Controls 
Firm size (-) 
Country dummy
Lagged
Industrial
Restructuring
This provided us with the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis development
1. Controls
Beginning with firm controls, firm size is included. Results in Table six and eight showed that
(1986) investigate a model where a large minority shareholder mitigates the free rider problem
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firm size is negatively associated with foreign partner presence and retaining a foreign partner, 
reflecting that remnants of Soviet era gigantism repel foreign partners, possibly due to the huge 
investment required in order to upgrade product design and technology to global standards. Also 
larger firms may represent a greater challenge in terms of restructuring, for example there maybe a 
higher incidence of labour hoarding. In general terms, Stiglitz and Driffill (2000) note several 
problems associated with larger firms: difficulties in managing and supervising staff; greater need for 
bureaucracy; and slower communication. Thus we test the following:
Control 1: firm size is negatively associated with the probability of a firm retaining a 
foreign partner.
2. Industrial Restructuring
Industrial restructuring involves “the whole process undertaken by enterprises as they adapt 
their behaviour to that necessary for survival and success in a market economy, ” Djankov 
and Murrell (2002).
It will be anticipated that evidence of restructuring will be positively associated with a firm retaining a 
foreign partner, as Smart and Waldfoegel (1994) state, “restructuring is attributable to 
subsequent improvements in performance, ” (p503).
Firstly, two hypotheses will be postulated concerning reactive restructuring. This kind of 
restructuring involves labour shedding, boosting labour productivity, wage reductions and plant 
closures (Aghion and Carlin, in Zecchini, 1997, p244-5), reflecting that firms have moved away 
from the Soviet practices of labour hoarding, low fire rates and excess capacity, therefore we test 
the following:
HI: lagged capacity lost due to depreciation of machinery/equipment and permanent 
removal of workshops/plants is positively associated with the probability of a firm retaining 
a foreign partner.
H2: lagged labour productivity28 is positively associated with the probability of a firm 
retaining a foreign partner.
Next three hypotheses shall be tested concerning deep and strategic restructuring, namely 
improvements in the export structure, technology changes and alterations in managerial structures 
(Aghion and Carlin, in Zecchini, 1997, p244-5).
28 Defined as total sales/no. of employees
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Job gains in production units can be expected to positively affect whether a firm retains a foreign 
partner or not, as they may act as a positive signal of firm growth to the foreign partner. Ijiii and 
Simon (1967) in their seminal text suggest that firm growth is dependent on an impetus, such as 
innovations in production or marketing or new managerial techniques.
In addition job gains maybe a sign of organic (internal) growth and that the firm has undergone the 
process of labour shedding, and now progressed to job creation within the firm. Furthermore, in the 
context of the FSU, Aukutsionek et al, (1998) in their work on dominant shareholders and 
restructuring use the number of employees hired as a performance measure, therefore we test H3. 
H3 : gross job gains in existing and new production units (by taking the number of 
productive employees in 1.01.95 as 100% and giving the net change in employment in 
1.01.97) is positively associated with the probability of a firm retaining a foreign partner. 
By exporting to non former CMEA countries firms are illustrating that they can successfully operate 
on foreign markets and meet international quality standards. Brezeinski and Kaltholff (1998) treat 
exporting as a signal of successful restructuring in their study of Polish firms. Similarly, Landesmann
(2000) states that export performance is a move towards “active restructuring” and represents a 
change in behavioural response into new markets by upgrading the composition and quality of their 
products. Also, Aghion and Carlin, (in Zecchini, 1997, p 278) highlight that the ability of transition 
economies to export to the EU, reflects their ability to penetrate high quality markets, while Jones
(1998) claims that the ability of firms to find new clients is a signal of successful change.
As Bernard and Jensen (1999) state “exporters are better than non exporters, ” (pi) as 
“exporters are larger, more productive, more capital intensive and more technology 
intensive, ” (p2), clearly positively affecting whether a firm retains a foreign partner.
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) attempt to determine the determinants of foreign investment in 
Sweden and their results reveal that foreign investors are drawn to firms with a presence on 
international markets, therefore we test a similar hypothesis:
H4: export intensity is positively associated with the probability of a firm retaining a 
foreign partner.
A firm’s annual investment level may also affect whether a firm retains a foreign partner or not. For 
example, higher levels of investment may signal the ability to obtain/attract financial capital in order 
to undertake important and necessary investment projects. Furthermore, new investments may be a 
signal of deep restructuring. Aukutsionek et al, (1998) claim that firms in Russia are operating in a
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climate of industrial decline, thus we can expect firms to reduce their investment levels, thus firms 
who do not reduce investment, can be expected to be in a better financial position, therefore the 
following hypothesis is developed:
H5: lagged annual investment levels are positively associated with the probability of a firm 
retaining a foreign partner.
3. Financial performance
The level of lagged financial performance of the firm should also affect the probability of the firm 
retaining a foreign partner, this treats ownership as an endogenous factor, as opposed to 
hypothesising that ownership affects performance. This approach was tested by Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) who argue that “the ownership structure o f a corporation should be thought 
o f as an endogenous outcome o f decisions, ” (p210) and find that ownership structure is 
“determined... by firm performance, ”(p216 and p227). Previously, Himmelberg et al, (1999) 
had also found that ownership should be treated as an endogenous factor, and that managerial 
ownership is determined by changes in the firm’s contracting environment 
In a study of the determinants of foreign ownership, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) find that 
foreign investors exhibit a preference for better performing firms, with higher current ratios, reflecting 
the firm’s ability to meet short term payments. Similarly, Kang and Stulz (1997) find that foreign 
investors tend to hold shares in firms with higher levels of return on assets.
H6: lagged profit29 is positively associated with the probability of a firm retaining a foreign 
partner.
Higher levels of liabilities may suggest that firms are able to obtain access to external finance from 
banks or other such sources, thus they may have no need of a foreign partner thus we test:
H7: total liabilities (to banks, suppliers, utilities, government and wage arrears is 
negatively associated with the probability of a firm retaining a foreign partner.
29 Of course it is accepted that another strategy would be to test the impact of profits/revenues and 
liabilities/revenues on foreign partner retainment, in order to control for the size effect. However, firm size in this 
sample is similar across years and countries (see for example table 1 in chapter four) so I hope that this would not 
affect results too seriously. Furthermore Filatotcheve/ al., (2001) warn against using ratios in some scenarios.
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Table 9: regression results: the alternative model
Dependent variable: 
retaining a foreign partner in 
1997
Capacity lost due to 
depreciation of machinery and 
permanent removal
0.38
Gross job gains in existing and 
new production units
0.22*
Annual investment -0.002
Log of employees 0.4
Total liabilities -0.002|
Labour productivity -0.008
Export intensity 0.04|
Profit 0.0009f
Russian dummy -12.1
Ukrainian dummy 9.71
Constant 6.05
- 2 log likelihood 39.28
Chi square 23.56**
Hosmer and Lemeshow’s R2 0.59
Notes: Sig. levels: *** p<0.001; **p<0.01; * p<0.05; f  p<0. Presence of a retained foreign partner presence was 
coded 1, while non foreign partner presence was coded 0. Checks were made for the existence of multicollinearity 
problems; all VTFs were well below 10.
Beginning with firm controls, we can see that both are insignificant: firm size and country membership 
do not impact upon whether a firm has retained a foreign partner or not.
As for the degree of reactive restructuring, such as capacity depreciation and labour productivity 
improvements these are both insignificant factors, perhaps suggesting that foreign partners view 
evidence of reactive restructuring as a superficial measure of firm performance.
This is not the case for deeper restructuring, job gains in production units (over the period 1995- 
1997) and export intensity are both positively associated with retaining a foreign partner, thus we 
can accept H3 and H4. From this we can infer that foreign partners retain alliances with firms who 
have finished the procedure of labour shedding and begun to hire new workers. Furthermore they 
remain with local firms who have shown that they can penetrate high quality markets, by exporting to 
non former CMEA countries. However we cannot accept H5 as lagged investment levels do not 
affect whether or not a firm retains a foreign partner.
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Financial performance also appears to be a significant factor of determining whether a firm retains a 
foreign partner. Foreign partners are clearly keen to retain strategic alliances with firms who were 
committed to profit maximisation and those who exhibited superior financial performance, as firm 
profit positively effects the probability of a firm retaining a foreign partner, allowing us to accept H6. 
Liabilities to banks, suppliers etc. appears to negatively affect whether a foreign partner is retained, 
suggesting that local firms with access to alternative sources of credit and funding do not need to 
continue in a relationship with a foreign partner, thus we can accept H7.
Overall, it appears that this alternative specification, using evidence of industrial restructuring and 
financial performance is a better model for determining whether a firm has retained a foreign partner 
the R2 has increased to 0.6 in table 9.
6.9c Implications for local firms and foreign partners.
Firstly, from the results it seems that general firm characteristics do not affect whether a firm retains a 
foreign partner: firms retain a foreign partner regardless of firm size or country status, which is 
surprising as tables 6 and 8 show firm size to be a significant determinant of foreign partner 
presence.
Furthermore, it appears from table nine that for a local firm to retain a strategic alliance with a 
foreign partner it is not enough to exhibit evidence of only reactive restructuring. Foreign partners 
appear only to be interested in remaining in relationships with firms which have undertook deep 
restructuring. In particular, the ability to create new jobs and hire workers appeals to foreign 
partners, as does the ability to re-orientate the geographic structure of their exports, and to 
penetrate high quality, non former CMEA markets.
Moreover, if local firms wish to remain in a relationship with a foreign partner they must improve 
their indicators of financial performance, in terms of profits and total liabilities. In a climate of 
industrial decline it may be difficult for a firm to increase profits etc. and they may prefer to focus on 
survival, such as finding new clients/markets, developing new products, marketing strategies or 
production techniques. Therefore it could be claimed that measures of financial performance, such as 
profits are superficial and thus foreign partners should reconsider their reasons for not continuing 
with a strategic alliance. A firm’s progress in restructuring and dealing with corporate governance 
issues maybe a more worthwhile consideration.
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Lastly, it is clear that relationships between local firms in the FSU and foreign partners are 
particularly fiagile. Furthermore it appears that foreign partners observe the behaviour of the local 
firm or find some new information about the other party, which affects whether they remain in the 
alliance.
An item for further research would be to examine the influence of the characteristics of the foreign 
partner, such as attitudes to R&D expenditure and technology transfer, on the probability of whether 
a firm retains a foreign partner.
Table 10 
Summary tables
The following tables summarise the key findings.
Variable Likelihood of Having A Foreign Partner
Hypothesis and anticipated sign 1996 1997
Cl. Employment Size (-) Not significant Significantly reduces likelihood 
of having a foreign partner
C2 Required. Investment (+) Significantly increases likelihood 
of having a foreign partner
Significantly increases likelihood 
of having a foreign partner
HI. Perception that Foreign 
Partners Seek Access to Local 
Markets Through Local 
Production (+)
Not significant N.a.
H2. Perception that Foreign 
Partners Seek Access to Local 
Technology (-)
Significantly reduces likelihood 
of having a foreign partner
N.a
H3. Looking for Foreign Partner 
to Provide Access to 
Technology (-)
Not significant Not significant
H4. Looking for Foreign Partner 
to Provide Access to Markets 
(+)
Significantly increases likelihood 
of having a foreign partner
Significantly increases likelihood 
of having a foreign partner
H5. Directors Give Priority to 
Domestic market strategy (-)
Significantly reduces likelihood 
of having a foreign partner
Not significant
H6. Export intensity (+) Significantly increases likelihood Significantly increases likelihood
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Variable Likelihood of Having A Foreign Partner
of having a foreign partner of having a foreign partner
H7. Presence of a new Director 
(+)
Probability of a firm having a 
foreign partner increases when 
a firm has had a new director30.
Not significant
H8„Greater than average 
employee shareholding20 (-)
Not significant Not significant
H9_Greater than average 
foreign shareholding (+)
Not significant Probability of a firm having a 
foreign partner falls when a firm 
does not have greater than 
average foreign shareholding
Country dummy 1. Russia Significantly increases likelihood 
of having a foreign partner
Not significant
Country dummy 2. Ukraine Not significant Not significant
Hypothesis and anticipated sign Retaining a foreign partner Gaining a foreign partner
Cl> Employment Size (-) Significantly reduces likelihood 
of retaining a foreign partner
Not significant
C2 (Required) Investment (+) 
For gained a foreign partner 
independent variable is “required 
investment. For retained a foreign 
partner independent variable is annual 
investment
Significantly increases likelihood 
of retaining a foreign partner
Not significant
HL Perception that Foreign 
Partners Seek Access to Local 
Markets Through Local 
Production (+)
Not significant Significantly increases likelihood 
of retaining a foreign partner
H2- Perception that Foreign 
Partners Seek Access to Local 
Technology (-)
Not significant Not significant
H3. Looking for Foreign Partner 
to Provide Access to
Not significant Not significant
30 Support for H7 was also found in the pooled specification. H8 was rejected in the pooled specification.
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Hypothesis and anticipated sign Retaining a foreign partner Gaining a foreign partner
Technology (-)
H4.. Looking for Foreign Partner 
to Provide Access to Markets 
(+)
Not significant Significantly increases likelihood 
of retaining a foreign partner
H5 .. Directors Give Priority to 
Domestic market strategy (-)
Significantly reduces likelihood 
of retaining a foreign partner
Significantly increases likelihood 
of retaining a foreign partner
H6- Export intensity (+) Not significant Not significant
H7. Presence of a new Director 
(+)
Not significant Significantly increases likelihood 
of retaining a foreign partner
H8_ Greater than average 
employee shareholding20 (-)
Not significant Significantly increases likelihood 
of retaining a foreign partner
H9_ Greater than average 
foreign shareholding (+)
Not significant Significantly increases likelihood 
of retaining a foreign partner
Country dummy 1. Russia Not significant Significantly increases likelihood 
of retaining a foreign partner
Country dummy 2. Ukraine Not significant Not significant
Hypothesis and anticipated sign Retaining a foreign partner: an alternative model
Control 1: firm size (-) Not significant
Control 2: Country membership31 Not significant
HI: capacity depreciation (+) Not significant
H2: labour productivity (+) Not significant
H3: job gains (+) Significantly increases likelihood of retaining a foreign 
partner
H4: export intensity (+) Significantly increases likelihood of retaining a foreign 
partner
H5: annual investment level (+) Not significant
H6 : profit (+) Significantly increases likelihood of retaining a foreign 
partner
H7: total liabilities (-) Significantly decreases likelihood of retaining a foreign 
partner
31 No hypothesis is made concerning country status.
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C h a p t e r  s e v e n : c o n c l u s io n s , c o n t r ib u t io n s , im p l ic a t io n s  a n d
FURTHER RESEARCH
This first part of this chapter shall present a summary of the main findings of my thesis and 
make comparisons with existing research. The second section shall deal with my 
contributions to the internationalisation literature and the third shall examine some of the 
implications of my findings, along with presenting some tentative policy conclusions. Lastly, 
several points for further research shall be discussed.
1. Principal Findings in Chapter five.
Here the key findings shall be summarised and tabulated in order to see how they compare 
with existing internationalisation research. Also we will see if the key results are transition 
specific1 (the relationship is unique to the CIS) or theory specific (a similar relationship has 
been found in existing research).
Beginning with the main findings for the determinants of exporting we have the following 
table:
Table 1: Determinants of exporting
Independent variable Relationship with exporting activity
Firm size Positive
Industrial decline- (industry’s reported decline in 
real output over 1993-1996 as a % of 1993 level.)
Positive
Foreign ownership Positive
Institutional ownership Positive
Dominant group of owners Positive
% of seats held by outsiders Negative
% of seats held by outsiders* % of shares 
held by outsiders
Positive
Firstly, dealing with firm size, a key variable in export research, this appeared to be strongly 
and positively associated with exporting. This supports existing research by Perkett (1963) 
and Delgado et al, (2001), who both also found positive relationships between exporting 
and firm size in the UK and Spain, respectively. Thus it appears that the relationship 
between firm size and exporting is not transition specific, and secondly that the international 
business framework can be applied to the economies of the CIS. However this disagrees
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with the findings of Bonaccorsi (1992) who found that small firms are more likely to be 
exporters in Italy.
Bonaccorsi also highlights the importance of the causality issue: does exporting affect firms 
size? This would be a useful extension for further research; could firms in the CIS use 
exporting as a means for growth2?
Next we can see that industrial decline positively affects export activity, this proves that the 
context of the CIS is not unique in terms of industrial decline leading to exporting. 
Furthermore we can successfully employ the strategy based framework, as it is clear that 
exporting is used as a strategy to overcome difficult market conditions. For example, other 
researchers working under the strategy doctrine, such as Barker and Duhaime (1997) find 
that if a firm is in decline (i.e. its performance is below the industry average) then it will be 
forced to implement strategic change. It could be argued that this will affect exporting 
activity, as exporting is treated here as a strategy to improve performance (see chapter five, 
section 5.1 for a rationale of this framework). In addition, Pavord and Bogart (1975) found 
that poor market conditions lead firms to seek export markets as a strategy for survival, 
which is similar to my result
The analysis showed that foreign ownership appeared to have a positive influence on 
exporting, supporting the work of many other researchers in the sphere of the economics 
and transition literature. The seminal text by Caves (1996) states that foreign owners are 
either motivated by the desire to market seek (and serve the domestic market) or export 
extensively (foreign sourcing). Clearly in the case of the CIS foreign owners are foreign 
sourcing, and using the host firm as an export platform. In the case of Spain, Molero (2001) 
found that a common strategy of foreign owners is to use the host country as an export 
platform. This phenomenon is not rare in transition economies. Rojec et al, (2000) find that 
Slovenian foreign owned firms are more likely to export a larger proportion of their output 
than majority domestically owned firms and MacBean (2000) finds that the output of foreign 
owned Czech firms is export orientated. Thus it appears that the relationship between 
foreign ownership and exporting in the CIS is not transition specific.
1 Of course it is accepted that there are differences between groups of transition economies such as the 
CIS countries and those of Central and Eastern Europe, see for example, The Transition report, 1998.
2 Assuming that the firm has already downsized, and that any employment growth would not led to 
inefficiencies.
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Johnson et al., (1996) document the recent dramatic increase in institutional ownership and 
state how it has become an important monitoring body. Results from my research show that 
institutional owners try to implement performance improving policies and thus positively 
influence exporting. This reflects that agency theory can be applied to the CIS environment, 
as institutional investors are willing to undertake the associated agency costs3, and therefore 
are able to successfully monitor management
Other researchers have also highlighted the positive role of institutional investors, for 
example Kochar and David (1996) find that institutional investors are “active” and exercise 
their voice to attempt to influence management decisions. Wahal and McConnell (2000) find 
that this type of owner possesses an informational advantage and also allows management to 
focus on projects with long term payoffs. In a transition context Perotti and Gelfer (2001) 
find that financial industrial groups (FIGs) play an important governance function and 
successfully monitor management activity. Coupled with my findings, this may tentatively 
suggest that FIGs and institutional owners are not such a nefarious governance body, as 
thought previously.
However this ignores the existence of selection bias among institutional owners, who may 
select firms with superior performance, thus the relationship may run the opposite way: with 
exporting leading to the incidence of institutional ownership.
A unique element of my thesis was to look at the impact of a group of dominant owners on 
exporting activity, which was found to have a positive influence.
Earlier, La Porta et al., (1999) found that widely held ownership is not common in 
economies with poor shareholder protection in a survey of 27 wealthy economies, and more 
recently Dyck (2001) highlighted that multiple blockholders can be efficient in an 
environment where legal protection is poor. This is a result common with my research as 
groups of shareholders coalesce as their rights are not well protected, in order to monitor 
managerial strategy towards exporting. Therefore, it appears that the La Porta et al., 
framework is useful for understanding the determinants of exporting in the CIS.
A principal result is that groups of owners behave similarly to a single owner and strive to 
improve firm performance. Also, this is not a transition specific finding, as other researchers 
have also documented a positive relationship between concentrated ownership and
3 See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for a description.
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performance in developed countries. For instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) found that 
large shareholders boost expected profits, while Bethel and Liebskind (1993) state that 
blockholders can exert a disciplinary effect upon management 
However, the literature has also documented negative effects of blockholders. Black
(1999) has found that large shareholders are prone to insider dealing and asset stripping 
within a transition context. Thus, although groups of shareholders positively affect exports it 
remains to see if they are solely a positive influence for other aspects of the performance of 
firms.
Next it was found that board representation of outsiders is negatively (albeit weakly) 
associated with exporting activity. This appears to be a transition specific result, as previous 
research has supported the resource dependence role of outsider board members, as 
postulated by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). They state that outsider board members can 
bring resources and knowledge to the firm. However, this appears not to be the case in the 
CIS, as outsiders are found not to be adopting exporting as a strategy to improve 
performance. One very tentative reason for this could possibly be a lack of specialised 
knowledge concerning exporting or other board members forcing them to collude with their 
decisions and strategies.
However, outsider control (defined by the interaction of the percentage of seats held by 
outsiders and the percentage of voting shares held by outsiders) provided a stronger result 
and was found to positively affect exporting activity. This reflects that board representation 
and share ownership are complementary in affecting exporting. This suggests that in the 
context of the CIS outsider owners require board representation in order to influence 
strategy in order to improve firm performance. See Filatotchev et ah, (2001b) who first 
developed the link between complementarity of corporate governance factors.
Thus it seems clear that there is a strong relationship between ownership and exporting 
activity, an issue widely ignored in the internationalisation literature, as Dosaglu-Guner 
(2001) points out, this research topic “has not been developed, despite a possible link, ” 
(p72). Thus I hope to have contributed to and expanded this literature.
Lastly, by running separate equations for each year it was found that the exporting process is 
temporal. This is similar to findings by Bilkey (1976): the factors which affect the decision to
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export change over time. In addition, Johanson and Vahlne (1977) in their seminal work 
state that internationalisation is an incremental, sequential process.
lJb Principal Findings in Chapter six.
Firstly, the determinants of foreign partner presence were examined. The key results are
shown below.
Table 2: Determinants of foreign partner presence.
Independent variable Relationship with foreign partner 
presence
Firm size Negative
Required investment Positive
Foreign partner seeks access to local 
technology
Negative
Host seeks access to markets Positive
Managers give priority to domestic market 
strategy
Negative
Export intensity Positive
Presence of new director Positive
Presence of greater than average foreign 
ownership
Positive
The results in this section are transition environment specific as the majority of extant 
research has focused on characteristics of the partner from the developed country.
Firstly, firm size reduces the likelihood of foreign partner presence. This possibly reflects the 
problems associated with large firms, such as slow communication and supervising staff 
(Stiglitz and Driffill, 2000).
Next it was found that required investment increases the likelihood of a firm having a foreign 
partner, thus foreign partners are being attracted to alliances where their resources are 
needed the most (as in Wright et al., (2002)).
A unique contribution of this research is to incorporate the perceived resource contributions 
of the CIS firm’s partner and perceptions of local firm attractiveness.
Local firms perceiving foreign partners to bring access to markets increases the firm’s 
likelihood of having a foreign partner. This reflects that the host and foreign partner have 
similar objectives concerning access to markets.
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As for managers giving priority to strategy geared toward the domestic market this reduces 
the probability of a firm having foreign partner. Strategy geared towards domestic market 
strategy could reflect that management is risk averse (Hitt et al., 1997), which may repel 
potential foreign partners, as they perceive managers not to be interested in the risky 
process of internationalisation.
It was found that foreign partners perceiving local firms as attractive for access to local 
technology reduces the probability of foreign partner presence. This suggests that technology 
transfer is a difficult issue4. This is clearly not limited to the transition environment, for 
example Fey (1995, pl41) documents the issue of conflict in the literature, so once again the 
international business framework can be applied
The level of export intensity was found to increase the probability of a firm having a foreign 
partner. Foreign partners may view a local firm’s ability to export as a signal of active 
restructuring (Landesmann, 2000) and having broken away from central trade monopolies.
In addition, we may be able to tentatively conclude that foreign partners view exporting as a 
positive performance measure, an assumption similar to that in chapter five, which stated that 
exporting is a strategy to improve firm performance. Also, exporting activity can be used as 
a performance measure in itself, particularly in less developed or transition economies, for 
example Douglas (1996) uses export sales volume as a performance measure in her study of 
Peruvian firms.
Previous research has documented the positive influence of managerial turnover, for example 
Warzynski (2001) has found that managerial turnover boosts productivity in Ukraine. In 
addition, Ocasio (1993) found that a change in top management leads to a change in 
organisational strategy. It is likely that increases in productivity and new strategy (assuming it 
is moving away from that of the Soviet era) will appeal to potential foreign partners. 
Similarly, the presence of greater than average foreign ownership increases the likelihood of 
having a foreign partner. This suggests that foreign partners are seeking a homogeneous 
ownership structure, in anticipation of sharing similar objectives. More generally, foreign 
partners could be attracted to outside ownership per se, as several researchers in transition 
economies have found outsider and foreign owners to be beneficial for restructuring (see
4 Also managers may not even desire monetary compensation for technological transfer, full control may 
be the crux of the matter.
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Djankov and Murrell (2002)). While Konings (1999) found that foreign owners have 
greater access to technological know how and finance, which could clearly be an attractive 
attribute for a potential foreign partner.
Lastly, it was found that that the foreign partner selection process is time variant, as the 
motives and determinants of foreign partner presence change over the two year period. Hitt 
et a l, (2001) had previously recommended that the process should account for the time 
factor.
Following this, logistic regression was undertaken to determine the factors which affect 
whether a firm gains a foreign partner. The key results are shown in table three.
By referring to tables 2 and 3 it is clear that many of the factors which determine the 
likelihood of foreign partner presence are similar to those which determine whether a firm 
gains a foreign partner in the two year period Therefore only those factors which do not 
appear in table 2 shall be discussed.
Firstly, both the local and foreign partner seeking access to markets positively affects the 
likelihood of a firm gaining a foreign partner. This reflects that both parties are interested in 
exporting, possibly in order to boost firm performance, as suggested in chapter five. Thus it 
appears that for a firm to gain a foreign partner both parties must “match” their objectives 
and strategies.
Another interesting result is that both greater than average foreign and insider ownership 
increases the likelihood of gaining a foreign partner. This suggests that potential partners 
seek firms with homogenous ownership structures, as opposed to diffused ownership 
structure, in anticipation of incentive alignment and easier co-ordination of activities. This 
may reflect that potential partners find it easier to negotiate contracts when there is a high 
level of homogeneity between owners.
Table 3: Determinants of gaining a foreign partner.
Independent variable Relationship with gaining a foreign 
partner
Firm size Negative
Required investment Positive
Foreign partner seeks access to local market Positive
Host seeks access to markets Positive
Managers give priority to domestic market 
strategy
Negative
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Imdependent variable Relationship with gaining a foreign 
partner
Exxport intensity Positive
Prresence of new director Positive
Prresence of greater than average insider 
ownership
Positive
Prresence of greater than average foreign 
ownership
Positive
Laastly, an alternative model was developed in order to determine the factors which affect the 
probability of a firm retaining a foreign partner over the two year period. The key results
arce shown below.
Taable 4: Alternative model
Imdependent variable Relationship with retaining a foreign 
partner
Jo’)b gains (taking 1.1.95 as 1 0 0 %, this represents 
thee net change in employment on 1.1.97)
Positive
Excport intensity Positive
Prrofit Positive
Tcotal liabilities (the sum of liabilities to banks, 
suppliers, utilities, government and wages)
Negative
Fiirstly, it should be noted that general firm characteristics and evidence of reactive 
restructuring5 (in particular labour productivity and capacity depreciation) do not impact 
upxm whether a firm retains a foreign partner. However, evidence of so called deep 
restructuring (namely export intensity and gains in net employment) along with financial 
performance are both important determinants. Hypotheses were made concerning the 
relationship between restructuring and the presence of a retained foreign partner as it was 
amticipated that they would wish to remain in an alliance with a firm which had shown 
evidence of improving export structures and increasing productivity etc. These hypotheses 
treat ownership as an endogenous factor, similarly to Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). 
Beginning with deep restructuring, the likelihood of a firm retaining a foreign partner 
increases if firms have experienced job gains in existing or new production units over the 
period 1995-1997.
5 Siee section 6.9b in chapter six for a discussion on restructuring.
280
Another aspect of deep restructuring which is an important determinant of retaining a foreign 
partner is the level of export intensity. Clearly, a foreign partner is more likely to be retained 
in those firms where it is obvious that they can meet international quality standards, which is 
essential if firms are to export successfully to non CMEA countries.
In addition, financial performance plays a significant role in determining whether a firm 
retains a foreign partner. It appears that profit is a positive influence. This appears not to be 
a CIS specific finding, as Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Bishop et ah, (2001) (in the 
case of Hungary) both treat the ownership structure of firms as an endogenous factor and 
find that it is likely to be affected by firm performance.
Conversely, the level of total liabilities reduces the likelihood of a firm retaining a foreign 
partner. Liabilities may reflect the ability of the firm to gain access to credits from banks, 
suppliers, utility companies and the State, this finding may suggest that foreign partners 
remain in alliances with firms which require their resources the most, which suffer from poor 
levels of access to credit, and thus low levels of liabilities. Similar results were found in the 
tables above, as required investment positively influences the likelihood of foreign partner 
presence.
2. Research Contribution
I believe that I have made several contributions to the research on the internationalisation 
process in the methodological, empirical and theoretical fields.
I also hope to have contributed to the strategy, international business and economics 
literatures.
1. Empirical techniques contribution
Firstly, I have used a wide variety of empirical techniques to test hypotheses, whereas 
previous researchers have used only employed a single technique, for example Bhavani and 
Tendulkhar (2001) and Dosoglu-Guner (2001) have only used logistic regression in their 
studies of exporting firms. Furthermore I have had access to a database from a research 
team at the University of Nottingham which was collected from a unique survey within a 
particular institutional setting, enhancing the importance of the results.
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2. Methodological contribution
I have extended the research on the relationship between ownership and exporting. Other 
researchers have only used a maximum of three dummy variables to represent ownership, 
for example Javalgi et al, (1999) use a dummy variable in order to distinguish between 
publicly and privately held firms. Bhavani and Tendulkhar (2001) use a dummy variable to 
represent if a firm is a single proprietorship or a limited company, while Dosaglu-Guner
(2001) employs dummy variables to determine whether a firm is pure proprietorship, insider 
or externally owned. In comparison my research has employed a wide variety of ownership 
and board structure variables.
In addition, I have assumed that the factors which affect exporting change over time, as 
recommended by Bilkey (1976), therefore I have used lagged independent variables over a 
two year time period, as well as having employed techniques for pooled regression, along 
with repeated measures techniques. Some researchers were unable to introduce a temporal 
element in the exporting process, such as Bhavani and Tendulkhar (2001), who have used 
cross sectional data only.
3. Theoretical contribution
Another innovation is to employ both internal and external factors in determining export 
activity, such as firm characteristics along with exogenous factors such as industrial decline. 
This relies on the existing work of the research team at the University of Nottingham, such as 
Buck et a l, (2000), Filatotchev et al, (2001b) and Filatotchev et al (1999), Wright et al, 
(2002, 2000), and Zhukov (1999).
Other researchers have limited their research to one kind of factor, Javalgi et al, (1999) for 
example, only concentrate on internal factors.
Integration into the world economy is a vital part of economic transformation for the 
transition economies (Transition Report, 2001). Hopefully, by examining the impact of firm 
characteristics on exporting we can develop a profile of exporting firms in transition 
economies, which can help to assist non exporting firms to begin to enter global markets, 
and thus form an export promotion policy. This should be beneficial as Bilkey (1976) 
emphasises the importance of export profiles in identifying potential exporters among firms 
which are not already exporting. For example, export profiles created by Cavusgil (1976)
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can be used by government export agencies to identify those firms with a high export 
potential, thus limited resources for export promotion (loans, export training) can be 
concentrated on the high export potential firms.
Foreign partner selection research contributions
I hope to have made several research contributions to the area of foreign partner selection 
process also.
1. Methodological contribution
Furthermore I have assumed that foreign partner selection is a temporal process, and have 
therefore studied the determinants of a firm gaining and retaining a foreign partner.
In particular, I have developed a model of retained foreign partner presence by examining 
the influence of reactive and deep restructuring and financial performance. As far as I am 
aware, I do not know of any of other research which has covered such a topic.
2.Theoretical contribution
Firstly, most foreign partner research has concentrated upon the motives and characteristics 
of the foreign partner, as opposed to the host firm, moreover very few researchers have 
examined partner selection in the environment of the transition economies6.
Another novel aspect of my research is to examine the impact of foreign partner and local 
firms’ perceptions of resource contributions and objectives for a strategic alliance. Other 
researchers, such as Fey and Beamish (2000) have examined the impact of organisational 
climate, culture and parent firm commitments on joint venture conflict, while Brouthers and 
Bamossy (2000) have examined the influence of governments on joint venture negotiations. 
They found that transitional governments acting as key stakeholders intervene at different 
stages of the negotiation process, however they can change the balance of power, 
occasionally to the detriment to their own state owned enterprise.
The majority of my findings have not been transition specific, and some of my results are 
similar to those found by researchers on developed market economies, such as that involving 
the relationship between firm size, industrial decline, foreign ownership etc., and exporting.
6 Of course one exception is the work of Hitt et a l, (2001) who examine foreign partner selection in 
Poland and Romania.
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Also the results on foreign partner presence confirmed that ownership structure should be 
treated as an endogenous factor, and is determined by firm performance, as first 
documented by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) in the case of firms in the US.
The exception is the result concerning the representation of outsiders on boards, which was 
found to negatively (albeit weakly) effect exports. This refuted the resource dependence role 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) often found in studies of board structure and performance 
carried out in Western economies. Therefore we can conclude that this is a transition 
specific finding. However the interaction of outsider ownership and board membership 
appeared to be the stronger result, with a higher significance level, reflecting that both 
aspects are needed in order to influence exporting activity.
The result concerning the impact of a dominant group of owners on exporting also relates to 
other middle income economies with poor legal environments, as it was found that groups 
coalesce to improve performance in the CIS countries. Thus it could be claimed that this 
finding is transition or middle income country specific.
Several frameworks or theoretical perspectives were implemented in order to carry out the 
research, namely international business, economics, and strategic management based 
literature. For the research on exporting behaviour it appears that the international business 
and economics frameworks were the most useful, whereas for research on foreign partner 
presence all three frameworks could be implemented successfully. Overall, it appears that 
the three perspectives are complementary in determining the internationalisation process.
3. Implications
Next the implications of these findings will be discussed.
It is clear that certain ownership structures should be encouraged if firms are to export 
Foreign owners, as well as institutional owners have proved to be active monitors of 
management, and have attempted to implement performance improving strategies, such as 
exporting. This refutes the negative effects of foreign and institutional owners reported by 
Thirlwall (2000) and Bim (1995) respectively.
Instead, these types of owners should be encouraged by government policy, by introducing 
tax breaks and other incentives; for example Lankes and Venables (in Zeccchini, 1997)
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document the importance of tax breaks, removing barriers to trade and creating an 
environment of political stability in order to attract foreign investors to transition economies. 
Surprisingly, the level of outsider ownership has an insignificant impact upon exporting. 
However when outsider ownership is coupled with board representation it has a significant 
positive influence. Therefore the discrepancy between outsider ownership and board 
representation, mentioned by Blasi et al, (1997) should be dealt with, in order for outsider 
owners to play a greater part in decision making and strategy implementation, see also 
Filatotchev et al, (2001b).
Furthermore it was found that a group of dominant owners positively affect exporting 
activity. Although it appears that these groups of similar owners are co-ordinating activities 
in order to improve performance by exporting, it is not clear whether they are implementing 
other strategies which may impede firm performance. Many researchers of concentrated 
ownership in transition economies have found some worrying results. As early as 1995 
Gurkov and Asselbergs had reported negative findings about outsider blockholders who do 
not focus on improving the long term performance of the firm. Black (1999) found that 
controlling shareholders were taking part in asset stripping and insider dealing, while more 
recently Filatotchev et al, (2001) found that large blockholders are negatively correlated 
with investment and firm performance in Russian firms. Given these serious misgivings, legal 
mechanisms will need to be put in place to prevent such occurrences7.
Several implications are also borne from the research on foreign partner presence.
Results have shown that the perception that foreign partners are seeking access to local 
technology, and managers giving priority to domestic market strategy reduces the likelihood 
of foreign partner presence. Clearly policy needs to focus on reducing the problems 
associated with technology transfer, as well as adapting managerial attitudes towards foreign 
market development, by creating a secure framework of property rights and introducing 
internationalisation education programmes for managers8.
Secondly, it was found that the level of export intensity increases the likelihood of foreign 
partner presence. Thus if policy makers wish to attract more potential partners then one
7 Since the relationship between board structure and exporting was weak no policy implications shall be 
given.
8 Of course these policies maybe ineffective if managers are only interested in full control of the 
company.
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such route would be to make the export process easier for firms, this could be done by 
removing the need for export licenses and providing loans for firms wishing to export. 
Another interesting result was that managerial turnover is positively linked to foreign partner 
presence, thus if firms wish to attract a foreign partner they need to show that the former 
Red Directors have been removed. This could be a very difficult process for firms, so 
perhaps funds need to be created in order to compensate leaving directors, or for re-training 
them, as well as giving assistance in recruiting new managers.
Lastly, it is apparent that foreign partners are attracted to homogenous ownership structures, 
so firms should try to emanate these structures if they wish to ease the co-ordination of 
activities and be able to attract a foreign partner.
Perhaps more importantly firms need to retain a foreign partner. In order to do this they 
must provide evidence of deep restructuring, in particular they must have experienced job 
gains in production units and have begun to export to non former CMEA countries. 
Therefore policy should focus once again on encouraging exports by focusing upon active 
labour market policies. For example, Coe and Snower (1997) suggest using a well balanced 
selection of policies to assist exchange of information on job vacancies, assist training and 
job creation via employment subsidies.
Perhaps one of the key findings of this research is that alliances between foreign partners 
and CIS firms are extremely fragile. The inauguration of a national foreign direct investment 
agency, similar to that which exists in Poland9, could be useful. This could act as an 
information agency for potential partners and help both parties match their strategic 
objectives
9 This is more commonly known as PAIZ: Polish Agency for FDI.
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4. Points for further research.
Whilst carrying out my PhD I found several other interesting aspects of the 
internationalisation process I would like to explore further.
Firstly, it would be interesting to examine whether firms with high export intensities also have 
high levels of import intensities, in order to determine whether those firms which produce for 
foreign markets need to import their inputs for production.
Preliminary analysis has shown that there is a positive correlation at 5% level between 
export intensity and inport intensity. An important policy implication stemming from this line 
of research could show that firms’ exports and thus performance may be hindered by 
insufficient access to imports, which could reflect a need to reduce tariffs.
Cavusgil (1984) noted that it is now the general opinion of governments, agencies and 
financial leaders that the best method to remedy a trade deficit is to boost exports, as 
opposed to restricting imports. Similarly, Javalgi et al, (1999) documented that the US 
government renewed efforts to expand manufacturing exports in order to address the trade 
deficit An interesting point for further research would be to examine the impact of exports 
on the trade balances in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.
Bernard and Jensen (1999) examine the complex relationship between firm performance 
and exporting, and find that employment growth and probability of survival are higher for 
exporting firms. I would like to pursue this topic and see how exporting affects other 
performance measures in the Nottingham dataset.
Lastly, I would like to examine the determinants of other modes of internationalisation, such 
as licensing and outward foreign direct investment, in a similar vein to that of Bulatov (1998) 
who examines the motivations of Russian firms investing abroad.
287
Bibliography
Aaby, N., and Slater, S., (1989), “Management influence on export performance: a review 
of the empirical literature: 1978-88,” International Marketing Review, 6(4), pp7-26. 
Adler, N., and Graham, J., (1989), “Cross Cultural interaction: The international 
comparison fallacy?” Journal o f International Business Studies, 20(3), pp515-537. 
Aghion, P., and Blanchard, O., (1996), On privatisation methods in Eastern Europe and 
their implications, EBRD, mimeo.
Aitken, B., Hanson, G and Harrison, A., (1997), “Spillovers, foreign investment and export 
behaviour,” Journal o f International Economics, pp 103-32.
Akerlof, G., Romer, P., (1993), “Looting: the economic underworld of bankruptcy for 
profit,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, ppl-60.
Allan, G., and Skinner, G., (1991), Handbook for Research Students in the Social 
Sciences, The Falmer Press.
Allison, P., (2002), Missing data, Sage, Thousand Oak.
Anderson, E., and Gatignon, H., (1989), “Modes of Foreign entry: A transaction cost 
analysis,” Journal o f International Business Studies, ppl-26.
Anderson, O., (1993), “On the internationalisation process of firms: a critical analysis,” 
Journal o f International Business Studies, pp209-230.
Andreyeva, T., and Dean, J., (2001), “Company performance and corporate governance in 
the Ukraine,” Conference proceedings of'Enterprise in Transition”, Split Croatia. 
Aukutsionek, A., Filatotchev, I., Kapelyushnilov, R., and Zhukov, V., (1998), “Dominant 
shareholders, Restructuring and Performance of Privatised companies in Russia: An analysis 
and some policy implications,” Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, 
10, pp495-517.
Aw, B., and Batra, G., (1998), “Firm size and patterns of diversification,” International 
.Journal o f Industrial Organisation, pp313-31.
Aw, B., and Hwang, A., (1995), “Productivity and the export market: a firm level analysis,” 
.Journal o f Development Economics, 47, pp313-332.
Baltagi, B., (1995), Econometric analysis o f panel data, John Wiley and Sons, New 
York.
288
Banai, M., and Chainin, M., and Teng, B., (1998), “Russian managers’ perceptions of 
prospective Russian-US joint ventures,” International Business Review, pp 17-37. 
Barberis, N., Boyko, M., Shleifer, A. & Tsukanova, N., (1996), “How does privatisation 
work? Evidence from Russian shops,” Journal o f Political Economy, 104(4), pp764- 
790.
Barkema, H., Bell, J.H., & Pennings, J.M., (1996), “Foreign entry, cultural barriers and 
learning,” Strategic Management Journal, 17(2), pp 151 -166.
Barker, V., and Duhaime, I., (1997), “Strategic change in the turnaround process: theory 
and empirical evidence,” Strategic Management Journal, ppl3-38.
Barrell, R., and Pain, N., (1999), “Domestic institutions, agglomerations and foreign direct 
investment in Europe,” European Economic Review, 43, pp925-934.
Barret, N., and Wilkinson, I., (1985), “Export stimulation: a segmentation study of the 
exporting problems of Australian manufacturing firms,” European Journal o f Marketing, 
19(2), pp53-71.
Barro, R and Lee, J, (1993), “International Comparisons of Educational Attainment,” 
Journal o f  Monetary Economics, pp363-94.
Baysinger, B and Hoskisson, R, (1990), “The composition of boards of directors and 
strategic control,” Academy o f Management Review, 15, pp72-97.
Baysinger, B. D., & Hoskisson, R.E, (1990), “The composition of boards of directors and 
strategic control: effects on corporate strategy,” Academy o f Management Review, 15(1), 
pp72-87.
Beamish, P.W., (1985), “The characteristics of joint ventures in developed and developing 
countries,” Columbia Journal o f World Business, 20(3), pp 13-20.
Beamish, P.W. (1994), “Joint ventures in LDCs: Partner selection and performance. 
Management International Review,” 34, pp60-74.
Begg, D., Fischer, S., (1992), Dombush, R., Economics, Fourth Edition, McGraw Hill, 
London.
Belkaoui, A., (1998), “The effects of internationalisation on firm performance,” 
International Business Review, pp315-321.
Bernard, A., and Jensen, J., (1999), “Exceptional exporter performance: cause, effect or 
both?” Journal o f International Economics, ppl-25.
289
Bethel, J., and Liebskind, J., (1993), “The effects of ownership structure on corporate 
restructuring,” Strategic Management Journal, 14, p 15-31.
Bhavani, T., and Tendulkar, S., (2001), “Determinants of firm level export performance: a 
case study of Indian textile garments and apparel industry,” Journal o f International trade 
and Economic Development, pp65-92.
Bilkey, W., (1976), “An attempted integration of the literature on the export behaviour of 
firms,” presented at Academy o f International Business Conference.
Bishop, K., Filatotchev, I., and Mickiewicz, T., “Endogenous ownership structures: factors 
affecting the post privatisation equity in largest Hungarian firms,” Acta Oeconomica, 52(4). 
Bjorkman, I., & Forsgren, M., (eds.) (1997), The nature o f  the international firm. 
Copenhagen: Copenhagen Business School Press.
Black, B., (1999), “Russian Privatisation and Corporate Governance: what went wrong?” 
Transition, World Bank.
Blasi, J., Kroumova, M, Kruse D., (1999), Kremlin Capitalism Privatising the Russian 
Economy, Cornell University.
Bleaney, M., and Wakelin, K., (1999), “Sectoral and firm specific determinants of export 
performance: evidence from the UK,” GLM Research Paper, 99/12, University of 
Nottingham, School of Economics.
Bleaney, M., Filatotchev, I., and Wakelin, K., (2000), Learning by exporting: evidence 
from three transition economies, Mimeo.
Blomstrom, M., and Sjoholm., F, (1999), ‘Technology transfer and spillovers: does local 
participation with multinationals matter?” European Economic Review, 43, pp915-923. 
Boeker, W., (1997), “Strategic change: the influence of managerial characteristics and 
organisational growth,” Academy o f Management Journal, pp 152-170.
Bonaccorsi, A., (1992), “On the relationship between firm size and export intensity,” 
Journal o f  International Business Studies, 23(4), pp605-636.
Borensztein, E„ Gregorio de, J„ and Lee, J„ (1995), “How does foreign direct investment 
affect economic growth?” NBER Working Paper, No. 5057.
Bomstein, M., (2000), “Post privatisation enterprise restructuring,” Working paper 327. 
Williamson Davidson Institute, University of Michigan.
Boycko, M, Shleifer, A and Vishny, R, (1996), Privatising Russia, MIT.
290
Bowen, H., Learner, E., and Sveijaukas, L., (1987), “Multi country, multi factor tests of the 
factor abundance theory,” American Economic Review, pp791-809.
Bowles, S., Gintis, H., and Gustafsson, B., (Eds.) (1993), Markets and democracy: 
participation, accountability and efficiency, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Brenton, P., and Gros, D., (1999), “Trade between the EU and central Europe an 
economic and policy analysis,” CEPS working document, Brussels.
Brenton, P., and Gros, D., (1997), “Trade reorientation and recovery in transition 
economies,” Oxford Review o f Economic Policy, pp65-76 .
Brezeinski, H and Kalthoff, A, (1998), “The development of Polish foreign Trade as a 
indicator for a successful restructuring of the Polish economy,” Economic Systems, pp273- 
78
Bridgewater, S, (1999), “Networks and internationalisation: the case of MNEs entering 
Ukraine,” International Business Review, 8, pp99-l 18 .
Brouthers, K.D., & Bamossy, G.J., (1997), “The role of key stakeholders in international 
joint venture negotiations: case studies form Eastern Europe,” Journal o f  International 
Business Studies, 28(2), pp285-308.
Brown, A., Ickes, B., Ryterman, R., (1994), “The Myth of monopoly: a new view of 
industrial structure in Russia,” World Bank Policy Research Department, Transition 
Economics.
Buck, T., Filatotchev, I., Wright, M., and Zhukov, V., (1999), “Corporate Governance and 
Employee Ownership in an Economic Crisis: Enterprise Strategies in the FSU,” Journal o f 
Comparative Economics, pp459-474.
Buck, T., Filatotchev, I., and Wright, M., (1994), “Employee buyouts and the 
transformation of Russian Industry,” Comparative Economic Studies, Vol. 36(2), pp 1-15. 
Buck, T., Filatotchev, I., Demina, N. & Wright, M., (2000), “Exporting activity in 
transitional economies: An enterprise-level study”, Journal o f Development Studies, 37(2), 
pp44-66.
Buck, T., Filatotchev, I., Nolan, P. & Wright, M., (2000), “Different paths to economic 
reform in Russia and China: Causes and consequences,” Journal o f World Business, 35(2), 
pp379-400.
291
Buckley, P., and Casson, M., (1990), ''‘'Joint ventures,” in Casson., M, Enterprise and 
Competitiveness, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Buckley, P., and Casson, M., (1992), Multinational Enterprises in the World Economy. 
Essays in the honour o f John Dunning, Edward Elgar.
Buckley, P., and Casson, M., (1998), “Analysing foreign market entry strategies: extending 
the internalisation approach,” Journal o f International Business Studies, pp539-561. 
Buckley, P., and Ghauri, N., (1999), The Internationalisation o f the Firm: A Reader, 
ITP.
Buckley, P., and Michie, J., (1996), Firms, Organisations and Contracts, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press.
Bulatov, A., (1998), “Russian Direct Investment abroad: main motivations in the Post Soviet 
period,” Transnational Corporations, 7(1), pp69-82.
Carlin, W., Fries, S., Schaffer, M., and Seabright, P., (2001), “Competition and enterprise 
performance in Transition Economies: evidence from a cross country survey,” Working 
paper, Department of Economics, University College, London.
Cavusgil, M., (1984), “Organisational characteristics associated with export activity,” 
Journal o f  Management Studies, 21, pp3-22.
Chen, S., and Ho, K., (2000), “Corporate diversification, ownership structure and firm 
value: The Singapore evidence,” International Review o f Financial analysis, pp315-326. 
Chhibber, P., and Majumdar, S., (1999), “Foreign ownership and profitability: property 
rights, control and the performance of firms in Indian Industry,” Journal o f Law and 
Economics, 4, pp209-238.
Child, J., (1993), “Organisational structure, environment and performance: the role of 
strategic choice,” Sociology, pp2-12.
Claessens, S., and Djankov, S., (1999), “Ownership concentration and corporate 
performance in the Czech Republic,” Journal o f  Comparative Economics, 27, p498-513. 
derides, S., Lach, S., and Tybout, J., (1998), “Is learning by exporting important? Micro 
dynamic evidence from Colombia, Mexico and Morocco,” The Quarterly Journal o f  
Economics, pp 903- 947.
Co, C., (1998), ‘Trade, foreign direct investment and industry performance,” International 
Journal o f Industrial Organisation, 19, ppl63-183.
292
Coase, R., (1960), “The problem of social cost,” Journal o f Law and Economics, 3, ppl- 
44.
Coffee, J., (1996), “Institutional investors in transitional economies,” in Frydman, R., Gray, 
C., Rapaczynski, Corporate Governance in Central Eastern Europe and Russia, Vol. 
1&2, Central European University Press.
Coffee, J., (1999), “Privatisation and corporate governance: lessons from securities market 
failure,” Transition, World Bank.
Commander, S., Fan, Q., and Schaffer, M., (1996), “Enterprise Restructuring and 
Economic Policy in Russia,” EDI Development Studies.
Craig, B., and Pencavel, J., (1995), “Participation and productivity: a comparison of worker 
co-operatives and conventional firms in the Plywood industry,” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity: Microeconomics, pp 121 -160.
Curran, J., and Blackburn, R., (2001), Researching the Small Enterprise, Sage 
Publications.
Czinkota, M., and Ronkainen, I., (1998), International marketing, Dryden Press. 
Czinkota, M., and Tesar, G., (1982), Export management: an international context, 
New York, Praeger.
Czinkota, M., and Ursic, M., (1984), “An experience curve explanation of export 
expansion,” Journal o f Business Research, pp 159-168.
Dacin, T., Hitt, M. & Levitas, E., (1997), “Selecting partners for successful international 
alliances: Examination of US and Korean firms,” Journal o f World Business, 32(2), pp3- 
16.
Dahlquist, M., and Robertsson, G., (2001), “Direct foreign ownership, institutional investors 
and foreign characteristics,” Journal o f Financial Economics, 59, pp413-440.
Daily, C., and Dalton, D., (1992), “The relationship between governance structure and 
corporate performance in entrepreneurial firms,” Journal o f  Business Venturing, 7, 
pp375-386.
Daily, C., and Dalton, D., “Bankruptcy and corporate governance: the impact of board 
composition and structure,” Academy o f Management Journal, Vol.37, ppl603-1617.
293
Damijan, J., Majcen, B., Rojec, M., and Knell, M., (2001), “The role of FDI, R&D 
accumulation and trade in transferring technology to transition countries: evidence from firm 
panel data for eight transition economies,” Working Paper No. 10, University of Ljubljana. 
Damijan, J., Knell, M., (2001), “Does FDI facilitate the economic transformation of eastern 
Europe? Evidence from Estonia and Slovenia, paper presented at MET eighth research 
seminar, SSEES, University College London.
Davidson, D., and Mackinnon, J., (1993) Estimation and inference in econometrics, 
Oxford University Press.
Davis, J., & North, D.C., (1971), Institutional change and American economic growth, 
Cambridge and London, Cambridge University Press.
De Castro, J and Uhlenbruck, (1997), “Characteristics of Privatisation: Evidence form 
developed, less developed, and Former Communist Countries,” Journal o f  International 
Business, pp 123-143.
Delgado, M., Farinas, J., and Ruano, S., (2001), “Finn productivity and export markets: a 
non parametric approach,” Journal o f  International Economics, in press.
Demirgu^-Kunt, A., and Maksimovic, V., (1998), “Law, finance and firm growth,” Journal 
o f Finance, 53, pp2107-2137.
Demsetz, H., and Lehn, K., (1985), “The structure of Corporate ownership: causes and 
consequences,” Journal o f Political Economy, ppl 155-1177.
Demsetz, H., and Villalonga, B., (2001), “Ownership structure and corporate 
performance,” Journal o f Corporate Finance, pp209-233.
Dewenter, K., and Malatesta, P., (2001), “State owned and privately owned firms: an 
empirical analysis of profitability, leverage and labour intensity,” American Economic 
Review, 91, pp320-34.
Dhawan, R., (2001), “Firms size and productivity differential: theory and evidence from a 
panel of US firms,” Journal o f Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 44, pp269-93. 
Dixit, A, (1989), “Entry and exit decisions under uncertainty,” Journal o f Political 
Economy, 3, pp620-38.
Djankov, S., (1999), “Ownership structure and enterprise restructuring in six newly 
independent states,” Comparative Economic Studies, 41, pp75-95.
294
Djankov, S., and Hoekamn, B., (1996), “Trade-orientation and Post reform productivity 
growth in Bulgarian enterprises,” World Bank working paper.
Djankov, S., and Pohl, G., (1998), “The restructuring of large firms in the Slovak 
Republic,” Economics o f Transition, 6, pp667-685.
Djankov, S., and Muirell, P., (2002), “Enterprise restructuring in transition: a quantitative 
survey,” CEPR Discussion Series, No. 3319.
Dominguez, L.V., & Sequeira, C.G., (1993), “Determinants of LDC exporters’ 
performance: a cross-national study,” Journal o f International Business Studies, 24(1), 
pp 19-40.
Dunning, J., (1973), “The determinants of international production,” Oxford Economic 
Papers, pp289-336
Dyker, D., (ed), (1999), Foreign Direct Investment and technology transfer in FSU, 
Edward Elgar.
Earle, J. S., & Estrin, S., (1996). Employee Ownership in Transition, ppl-61 in R  
Frydman, C.W. Gray & Rapaczynski, A., (eds) (1996), Corporate governance in 
Russia: Vol. 2, Insiders and the State, London: World Bank/CEU Press.
Earle, J., Estrin, S. & Leschenko, L., (1996), “Ownership structures, patterns of control 
and enterprise behaviour in Russia,” In S. Commander, Q. Fan & M. Shaffer, editors, 
Enterprise restructuring and economic policy in Russia. Washington DC: World Bank. 
The Economic Survey o f Europe, Nol., 2001, found at www.unece.org.
EBRD (1999). Transition Report. London: European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.
EBRD (1998). Transition Report. London: European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.
EBRD (1997). Transition Report. London: European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development.
Erammili, .K., (1991), “Experience factor in foreign market entry behaviour of service 
firms,” Journal o f  International Business Studies, pp479-501.
Eriksson, K., Johanson, J., Majkgard, A., & Sharma, D.D., (1997), “Experimental 
knowledge and cost in the internationalisation process,” Journal o f International Business 
Studies, 28(2), pp337-360.
295
Estrin, S., (ed.), (1994), Privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe, McGrawHill. 
Estrin, S., “Competition and corporate governance in Transition,” forthcoming in the 
Journal o f Economic Perspectives.
Estrin, S., Hare, P., and Rosevear, A., (1998), “Company restructuring and privatisation in 
Ukraine,” Mimeo, CIS-Middle Europe Centre, London Business School.
Estrin, S., and Rosevear, A., (1999), “Enterprise Performance and Corporate Governance 
in Ukraine,” Journal o f  Comparative Economics, pp442-458.
Estrin, S., and Wright, M., (1999), “Corporate Governance in the FSU: an overview of the 
issues,” Journal o f Comparative Economics, 27(3), pp398-421.
Etgar, M., and McConnel, J., (1976), “A theoretical model of export behaviouf’, mimeo. 
Fama, E., and Jensen, M., (1983), “Separation of ownership and control,” Journal o f Law 
and Economics, pp301-25.
Feder, G., (1983),“On exports and economic growth,” Journal o f Development 
Economics, p59-73.
Fey, Carl, (1995), “Important design characteristics for Russian-foreign joint venture 
success,” European Management Journal, 13(4), pp405-415.
Field, A, Discovering Statistics: using SPSS for windows, Sage, 2000.
Filatotchev, I., and Bishop, K., (2002), “Resource and strategy roles of corporate 
governance and stock market response: an investigation of initial public offerings in the UK, 
1999-2000,” Strategic Management Journal, 23(10), pp941-955.
Filatotchev, I., Kapelyushniko, R., Dyomina, N., Aukutsionek, S., (2001), “The effects of 
Ownership concentration on investment and performance in privatised firms,” Managerial 
and Decision Economics, 22, pp299-313.
Filatotchev., I., Dyomina, N., Wright., M and Buck. T., (2001b), “Strategic choices, export 
orientation and corporate governance in privatised firms in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: 
theory and empirical evidence,” Journal o f International Business Studies, 32, pp853- 
871.
Filatotchev, I., and Mickiewicz, T., (2000), “Ownership concentration, private benefits of 
control and debt financing,” Working Paper No.4, Centre for the Study of Economic and 
Social Change in Europe, SSEES, UCL.
296
Filatotchev, I., Wright, M., Buck, T. & Dyomina, N., (1999), “Exporting and restructuring 
in privatised firms from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus,” World Economy, 22(7), pp l013- 
37.
Filatotchev, L, Wright, M. & Bleaney, M., (1999b), “Insider control and entrenchment in 
privatised Russian firms,” Economics o f Transition, 7(2), pp481-504.
Filatotchev, I., Buck, T. & Zhukov, V., (2000), “Downsizing in privatised firms in Russia, 
Ukraine and Belarus: theory and empirical evidence,” Academy o f Management Journal, 
43(3), pp286-304.
Filatotchev, I., Hoskisson, R., Buck, T. & Wright, M. (1996), “Corporate restructuring in 
Russian privatisations: implications for US investors,” California Management Review, 
38(2), pp87-105.
Filatotchev, I.,Buck, T. & Wright, M. (1993), “The military-industrial complex of the former 
USSR: asset or liability?” Communist Economies & Economic Transformation, 5(2), 
pp 187-204.
Fitzmaurice, G., and Laird, N., (1997), “Regression models for mixed discrete and 
continuous responses with potentially missing values,” Biometrics, 53(1), ppl 10-22.
Ford, D., (Ed.), (1997), Understanding Business markets, Dryden Press.
Fox, M., and Heller, M., (1999), “Lessons from fiascos in Russian corporate governance,” 
Transition, World Bank.
Frydman, R., Gray, C., Hessel, M., and Rapaczynski, A., (1999), “When does privatisation 
work? The impact of private ownership on corporate governance in the transition 
economies,” The Quarterly Journal o f Economics, 114, 4, ppl 153-91.
Frydman, R, Gray, C, Hessel, M, and Rapaczynski, A, (1997), “Private Ownership and 
corporate governance: some lessons from transition economies,” mimeo.
Frydman, C.W. Gray & Rapaczynski, A., (eds) (1996), Corporate governance in 
Russia: Vol. 2, Insiders and the State, London: World Bank/CEU Press.
Frydman, R, Gray, C, Rapaczynski, (1996), Corporate Governance in Central Eastern 
Europe and Russia, Vol. 1&2, Central European University Press.
Frydman, R, Phelps, E, Rapaczynski, A and Shleifer, A, (1993), “Needed mechanisms of 
corporate governance and finance in Eastern Europe,” Economics o f Transition, 1,2, 
p p l71-207.
297
Gaddy, C and Ickes, B, (1998), “Russia’s virtual economy,” Foreign Affairs, pp53-67. 
Gates, J, (1998), The Ownership Solution, London, Penguin.
Gillespie, K. & Teegen, H., (1995), “Market liberalisation and international alliance 
formation: The Mexican paradigm,” Columbia Journal o f World Business, 30(winter), 
pp58-69.
Gilson, R., “The globalisation of corporate governance: convergence of form or function,” 
Columbia Law School, Working Paper 174, can be found at 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/lawec/
Gravelle, H., and Rees, R., (1992), Microeconomics, second edition, Longman Group Ltd. 
Greene, W, (2000), Econometric analysis, Fourth edition, Prentice Hall.
Greene, W., (2000), “Strategic alliances in emerging Latin America: a view from Brazilian, 
Chilean and Mexican companies”, Journal o f World Business, 35(2), ppl 14-132. 
Grossman, S., and Hart, O., (1988),“One share- one vote and the market for corporate 
control,” Journal o f Financial Economics, 20, ppl 75-202.
Gruber, W., Menta, R., Vemon, R., (1967), “The R&D factor in international trade and 
investment of the US,” Journal o f Political Economy, p20-37.
Guner- Dosoglu, B., (2001), “Can organisational behaviour explain the export intention of 
firms? The effects of organisational culture and ownership type.” International Business 
Review, pp71-89.
Gurkov, I., and G. Asslebergs.,(1995), “Ownership and control in Russian privatised 
companies: Evidence from a survey,” Communist Economies and Economic 
Transformation, pp 195-211.
Hamar, J., (2002), “FDI and industrial network in Hungary,” Working paper, ESRC, One 
Europe or Several Programme?
Harper, J., (1996), “The performance of privatised firms in the Czech Republic,” Working 
Paper, Florida Atlantic University.
Harrigan, K, (1998), “Joint ventures and global strategies,” Columbia Journal o f  World 
Business, pp483-98.
Harris, F, ‘Tunnel vision,” (1997), Business Central Europe, May.
Haskel, J., Pereira, S., and Slaughter, M., (2002), “Does inward foreign direct investment 
boost the productivity of domestic firms?” CEPR Discussion Paper No.3384.
298
Havrylyshyn, O., and McGettigan, D., (1999) “Privatisation in transition countries: lessons 
from the first decade,” IMF, Economic Issue, No. 18.
Hendley, K., Ickes, B., and Ryterman, R., ‘Remonetizing the Russian economy,” see 
http://econ.la.psu.edu/-bickes/barter.pdf.
Hermalin, B., and Weisbach, M., (2000), “Boards of directors as an endogenously 
determined institution: a survey of the economic literature,” downloaded from the Social 
Science Research Network, June 2002.
Hermalin, B., and Weisbach, M., (2001), “The Determinants of board composition,” the 
Rand Journal o f Economics, Vol. 19. (Winter), pp589-606.
Hertz, N, (1997), Russian Business relationships in the Wake o f Reform, Macmillan 
Press.
Hill, C and Gareth, J, (1980), Strategic Management: an integrated approach, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford.
Hillman, A., (2003), “Departure from free trade: a survey,” CEPR Discussion Paper, 
January, No. 3707.
Himmelberg, C., Hubbard, R., and Palia, D., (1999), “Understanding the determinants of 
managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance,” Journal o f 
Financial Economics, pp 353-384.
Hirschhausen, Von, C., (1998), “Industrial restructuring in Ukraine 7 years after 
independence: From socialism to planning economy,” Communist Economies and 
Economic Transformation, pp451-465.
Hitt, M., Ireland, R., and Hoskisson, R , (1999), Strategic Management: 
Competitiveness and Globalisation,” ITP.
Hitt, M., Dacin, M.T., Levitas, E., Arregle, J-E & Borza, A., (2001), “Partner selection in 
emerging and developed market contexts: resource-based and organisational learning 
perspectives,” Academy o f  Management Journal, 43(3), p449-467.
Hitt, M., Hoskisson, R  & Kim, H., (1997), “International diversification: effects of 
innovation and firm performance in product-diversified firms,” Academy o f Management 
Journal, 40(4), pp767-798.
299
Hitt, M.A., Hoskisson, R.E., Johnson, R.A., & Moesel, D.D., (1996), “The market for 
corporate control and firm innovation,” Academy o f  Management Journal, 39(5), 
ppl084-1119.
Hooley, G., Shiply, D., Fahy, J., Beracs, J., & Kolos, K., (1996), “FDI in Hungary: 
resource acquisition and domestic competitive advantage,” Journal o f  International 
Business Studies, 27(4), pp683-710.
Hoon-Halbauer, S., (1999), “Managing relationships within Sino-foreign joint ventures,” 
Journal o f World Business, 34(4), pp344-369.
Hoskisson, R.E., Eden, L., Lau, C.-M. & Wright, M.,(2000), “Strategy in emerging 
economies,” Academy o f Management Journal, 43(3), pp249-267.
Hoskisson, R., Johnson, R., and Moesel, D., (1994), “Corporate divesting intensity in 
restructuring firms: effects of governance, strategy and performance,” Academy o f  
Management Journal, p p l084-1119.
Hyman, H., (1972), Secondary analysis o f  sample surveys: principles, procedures and 
potentialities, London, Wiley.
Hymer, S., (1960), The international operations o f  national firms: a study o f direct 
foreign investment, PhD thesis, published 1976, MIT.
Ijiri, Y., and Simon, H., (1967), “A model of Business firm growth,” Econometrica, 35(2), 
pp348-355.
Ilieva, J and Healy, N., (2000), “Central bank independence in selected transition 
economies,” Slovo Vol. 12.
Inkpen, A., & Beamish, P., (1997), “Knowledge, bargaining power and the instability of 
international joint ventures,” Academy o f Management Review, 22, pp77-202.
Javalgi, R., White, D., Lee, O., (1997), “Firm characteristics influencing export propensity: 
an empirical investigation by industry type, Journal o f  Business Research, 47, pp217-228. 
Johanson J, and Vahlne, J., (1977), “The Internationalisation process of the firm: a model of 
knowledge development and increasing foreign market commitments,” Journal o f  
International Business Studies, pp23-32.
Johanson, J., and Paul-Wiedersheim, F., (1975), “The internationalisation process of the 
firm-four Swedish cases, Journal o f Management Studies, 12, pp305-22.
300
Johnson, G., Smith, S. & Codling, B., (2000), “Microprocesses of institutional change in 
the context of privatisation,” Academy o f Management Review, 25(3), pp572-580. 
Johnson, S, KaufmannJD and Shleifer, A, (1997), “The unofficial economy on transition,” 
Brookings papers on Economic activity, pp 159-239.
Johnston, J and DiNardo, J., (1997), Econometric methods, Fourth edition, McGrawHill. 
Jones, D., (1998), “The economic effects of privatisation: evidence from a Russian Panel,” 
Comparative Economic Studies, 40, pp75-102.
Jovanovic, B, (1993), “The diversification of production,” Brookings Papers: 
Microeconomics, Vol.l, ppl97-247.
Jung, W, and Marshall, P, (1985), “Exports, growth and causality in developing countries,” 
Journal o f  Development Economics, ppl-12.
Katz, M and Rosen, H, (1994), Microeconomics, 2nd edition, Prentice Hall.
Kavoussi, R, (1984),“Export expansion and economic growth,” Journal o f Development 
Economics, pp241-250.
Keasey, K., and Wright, M., (eds) (1997), Corporate Governance, Wiley, Chichester. 
Keselman, H., Mendza, J., Rogan, J., Breen, L., (1980), “Testing the validity conditions of 
repeated measures F tests, Psychological Bulletin, 87 (3), pp479-481.
Kesner, I, (1987), “Directors’ stock ownership and organisational performance; an 
investigation of Fortune 500 companies,” Journal o f Management, pp499-507.
Kim, J. O., and Curry, J., (1982), “The treatment of missing data in multivariate analysis,” 
Sociological Methods and Research, Vol.6, pp215-240.
Klein, A., (1998), “Firm performance and board committee structure,” Journal o f  Law 
and Economics, pp275-303.
Kmenta, J., (1986), Elements o f  Econometrics, Macmillans, New York.
Knickerbocker, F., (1977), Oligopolistic reaction and Multinational Enterprise,
Harvard University Press.
Kochhar,K and Parthiban, D., (1996), “Institutional Investors and Firm Innovation: A test of 
competing Hypothesis,” Strategic Management Journal, pp73-74.
Konings, J., (1999), “The effect of direct foreign investment on domestic firms: evidence 
from firm level panel data in emerging economies,” unpublished paper.
301
Komai, J. (1998), “The place of the soft budget syndrome in economic theory,” Journal 
o f Comparative Economics, 26(1), ppl 1-17.
Kotabe, M., & Czinkota, M.R, (1992), “State government promotion of manufacturing 
exports: a gap analysis,” Journal o f International Business Studies, 23(4), pp605-636. 
Kroszner, R., and Strahan, P., (2001), “Bankers on boards: monitoring, conflicts of interest 
and lender liability,” Journal o f Financial Economics, 62, pp415-462.
Krugman, P., (1983), “New theories of trade among industrial countries,” The American 
Economic Review, 73(2), Papers and Proceedings of the ninety fifth annual meeting of the 
American Economic Association, pp342-347.
Krugman, P., (1991), “Increasing returns and economic geography,” The Journal o f  
Political Economy, 99(3), pp483-499.
Krugman, P., Obstfield, M., (1994), International Economics Theory and Policy, Harper 
Collins.
Kuznetsova, O., and Kuznetsov, A., (2001), “The virtues of and weaknesses of insider 
share-holding,” in Russian Corporations: the strategies o f survival and development, 
Kuznetsov, A., The Haworth Press, New York.
Landesmann, M., (2000), “Structural change in the Transition Economies, 1989-1999,” 
No.269, The Vienna Institute fo r  International Economics.
Lai. D., and Rajapatirana, S., (1987), “Foreign trade regimes and economic growth in 
developing countries,” International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Research 
Observer 2.
La Porta, R., Lopez de Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R , (2000), “Investor 
protection and corporate governance,” Journal o f Financial Economics, 58, pp3-27.
La Porta, R, Lopez de Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A., (1999), “Corporate Governance 
around the world,” The Journal o f Finance, pp471-517.
Lavigne, M, (1999), The Economics o f Transition from socialist economy to market 
economy, Macmillan Press.
Lecomber, R , (1978), “Social cost and the national accounts,” in Pearce, D, W, The 
valuation o f  social costs, London.
Lee, Y., (1999), “Wages and Employment in China’s SOES, 1980-94: Corporatisation, 
Market Development and insider Forces,” Journal o f Comparative Economics.
302
Leonidou, L. C., & Katsikeas, C.S., (1996), “The export development process: an 
integrative review of empirical models,” Journal o f International Business Studies, 27(3), 
pp517-552.
Leontief, W., (1953),” Domestic production and foreign trade: the American capital 
position re-examined,” Proceedings o f the American Philosophical Society, 97, pp331- 
349.
Levy-Livermore, A., (1998), Handbook on the Globalisation o f the World Economy, 
Edward- Elgar.
Lewis, A., (1980), “The slowing down of the engine of growth,” American Economic 
Review, pp555-64.
Lieberman, I., and Nellis, J., (1995), Russia: creating private enterprises and efficient 
markets, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Light, M., Lowenhardt, J., and White, S., (2000), “Russia and the Dual expansion of 
Europe,” One Europe or Several? Policy paper.
Linz, S., (1996), “Russian firms in transition: champions, challengers or chaff?” 
Comparative Economic Studies, 39(2), ppl-36.
Liuhto, K., and Jumpponen, J., (2001), “The Internationalisation o f  the largest Baltic 
corporations,” Lappeenranta University of Technology, mimeo.
Luo Y. & Peng. M., (1998), “First mover advantages in investing in transitional economies,” 
ThunderbirdInternational Business Review, 40(2), ppl41-163.
Lyles, M., & Baird, I., (1994), “Performance of international joint ventures in two Eastern 
European countries: a case of Hungary and Poland,” Management International Review, 
34: pp313-329.
McCall, R., and Appelbaum, M., (1973), “Bias in the analysis of repeated measures 
designs: some alternative approaches,” Child Development, pp401-414.
McCarthy, D., Puffer, S. & Naumov, A., (2000), “Russia’s retreat to Statisation and the 
implications for business,” Journal o f World Business, 35(3), pp256-274.
McCarthy, D., & Puffer, S, (1997)., “Strategic investment flexibility for MNE success in 
Russia: Evolving beyond entry modes,” Journal o f World Business, 32(4), pp293-319. 
McDougall, P., and Oviatt, B., (1996), “New venture internationalisation: strategic change 
and performance: a follow up study,” Journal o f Business Venturing, 11, pp23-40.
303
McFaul, M., and Perlmutter, T., (1995), Privatisation, Conversion and Enterprise 
Reform in Russia, Westview Press.
McGuire, J., (1964), Theories o f Business Behaviour, Englewood Cliffs, N.J Prentice 
Hall.
McMillan, C., (1993), “The role of foreign direct investment in the transition from planed to 
market economies,” Transnational Corporations, 2 (3) pp97-l 17.
Meyer, K., and Skak, A., (2002), “Networks, Serendipity and SME entry into Eastern 
Europe,” European Management Journal, pp 179-188.
Meyer, K , (2000), “International production networks and enterprise 
transformation in Central Europe,” Comparative Economic Studies, 42(1), 
ppl35-150.
Meyer, K. & Moller, I., (1998), “Managing deep restructuring: Danish 
experiences in East Germany. European Management Journal,” 16(4), pp411- 
421.
Michaelopoulos, C., & Drebentsov, V., (1997), “Observations on state trading in the 
Russian economy,” Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 38(5), pp264-275. 
Michaely, M., (1977), “Exports and growth: an empirical investigation,” Journal o f  
Development Economics, pp 49-53.
Michalopoulos, C., and Kay, J., (1973), “Growth of exports and income and developing 
world: a neo classical view,” Discussion paper 23, US agency fo r  International 
Development.
Mickiewicz, T., (1996), “The spatial dimension of transformation: time pattern and 
ownership factors on the micro level,” Europe-Asia Studies, ppl 187-1202.
Milgrom, P., and Roberts, J., (1992), Economics, Organisation and Management, 
Prentice Hall.
Mintz, I., (1967), “Cyclical Fluctuations in the exports of in the US since 1879,” NBER 
Working Paper.
Moerland, P., (1998), “Changing models of corporate governance in OECD countries,” 
presented at the conference on Privatisation, corporate governance and the emergence of 
markets in Central eastern Europe, mimeo, European University, Viadrina.
304
Molero, J., (2001), “Industrialisation and Internationalisation in the Spanish Economy,” 
Working paper 28/01, ESRC, One Europe or Several ? Programme.
Morgan, R., and Katiskeas, C., (1997), “Obstacles to Export Initiation and expansion,” 
International Journal o f Management Science, 25, pp477-499.
Momsey, O., and Filatotchev, I., (editors) (2001), Globalisation and trade: implications 
fo r  exporting from marginalised economies, Franc Cass Publishers.
Moser, A, C., and Kalton, G., (1995), Survey methods in Social Investigation, 
Heinmann Educational Books, London, second edition.
Naumov, A.I., (1996), ‘Hofstede’s measures in Russia: the influence of national culture on 
business management’, Menedzhment, 3, pp70-103.
Neary, P., (2001), “Of hype and hyperbolas: introducing the new economic geography,” 
Journal o f Economic Literature, 39, pp536-561.
Newman, K.L., (2000), “Organizational transformation during institutional upheaval,” 
Academy o f Management Review, 25(3), p602-619.
Newman, W, (1992), “Focused joint venture in transforming economies” Academy o f  
Management executive.
Nikolic, M., (2000), “Money growth inflation relationship in Post Communist Russia,” 
Journal o f Competitive Economics, 28, ppl08-133.
Nikolic, M., (2002), “Russia and the IMF: pseudo lending for pseudo reforms,” CSESE 
Working Paper Series, No.6.
Nuti, D (1999), “Belarus a command economy without central planning,” presented at the 
fifth Dubrovnik Conference on Transition Economies, 23-25 June 1999.
Ocasio, W., (1994), “Political dynamics and circulation of power: CEO succession in US 
industrial corporations, 1960-1990,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 39, pp285-312. 
Olson, C.J., (1989), “Comparative robustness of six tests in multivariate analysis of 
variance,” Journal o f the American Statistical Association, 69, pp894-908.
Oswald, S., and Jahera, J., (1991), “Research notes and communications: the influence of 
ownership on performance: an empirical study,” Strategic Management Journal, pp321- 
26.
Otani, I., and Vilanueva, D., (1990), “Long term growth in developing countries and its 
determinants: An empirical analysis,” World Development, pp 769-83.
305
Pavord, W., and Bogart, R,, (1975), “The dynamics of the decision to export,” Akron 
Business and Economic Review, pp6-l 1.
Pearce, J., and Zahra, S., (1992), “Board Composition from a strategy agency 
perspective,” Journal o f Management Studies, pp 13 5-53 
Pejovich, S., (1994), “A property Right Analysis of alternative methods of organising 
Production,” Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, pp219-30.
Peng, M. & Heath, P., (1996), “The growth of the firm in planned economies in transition: 
institutions, organisations and strategic choice,” Academy o f Management Review, 21(2), 
pp492-528.
Peng, M., (2000), Business strategies in transition economies. Thousand Oaks CA: 
Sage.
Peng, M., (2001),”How do entrepreneurs create wealth in transition economies?”, 
Academy o f Management Executive, 15(1), pp95-110.
Perotti, E., and Gelfer, S., (2001), “Red barons or robber barons? Governance and 
investment in Russian financial groups,” European Economic Review, 45, ppl601-1617. 
Perotti, E., and Van Oijen, P., (2001), “Privatisation, political risk and stock market 
development in emerging economies,” Journal o f International Money and Finance, 20, 
pp43-69.
Prowse, S., (1990), “Institutional investment patterns and corporate financial behaviour in 
the US and Japan,” Journal o f Financial Economics, pp43-66.
Puffer, S., (1994), “Understanding the bear: a portrait of Russian business leaders,” 
Academy o f  Management Executive, pp41-52.
Putterman, L., (1986), The Economic nature o f the Firm, Cambridge University 
Press, 1986.
Radosevic, S., (1999), International technology transfer and catch up in economic 
development, Edward Elgar.
Rajan, R., Servaes, H., Zingales, L., (1998) “The cost of diversity: the diversification 
discount and inefficient investment,” Journal o f Finance, 55(1), pp5-46.
Ramamurti, R., (1996), (ed). “The new frontier of privatisation,” in Privatising 
Monopolies: lessons from the Telecommunications and transport sectors in Latin 
America,
306
Rangan, S., (2000), “Search and deliberation in international exchange: microfoundations to 
some macro patterns,” Journal o f International Business Studies, 31(2), pp205-222. 
Reich, R and Mankin, E, (1986), “Joint ventures with Japan give away our future,” Harvard 
Business Review, pp78-86.
Roberts, M., and Tybout, J., (1997), “The decision to export in Colombia: an empirical 
model of entry with sunk costs,” The American Economic Review, 87(4), pp545-564. 
Rojec, M., Damijan, J., and Majcen, B., (2000), “Export propensity of foreign subsidiaries 
in Slovenian manufacturing industry,” paper presented at “Globalisation and European 
Integration” sixth EACES Conference, Barcelona, Spain.
Rubin, D., (1996), “Multiple imputation after 18 plus years,” Journal o f the American 
statistical Association, 91, pp473-88.
Russian Economic Trends, 30 July 2001, Russian European Centre for Economic Policy. 
Soderbom, M., and Teal, F., (2001), “Skills, investment and exports from manufacturing 
firms in Africa,” in Morrisey, O., and Filatotchev, I., (editors), Globalisation and trade: 
implications for exporting from marginalised economies, Franc Cass Publishers.
Samiee, S., and Walters, P., (1990), “Influence of firm size on export planning and 
performance,” Journal o f Business Research, pp373-397.
Shama, A., and Merrell, M., (1997), “Russia’s True Business Performance: inviting to 
international business,” Journal o f World Business, pp320-332.
Shama, A., (1993), “Management under fire: The transformation of managers in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe,” Academy o f Management Executive, 7(1), pp22-25.
Shleifer, A., (1984), “Establishing property rights,” Paper presented at World Bank 
ABCDE.
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., (1986), “Large shareholders and corporate control,” Journal 
o f Political Economy, 94(3), pp461-488.
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R , (1994), “Politicians and firms,” The Quarterly Journal o f  
Economics, 109, pp965-1025.
Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R , (1997), R , “A Survey of Corporate Governance”, Journal o f  
Finance, pp737-784.
Shleifer, A., and Tresiman, D., (2000), Without a map: Political tactics and economic 
reform in Russia, The MIT Press, London, England.
307
Simpson, C, Jr., (1973), “The export decision: an interview study of the decision process in 
Tennessee,” PhD dissertation, Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia.
Smith, A., (1993), Russia and the World Economy; problems o f Integration, Routledge. 
Smart, S., and Waldfoegel, J., (1994), “Measuring the effect of restructuring on corporate 
performance: the case of Managerial Buy Outs,” The Review o f Economics and Statistics, 
76, 3, pp503-ll.
Steams, L., and Mizruchi, M., (1993), “Board composition and corporate financing: the 
impact of financial institution representation on borrowing,” Academy o f Management 
Journal, 36, pp 603-618.
Stiglitz, J., and Driffill, J., (2000), Economics, Norton Publishing, London.
Thomsen S., and Pedersen, T., (1997), “Nationality and ownership structures: the 100 
largest companies in six European Nations,” Management International Review, ppl49- 
157.
Tian, L., “State share holding and corporate performance: a study of a unique Chinese 
dataset,” working paper, London Business School, 2000.
Uhlenbruck, K., & de Castro, J., (1998), “Privatization from the acquirer’s perspective,” 
Journal o f Management Studies, 35(3), pp619-640.
UN statistical year book, 43rd issue, 1999.
Useem, M., (1993), Executive defence: shareholder power and corporate 
reorganisation, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Utterback, J., Mastering the dynamics o f innovation, Harvard Business School Press, 
Boston, MA.
Varian, H., (1993), Intermediate Microeconomics: a modem approach, Third edition, 
Norton, 1993.
Vemon, R., (1966),“International investment and international trade in the product cycle,” 
Quarterly Journal o f Economics, pp 190-207.
Vikhansi, O., and Puffer, S., (1993), “Management education and employee training at 
Moscow McDonald’s,” European Management Journal, pp 102-7.
Vining, R., and Boardman, N., “Ownership versus competition: efficiency in public 
enterprise,” Public Choice, 73, pp205-39.
308
Von Eye, A., (1991), Statistical methods in Longitudinal research, Volume one: 
principles and structuring change, Academic Press.
Wagner, J., Stimpert, J., and Fubara, A,. (1998), “Board Composition and organisational 
performance: two studies of insider/outsider effects,” Journal o f  Management Studies, 
pp655-677.
Wahal, S., and McConnell, J., (2000) “Do institutional investors exacerbate managerial 
myopia?” Journal o f Corporate Finance, 6, pp307-329.
Wakelin, K., (1998), “Innovation and export behaviour at the firm level,” Research Policy, 
pp829-841.
Warzynski, F., (2001), “The complementarity of reforms: evidence from a survey of 
Ukrainian firms,” Working Paper, LICOS Centre for Transition Economics, Catholic 
University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium.
Watanabe, S., (1971), “Subcontracting, Industrialisation and employment creation,” 
International Labour Review, 104, Nos. 1 and 2, pp51-76.
Willmore, L., (1992), ‘Transnationals and foreign trade: evidence from Brazil,” Journal o f  
Development Studies, 28, 2, pp314-335.
World Trade Organisation Annual Report, 1999.
Wright, M., Filatotchev, I., Buck, T., Bishop, K., (2001), “Foreign partner selection in the 
former Soviet Union,” forthcoming, Journal o f World Business, 39(3), pp 165-79, 2002. 
Wright, P., Ferris, S., Sarin, A., and Awasthi, V., (1996), “Impact of corporate insider, 
blockholder and institutional equity ownership on firm risk taking,” Academy o f  
Management Journal, 39, 2, pp441-463, 1996.
Wruck, K., (1989), “Equity ownership concentration and firm value. Evidence form private 
equity financings,” Journal o f Financial Economics, 23, pp3-298.
Yarrow, G., and Vickers, J., (1987), Privatisation- an economic analysis, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.
Yoram, B., (1997), Economic Analysis o f Property Rights, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press.
Yoruk, D.E., (2002), “Patterns of industrial upgrading in the clothing industry in Poland and 
Romania”, Centre fo r  the Study o f  Economic and Social Change, Working Paper 
No. 19.
309
Zechinni, S, (1997), Lessons from the Economic Transition: Central and Eastern 
Europe in 1990’s, Kluwer Academic Publications, Dordrecht.
Zhukov, V., (1999), Corporate governance, strategies and performance ofprivatised 
industrial firms in the former Soviet Union, PhD thesis, University of Nottingham.
APPENDIX
A  GENERAL COMPANY DETAILS
Name of company, legal status 
Address, telephone number 
Person interviewed, position 
Number of employees 
Date of interview
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B POST-PRIVATISATION CHANGES IN ACTIVITIES
1. Please, give the following information about the net change in employment since 01.01.1997 
(number of employees):
- Gross voluntary quits
- Gross involuntary dismissals
- including in production units closed, 
separated, etc.
- including in existing production units.
- Gross job gain in existing production units
- Gross job gains in new production units
2. At the current level of demand, please estimate the desired level of employment as a 
percentage of the actual current level of employment:
3. Please, estimate what were these indicators in the 1 January 1998 (in current roubles):
Trade debtors
Stock of Finished Products 
Average Monthly Wage 
Annual Sales 
Annual Investment 
After-tax Profits
4. What was the approximate value of your liabilities at 1 January 1998 in current roubles?
To Banks
To suppliers and utilities
To the government
(including taxes, social security, etc.)
To wage arrears (more than 
one month)
5. Is your company a member of a Financial-Industrial Group? Yes No 
- If yes, what PERCENTAGE of VOTING shares does it hold?
6. What actions has the bank taken in the light of your company not meeting payments of 
interest and capital?
None, as this problem has not arisen Yes No
312
Personal discussions to resolve the issue Yes No
Decision by the bank to keep the situation under review Yes No
Rescheduling of loan payments Yes No
Legal action Yes No
Refusal to give a new loan Yes No
None, the bank has ignored it Yes No
7. Taking the capacity level in 1.01.1997 as 100% what percentage of capacity has been lost in
1.01.1998 due to:
depreciation of the machinery and equipment
- the permanent removal (sale, leasing out, etc.) of a workshop or whole plant
8. Since 1.01.1997 has the company established or acquired a capital stake in the following 
(please, indicate approximate size of the stake):
Minority Controlling
stake stake
- another industrial company
- bank or other financial organisation 0
- trade company
- joint venture with foreign partner
- consultancy or services firm
- a firm abroad
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C MARKET STRUCTURE
9. Please, give an approximate breakdown of your markets (percentage of sales)
January 1998
Russian market
Export to CIS
Export to former CMEA
Export to outside former 
CMEA
10. What percentage of your inputs are purchased from (percentage of purchases):
January 1998
Russia
Import from CIS
Import from former CMEA
Import from outside former 
CMEA
11. Do you consider that your main products do not sell better on world markets as a 
result of (score your answers as follows: 1 = little importance, 7 = very important):
- high price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- weak advertising 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- poor quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- slow delivery 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- adverse terms of payments 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- poor after-sale servicing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- poor managerial connections 
and networks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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12. Would the achievement of world product standards require: (score each factor as 
follows: 1 = low importance, 7 = high importance):
- investment in machinery and
equipment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- investment in research and
development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- acquisition of patents,
licenses 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- investment in marketing 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. Estimate the level of product market competition faced by your company (score each 
factor as follows: 1 = low importance, 7 = high importance):
Upon privatisation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
In 1996 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Now 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14. If product market competition has increased, how important were the following 
sources of competitive pressure (score each factor as follows: 1 = low importance, 7 = 
high importance):
Import from the West 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Competition from other national
or CIS producers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. Please, indicate the importance of personal networks and connections between 
managers of your company and the following (score each factor as follows: 1 = low 
importance, 7 = high importance):
Managers at buyer firms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Managers at supplier firms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Managers at competitor firms 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Political leaders at the various
levels of the government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Official and regulatory organisations
(Tax authorities, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
16. What are the likely most important sources of your investment finance (score each 
factor as follows: 1 = low importance, 7 = high importance):
Selling/leasing your buildings and
equipment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Retained earnings (profits) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Credits from Russian Banks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Credits from Foreign Banks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Credits from industrial partners 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
State financial support 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Issue of equity to Russian investors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Issue of equity to Foreign investors 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Issue of bonds 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. Do you have a foreign partner/investor? Yes No
Are you actively looking a foreign partner/investor? Yes No
If YES to any of these questions, please, specify why (score each factor as follows:
not important, 7 = of great importance):
Introduction of new technology for
existing products 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Introduction of new technology for
new products 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Rehabilitation of existing machinery 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Training managers in marketing,
finance, quality management etc. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Access to foreign markets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
General advice and consultancy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
D DIRECTORS AND WORKERS
19. What priority does the Directorate now give to the following functions (score each 
function as follows: 1 = low priority, 7 = high priority):
Development of new products/
services for export 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Development of new products/ services 
for domestic market
Marketing and advertising
Seeking new domestic markets for 
existing products
Seeking new export markets for 
existing products
Increasing sales of existing products 
by reducing price 
Reducing labour force
Reducing non-labour costs
Monitoring of cash flow
Monitoring firm's return on investmen
Short-term profit targets set by the 
Directorate for managers of 
different parts of the company
Seeking investors
4
20. Since 1.01.1997 what changes have there been to the Directorate?
- New General Director Yes No
- Replacement of other member of the Directorate Yes No
- Has General Director quit voluntarily? Yes No
22. Are Directors planning to purchase shares from employees?
Yes No
23. Please indicate the percentage of VOTING SHARES held by each of the following 
(TOTAL = 100%):
January 1998
Individual Directors in Total
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Individual Workers in Total 
All Employees Collectively 
Trading Partners 
Investment Funds 
Banks
External Private Individuals 
The State
Holding Companies 
Foreign Investors
Other Organisations (please, specify)
TOTAL 100
E OUTSIDE SHAREHOLDERS
26. How many seats on the Supervisory Board are held by representatives of the 
following:
Number of 
seats,
1.01.1998
Banks
Investment Funds
Private Individuals outside the 
company
Industrial Organisations
Foreign Company
Managers
Employees
State Property Fund
TOTAL
318
27. Is your company generally attractive to a foreign investor? Yes No
If NO, please, explain, why (score each factor as follows: 1 = not important, 7 = of great 
importance):
- majority stake is owned by
employee-shareholders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- the size of necessary investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- instability of consumers' demand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- there are more attractive companies in the
same industry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- management is hostile to outsiders 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- lack of understanding of company's
potential 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- shortcomings in skill base 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
- ecological problems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
